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Preface 
I BEGAN THIS PROJECT hoping to trace the growth of the 
Republican and Federalist parties in Virginia. The finished 
product, however, is only in part a study of the development 
of the party system, for party machinery and partisan rhetoric 
constituted but one aspect of political life in the Old Dominion 
during the last decade of the eighteenth century. Coexisting 
with the new system of party politics was the old, oligarchic 
system-vividly described, but romanticized by Charles Sydnor 
in his small classic, Gentlemen Freeholders-based on wealth, 
influence, and social prestige. Although the techniques of 
party organization and mass voter participation seem hardly 
compatible with the closed system usually associated with 
oligarchic control, the two systems rarely came into conflict. 
The men who ruled Virginia-the wealthy planters and lawyers 
who dominated the county courts, the members of the legis-
lature, and the handful of men who served in the national 
government-discovered ways to use the outward mechanisms 
of the new, partisan mode of politics while at the same time 
preserving traditional patterns of elite-dominated, deferential 
politics. 
I hope therefore to tell two stories. On one level I will 
trace the emergence and development of Republican and 
Federalist party organizations in Virginia. It is here that the 
reader will find the details of the Virginia Antifederalists' 
continuing hostility to the federal Constitution, of James 
Madison's switch from the Federalist to the emerging Repub-
lican party, of Madison's and Jefferson's attempts to coordinate 
Republican opposition to Federalist foreign policy, and finally, 
of the Republicans' successful campaign in 1800 to replace 
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President John Adams with a Virginian. This is an important 
story that deserves to be told. Yet the second story-an account 
of the continuing dominance of the "old style" of politics in 
Virginia-is essential to understanding the first. 
The opposition to the federal government, first from the 
Antifederalists and later from the Republican party, stemmed 
primarily from the desire of most members of Virginia's polit-
ical elite to preserve their political institutions, and their 
personal power, from the threat of a new, competing agency 
of government. Their system of decentralized, locally con-
trolled government had, they believed, worked equitably and 
efficiently for the colony and later for the state. Moreover, 
it had insured them a dominant role in the affairs of the Old 
Dominion. And they had proved that they were prepared to 
defend that government against "innovation." When Great 
Britain enacted a scheme of imperial reorganization that 
threatened to substitute royal for provincial authority in Amer-
ica, the members of Virginia's provincial elite quickly assumed 
political and military leadership in the struggle that followed. 
The Revolution brought an end to British interference in 
Virginia's internal affairs, but it did little to change the 
structure of provincial politics. If anything, the Revolution 
only strengthened the power of Virginia's provincial ruling 
class. 
The prerevolutionary elite maintained almost complete con-
trol over the Virginia Convention and framed a state con-
stitution that retained most of the features conducive to 
oligarchic local control. Most of the reforms brought about 
by the Constitution-the limitation of the governor's powers 
and the provisions strengthening the lower house at the expense 
of the upper house-resulted not from any democratic impulse, 
but rather were caused by the reaction against the abuses of 
royal government and served only to increase the power of 
the small group of men who constituted the provincial elite. 
It is not surprising that these same men viewed proposals for 
a new federal Constitution in 1788 with some misgiving. Al-
though a slim majority in Virginia voted for ratification of 
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the federal Constitution in June 1788, a large number of those 
delegates believed that substantive amendments would be 
added to prevent the new government from threatening 
Virginia's interests. Accustomed to guiding their state's destiny 
free from outside interference, the Antifederalists and many 
lukewarm Federalists remained hostile to any measure that 
might imperil the autonomy of the Old Dominion. This 
suspicion, far from disappearing after ratification, was height-
ened by subsequent Federalist policies. In the decade follow-
ing ratification, more and more Virginians regretted that they 
had not heeded the advice of the Antifederalists. 
The political leaders of the Old Dominion were accustomed 
to operating within a frame of reference that was peculiarly 
Virginian; their response to the policies of the new government 
was shaped by the interests and aspirations of their own local-
ities and not by any broad conception of the national interest. 
Indeed, even purely local issues tended to be settled according 
to the narrow and particularistic interests of individual regions 
and counties. As a consequence, the numerous and often bitter 
divisions within the elite on issues of local concern-such as those 
involving state banking, internal improvements, and compensa-
tion of slaveowners for executed slaves-were rarely translated 
into partisan gain for either national party. 
I will discuss in detail those few local issues having a bearing 
on the debate on national questions, but I have left a thorough 
discussion of the other local issues to historians interested 
primarily in the economic and cultural structure of the state. 
This volume is principally concerned with the style of political 
life in Virginia and with the effect of that style on national 
party alignments. The mode of political conduct that I have 
discovered, while perhaps conducive to just and efficacious gov-
ernment in the more uncomplicated period of the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries, proved to be increasingly self-
indulgent and dysfunctional by 1800. 
I have benefited from the counsel and criticism of many of 
my teachers and colleagues in the course of the research, writ-
ing, and revising of this work. William W. Abbot acted as a 
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wise and patient teacher during the first stages of the study; 
Daniel J. Boors tin, who directed the dissertation on which 
this book is based, gave me the guidance and inspiration that 
could be expected from a man of his genius. John Hope 
Franklin and Lawrence \V. Towner contributed not only their 
historical and editorial judgments but also a good measure of 
kindness and encouragement. Stephen Kurtz and Lee Benson 
read the manuscript at a later stage and offered helpful sug-
gestions for revision. My colleague Richard S. Dunn gave me 
some much-needed encouragement and advice during a par-
ticularly crucial stage of the revision of the manuscript. James 
C. Curtis, my good friend, uncompromising critic, and mediocre 
tennis partner was a constant source of ideas and suggestions 
at virtually every stage of my work. Finally, I benefited from 
the painstaking editorial criticism of Robert Ferrell, chairman 
of the Frederick Jackson Turner Award committee. 
Information in the map "Virginia Voting, 1788-1793" is 
taken from Norman Risjord's article "The Virginia Federalists," 
Journal of Southern History 33 (1967). 
A number of institutions have been generous in their 
financial support for this venture. A grant from Colonial 
Williamsburg, Inc., financed much of the initial research on 
the topic. The Newberry Library provided both the funds and 
the facilities for a distraction-free year of writing; more im-
portant, the staff of the Newberry Library provided an in-
tellectually stimulating atmosphere that made my year there 
one of the most rewarding of my life. The University of 
Pennsylvania awarded me a summer research fellowship which 
greatly facilitated many of the final revisions of the work. 
My wife Pam has played an important role at every stage. 
A ruthless editor, she has helped me with the research, writing, 
typing, revising, and not unimportantly, the financing of the 
venture. And my two wonderful children, Kristin and Joshua, 
have probably hindered my progress on the book, but I love 
them anyway. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Union or No Union 
THE FIRST DAY of June 1788 had been unseasonably hot in 
Richmond, Virginia, but it was no warmer than the debate 
and speculation that filled the air. The convention to consider 
ratification of the federal Constitution was to convene the 
next day; no one could be sure of the outcome. Some Federalists 
were so confident as to expect a majority of twenty or more, 
but few shared their optimism. James Madison, the most active 
in organizing support for the Constitution, admitted that "the 
business is in the most ticklish state that can be imagined. The 
majority will certainly be very small on whatever side it may 
finally lie; and I dare not encourage much expectation that it 
will be on the favorable side."1 
The Constitution's opponents were equally cautious in their 
predictions. Patrick Henry was convinced that four-fifths of 
the state's inhabitants opposed the new plan of government, 
"yet strange as it may seem, the numbers in convention appear 
equal on both sides: so that the majority, which way soever 
it goes, will be small." Henry's Antifederalist colleague, Colonel 
William Grayson, agreed that the outcome was "suspended by 
a hair" and shared the concern of both Federalists and Anti-
federalists over the "seven or eight dubious characters, whose 
opinions are not known, and on whose decisions, the fate of this 
important question will ultimately depend."2 
Historians, looking back on the final roll call vote on ratifica-
tion, have had no difficulty in labeling members of the Virginia 
2 The 0 ld Dominion 
Convention either Federalists or Antifederalists, but the dele-
gates did not fall neatly into those two categories. The Fed-
eralists were aware of this when they began planning their 
strategy for the Convention. They recognized at least three 
factions in Virginia. The first, the core of Federalist strength, 
was willing to ratify the Constitution with or without amend-
ments. At the other extreme were those individuals who would 
not consent to ratification unless they received a guarantee of 
amendments before the new government commenced operation 
-amendments which would insure that the new Constitution 
would differ little from the old Articles of Confederation. The 
third, and pivotal group, was convinced that amendments were 
necessary, but was reluctant to reject the Constitution for fear 
of jeopardizing the union.3 
The difficulty in predicting the outcome of the Virginia 
Convention was compounded by the fact that many delegates 
simply did not know enough about the proposed plan of 
government to have a firm opinion. Humphrey Marshall, a 
delegate from the crucial district of Kentucky, could not even 
locate a copy of The Federalist until he was on his way to the 
Convention. George Nicholas, a delegate from Albemarle, 
urged James Madison to distribute the essays in pamphlet 
form because the "greater part of the members will go to the 
meeting without information on the subject."4 
The ordinary citizens of Virginia were even less certain, 
1 George Washington to John Jay, Mt. Vernon, 8 June 1788, in The Writings 
of George Washington . .. , ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 37 vols. (Washington, D.C., 
1931-1944), 29: 514 (hereafter referred to as Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington's Writ-
ings); James Madison to Washington, Richmond, 13 June 1788, in The Writings 
of ]ames Madison ... , ed. Gaillard Hunt, 9 vols. (New York, 1900-1910), 5: 179 
(hereafter referred to as Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings). 
2 Patrick Henry to John Lamb, Richmond, 9 June 1788, William Grayson to 
.John Lamb, Richmond, 9 June 1788, in Isaac A. Leake, Memoir of the Life and 
Times of General John Lamb (Albany, N.Y., 1857), pp. 307, 311. 
3 Madison to Washington, New York, 7 Dec. 1787, in Hunt, ed., Madison's 
Writings, 5: 65; Henry Lee to Madison, Richmond, Dec. 1787, Papers of James 
Madison, Library of Congress. 
4 Hugh Blair Grigsby, The History of the Virginia Federal Convention of 1788, 
2 vo1s. (Richmond, 1890), 1: 31 (hereafter referred to as Grigsby, Virginia Con-
vention of 1788); George Nicholas to Madison, Charlottesville, 5 April 1788, in 
Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings, 5: ll4-15. 
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and considerably less informed, about the merits of the pro-
posed Constitution. Although the Antifederalists claimed that 
most Virginians opposed ratification, there was in fact little 
basis for predicting the temper of the people on the subject. 
Except for those persons living in the cities of Richmond, 
Norfolk, Alexandria, and Petersburg, where newspapers kept 
them informed of the national debate over the Constitu-
tion, few Virginians were in a position to form an opinion. 
Nor did they seem willing to hazard an opinion at the polls. 
In the elections for delegates to the Ratifying Convention 
voter turnout rarely exceeded 25 percent of the free adult 
white males and often dropped as low as 10 percent.5 If 85-95 
percent of the free adult white males were eligible to vote, as 
recent research on the suffrage in Virginia indicates, an aston-
ishingly large number of citizens stayed away from the polls.6 
Those Virginians who did vote were more likely to be 
familiar with the wealth and prestige of their candidates than 
with the subtleties of the Federalist and Antifederalist argu-
ments. In many counties a candidate's election to the Ratifying 
Convention, regardless of his stand on the Constitution, was a 
foregone conclusion. In Louisa, Warwick, Accomac, New Kent, 
and Chesterfield counties the delegates were not certain how 
they would vote, so it is obvious that their constituents did 
not choose them on the basis of Federalist and Antifederalist 
5 Election statistics for the Virginia Ratifying Convention are extremely rare, 
but a comparison of the Virginia Census of 1790, printed in Evarts B. Greene and 
Virginia Harrington, American Population before the Census of 1790 (New York, 
1932), pp. 154-55, with scattered returns found in the Virginia Herald and 
Fredericksburg Advertiser, 27 March 1788, the Virginia Independent Chronicle, 
12 March 1788, the Norfolk I ournal, 12 March 1788, the Essex County Deed 
Book, no. 33, and the Princess Anne County Deed Book, no. 21, Virginia State 
Library, gives an indication of the astonishing degree of apathy displayed by 
Virginia's voters. 
6 These voting percentages are the calculations of Robert E. and B. Katherine 
Brown, Virginia, 1705-1786: Democracy or Aristocracy? (East Lansing, Mich., 
1964), pp. 125-46. There seems to be little reason to challenge the accuracy of 
the Browns' statistics, since they are based on massive research and a sophisticated 
evaluation of data. However, their conclusion that full political democracy existed 
in eighteenth-century Virginia does not necessarily follow from those statistics. 
The extremely high degree of voter apathy, for example, indicates that a sig-
nificant number of Virginians felt that the mere right to vote was of little value. 
4 The Old Dominion 
labels.7 And in at least four counties, the elected delegates, 
confident of their base of personal support, would go against 
the wishes of their constituents and switch sides when they 
arrived at the Ratifying Convention.8 This style of personalized, 
nonpartisan politics, long a tradition in Virginia, would make 
it all the more difficult for the Federalist and Antifederalist 
factions to assess their strength in the Convention. 
In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the delegates began their 
deliberations. Madison, who had already emerged as the prin-
cipal spokesman for the Constitution in Virginia, would prove 
to be the most influential Federalist in the Ratifying Conven-
tion. Just thirty-seven years old at the time of the Convention, 
he had already spent thirteen years in public service, most of 
which had occurred not in his home state, but rather, with 
the continental government. In 1780, after serving briefly on 
the Committee of Safety for Orange County, in the Virginia 
Convention of 1776, and one term in the Virginia Assembly, 
Madison was elected a delegate to the Continental Congress. 
From that time until 1788 his political experience, and the 
range of his concerns, remained primarily continental. He had 
not served a long apprenticeship in either the county court or 
the General Assembly and, more than most of his colleagues 
in the Ratifying Convention, was free from attachments to local 
interests and more likely to give priority to national rather 
than local concerns. 
Madison, along with Henry Lee, George Nicholas, Wilson 
Cary Nicholas, and John Marshall followed the Federalist 
strategy of defending the proposed Constitution article by 
article in an attempt to forestall any wholesale attack on the 
very conception of that document by its opponents. When the 
Antifederalists succeeded in arguing their case on more general 
terms, however, Madison and the other confirmed Federalists 
in the Convention enjoyed three important advantages. First, 
7 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution ... , 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1836), 3: 653-62 
(hereafter referred to as Elliot, Debates); Jackson T. Main, The Antifederalists: 
Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1961), pp. 223-33, 285-86. 
8 Main, The Antifederalists, pp. 223-33, 285-86. 
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they were able to remind the members of the Convention of 
the grave defects of the Articles of Confederation. Even the 
Antifederalists admitted that the Articles needed amending, 
but they were unable to devise a way in which to make the 
amendment process workable. New York, when it vetoed the 
Impost bill in 1786-a measure that would have granted to the 
Confederation government a limited power of taxation-proved 
the near impossibility of securing the unanimous vote necessary 
for amending the Articles. 
More important, the Federalists, armed with the information 
that eight states had ratified the Constitution, were able to issue 
gloomy predictions about Virginia's fate should it stay out of 
the union and attempt to compete with a consolidated phalanx 
of the other states. Nor was this merely partisan rhetoric; most 
Federalists genuinely believed that Virginia would face ruin 
if it refused to join the union. Edmund Pendleton, a proud 
Virginian and a reluctant Federalist, calculated: 
8 states have already Ratified, some with, and some without 
Amendments proposed; to those at least, and others who may 
so adopt, we shall appear with Hostile Countenances, unfavor-
able to a cordial reception. They will consider our Proposals 
[of previous amendments as a condition to ratification] as 
coming from Men, refusing to make a Common Stock with 
them of Interests, under the direction of the General Govern-
ment, And therefore as dictating the admission of local Interests, 
Circumstances all unfavorable to Patient hearing and candid 
investigation. But say Gentlemen Virginia is too important in 
the Union, to risque her Separation by refusing her reasonable 
propositions. Alas Sir, with Irritated minds, reason has small 
force, and if those 8 states should make the Supposition of that 
ground's having produced our Conduct, it will add that of 
Insult to the other causes of Resentment, and will any Gentle-
men say that Virginia, Respectable as she is, is able to sustain 
the Conflict? Does any wish to see the experiment even put 
in risque?9 
9 Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee, Richmond, 14 June 1788, in The 
Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734-1803, ed. David John Mays, 2 vols. 
(Charlottesville, Va., 1967), 2: 531. 
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Confirmed Antifederalists such as Patrick Henry were not likely 
to be persuaded by Pendleton's argument, but to many of the 
undecided delegates, the consequences of refusing to join the 
union seemed worse than those of joining a partially defective 
one. 
And finally, the Federalists capitalized on the prestige of the 
Constitution's most illustrious supporter, General George Wash-
ington. Although Washington had declined to serve in the 
Ratifying Convention in order to avoid the partisan quarrels 
of his home state, his presence was felt. James Monroe, assessing 
Washington's importance to the Federalist cause, exclaimed: 
"Be assured, his influence carried this government."10 
The Federalists, in addition to these three general advantages, 
were also able to appeal to the special interests of the various 
groups that stood to benefit directly from the new Constitution. 
There were not enough groups in the Convention with clearly 
defined interests to make this an effective tactic by itself, but 
in certain cases it did prove helpful to the Federalist cause. In 
particular, the western delegates, who desperately needed pro-
tection from hostile Indians, were noticeably impressed by the 
Federalists' promises of a strong federal militia to patrol the 
western frontiers. 
The chief spokesman in the Virginia Convention for the 
opponents of the Constitution was a man of quite different 
background and experience than that of young nationalists 
like Madison or John Marshall. Patrick Henry, at fifty-two 
years of age, was revered throughout the state as the man who, 
as much as Washington, had fought to free Virginians from the 
tyranny of arbitrary authority.11 Henry had served in the 
colonial and state legislatures nearly every year since he entered 
that body in 1765; he was chosen as the first governor of the 
independent state of Virginia in 1776 and served five terms in 
10 James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, 17 July 1788, in The Writings of james 
Monroe .•. , ed. Stanislaus M. Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York, 1898-1903), 1: 186 
(hereafter referred to as Hamilton, ed., Monroe's Writings). 
11 Henry's image in Virginia was, of course, not the same as that of Washington, 
for Henry never was able to give all his actions the appearance of nonpartisanship 
and disinterestedness that characterized the public image of Washington. 
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that post during the twelve years between the framing of the 
Virginia constitution and the Ratifying Convention of 1788. 
Although a delegate to the First and Second Continental Con-
gresses in 1774 and 1775, Henry spent the greater part of his 
political career at home, in Virginia. When Henry exclaimed, 
during debate in the Ratifying Convention, "This government 
is not a Virginian, but an American government," he was 
speaking of his and other confirmed Antifederalists' fears.12 
Henry was striving to preserve everything that Virginians had 
fought for during the eighteenth century. They had revolted 
against British rule to have a Virginian government, and during 
the Confederation period they had continued to take pride in 
their local independence while defending the sovereignty of 
their state. 
There was good cause for the Antifederalists' attachment to 
Virginia's decentralized, and often oligarchic, government. That 
government had proved exceptionally effective in the past. It 
had guided the Old Dominion through the Revolution and 
had produced an important share of the new nation's leaders. 
Although few of the mechanisms of that government were 
democratic, few Virginians were inclined to lodge any public 
protests against the manner of its operation. And most im-
portant, the state had prospered under that government. Men 
like Patrick Henry could point to the population, economic 
resources, and political prestige of their state and argue with 
some plausibility that it would be a mistake for Virginians to 
trade their political independence for the less-tangible benefits 
of a consolidated government. 
Moreover, the Antifederalists had a selfish reason for desiring 
the continued dominance of their system of government over 
all other, more centralized forms. Men like Henry, William 
Grayson, and George Mason had devoted most of their lives 
to public service on the state and local level. They were quite 
naturally, and justifiably, proud of the way in which they had 
guided Virginia's destiny and were decidedly uneasy about the 
12 Elliot, Debates, 3: 55. 
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prospect of losing their power to a competing elite m a new, 
federal governmentP 
Governor Edmund Randolph, who had initially opposed the 
Constitution in the Philadelphia Convention, would prove to 
be a pivotal figure during the Virginia Convention. After the 
Philadelphia Convention had adjourned, Randolph had reaf-
firmed his opposition to the Constitution in a letter to the 
Virginia General Assembly, later published in the Virginia 
Gazette in January 1788. In that letter he had urged Virginians 
not to ratify the Constitution until substantive amendments 
had been agreed to by the other states.14 Although not con-
sidered to be as steadfast in his opposition as Henry, he was at 
least classed with those undecided delegates who would work 
with the Antifederalists to obtain prior amendments drastically 
reducing the power of the federal government over such vital 
areas as taxation and defense as a condition for ratification. 
"While Washington and Madison were aware of Randolph's 
increasing sympathy with the Federalist cause, and indeed had 
been instrumental in ultimately persuading Randolph to sup-
port the Constitution, most at the Convention expected Ran-
dolph to side with the Antifederalists.15 He would prove, how-
ever, to be the most illustrious and influential convert to the 
Federalist side. Some of Randolph's contemporaries ascribed 
his conversion to ambition for public office in the new govern-
ment, but his own explanation seems more convincing. On the 
first day of debate in the Ratifying Convention, in answer to 
Henry's speech against the Constitution, Randolph voiced the 
motives and the misgivings of all those who, in the end, reluc-
tantly gave their assent to the Constitution. He repeated his 
13 For the most perceptive discussion of the persistence of oligarchic patterns of 
government in Virginia, see Charles Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders: Political 
Practices in Washington's Virginia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1952), passim. 
14 Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, 16 Oct. 1787, 
in Elliot, Debates, l: 482-91. 
15 Thomas Jefferson to William Short, Paris, 20 Sept. 1788, in The Writings of 
Thomas jefferson ... , ed. Paul Leicester Ford, 12 vols. (New York, 1904-1905), 
5: 50 (hereafter referred to as Ford, ed., jefferson's Writings); Madison to 
Randolph, lO April 1788, George Nicholas to Madison, Charlottesville, 5 April 
1788, Madison to Jefferson, 22 April 1788, in Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings, 5: 
ll4, ll7-2l. 
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contention that the document was materially defective in some 
of its parts; in explaining his conduct at Philadelphia he avowed, 
"I refused to sign, and if the same were to return, again I 
would refuse." He then reaffirmed his determination to obtain 
amendments, but added: "As with me the only question has 
ever been between previous and subsequent amendments, so 
will I express my apprehensions, that the postponement of this 
Convention to so late a day has extinguished the probability 
of the former without inevitable ruin to the Union, and the 
Union is the anchor of our political salvation." Randolph's 
speech reflected the dilemma of so many reluctant Federalists. 
He made little attempt to defend the new plan of government 
as a positive good, but instead dwelt on the potential dangers 
facing Virginia should the state refuse to ratify the Constitution. 
For Randolph, the question was not whether the Constitution 
was a good one, but whether a union of the states under a 
defective Constitution was preferable to an existence outside 
the union.16 
In the final speech before the vote on ratification, Randolph 
again emphasized the narrow range of choices open to Vir-
ginians. His tone-uncertain and apologetic-was perhaps char-
acteristic of the manner in which Virginia entered the union. 
He asked future annalists to remember "that I went to the 
federal Convention with the strongest affection for the Union; 
that I acted there in full conformity with this affection; that I 
refused to subscribe, because I had, as I still have, objections to 
the Constitution, and wished a free inquiry into its merits; and 
that the accession of eight states reduced our deliberations to 
the single question of Union or no Union." 
Immediately after Governor Randolph uttered those words, 
Virginia, by the slim margin of 89-79, grudgingly joined the 
unionY Young Spencer Roane, soon to become a bitter critic 
of the nationalist concept of union, described the occasion 
16 Elliot, Debates, 3: 25-26. Some of Randolph's Antifederalist colleagues never 
forgave him. George Mason thereafter referred to him as the "young Arnold." 
Kate Mason Rowland, The Life of George Mason, 2 vols. (New York, 1892), 2: 
308 (hereafter referred to as Rowland, Life of Mason). 
17 Elliot, Debates, 3: 652-55. 
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somberly: "The decision has been distressing and awful to great 
numbers; & it is generally believed will be so received by the 
people. The minority is a very respectable one indeed, & made 
a most noble stand in defence of the liberties of the people ... 
there is no rejoicing on Acct of the vote of ratification-it would 
not be prudent to do so; & the federalists behave with modera-
tion and do not exult in their success."18 Nor was there much 
call for exultation. The reluctant Federalists would have to 
wait and see if the promised benefits of union materialized. 
The initially uncommitted members from Kentucky and the 
northwest who were ultimately persuaded to vote in favor of 
the Constitution, would watch to see whether the new govern-
ment would protect their right to navigate the Mississippi and 
whether the federal army would fulfill the promise to protect 
the frontier. Randolph and Pendleton, despite their support 
for the Constitution, would immediately initiate plans for 
calling another convention to remedy the defects of the new 
government.19 They would be supported in this endeavor by 
a sizable number of the Federalist delegates to the Convention, 
most of whom would join with the Antifederalists in an attempt 
to effect major changes in the structure of the new government.20 
Virginia's adherence to the union could have ended before 
it began had Patrick Henry been unwilling to accept his defeat 
peacefully. The night after the Convention adjourned, a group 
of dissident Antifederalists assembled to seek a way of prevent-
ing the new government from beginning its operation. They 
18 Spencer Roane to Philip Aylett, 26 June 1788, in David Mays, Edmund 
Pendleton, 1721-1803: A Biography, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), 2: 272. 
19 Edmund Randolph to Madison, 18 Aug. 1788, Edmund Pendleton to Mad-
ison, 3 Sept. 1788, in Moncure D. Conway, Omitted Chapters of History Disclosed 
in the Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph (New York, 1888), pp. 117-18 (here-
after referred to as Conway, Edmund Randolph). 
20 The exact identity of all the undecided delegates has always been something 
of a mystery. That they existed is attested to by the constant references to them 
during the Convention. Main, The Antifederalists, lists ten men in addition to 
the uncommitted delegates from the west who were wavering on the question of 
ratification. I have verified Main's findings and have added a few more men to 
the "undecided" list by comparing those who voted "yes" on ratification with 
those in the convention who subsequently advocated an amendment curtailing 
the federal government's power over direct taxation. 
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asked Henry's cooperation, but the old patriot, devoted to 
order as well as liberty, dissuaded them. Henry had vowed that 
"my hand and my heart shall be at liberty to retrieve the loss 
of liberty, and remove the defects of the system, in a con-
stitutional way," but he refused to thwart the will of the ma-
jority by force. 21 
The delegates to the Virginia Convention did not end their 
labors with the vote favoring ratification. As soon as the Con-
stitution was adopted, many Federalists joined the Antifed-
eralists in their drive to amend the document. George Wythe, 
chairman of the Federalist-controlled committee for amend-
ments, reported his committee's recommendations to the Con-
vention on June 27, 1788, two days after ratification.22 In 
addition to a bill of rights to protect individual liberties, the 
committee proposed another twenty amendments designed to 
preserve the power of the states. The spirit of all the amend-
ments was similar: they reflected the delegates' apprehension 
over what they considered the excessive power of the new 
government. 
Two of the proposed amendments were aimed at forestalling 
the development of the doctrine of implied powers. The first 
of these was similar to what became the Tenth Amendment; it 
provided "that each state in the Union shall respectively retain 
every power" not expressly granted to the federal government. 
Yet unlike the Tenth Amendment, it reserved these powers 
not to the states and the people, but solely to each state. 
The western delegates, afraid that the new government 
would barter their right to navigate the Mississippi River, 
demanded an amendment requiring approval of three-fourths 
of the members of both houses in Congress for ratification of 
treaties touching the territorial rights of any state. All the 
delegates were jealous of their commercial liberties and pro-
posed that "no navigation law, or law regulating commerce, 
21 Rowland, Life of Mason, 2: 274; Elliot, Debates, 3: 652. 
22 Eleven Federalists and nine Antifederalists served on the committee. Grigsby, 
Virginia Convention of 1788, I: 347. 
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shall be passed without the consent of two-thirds of the members 
present, in both houses." Control over the nation's defense, a 
source of much contention during debate, was to be safeguarded 
by an amendment requiring the consent of two-thirds of both 
houses for recruitment of a standing army during peacetime. 
Amendments restricting the federal government's control over 
commerce and foreign affairs passed without a division.23 
Last, and most important, a majority of delegates sought to 
impose sharp restrictions on the new government's power over 
the purse. The committee for amendments proposed that Con-
gress be required to requisition the states for funds before it 
levied taxes; Congress could levy direct taxes only if a state 
failed to meet its quota under the requisition. Ostensibly, the 
federal government would retain ultimate authority over tax-
ation-an advance over the nonexistent taxation power of the 
Articles-but in fact the Virginia amendment would have crip-
pled the power of the new government to levy taxes. Experience 
had proved that the requisition system was plagued by evasions, 
postponements, and delays. The time needed to collect taxes 
under the requisition system, or to prove that a state had failed 
to meet its quota under the system, would make it impossible 
for the federal government to plan its financial operations 
intelligently. This last amendment was the only one of the 
twenty proposed by the committee to meet opposition, but it 
passed, 85-65. Twelve Federalists voted with the Antifederalists 
on this crucial issue, which if adopted by the other states, would 
strike at the heart of the new government's authority.24 
That an overwhelming majority in the Convention so quickly 
proposed to reduce drastically the powers granted by the Con-
stitution indicated the tentative nature of Virginia's commit-
ment to Federalism. Most of Virginia's Federalists were just 
as determined as their opponents to ward off the twin evils of 
consolidation and domination; any attempt by the new govern-
ment to thwart the principles embodied in the Virginia amend-
ments would drive supporters of the government into the arms 
of the Antifederalists. 
23 Elliot, Debates, 3: 662. 24 Ibid., 3: 661. 
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Many Virginians were initially optimistic about securing the 
agreement of the other states to the proposed amendments, 
since it was generally conceded that Virginia's approval of the 
Constitution was vital to the success of the union. The residents 
of the Old Dominion were certain the other states would not 
run the risk of alienating Virginia by ignoring its demands for 
amendments. Their prospects seemed even brighter when the 
delegates to New York's ratifying convention unanimously 
agreed to send a circular letter to the states calling for a second 
convention to consider additional amendments to the Con-
stitution.25 
Virginia's political leaders wasted no time after they received 
word of New York's proposal. Even the small band of hard-core 
Federalists who had opposed substantive amendments were 
resigned to the fact that Virginia would vote in favor of a 
second convention to revise the Constitution. They were much 
more afraid that Henry and his followers would try something 
even more drastic. Henry had vowed "he should seize the first 
moment that offered for shaking off the yoke in a constitutional 
way" and some, like Madison, were afraid that he would use 
the issue of amendments as a pretext to destroy the whole 
system. They feared that the Antifederalists would attempt to 
obtain all the elective offices in the new government in order 
"to get a Congress appointed in the first instance that will 
commit suicide on its own authority."26 
Most Antifederalists were not prepared to go that far. Their 
first goal was to persuade the other states to call another con-
vention, and there was no doubt that "Mr. Henry and his 
friends enter with great zeal into the scheme."27 With his large 
following in the counties along Virginia's southern border, 
Henry had succeeded in swinging the balance toward Anti-
federalism in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, and 
the Federalists were convinced that he would lead the drive 
for "an early Convention composed of men who will essentially 
25 Ibid., 2: 413-14. 
26 James Madison to George Washington, Richmond, 27 June 1788, in Hunt, ed. 
Madison's Writings, 5: 234. 
27 Madison to Jefferson, 21 Sept. 1788, ibid., 5: 264. 
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mutilate the System, particularly in the article of taxation, 
without which ... the system cannot answer the purposes for 
which it was intended."2s 
The critics of the plan for a second convention were too 
harsh with their opponents. Although some, like Henry, 
favored it as a means of bringing about the destruction of the 
new government, many others-including Randolph, Monroe, 
and Pendleton-supported the idea of a new convention because 
they genuinely believed that fundamental changes in the Con-
stitution were essential in order to secure the benefits of union.29 
The lower house of the state legislature, the traditional 
spokesman for the state and local interests of Virginia, was 
the obvious place to initiate the call for another convention. 
The members of the lower house were acutely aware of Vir-
ginia's past glories. Many of them had been in the vanguard 
of Virginia's opposition to Great Britain prior to the Revolu-
tion. Their fathers and grandfathers had struggled to wrest 
from the Crown important powers over taxation, defense, and 
parliamentary privilege. They had inherited a long tradition 
of resistance to outside authority and were determined to pre-
serve that heritage. Moreover, they were determined to protect 
their own personal political power from the threat posed by 
the new, central government. 
When the Virginia General Assembly convened in October 
1788, the outnumbered Federalists realized that "a decided 
and malignant majority may do things of a disagreeable 
nature." John Beckley, clerk of the House of Delegates, reck-
oned the Antifederalist majority to be about fifteen, but he 
underestimated his opponents' strength. The Antifederalists, 
their ranks swelled by former Federalists who now favored a 
second convention, had at least a two-to-one majority.30 
In spite of the Antifederalists' numerical preponderance, the 
28 Ibid., 23 Aug. 1788, 5: 254. 
29 Edmund Randolph to Madison, 13 Aug. 1788, Edmund Pendleton to Mad-
ison, 3 Sept. 1788, in Conway, Edmund Randolph, pp. 117-18. 
30 Madison to Washington, New York, 5 Nov. 1788, in Hunt, ed., Madison's 
Writings, 5: 302; Edward Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 24 Oct. 1788, 
Madison Papers. 
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structure of leadership in the House of Delegates differed little 
from that in previous sessions. Even the position of Speaker, 
the most important office in the lower chamber, was not affected 
by the rivalry between Federalists and Antifederalists in the 
legislature. Thomas Mathews, a Revolutionary War general 
and a staunch Federalist, defeated two Antifederalists, William 
Grayson and Benjamin Harrison, in the contest for Speaker.31 
Mathews had served well in the post for several years; his past 
service and prestige within the House were enough to offset 
the disadvantage of his unpopular political views. This attitude 
toward political leadership would remain unimpaired by parti-
sanship for over a decade. Although divisions between Fed-
eralists and Antifederalists, and later between Federalists and 
Republicans, came to affect the affairs of the Assembly, the 
members of the Virginia lower house were loathe to allow party 
labels to replace the more traditional means of selecting their 
leaders. 
Mathews, entrusted with the power to appoint all committees, 
did not allow his desire to protect the new federal Constitution 
to affect his judgment. The chairmen of the six standing com-
mittees, who directed nearly all the day-to-day business of the 
House of Delegates, had always represented Virginia's top levels 
of wealth, influence, and prestige. The sudden appearance of 
two opposing political factions did little to alter this practice. 
The three Federalists and three Antifederalists appointed to 
these important posts were chosen not because of their role in 
the partisan debate over the Constitution, but because of their 
past experience and performance in the committee work of the 
lower house.32 
Although the Federalists maintained control of many key 
positions in the House, their leaders were not equal to those of 
the Antifederalists. With Madison and Henry Lee away in the 
31journal of the Virginia House of Delegates, 25 June 1788 (hereafter referred 
to as House journal). 
32 For an examination of the structure of leadership in the colonial House of 
Burgesses see Jack P. Greene, "The Foundations of Political Power in the Virginia 
House of Burgesses, 1720-1776," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 16 (1959): 
485-506. 
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Continental Congress, and Washington and George Nicholas in 
temporary retirement from political life, the Federalists were 
at a decided disadvantage. Richard Bland Lee lamented to a 
fellow Federalist that the Assembly was "very weak." In Patrick 
Henry the Antifederalists possessed the only able orator present 
and "the friends to the new government, being all young and 
inexperienced, form but a feeble band against them."33 
The Antifederalists wasted no time in using their majority to 
embarrass the Federalists. As soon as committee assignments 
were completed, they challenged Federalist Edward Carrington's 
election to the House of Delegates. Carrington had acted as 
chief aide and local informant of both Washington and Madison 
for several years and the small degree of political success that 
he had achieved in Virginia was due more to his ties with these 
national leaders than it was to his record of service in state and 
local government. Because of his Federalist leanings and his 
lack of a local political base, Carrington was a likely target for 
Antifederalist abuse. He had been serving in the Continental 
Congress until news of his election reached him in New York 
in June 1788, when he promptly resigned his post in Congress 
and returned to serve in Virginia. The Committee of Privileges 
and Elections examined the case and recommended that Car-
rington take his seat in the lower house, but the Antifederalists 
overruled the Committee's recommendation and unseated him, 
claiming that he had violated an act prohibiting officials from 
serving in both the state and the continental governments.34 
Although the vote on Carrington's dismissal was not recorded, 
there is little doubt that partisan feelings entered into the final 
decision; Henry had specifically mentioned Carrington's Fed-
eralist outlook during previous debate and Carrington was 
convinced that the Antifederalists' bitterness toward him was a 
decisive factor in the outcome.35 
Carrington's unseating was merely the opening salvo. On 
October 29, Henry announced that he would oppose any meas-
33 Richard Bland Lee to Madison, 29 Oct. 1788, Richard Bland Lee Papers, 
Library of Congress. 
34 House journal, 23, 24 Oct. 1788. 
35 Edward Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 24 Oct. 1788, Madison Papers. 
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ure to put the new government into operation unless accom-
panied by proposals for amending the Constitution. The same 
day he presented his plan for a second convention. According 
to Henry's opponents, the language of the proposal constituted 
"a direct and indecent censure on all those who had befriended 
the new government, holding them forth as the betrayers of the 
dearest rights of the people." Unfortunately, there were few 
Federalists present who had been active enough in the Ratifying 
Convention to answer Henry's allegations. Francis Corbin 
was the only vocal supporter of the Constitution present in the 
House of Delegates and he seemed "not to have the confidence 
of those who are friends to the fair trial of the new govern-
ment.''36 
Corbin was a poor match for the venerable Henry. Corbin's 
father had been an influential figure in the royal government 
of Virginia, and when the Revolution came he had fled to 
England with his sons. Francis Corbin was the only member 
of the family not to side with the Loyalists, but he nevertheless 
remained in England during the entire period of the Revolution 
and came back to Virginia only after his schooling, and the 
war, had ended.37 Corbin's close attachment to England was 
hardly advantageous to his political ambitions in anglophobic 
Virginia. When Corbin attacked Henry for going against the 
wishes of the people by asking for another convention, the old 
patriot was quick to compare Corbin's past services to Virginia 
with his own, reminding his listeners that he had not been 
"basking in the beams of royal favour at St. James" during the 
Revolution. Though most of the legislators had taken sides 
on the issue of a second convention, any comparison of the 
principal spokesmen of the two parties in the General Assembly 
must have worked in favor of the Antifederalists.38 
Henry's resolution calling for another convention asked: 
36 Charles Lee to George Washington, Richmond, 29 Oct. 1788, in U.S., De-
partment of State, Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States, 
5 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1894-1905), 5: 101-3 (hereafter referred to as Docu-
mentary History). 
37 Grigsby, Virginia Convention of 1788, 1: 143-44. 
38 William Wirt, Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry (Phila-
delphia, 1817), pp. 305-7. 
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"that for quieting the minds of the good citizens of this Com-
monwealth, and securing their dearest rights and liberties, and 
preventing those disorders which must arise under a govern-
ment not founded on the confidence of the people, application 
be made to the Congress of the United States, as soon as they 
shall assemble under the said Constitution, to call a Convention 
for proposing amendments to the same, according to the mode 
therein directed." The Federalists tried to soften the proposal 
by offering a substitute resolution, agreeing on the need for 
amendments, but asking that Congress be given the first oppor-
tunity to act on them. The Antifederalists would have none 
of it. The Federalist proposal was overwhelmingly defeated, 
39-85, and Henry's resolution passed.39 
The next step in the Antifederalists' strategy was to elect 
representatives to the First Congress who would be hostile to 
the federal government. Although some Federalists suspected 
that this was part of a plan to make the new government 
dissolve voluntarily on its first assemblage, the purpose was to 
insure that Virginia's congressional delegation would do every-
thing in its power to obtain adoption of all amendments proposed 
in the Ratifying Convention.40 The election by the legislature 
of Virginia's two United States senators offered the first oppor-
tunity to carry out this scheme. The Antifederalists backed 
Madison as a candidate for the Continental Congress to dimin-
ish his influence over the senatorial elections; with Madison 
out of the state, they were more confident they could attract 
enough support to elect both their candidates, William Grayson 
and Richard Henry Lee. While Madison's consequent absence 
did not prevent his name from being placed in nomination, he 
failed in his bid for election. On November 8, 1788, the Gen-
eral Assembly balloted for two United States senators and 
despite Edward Carrington's enthusiastic lobbying for Madison, 
the results were: Lee-98, Grayson-86, Madison-77.41 Thus, 
39 House journal, 30 Oct. 1788. 
40 Theodorick Bland to Richard Henry Lee, Richmond, 28 Oct. 1788, Lee 
Family Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia; Patrick Henry to 
Caleb Wallace, Richmond, 15 Nov. 1788, Patrick Henry Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
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Virginia's two representatives to the United States Senate were 
men determined to curtail drastically the powers granted to 
the new government.42 
The Antifederalists sought to consolidate their political su-
premacy the next week. On November 13 the legislature laid 
out districts for the election of congressional representatives; 
the results suggest that Patrick Henry and not Elbridge Gerry 
should have been given credit for the practice of gerrymander-
ing. The Antifederalists again used their majority in the 
Assembly to strike at Virginia's foremost nationalist, James 
Madison. Madison's district was drawn to include his own 
county of Orange, but then was extended far into the southwest 
to embrace the Antifederalist counties dominated by Henry and 
the Cabell family. Madison would have an uphill fight to gain 
election, and his experience would be a lesson to Virginia 
Federalists with political ambitions.43 
Henry and the Antifederalists next drafted a bill to prevent 
any person from holding important posts in both state and 
federal governments. Even the Federalists agreed that this was 
a necessary piece of legislation, since it was important to guard 
against conflict of interest among government officials, but the 
Antifederalists carried it a step further and used the act to 
attack the new government. According to Carrington, the 
Antifederalist version of the bill was "intended for the purposes 
of bringing odium upon the Federal Government and embar-
rassing it."44 It stated that no one holding any lucrative position 
in any branch of the federal government would be allowed to 
hold office in the state government. It even disqualified soldiers 
in the United States militia from serving in the state govern-
41 George Lee Turberville to Madison, 27 Oct. 1788, Edward Carrington to 
Madison, 9 Nov. 1788, in Documentary History, 5: 110. 
42 Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson to the Speaker of the House of 
Delegates, New York, 28 Sept. 1789, in The Letters of Richard Henry Lee, ed. 
James C. Ballagh, 2 vols. (New York, 1914), 2: 507-9 (hereafter referred to as 
Ballagh, ed., Richard Henry Lee). 
43 House journal, 13 Nov. 1788; Irving Brant, ]ames Madison, 5 vo1s. (New 
York, 1941-1961), 3: 238-39. 
44 Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 18 Nov. 1788, in Documentary History, 
5: 119. 
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ment-although members of the Virginia militia could serve in 
federal posts. The bill passed, 71-52, with Antifederalists almost 
unanimous in support of the measure.45 One purpose of the 
act was to discourage men from taking employment in the na-
tion's capital for fear that they might lose their power in the 
state government. But this was sadly out of touch with reality. 
Instead of forcing Virginia's political leaders to continue work-
ing for the state government, the effect of the bill proved the 
opposite. As Carrington predicted, "the United States, being 
debarred from conferring their powers upon state officers, will 
induce the most able of these into service." The result of 
course would be a diminution in the number of talented and 
prestigious people holding office and serving in the state gov-
ernment.46 
The Virginia legislature on November 14, 1788, delivered its 
final warning to the new national government. In an address 
to Congress, which was to convene in March 1789, the legislature 
reaffirmed its opposition to the Constitution in its present form. 
The legislators claimed that a desire for union had brought 
about Virginia's ratification, but that serious defects remained 
which far outweighed any benefits that union might bring. 
Despite their assent to the Constitution, the members of the 
Ratifying Convention had given "the most unequivocal proofs 
that they dreaded its operation in its present form." The 
address hinted that the new government could not hope to 
endure unless the apprehensions of the people of Virginia were 
relieved by amendments. The members of the Assembly-no 
doubt recalling the vacillation of the Confederation Congress 
-placed little faith in "the slow forms of Congressional discus-
sion and recommendation" and questioned whether "indeed, 
they [Congress] should ever agree to any changes." On the 
same day the legislature proposed a circular letter to the other 
45 William Walter Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of the 
Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619, 
12 vols. (Richmond, 1823): 12: 694-95 (hereafter referred to as Hening, Statutes 
at Large); House journal, 8 Dec. 1788. 
46 Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 9 Nov. 1788, in Documentary History, 
5: 111-12. 
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states asking their concurrence in the call for another con-
vention.47 
Once again the outnumbered Federalists tried to tone down 
the Antifederalist address. They proposed a substitute resolu-
tion which "earnestly called upon the Congress of the United 
States to take the said amendments under their immediate con-
sideration," but this mere show of approval for the Virginia 
amendments did not satisfy their opponents; the Federalist 
version of the address was defeated, 50-72, and the original 
passed viva voce.4 B 
The debate over a second convention provides an interesting 
commentary on Virginia's attitude toward union. That a 
decisive majority of Virginia's elected representatives agreed to 
call a second convention with the purpose of undoing much 
of the work of the first is indicative of a strong aversion to the 
nationalists' concept of union. Even more extraordinary is that 
almost no one, including most Federalists, quarreled with the 
ostensible aim of the Antifederalists-adoption of the amend-
ments proposed by the Virginia Ratifying Convention. It was 
not a mere majority, but a near unanimity of Virginians who 
favored a set of amendments that would deprive the new gov-
ernment of many of its essential powers. Most Virginia Fed-
eralists, although they feared the disruptive effects of another 
convention, shared the Antifederalists' distaste for consolidated 
government. 
The major division in Virginia in the fall of 1788 was not 
between confirmed Federalists and Antifederalists. Rather, it 
was between a band of determined Antifederalists that wanted 
to limit or even destroy the powers of the federal government 
and another group that approved of union, but nevertheless 
desired that Congress adopt amendments to render parts of 
the new system less obnoxious. The only stern criticism of 
these two groups came from a small group of nationalists within 
the Federalist faction, who were incensed that the legislature 
should show "the most malignant (and if one may be allowed 
47 House Journal, 14 Nov. 1788. 
48 Ibid. 
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the expression, the most unwarrantable) disposition toward 
the new government."49 In particular, they resented Henry's 
dominance over the legislature; according to Tobias Lear, 
"he ruled a majority of the Assembly, and his edicts were 
registered by that body with less opposition than those of the 
Grand Monarque have met with from his parliaments .... 
And after he had settled everything ... to his satisfaction, he 
mounted his horse and rode home, leaving the little business of 
the state to be done by anybody who chose to give themselves 
the trouble of attending to it."50 
Lear and his nationalist colleagues were peevish in their 
criticism. The Antifederalists had not initiated the assault on 
the new government because they enjoyed the role of obstruc-
tionists. They feared an erosion of their liberties and preroga-
tives unless Virginia's amendments were adopted, and they did 
not believe Congress could be trusted to act in good faith on 
Virginia's proposals. Patrick Henry was so disturbed by the 
Constitution in its unamended form that he claimed he was 
prepared to move to North Carolina, which had refused to 
ratify the Constitution, and where, presumably, his liberties 
would go untrammeled. 51 Even a staunch nationalist like Chief 
Justice John Marshall, looking back on the fight over the 
Constitution, was able to see justification for the Antifederalists' 
apprehensions. One of the central tenets of Antifederalist 
thought, according to Marshall, was that "liberty could only 
be endangered by encroachments upon the states; and that it 
was the great duty of patriotism to restrain the powers of the 
general government within the narrowest possible limits.'' 52 
This was not an unreasonable view in eighteenth-century 
49 Washington to David Stuart, Mt. Vernon, 2 Dec. 1788, in Fitzpatrick, ed., 
Washington's Writings, 30: 146. 
5() Tobias Lear to the Governor of New Hampshire, Mt. Vernon, 31 Jan. 1789, 
in George Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United 
States of America, 2 vo1s. (New York, 1885), 2: 488-89. 
51 Theodorick Bland to Richard Henry Lee, Richmond, 28 Oct. 1788, Lee 
Family Papers; Patrick Henry to Caleb Wallace, Richmond, 15 Nov. 1788, Henry 
Papers. 
52 John Marshall, The Life of George Washington ... , 2d ed., 2 vols. (Phila-
delphia, 1843), 2: 205-6 (hereafter referred to as Marshall, Washington). 
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America. The central government of Great Britain had posed 
a threat to American liberties by its denial of colonial authority 
over such measures as taxation and legislative prerogative. It 
was natural that Henry, the champion of Virginia's right to 
govern her own affairs within the imperial system, would insist 
on that right for the Old Dominion within the new nation. 
He had fought centralized power throughout the course of his 
political career. His campaign to curtail the power of the 
federal government was but one more round in that fight. 
The Antifederalists would be rebuffed in their attempt at 
another constitutional convention and would have to rely on 
Congress for amendments. But their efforts were not all in vain. 
They had registered strong opposition to the whole notion of 
centralized power, and their influence was being felt by even 
the most determined of the Old Dominion's nationalists. 
The changing political fortunes of Madison best illustrate 
the pressure exerted by the Antifederalists. Madison was one 
of the few Virginians who in 1788 could be classified as an 
enthusiastic nationalist. He had spent most of his career in 
national service and unlike most political leaders in Virginia 
was not accustomed to subordinating national to local interests. 
But it was becoming apparent that the rising tide of Anti-
federalist sentiment in Virginia was making it necessary to do 
just that. 
Madison's defeat, in November 1788, for a seat in the United 
States Senate would cause him to begin to move away from his 
nationalist stance and to become more solicitous of local 
interests. 53 Although he had originally been an unwilling candi-
date for the Senate, the manner of his defeat proved a shaking 
experience for the young Federalist. Henry had attacked him 
abusively during the debates on the candidates, pronouncing 
him "unworthy of the confidence of the people in the station 
of senator," and claiming that his election "would terminate 
53 The most persuasive account of Madison's switch from a national to a state-
oriented position is E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of 
American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1961), pp. 297-305. 
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in producing rivulets of blood throughout the land."54 Vitu-
peration might have been expected, especially from an im-
placable foe like Henry, but Madison was more dismayed by 
indications that he would also fail in his bid for a seat in the 
House of Representatives. His chances were dimmed by the 
gerrymandering of his congressional district. It was imperative 
that he do something to bolster his sagging popularity. His 
supporters pleaded with him to come home from New York 
and, more important, to soften his opposition to constitutional 
amendments. Accustomed to operating independently of local 
interests, Madison was averse to doing either. He did not want 
to stoop to "an electioneering appearance" and was not con-
vinced of the necessity of amendments.55 In October 1788, 
before the Antifederalists had blocked his election to the Senate, 
he wrote Jefferson explaining his position. He was willing to 
support a bill of rights, but only with the greatest reluctance. 
"I have never thought the omission [of a bill of rights] a material 
defect," he informed Jefferson, "nor been anxious to supply it 
even by subsequent amendments, for any other purpose than 
that it is anxiously desired by others." Under no circumstances 
would he support amendments to restore to the states power 
given to the national government.56 
James Monroe, Madison's opponent in the congressional 
race, hoped that he could use the amendment issue to advantage. 
During November and December of 1788 he traveled through 
Orange, Amherst, Spotsylvania, Culpeper, Louisa, Albemarle, 
Goochland, and Fluvanna-the counties comprising the con-
gressional district-informing the people that Madison opposed 
all amendments. The strategy seemed to work: by the end of 
December 1788 it appeared that the lesser-known Monroe might 
defeat Madison.57 To counteract Monroe's efforts Richard 
54 Henry Lee to Madison, 19 Nov. 1788, Madison Papers. 
55 Madison to Edmund Randolph, Philadelphia, 23 Nov. 1788, in Hunt, ed., 
Madison's Writings, 5: 305; Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 15 Nov. 1788, in 
Documentary History, 5: llO. 
56 Madison to Jefferson, New York, 17 Oct. 1788, in Hunt, ed., Madison's 
Writings, 5: 269-71. 
57 Madison to Henry Lee, Philadelphia, 30 Nov. 1788, ibid., 5: 308-9; Carring-
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Bland Lee began circulating pamphlets in favor of Madison. 
Lee attacked the partisan spirit of Henry's criticism of Madison 
and assured the voters that Madison was not as unfriendly to 
amendments as Monroe claimed.58 
It was still imperative that Madison make those assurances in 
person. In January 1789 he finally yielded to the wishes of his 
supporters. He came to Virginia to campaign personally and 
at the same time began to shift his position on amendments. 
In a letter to Baptist minister George Eve, a communication 
certain to gain wide circulation, Madison openly advocated 
limited amendments. He defended his decision to oppose 
amendments as a condition to ratification, but admitted that 
"circumstances are now changed." He vowed that, since the 
Constitution had been ratified by the necessary number of states, 
"it is my sincere opinion that the Constitution ought to be 
revised." He then endorsed not only a bill of rights but also an 
amendment increasing the number of representatives in the 
lower house-this last step to eliminate complaints that adequate 
representation would be impossible in a government extending 
over such a large, populous territory.59 Circumstances had 
changed. Only a few months earlier he had repudiated the 
notion of increasing the ratio of congressional representation 
on the grounds that it would create confusion and dilute talent 
in the House of Representatives.60 Madison concluded his 
letter to Eve by conceding that there "are sundry other altera-
tions which are either eligible in themselves, or being at least 
safe, are recommended by the respect due to such as wish for 
them."61 This last statement, suitably vague, could allow 
Madison's supporters to intimate to the voters that he favored 
ton to Madison, Richmond, 15 Nov. 1788, Alexander White to Madison, Rich-
mond, 4 Dec. 1788, Hardin Burnley to Madison, 16 Dec. 1788, in Documentary 
History, 5: 117-18, 128-29, 133-34. 
58 Richard Bland Lee to Madison, Richmond, 12 Dec. 1788, Richard Bland Lee 
Papers. 
59 Madison to George Eve, 2 Jan. 1789, in Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings, 5: 
319-21. 
60 Benjamin F. Wright, ed., The Federalist, "Number 58" (Cambridge, Mass., 
1961), p. 392. 
61 Madison to Eve, 2 Jan. 1789, in Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings, 5: 319-21. 
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a wide range of amendments without having to state specifically 
what those amendments were. 
That Madison appealed to a Baptist minister for support 
was significant. The Baptists, the principal evangelical sect in 
Virginia, had for decades played an active role in the state's 
political affairs. In their desire to increase liberty for dissenters 
the Baptists had become the only religious group in Virginia to 
show an interest in political organization. They distrusted the 
state government because it had consistently subordinated their 
interests to those of the Episcopal Church and had tended to 
side with the Antifederalists on the Constitution out of fear 
that their religious liberties would fare even worse at the hands 
of a more powerful, highly centralized government. By solic-
iting the aid of the Baptists to secure his political survival, 
Madison had entered into an alliance with a group whose 
political principles were often in direct opposition to his own. 
An alliance containing such disparate elements would not have 
been possible in many states, but in Virginia, where personal 
influence and prestige were often more important than an 
individual's ideology, Madison was able to obtain Baptist aid 
without opening himself to the charge of having betrayed his 
political principles.62 
The appeal to the Baptists proved successful. In the con-
gressional election, held in February 1789, Madison defeated 
Monroe 1,308 to 972.63 But he had been forced to make 
important concessions in order to achieve his victory. He had 
not previously been willing to agree to amendments simply 
out of "respect due to such as wish for them," but with his 
political career on the line, he modified his views. 
Madison's shift was part of a trend that affected nearly 
all Virginia's representatives in the nation's capital. Within 
the next few years most of Virginia's Federalist congressmen 
would moderate their positions in an attempt to court powerful 
62 Wesley M. Gewehr, The Great Awakening in Virginia, 1740-1790 (Durham, 
N.C., 1930), pp. 189-94. The alliance, though politically expedient, was not always 
a comfortable one. The extreme statements of some of the more radical Baptists 
often hindered, rather than helped, the cause of the antiadministration party. 
63 Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, 12 Feb. 1789. 
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political groups within Virginia committed to preserving their 
tradition of local, decentralized government. This drift of 
Virginia's Federalist congressmen toward the Antifederalist 
camp did not signify a complete capitulation to the political 
principles of extreme Antifederalists such as Patrick Henry or 
Richard Henry Lee-men like Madison would retain many 
of their nationalistic principles while at the same time borrow-
ing Antifederalist rhetoric-but it was a clear sign that a large 
segment of the powerholders in the Old Dominion were 
determined to prevent any further growth in the nationalizing 
tendencies of the new government. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Continuity of 
Political Life 
THE RELUCTANCE of so many of Virginia's state-oriented poli-
ticians to yield power to a new federal government is hardly 
surprising. For those same men had successfully resisted any 
changes in their own state government which threatened to 
diminish their political power. Even the Revolution, although 
it succeeded in eliminating royal authority, left the structure 
of provincial politics intact. The Virginia constitution of 1776 
merely legitimized the destruction of royal power and strength-
ened the grasp of the provincial oligarchy on the politics of 
the state. That constitution, although hardly advancing the 
already-slow process of democratization in Virginia, was never-
theless wholly in keeping with the ideals for which Virginia's 
political leaders fought the Revolution. For those leaders had 
rebelled against Great Britain to preserve local institutions of 
government, and therefore their own political power, from the 
threat of outside interference. 
The efficacy and stability of Virginia's political system was 
founded on a strong tradition of vigorous and responsible local 
government. During the colonial period local units of govern-
ment, and the county courts in particular, had gradually 
assumed control over the internal polity of Virginia's many 
counties. Royal governors and the House of Burgesses seemed 
far-removed from the daily concerns of small farmers and large 
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planters alike; for most people, distant from the seat of power, 
the county court was the government. 
The average number of judges in each county was twenty-
two, but only four were needed to conduct the business of the 
county court.1 The court was to meet each month, on a day 
fixed by law, to consider nearly every type of business; it often 
acted in a legislative and executive capacity as well as in its 
judicial role. In addition to being the court of first instance 
for all civil and criminal cases, the county court by mid-
eighteenth century had assumed responsibility for collecting 
taxes, licensing all public utilities, and supervising all charities. 
The social value of the county court was perhaps even more 
important than its official role. It was here that the residents of 
a widely dispersed agrarian society could gather to transact busi-
ness, renew acquaintances, and exchange gossip.2 
Theoretically the governor had the power to appoint the 
members of the county court, who in turn appointed the lesser 
county officials, but through a long series of struggles with the 
royal governors, the justices assumed practical control over local 
appointments. When a vacancy occurred, the justices would 
recommend a replacement to the governor, who would gen-
erally approve it without question. The governor was not 
legally bound to accept the court's nomination, but since the 
court was usually composed of the leading men of the county, 
whose cooperation was invaluable for a harmonious term in 
office, he usually acquiesced in their decision. The justices also 
gradually established the precedent of a lifetime appointment, 
and when one of them died his successor often was a son or a 
close relative.3 
The system had supposedly worked well in the past. The 
county court officials of colonial days had constituted a "Who's 
Who" of Virginia society; nearly all Virginia's revolutionary 
1 Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders, pp. 78-93. The structure and function of 
the county courts has been accurately described by Sydnor; it is therefore neces-
sary only to summarize briefly his findings here. 
2 Albert 0. Porter, County Government in Virginia: A Legislative History, 1607-
1904 (New York, 1947), pp. 9-226. 
3 Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders, pp. 78-93. 
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heroes had served an apprenticeship as justices of the peace. 
Working for little or no pay, they had taken time from their 
business as planters or lawyers to look after the interests of 
their constituents in what most historians have characterized 
as a responsible and paternalistic fashion. With this heritage 
of effective local government it is not surprising that most 
Virginians had misgivings about the effects of national govern-
ment. The vision of federal tax officials and tobacco inspectors, 
sent from distant states with different interests, was not com-
forting. To most Virginians, even the state government seemed 
too distant to understand their needs. Only the county gov-
ernment could be trusted to act in accordance with the people's 
wishes. No matter that officials were not popularly elected; 
their physical proximity to the voters insured that they would 
act responsively. 
Yet by the 1780s this system of oligarchic, if benevolent, 
county rule was beginning to show signs of weakness. The 
county aristocracies were losing their effectiveness. The 
reasons for the decline are not altogether clear; an intensive 
study of local government in Virginia during the nineteenth 
century-the period in which the weaknesses of county govern-
ment become most apparent-would provide at least some ex-
planations. A few of the causes, however, can be detected in 
the late eighteenth century. First, the demands made upon 
local government were steadily increasing as the economy and 
social structure of the Old Dominion became more complex. 
The same structures of government were in many ways un-
equipped to cope with both the increasing and changing demands 
placed upon them. Moreover, the character of the people who 
controlled those structures of government was subtly changing. 
The county aristocracies were being weakened, not so much 
from pressure from the lower classes, as from the continual 
intermarriage between the many branches of prominent families 
and the newer, influential families. As the number of people 
with a claim to aristocracy grew, the answer to the question 
of who should rule the county was no longer as clear as it had 
been.4 The appointive system, which had previously selected 
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the educated, well born, and capable, now began to be used for 
corrupt purposes. 
It was no novelty that political leaders were using their 
influence to obtain government employment for friends. This 
was a time-honored practice dating back into the colonial 
period.5 More serious was the outright buying and selling of 
offices. In the past, when the social hierarchy in the counties 
was more stable and the choice for an office more apparent, 
this was not so common, but as those persons with a claim to 
social prominence increased, so too did applications for public 
office. In a system with some popular control over the selection 
of public officials, increased competition for public office 
would have led to an increased reliance on the people for sup-
port and would have tended to promote democratization of 
the political system. But in Virginia, with a system congenial 
to oligarchic control, this increased competition for office merely 
enlarged the possibilities of corruption. Instead of turning to 
the people to convince them of their qualifications for public 
office, the county oligarchs only intensified their efforts to use 
their personal influence and wealth to obtain appointive offices. 
Clerkships were openly purchased by those wealthy enough to 
invest in a position which they hoped would launch their 
political careers. There was also a constant maneuvering for 
appointments as officers in the state militia. Theoretically, a 
county court recommended the appointment of officers to the 
governor on the basis of seniority, but in practice both the 
court and the governor overlooked this tradition when it was 
politically or financially expedient. Virginians did not appear 
particularly concerned about the buying and selling of offices. 
A bill to prohibit the practice was defeated in 1789, although 
a milder version finally was passed in 1792. Despite this statu-
tory prohibition, the custom continued, particularly in the 
western part of the state, where enforcement was more difficult 
4 For example, there were members of the Lee, Mason, and Carrington families 
on each side of the question in the Virginia Ratifying Convention. 
5 Drury Stith to Henry Tazewell, Brunswick, 5 Feb. 1789, Spencer Roane to 
Tazewell, Essex, 6 Feb. 1789, Tazewell Family Papers, Virginia State Library 
(VSL). 
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and where the tradition of responsible local government was 
less strong among the newer ruling elite.6 
The county courts were faced with problems more serious 
than occasional cases of corruption: by the end of the eighteenth 
century the courts were in many instances not functioning. A 
common complaint by those who petitioned the General As-
sembly was that the system of justice in the counties was slow 
and inequitable. Most of the petitions pointed to the same 
fault: with a multiplicity of justices, working without pay and 
feeling no special responsibility to be present at the monthly 
meeting of the court, it was not uncommon for no one of them 
to appear at the scheduled session of the court. Without a 
quorum, the business of the court was at a standstill. This 
neglect of duty led to delays as long as five years in the settle-
ment of even the smallest claims. Not a few residents were 
becoming impatient with the system. "It has become question-
able," complained the petitioners from Albemarle County, 
"whether the condition of our aboriginal neighbours, who 
live without law or magistrates, be not preferable to that of 
the great mass of nations ... whose laws burden them."7 
But the county court was immune to change. For everyone 
who signed the petition of Albemarle County, there were many 
more like Benjamin Watkins Leigh, who as late as 1819 de-
clared that the county courts were "so important that their 
institutions may well be considered as a part of the constitution, 
both of the colonial and present government. No material 
change was introduced by the revolution in their jurisdiction, 
or general powers and duties of any kind .... It would perhaps 
be impossible for any man to estimate the character and utility 
6 House journal, 14 Dec. 1789, 6 Oct. 1792; Samuel Shepherd, The Statutes 
at Large of Virginia, 1792·1806, Being a Continuation of Hening's Statutes at 
Large, 3 vols. (Richmond, 1835·1836), 1: 6·7; James McDowell to John Preston, 
Smithfield, 21 Oct. 1792, Francis Preston to John Preston, 24 Oct. 1792, Preston 
Papers, Virginia Historical Society (VHS); Henry Lee to John Preston, Richmond, 
17 Feb. 1792, Executive Letterbooks, VSL; Thomas Smith to James Monroe, 28 
May 1800, Correspondence to the Executive, VSL. 
7 Petition of the Citizens of Loudon County, 19 Oct. 1792, Petition of Fairfax 
County, 6 Oct. 1792, Petition of Albemarle County, 24 Dec. 1798, all in Petitions 
to the Virginia General Assembly, VSL. 
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of this system, without actual experience of its operation."8 
Although one generation removed from the group of men 
who dominated the political affairs of Virginia in the 1790s, 
Leigh was a product of the same tradition. The county courts 
represented the cornerstone of effective government for both 
Leigh and his predecessors. This pride in Virginia's local 
institutions was the single most important factor working 
against any increase in the power of the continental govern-
ment or any alteration of the structure of the state government. 
The members of the lower house of the legislature, during 
both the colonial and post-revolutionary period, were at the 
pinnacle of political power within their respective county 
hierarchies. They had generally served an apprenticeship in 
county government and had advanced to a position where they 
served as spokesmen for their respective counties in the affairs 
of the state. They were understandably averse to any changes 
which threatened to weaken their positions. Many of the mem-
bers of the House of Delegates, the post-revolutionary counter-
part of the colonial House of Burgesses, would view the new 
federal government as precisely such a threat.9 
The first stage in the legislative process, the election of 
delegates to serve in the lower house, has long been a source 
of historical debate. The most recent research on suffrage in 
the Old Dominion suggests that as many as 85 to 95 percent of 
Virginia's free adult white males were permitted to cast votes 
in local elections. In many cases citizens without the necessary 
fifty-acre freehold were allowed to vote despite laws to the 
contrary. This latitude given to nonfreeholders is best il-
lustrated by a survey of contested election petitions presented 
8 Benjamin W. Leigh, comp., The Revised Code of the Laws of Virginia (Rich-
mond, 1819), I: 244n, quoted in Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders, p. 86. 
9 The lower house of the legislature tended to dominate the upper house. 
The state senate could only approve, amend, or reject legislation initiated by the 
lower house. On only a few occasions did it differ with the lower house on 
important matters. The history of the continuing fight for autonomy by the 
colonial counterpart of the House of Delegates, the House of Burgesses, is 
recounted in Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assem-
bly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-1776 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963). 
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to the House of Delegates. In these contested elections as many 
as 40 percent of the total votes were cast by citizens without the 
necessary freehold. When a formal complaint was filed, the 
illegal votes were voided, but one can assume that nonfree-
holders voted in elections that were not disputed and that it 
was only when the outcome was in doubt that their right to vote 
was challenged.1o 
There are questions relating to suffrage in Virginia, how-
ever, which are impossible to answer by analysis that is merely 
quantitative. How were elections conducted? How did the 
candidates view the electorate? On what criteria did the voter 
base his choice? What percentage of those who could vote 
thought it worthwhile to do so? The answers reveal much 
more about the nature of Virginia's political process than the 
simple fact that a high percentage of the people were allowed 
to cast a vote. 
In the 1780s and 1790s, as in the past, the county sheriff 
controlled nearly every step of the election process. If he 
thought most freeholders had voted, he could close the polls 
after a few hours; if a heavy voter turnout or bad weather 
slowed the process, he might extend voting into the next day. 
In some cases, as in Harrison County in 1790, the sheriff 
could keep the polls open for as many as eleven days. The 
10 Brown and Brown, Virginia, 1705-1786, are the most prominent of those 
historians arguing that the right of suffrage in Virginia was widespread. Their 
findings relative to the extent of the suffrage have not been successfully chal-
lenged. Their conclusions with respect to the presence or absence of "democ-
racy" resulting from that widespread suffrage, however, have been widely 
questioned. The present study was not conceived either as an attempt to support 
or to refute the Browns' findings, but there is abundant evidence to prove that 
the relationship between the right to vote and the existence of democratic 
attitudes is a dubious one. For examples of elections where nonfreeholders 
voted, see House Journal, 29 Oct., 27 Nov. 1790, 15 Jan. 1800; Petition of Thomas 
Stith to the Convention of 1788, Election Records no. 1, Election Committee to 
Chairman of the Committee of Privileges and Elections, 18 Nov. 1788, Election 
Records no. 362, Petition of Delegates for Jefferson County, 1790, Deposition of 
William Robinson, Sheriff of Harrison County, April 1790. Petition of M. Roberts 
to the Committee of Privileges and Elections, 20 Oct. 1790, Poll List, Greensville 
County, 26 April 1792, Petition of John Clopton to the Committee of Privileges 
and Elections, 21 Oct. 1792, Charles Griffin to William Foushee, 14 April 1798, 
Election Records no. 363, VSL. 
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sheriff could also challenge any prospective voter for not pos-
sessing the necessary freehold. 11 This kind of power, when 
exercised responsibly, did much to insure a fair and orderly 
election process. 
There were no institutional checks guaranteeing that the 
sheriff would use his power impartially. The House of Dele-
gates served as the court of appeal in cases where the sheriff 
was charged with abusing his power, but it rarely ruled against 
him. Complaints continued to flow into the House of Dele-
gates. Hardly a year went by when sheriffs were not accused 
of deliberately keeping the polls open to aid one candidate at 
the expense of another or that they were not charged with 
excluding the votes of some nonfreeholders but not the votes 
of others.12 
The voting was occasionally accomplished by a showing of 
hands, but more often it was viva voce) which allowed can-
didates or interested spectators to calculate the results of the 
election while it was in progress. This method had its draw-
backs, however. It lent itself to a subtle coercion, since a 
tenant of one of the candidates would be reluctant to cast his 
vote against his landlord, who was usually present at the polls 
watching the votes being cast. Since most candidates were 
wealthy planters, with many tenants, this could materially affect 
the outcome of an election. The defects of this method were 
described in 1789 by a disgruntled, defeated candidate for the 
Assembly: "The candidate stands upon an eminence close to 
the Avenue thro which people pass to give in their votes, viva 
voce, or by outcry. There the Candidates stand ready to beg, 
pray, and solicit the peoples votes in opposition to their com-
petitors and the poor wretched people are much difficulted by 
the prayers and threats of those Competitors, exactly similar 
11 Hening, Statutes at Large, 12: 120-29; Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders, 
pp. 18-21; Albert McKinley, Suffrage in the Thirteen English Colonies in America 
(Philadelphia, 1905), p. 35. 
12 See, for example, Deposition of William Robinson, Sheriff of Harrison 
County, April 1790, Poll Book, Ohio County, 24-26 April 1798, Petition to the 
Committee of Privileges and Elections, Berkeley County, April 1798, Petition to 
the Committee of Privileges and Elections, Ohio County, I May 1799, VSL. 
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to the Election of the corrupt and infamous House of Commons 
in England."13 
Political campaigns were sometimes hotly contested for weeks 
in advance and other times they merely formalized a victory 
that was a foregone conclusion, but nearly all the campaigns 
had one common denominator: a candidate was elected not 
because he took a stand on the issues of the day, but because 
he was popular and had influence in the county. 
Nearly all candidates disdained appeals to the people. Mad-
ison was reluctant even to appear in his home state during his 
campaign for a seat in the First Congress-despite the fact that 
his absence might spell defeat. 14 John Marshall not only re-
fused to campaign, he was not even aware of his candidacy in 
the 1795 election for the House of Delegates. He had gone to 
the polls to vote in a hotly contested election between two 
gentlemen who had been longstanding rivals. 
I attended at the polls to give my vote early and return to the 
court which was then in session at the other end of town. As 
soon as the election commenced a gentleman came forward 
and demanded that a poll should be taken for me. I was a 
good deal surprised at this entirely unsuspected proposition 
and declared my decided dissent. I said that if any of my fellow 
citizens wished it I would become a candidate at the succeed-
ing election but that I could not consent to serve that year 
because my wishes and my honour were engaged for one of the 
candidates. I voted for my friend and left the polls for the 
court which was open and waiting for me. The gentleman 
said that he had a right to demand a poll for whom he pleased, 
and persisted in his demand that one should be opened for me-
l might if elected refuse to obey the voice of the constituents 
if I chose to do so. He then gave his vote for me. As this was 
entirely unexpected-not even known by my brother, who 
though of the same political opinions with myself was the 
active and leading partisan of the candidate against whom I 
13 David Thomas to Griffith Evans, 3 March 1789, in Proceedings of the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 46 (1913): 370-71. 
14 Madison to Randolph, Philadelphia, 23 Nov. 1788, in Hunt, ed., Madison's 
Writings, 5: 305. 
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had voted, the election was almost suspended for ten or twelve 
minutes, and a consultation took place among the freeholders. 
They then came in and in the evening information was brought 
me that I was elected. I regretted this for this sake of my 
friend. In other regards I was well satisfied at being again in 
the assembly.I5 
A vigorous campaign based on issues was obviously not 
necessary if a man like Marshall did not even have to acknowl-
edge himself a candidate. The fate of the two original can-
didates is even more interesting. In this particular election, 
they held opposing positions on the most important political 
issue of the day-ratification of the Jay Treaty. That a man 
like Marshall, because of his popularity and prestige, could 
divert attention from such an important issue testifies to the 
role of personality in the political process. If this could occur 
in the city of Richmond, the most politically sophisticated area 
in Virginia, it could happen anywhere in the state. The conduct 
of Marshall's brother is yet another indication of the unim-
portance of political issues in Virginia's elections. Although 
sharing the same Federalist sentiments as John Marshall, he 
was the leading advocate of the Republican candidate.16 The 
entire episode serves to show that political labels based on 
national issues were often meaningless in a state where local 
problems and prominent personalities were the decisive factors 
in the political process. Marshall's victory in Richmond in 1795 
did not signify a triumph of the nationalistic principles of the 
Federalist party. Rather, it represented a personal vote of con-
fidence in the character and ability of John Marshall. 
Marshall was so popular, in fact, that he did not have to rely 
on a common Virginia practice-the liberal distribution of food 
and drink to potential supporters-to gain election. Some have 
maintained that this widespread practice of "treating" is proof 
of the candidates' dependence upon the will of the electorate 
and is therefore indicative of the democratic nature of Virginia's 
15 An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall, ed. John Stokes Adams (Ann 
Arbor, Mich., 1937), pp. 15-16. 
16 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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political process. It certainly seemed so to the Frenchman 
Ferdinand Bayard, traveling in Virginia in 1791. He claimed 
that election days in Virginia were days of reveling, of brawls, 
where "the candidates offer drunkenness openly to anyone who 
is willing to give them his vote. The taverns are occupied by 
the parties, the citizens flock to the standards of the candidates; 
and the voting place is often surrounded by men with clubs, 
who drive back and intimidate the citizens of the other party."17 
But treating was hardly the product of a democratic society. 
Its use presupposed that the candidates were wealthy enough 
to afford the practice. When it did influence the outcome of an 
election, then it inevitably worked in favor of those who could 
afford to be lavish in their entertainment. Its very existence 
also suggests a certain contempt for the voter, who needed to 
be bribed to vote for the best candidate.18 
Some Virginians, like Edmund Pendleton and his fellow 
petitioners from Caroline County, were disgusted with this 
style of campaigning. They asked the House of Delegates 
"whether the best mode of enabling electors to judge of a 
candidate's qualifications, is to deprive them of their senses?" 
They condemned the device of treating because it gave an 
inordinate advantage to the wealthy, thus perpetuating oligar-
chic rule. But this practice had roots deep in English and 
colonial tradition and was therefore difficult to stop. "I am 
sorry to observe that such is the disposition of my countrymen," 
Thomas Evans of Accomac County exclaimed in exasperation, 
"that nothing will induce them to attend elections of however 
great importance without being treated."19 
The apathy that Evans lamented persisted throughout the 
17 Ferdinand M. Bayard, Travels of a Frenchman in Maryland and Virginia, 
with a Description of Philadelphia and Baltimore in 1791, ed. Ben. C. McCary 
(Williamsburg, 1950), p. 65. 
18 For a contemporary description of the practice of treating, and of Virginia 
election practices in general, see Jay B. Hubbel and Douglass Adair, "Robert 
Munford's The Candidates," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 5 (1948):3-43. 
In addition to a perceptive textual analysis, the article also contains an interesting 
biographical sketch of Munford. 
19 Petition of Caroline County to the Virginia General Assembly, IS Dec. 1797, 
Virginia Miscellany, LC: Thomas Evans to John Cropper, 6 Dec. 1796, John 
Cropper Papers, VHS. 
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1790s in spite of statutes that punished nonvoting freeholders 
with a fine of one-quarter their yearly tax assessment. Although 
the tension between Federalists and Antifederalists in the legis-
lature increased, voter participation remained low, averaging 
less than 20 percent of the free adult white male population.20 
In some counties the response of the citizens was so feeble that 
there seemed to be little point in holding the election at all. 
In the 1790 election for the House of Delegates in Essex County 
the two victorious candidates, each running unopposed, gar-
nered a total of seven votes each. In Brunswick and Cumberland 
counties the contests for presidential elector in 1789 managed 
to interest only 15 percent of the voters. Even in the hotly 
contested election between Madison and Monroe in 1789, none 
of the eight counties had a voter turnout exceeding 35 percent 
and some had as low as 10 percent.21 
This low turnout is explained by two factors: first, political 
20 Hening, Statutes at Large, 12: 122. For a sampling of voter participation in 
Virginia during the period 1788·1792, see Poll List for presidential elector, 7 Jan. 
1789, Poll List for representatives to the House of Delegates, April 1789, Poll List 
for congressional election, April 1789, Poll List for election of representatives to 
the House of Delegates, 26 April 1790, Poll List for election of representatives to 
the state senate, 26 April 1790, Poll List for congressional election, 26 July 1790, 
Poll List for special congressional election, 6 Sept. 1790, Poll List for election of 
representatives to the House of Delegates, 25 April 1791, Poll List for congres· 
sional election, 5 Nov. 1792, Brunswick County Election Records, VSL: Poll List 
for election of representatives to the Ratifying Convention, 17 March 1788, Poll 
List for election of representatives to the House of Delegates, 21 April 1788, 
Poll List for presidential elector, 10 Jan. 1789, Poll List for congressional election, 
2 Feb. 1789, Poll List for election of representatives to the House of Delegates, 
19 April 1790, Poll List for congressional election, 6 Sept. 1790, Poll List for 
election of representatives to the House of Delegates, 18 April 1791, Poll List for 
election of representatives to the House of Delegates, 16 April 1792, Poll List 
for presidential elector, 5 Nov. 1792, Essex County Deed Book, no. 33, VSL; 
Poll List for presidential elector, 7 Jan. 1789, Poll List for congressional election, 
2 Feb. 1789, Poll List for election of representatives to the House of Delegates, 
26 April 1791, Poll List for presidential elector, 25 Sept. 1792, Westmoreland 
County Records and Inventories, vols. 6, 7, VSL; Poll List for presidential elector, 
.Jan. 1789, Poll List for congressional election, 2 Feb. 1789, Cumberland County 
Deed Book, no. 6, VSL; Poll List for congressional election, Lancaster County, 
Feb. 1789, Election Records no. 28, VSL. 
21 Poll List for election of representatives to the House of Delegates, 19 April 
1790, Essex County Deed Book, no. 33; Poll List for presidential elector, 7 Jan. 
1789, Brunswick County Election Records; Poll List for presidential elector, 
Jan. 1789, Cumberland County Deed Book, no. 6, VSL; Virginia Herald and 
Fredericksburg Advertiser, 12 Feb. 1789. 
The Old Dominion 
issues were not nearly so important to the average farmer as 
were the more immediate demands of scraping out an existence; 
and second, for every election with surplus quantities of liquor 
and excitement, there were several which were carried out in a 
perfunctory and thoroughly predictable fashion. In most coun-
ties there were men who expected to be elected almost auto-
matically. In Amherst County, Antifederalist William Cabell 
would be elected unanimously; in the Eastern Shore county of 
Accomac, Federalist Thomas Evans looked forward to similar 
support.22 It is hardly likely that this unanimity of opinion 
came about because the residents of a county were united in 
common political beliefs. Rather, the prestige of the Cabells 
and the Evanses of Virginia commanded the support of the 
citizens regardless of any differences in political philosophy 
between them and their constituents. 
In the case of men of stature, like Edmund Randolph, formal 
elections were not even necessary. In the middle of the im-
portant legislative session of 1788, Randolph, then governor 
of Virginia, decided that his presence in the House of Delegates 
could help reduce Patrick Henry's influence over the Assembly. 
He wrote to Madison, "On Friday I shall be a member. I could 
not get in sooner, as a vacancy could not be sooner created 
than today." Randolph merely persuaded the current member 
from his district of Williamsburg to resign and was immediately 
selected to take his place.23 If this had happened in a society 
which was not bound by gentlemanly traditions of aristocratic 
control, the opposition would at least have made an issue of it. 
In Virginia, where respect was high for Randolph both as a 
gentleman and a statesman, few citizens, if any, raised an 
eyebrow. 
Some historians would argue, however, that Randolph's case 
was not at all typical. In particular, Robert E. Brown and 
Katherine Brown, on the basis of their examination of Virginia 
22 Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings, 5: 318n; Election Records, no. 259, VSL. 
23 Randolph to Madison, Richmond, 10 Nov. 1788, in Conway, Edmund 
Randolph, p. 121; Earl G. Swem and John W. Williams, A Register of the General 
Assembly of Virginia, 1776·1918, and of the Constitutional Conventions (Rich-
mond, 1918), p. 29. 
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in the eighteenth century, have concluded that the electoral 
process of the Old Dominion was decidedly democratic. The 
statistical evidence that they have presented to prove their case 
is impressive, but one cannot help but feel that they are 
describing a society that eighteenth-century Virginians would 
not have recognized. Virginians were simply not concerned 
over the question of whether their society was democratic or 
aristocratic. Equity and efficiency, not democracy or aristocracy, 
were the attributes of the political system that were most highly 
valued by Virginians. And most of Virginia's voters, despite 
the rather limited range of choices presented them by the 
county oligarchs, were probably generally satisfied with the 
form of representation they received from the state government. 
Although most representatives to the legislature were far 
wealthier and more socially prominent than their constituents, 
the representatives' interests tended to be consistent with those 
of the rest of Virginia's overwhelmingly agrarian-oriented pop-
ulation. The interests of different counties were often dis-
similar, with conflicts between counties or regions carried over 
into the legislature; but these differences were seldom apparent 
in the politics of the individual counties. Apathy, far more 
than divisiveness or discontent, was the characteristic political 
attitude. Most Virginians were reasonably satisfied with the 
men who served them and did not give much thought to the 
mechanism by which their representatives were selected. 
The casual manner in which delegates were elected was in 
keeping with the informal way in which they conducted busi-
ness when they reached the capital city of Richmond. Dr. 
Johann Schoepf, traveling through Richmond in 1784, described 
the scene with amazement: 
It is said of the Assembly: It sits; but this is not a just ex-
pression, for these members show themselves in every possible 
position rather than that of sitting still, with dignity and atten-
tion. An assembly of men whose object is the serious and im-
portant one of making laws should at least observe a simple 
decorum, but independence prevails here. During the visits 
I made I saw this estimable assembly quiet not 5 minutes 
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together; some are leaving, others coming in, most of them 
talking of insignificant or irrelevant matters, and to judge from 
the indifference and heedlessness of most of their faces it must 
be a trifling business to make laws .... In the ante-room there 
is a tumult quite as constant; here they amuse themselves 
zealously with talk of horse-races, runaway negroes, yesterday's 
play, politics, or it may be, with trafficking.24 
Schoepf's description was in some ways unfair, since most of 
the business of the General Assembly was not accomplished 
on the floor, but in committee. Nevertheless, his description 
was in one important respect an accurate one: surely one of 
the major functions of the annual meeting of the General 
Assembly was to bring together men of experience throughout 
the state to conduct business, renew acquaintances, and meet the 
newer, rising group of Virginia gentry. The only change in this 
easygoing atmosphere came in 1787, when the delegates were 
finally required by law to be prompt in their attendance at the 
opening of the session. St. George Tucker marveled at the 
change: a "fine of ten pounds upon each individual had had 
an operation which the consideration of saving thousands to 
the community could not effect."25 
Representation in the House of Delegates was weighted 
slightly in favor of the eastern and particularly the wealthy 
Northern Neck sections of Virginia, but the disparity was not 
nearly so great as critics of the system claimed. The eastern 
coastal region, extending from the most southerly portion of 
the James River northward to the Rappahannock and from the 
Chesapeake Bay to the fall line, had a free white adult male 
population of 36,758 and a total of seventy-one delegates. The 
Piedmont, running roughly from the fall line to the Blue Ridge 
Mountains, had a free white adult male population of 41,815 
and fifty-two delegates. The 31,520 free white adult males in the 
transmontane west, that portion of Virginia west of the Blue 
24 Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, ed. Alfred J. Morrison. 
2 vols. (Philadelphia, l9ll), 1: 55. 
25 St. George Tucker to Francis Tucker, Richmond, 17 Oct. 1787, Tucker-
Coleman Papers, College of William and Mary. 
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Ridge Mountains, were represented by thirty-six delegates. 
Thus the eastern region of the state, with 33 percent of the free 
white adult male population, possessed 45 percent of the dele-
gates to the lower house; the Piedmont, with 39 percent of that 
population, sent only 32 percent of the delegates to the legis-
lature; and the transmontane west, with 28 percent of the free 
white adult male population, comprised only 23 percent of the 
total delegation to the House of Delegates. 
The most serious problem in the west, however, was not the 
inequity in its representation, but the new problems that were 
created in correcting that disproportion. Because delegates were 
apportioned two to a county, the only way in which to equalize 
representation was to divide the larger, western counties. This 
was done frequently, sixteen new counties being added in the 
years 1788-1800 alone. But each division created new problems. 
Certain groups in the underrepresented areas clamored for 
more representation, but others opposed any division on the 
grounds that it would double the expense of local government. 
And their argument was not without merit. The creation of 
a new county required new justices of the peace, sheriffs, and 
other lesser officials. The usual result was higher tax assessments 
and a chorus of complaints from residents of the new counties.26 
The major complaints from the west were aimed not at the 
failure of the eastern delegates to provide additional representa-
tives, but rather, at the expense involved in obtaining those 
representatives.27 The citizens of Greenbrier County, protesting 
the division of their county, actually refused to pay the increase 
26 A chronological listing of the divisions of Virginia's counties can be found 
in a number of sources, including J. R. B. Daniel, ed., A Hornbook of Virginia 
History (Richmond, 1965), pp. 12-30. The data on representation was based on 
the United States Census, 1790. Free white adult males rather than total popula· 
tion was chosen as the basis for comparison because it is the category that more 
closely (although not exactly) corresponds with the number of eligible voters in 
Virginia. It is also perhaps important to note that the western sections were 
even more underrepresented in the Senate. The transmontane west, with 28 
percent of the free adult white male population, comprised only about 17 percent 
of the membership of the upper house in 1790. 
27 Petition of Amelia County, 16 Nov. 1789, Petition of Mecklenburg County, 
2 Nov. 1793, Petition of Ohio County, 26 Dec. 1798, Petition of Greenbrier 
County, 12 May 1797, Legislative Petitions, VSL. 
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in their new tax assessment. The legislature relented and the 
next year enacted a special measure reducing their assessment. 
Although the desire for additional representation in the west 
was undoubtedly great, it is clear that a great many of Virginia's 
citizens were unwilling to pay the price of that representation.28 
The counties in northwest Virginia, because of their large 
land area and sparse population, suffered most from this 
awkward and expensive method of increasing representation. 
Not surprisingly, these same counties were to constitute a 
stronghold of Federalist sentiment in Virginia by the tum of 
the century. Their attachment to the federal government 
stemmed not from any devotion to the ideology of Federalism, 
but from a dissatisfaction with the way in which the Republican-
dominated state government had handled their problems in 
the past. 
The structure of the new House of Delegates differed little 
from that of the colonial House of Burgesses. The bulk of its 
business was carried on by the five standing committees. Nearly 
all the 170-odd delegates served on at least one of these com-
mittees. The Committee of Propositions and Grievances was 
the largest and most important. It received reports and com-
plaints from citizens in the counties asking for amendment, 
enactment, or repeal of a law. It was from this committee that 
most public and private bills emerged. The Committee of 
Claims, the second most powerful, considered and passed judg-
28Petition of Greenbrier County, 12 Nov. 1791, 7 Dec. 1797, 4 Dec. 1799, 
Legislative Petitions, VSL; Shepherd, Statutes at Large, 2: 245. Van Beck Hall, 
"A Quantitative Approach to the Social, Economic and Political Structure of 
Virginia, 1790-1810" (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the Southern Historical Association, October 1969), has quite properly stressed 
that underrepresentation in the legislature was a major western grievance. He 
further demonstrates that the western delegates in the legislature invariably 
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the division of western counties. These votes 
generally took place, however, only after a preponderance of petitions from the 
counties affected indicated that the residents of those counties approved of a 
division. Once an individual county agreed to bear the financial burden that a 
division of the county entailed, the other western counties had absolutely nothing 
to lose by voting in favor of such a division. But it is also clear that a great 
many proposals to divide counties were never brought to a vote in the legislature 
because of the flood of petitions from the county involved which protested 
division. 
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menton all claims filed by counties and individuals against the 
state. As had been the case since the Revolution, most of its 
work consisted of old war claims.29 The Committee of Courts 
of Justice had the most difficult task. The House, because it so 
dominated affairs of state, exercised executive and judicial 
functions in addition to its regular legislative business. The 
Committee of Courts of Justice decided whether a claim or 
petition should be considered by the House or sent to another 
state agency. If it fell under the jurisdiction of the House 
they sent it to the appropriate standing committee for further 
scrutiny.30 The Committee of Privileges and Elections, so im-
portant in the colonial House of Burgesses, lost much of its 
usefulness when the threat of imperial authority to parliamen-
tary privilege was eliminated. In the post-revolutionary period 
its function was to certify elections and to rule on election 
disputes.1ll The Committee of Religion, always the least im-
portant of the standing committees, was weakened by the dis-
establishment of the Episcopal Church. Its duty was to see 
that no House business was conducted during the morning 
prayer. The committee also had jurisdiction over suits for 
divorce-another indication of the imbalance of power between 
the judicial and legislative branches.32 
Except for the Speaker, who was in charge of committee 
appointments, the chairmen of the five standing committees 
were the most powerful members of the House. They not only 
controlled the House proceedings from their own committees 
but also served on the greatest number of special committees 
as well. These committees, ranging from the committee charged 
with the responsibility of drafting the tax bill to the committee 
to prepare a bill "for the killing of wolves," usually drafted the 
specific pieces of legislation which the standing committees 
had recommended.a3 
The House leaders were an impressive group of wealthy, 
29 House journal, 15, 24 Nuv. 1794, 18 Nov. 1796. 
30 Thomas Evans to John Cropper, 30 Nov. 1794, John Cropper Papers. 
31 House journal, 9 Nov. 1796. 
32Ibid., 19 Nov. 1794, 18 Nov. 1796. 
33 Ibid. 
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well-born, and well-respected men. Thirty-three men dom-
inated the business of the House of Delegates between the 
years of 1788 and 1800.34 This number would have been even 
smaller had there not been a flow of prominent Virginians from 
the state legislature to the various branches of the new national 
government. This exodus opened up committee chairmanships 
that had been held by the same men for years. When prominent 
figures such as John Taylor, James Madison, or William Branch 
Giles returned from the politics of the nation's capital, they 
immediately stepped back into the chairmanships of their 
respective committees.35 
The men who controlled the affairs of the House had im-
pressive family ties. Eighteen of the thirty-three leaders came 
from the highest strata of Virginia society. In this group were 
three Lees, two Harrisons, two Cabells, two Taylors, Francis 
Corbin, John Page, Wilson Cary Nicholas, Carter Braxton, 
Wilson Miles Cary, William Overton Callis, Edmund Ran-
dolph, French Strother, and Patrick Henry. Another seven, 
John Wise, Zachariah Johnston, Larkin Smith, Thomas Mad-
ison, William Branch Giles, William Tate, and John Marshall 
had improved their own lesser-gentry background by marrying 
into more prominent Virginia families. Only eight of the thirty-
three, Nathaniel Wilkinson, Robert Andrews, Joseph Eggleston, 
Thomas Mathews, Thomas Evans, William Foushee, John 
Guerrant, and Miles King, were without immediate ties to the 
first families of Virginia.36 Although influential family con-
34 See Appendix 1. 
35 House journal, 3 Dec. 1789, 9 Nov. 1796. 
36 It is much easier to prove that men did have prominent family connections 
than it is to prove that they did not, since the absence of information attesting to 
distinctive heritages is not irrefutable proof that they did not exist. Information 
for those listed in Appendix 1 was gleaned from William and Mary Quarterly, 
lst ser., 9: 39; Beveridge, Life of Marshall, 1: 9-11, 148-200; Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography 12: 434; Barton H. Wise, The Life of Henry A. Wise 
(New York, 1899), pp. 8-12; Hugh H. Mcllhany, Some Prominent Virginia 
Families (Staunton, Va., 1903), 100-107; Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch 
Giles: A Biography (Menasha, Wis., 1915), pp. 1·36. I have not felt it necessary 
to give references for those men, such as the Lees, Cabells, and Harrisons, whose 
family names were enough immediately to identify them as members of the 
aristocracy. A search of Lyon G. Tyler, Cyclopedia of Virginia Biography (New 
York, 1915); Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine (all volumes); 
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nections were important to a man's political career, they were 
not a guarantee of political success. Intermarriage between the 
many branches of the prominent families (and the newer, 
increasingly prominent families) had become so widespread 
by the 1790s that the number of those included in the circle 
of Virginians with an impressive genealogy had become legion. 
A politician from a prominent family seeking to capitalize on 
his family connections might find that he had competition not 
only from other prominent families but also from members 
of his own family. Thus, there were also many delegates 
possessing impressive family lineages who were excluded from 
positions of leadership.37 
The House leaders were generally men of substantial wealth. 
Ten were among the one hundred richest men in Virginia, 
with land holdings ranging among them from 4,000 to 22,000 
acres.38 The remainder were men of comfortable means. 
Twelve were farmers and planters on a more modest scale. 
Three of these owned between 2,000 and 4,000 acres and seven 
between 1,000 and 2,000 acres. Only two could be classed as 
small farmers, holding less than 500 acres. The other nine were 
professional men, whose wealth is more difficult to ascertain 
because it was not usually tied up in taxable property. Their 
security holdings and slaveholdings however indicate that they 
too were men of affluence. There were six lawyers, two phy-
sicians, and one minister among this last group. The only 
leader whose wealth is not known, Thomas Mathews, was 
probably a merchant.39 
Although nineteen of the thirty-three House leaders lived 
in the eastern coastal region, the role of the west in the House 
was steadily increasing. In the 1790s the Piedmont area was 
William and Mary Quarterly, 1st and 2d ser. (all volumes); Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography (all volumes); and myriad county histories and genealogies 
failed to turn up evidence on the eight men without apparent influential family 
ties. 
37 Swem and Williams, Register of the General Assembly, pp. 30-31. 
38 Property holdings for the one hundred wealthiest men in Virginia are listed 
in Jackson T. Main, "The One Hundred," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 
lO (1954): 368-83. 
39 See Appendix l. 
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the home of eleven prominent leaders; the remainder of west-
em Virginia had three men in positions of leadership.40 The 
increasing power of the western region in the House was not 
the product of any gradual democratization; it merely meant 
that the same families who had dominated the affairs of the 
state in the past had themselves begun to move westward. 
A composite picture of leadership in the lower house shows 
an impressive continuity with the past. The prominent names 
in the House of Delegates differed little from those in the 
colonial House of Burgesses, and wealth continued to be an 
important ingredient in political power. Nearly all leaders 
had college educations, a distinctive mark of the upper class 
in agrarian Virginia. Although the west was contributing more 
prominent legislators than it had in the past, this only indicated 
that the state was becoming more homogeneous, with the Pied-
mont and even the transmontane west adopting the settled 
and oligarchic characteristics of the coastal region. Perhaps the 
most significant thing about the House leaders was their ex-
perience. They had served their county and state for many 
years, and their fathers and grandfathers had often served before 
them. They were acutely conscious of their role as the states-
men of Virginia and this sense of duty impelled them to assume 
the bulk of the committee work of the House. More important, 
it made them jealous of any encroachment on their power, 
whether from the state or from the new national government.41 
By the 1780s, at least, some of Virginia's more perceptive 
citizens were beginning to question certain features of their 
mode of government; there were signs that it was becoming 
antiquated and was now inadequate to the needs of an in-
creasingly complex society. Thomas Jefferson, who had for a 
long time expressed dissatisfaction with many of the provisions 
of the Virginia constitution, subjected it to a detailed, systematic 
criticism in 1782 when he wrote his Notes on Virginia. He 
40 Ibid. 
41 Jack P. Greene, "Foundations of Political Power in the Virginia House of 
Burgesses," pp. 485-506. 
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saw three principal defects. First, he objected to the property 
qualification for voters and asked that all "who pay and fight" 
for the support of government be given the franchise. Second, 
he disliked the method of representation in the lower house; 
instead of the outmoded and often unfair system of allowing 
each county two representatives, he thought that representation 
should be apportioned by population. Finally, he deplored 
the lack of an adequate separation of powers between the three 
branches of government, and in particular, he decried the grant 
of excessive power to the lower house.42 
By 1788 Jefferson had gained the support of other progressive-
minded Virginians. Madison, Edmund Randolph, and Archi-
bald Stuart joined the fight to convince local leaders of the 
need for constitutional reform. Stuart had acted as lobbyist 
for Jefferson and Madison in the Virginia General Assembly. 
He had prepared a new draft of a constitution in 1785 in case 
the legislature should agree to call a convention to consider 
revision. Unfortunately, hostility to state constitutional reform 
was so great that he never had an opportunity to use it. Stuart 
had even suggested that the Virginia Federalists in the Ratifying 
Convention of 1788 should try to gain two objects at once: 
adoption of the new federal Constitution and major amend-
ments to Virginia's old constitution. He was dissuaded by 
Madison, who feared that the opponents of either object would 
band together to defeat both.43 
Most of Virginia's ruling elite viewed revision both as a 
threat to their own positions and as unnecessary tinkering with 
institutions that had served Virginia well, but many of the 
citizens of the state, particularly the disfranchised, were not 
satisfied with the operation of the existing constitution. "A 
Mechanic" complained to the editors of the Columbian Mirror 
and Alexandria Advertiser that it was grossly unfair to prevent 
42 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in Ford, ed., jefferson's Writings, 
3: 222-35. 
43 "Proposed Draft of Virginia Constitution, 1785," Stuart Family Papers, 
VHS; James Madison to Archibald Stuart, New York, 30 Oct. I 787, Stuart Family 
Papers; Jefferson to Stuart, Philadelphia, 23 Dec. 1791, in Ford, ed., .Jefferson's 
Writings, 5: 408-11. 
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a skilled artisan who worked hard, paid taxes, and served in the 
militia from participating in the political process simply because 
he lacked the necessary freehold. He could find no other reason 
for this inequity "but that the dregs of Monarchy and British 
influence were not quite purged off at the formation of the 
laws."44 "Analyticus," writing shortly after the presidential cam-
paign of 1796, laid the blame much closer to home. He thought 
it strange that the very people who had complained the loudest 
over the aristocratic elements in the federal government were 
the same men who had strongly opposed attempts to eliminate 
undemocratic features of the state constitution. He then gave 
his readers a lesson in practical political theory: 
An aristocracy is a government where all the power is possessed 
by a few titled individuals-an obligarchy is a government 
where a few individuals are possessed with the same power, 
but without titles; and such was the government of Virginia 
before the establishment of the Federal constitution-where a 
few influential individuals, (if not families) had, in a consider-
able degree, the direction of the affairs of the whole state. This, 
it is true, was not established by any law, but circumstances 
and the habits of the people, gave it a sufficient sanction; yet 
I have often thought it extraordinary to hear those very gentle-
men loudest in the cry against aristocracy. But it is a trick, 
common enough with those who are most guilty, to be always 
first in accusing their neighbors. There is no other way in 
accounting for the violent opposition of persons of this cast, 
to the general government, than by bringing into view the 
chagrin they have experienced, by the federal constitution hav-
ing in a great measure, stripped them of those oligarchical 
powers which they enjoyed in their own state, without giving 
them an equivalent for it in the government of the union.45 
"Analyticus," although writing for partisan ends, had hit 
upon the major contradiction between the rhetoric and the 
reality of the Antifederalists' opposition to the new government. 
The Antifederalists, and later the Republicans, constantly con-
44 Columbian Mirror and Alexandria Advertiser, 27 Sept. 1796. 
45 Ibid., 15 Dec. 1796. 
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demned the central government as an engine of aristocracy, 
while at the same time they rebuffed all attempts to alter or 
weaken their own oligarchical control over the state and county 
government of Virginia. Although they would ally themselves 
with men like Jefferson in their struggle against the centralizing 
tendencies of the new government, their reasons for opposing 
that government were not entirely consonant with those of the 
planter-statesman from Monticello. Jefferson combined his be-
lief in the efficacy of local government with at least a mild 
commitment to egalitarianism; his followers in Virginia shared 
his attachment to local government, but they too often used 
that system of government as an instrument to thwart the 
advancement of those egalitarian ideals. As a result, few Vir-
ginians were willing to apply to their own government the same 
critical standards that they insisted in applying to the federal 
government. For every citizen like "Analyticus," there were 
many holding the views of "A Real Farmer," who asked, "from 
what human production may we not expect defects; is it not 
therefore safer to remain as we are rather than risk a reform 
which probably may be more defective?"46 This disinclination 
to experiment for fear that things might be made worse, or 
for fear that their own power and prestige might be threatened, 
was a common thread through the Antifederalists' arguments 
against adoption both of the federal Constitution and of major 
amendments to the state's plan of government. 
Despite this widespread aversion to innovation, Edmund 
Randolph, in December 1789, attempted to persuade the Vir-
ginia House of Delegates to consider a plan of revision for the 
state constitution.47 Randolph prefaced his remarks with a 
tribute to the framers of the Constitution of 1776, but added 
"that having always lived in a dependency on the English mon-
archy, they were destitute" of any practical knowledge in the 
46 Ibid., 15 Sept. 1796. 
47 Although the resolution criticizing the Virginia Constitution has been men· 
tioned by Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of john Marshall, 4 vols. (New York, 
1916-1919), 2: 56n, its authorship has been hitherto unknown. I have found 
evidence that Randolph was the author in John Dawson to James Madison, 
Richmond, 17 Dec. 1789, Madison Papers; and Arthur Campbell to Zachariah 
Johnston, Richmond, 21 Nov. 1791, Zachariah Johnston Papers, VSL. 
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techniques of constitution-making.48 His first cnt1osm was 
aimed at the "unbounded extent of the legislative power." The 
framers, he said, had overreacted to the abuses of the royal 
governors. By vesting the legislature with nearly unlimited 
power they had created a new source of tyranny, and the result 
was that the "constitution has been invaded by some law or 
another of almost every session." By passing bills of attainder, 
ex post facto laws, and general assessments for the support of 
religion the legislature had ignored principles contained in the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights. The first two were now for-
bidden by the federal Constitution and the last by action of 
the legislature itself, but the Assembly still possessed power to 
suspend habeas corpus regardless of any clear indication of 
public danger.49 
Randolph also objected to the Assembly's control over ap-
pointments. The legislators elected the governor, members 
of the Council of State, militia generals, United States senators, 
state judges, and a host of lesser state officials. In addition, the 
governor and his council appointed justices of the peace, sheriffs, 
county clerks, and militia officers below the rank of general. 
Since the governor and council were dependent upon the legis-
lature for election each year, they were careful not to appoint 
anyone of whom the legislature might disapprove. Because of 
its hold on the executive branch, the legislature had practical 
control over nearly every state and local office in the Old 
Dominion. The overseers of the poor, who were elected in 
their individual counties, were the only public officials who 
escaped this influence of the Assembly. Nor was the legislature 
always vigilant in maintaining a high standard in its appoint-
ments. Randolph observed that in spite of an office-seeker's 
"merit out of doors [he J will be too weak to combat the solicita-
tion of a brother in office .... The obstacles then are multiplied 
against talents and virtue, which are sufficiently countenanced 
by the feeble discernment of a large assembly, considered as 
the source of all appointments."50 
48House Journal, 8 Dec. 1789. 
49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 
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Randolph would have agreed with the eminent jurist St. 
George Tucker in his assessment of the executive branch. 
Tucker, in an appendix to his 1803 edition of Blackstone's 
Commentaries, noted that the "executive department in Vir-
ginia is chosen, paid, directed, and removed by the legislature. 
It possesses not a single feature of independence."51 And the 
post-revolutionary governors did not complain of their de-
pendent status; most of them had served as leaders in the lower 
house and were in harmony with its policies. In times of crisis, 
the governor had even been known to resign his post to take a 
seat in the House of Delegates, where his influence on legisla-
tion might be greater.52 
The judiciary was even less independent of legislative in-
fluence than was the governor. Virginia's constitution never 
fully defined the jurisdiction of the various state courts-the 
result being that no one was sure who had the authority to 
hear a given case. Nor did it define the extent of the judiciary's 
power. It was still an open question whether any of the state 
courts could void an act of the legislature. Randolph believed 
that the result of this lack of definition in the courts' authority 
would be "that every command of the Legislature is to be 
executed without hesitation, or the Judiciary and Legislature 
will be in eternal strife." Since the legislators controlled the 
appointments, salaries, and removals of state judges, there 
could be no doubt as to which side would win such a contest.53 
The lower house was also plagued by defects within its 
internal structure. Randolph was particularly displeased with 
the system of electing new delegates each year, for he believed 
that it resulted in a multiplicity of laws, in a disregard of past 
policy, and in a continual loss of valuable experience among the 
membership of the legislature. He was similarly distressed with 
the method of legislative apportionment which stipulated that 
51 Ibid.; St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries; with Notes of Refer· 
ence, to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United 
States ... (Philadelphia, 1803), bk. 1, pt. 1, Appendix, p. 119. 
52 Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders, pp. 95-96; Edmund Randolph to James 
Madison, Richmond, 10 Nov. 1788, in Conway, Edmund Randolph, p. 121. 
53 House journal, 8 Dec. 1788. 
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each county be given only two representatives in the House of 
Delegates, regardless of population. Randolph was not so much 
concerned with the inequity, as he was with the inefficiency, of 
this system. The House had been willing to subdivide counties 
when their population warranted additional representation, but 
the effect of this was to make itself too large to deal efficiently 
with the problems of the state. The House had grown from 
126 members in 1776 to 173 members in 1789, and new counties 
were being added every year.54 
Randolph concluded his critique by asking that "our own 
Constitution be compared with that of the United States, and 
retrenched where it is repugnant." This plea could hardly have 
appealed to those who were hostile to the new federal Constitu-
tion, and the delegates' reaction to his suggestion made it obvious 
that it did not. A counterresolution was offered, bluntly stating 
that Randolph's proposals contained "principles repugnant to 
Republican Government, and dangerous to the freedom of this 
country, and therefore ought not to meet with the approbation 
of this House, or to be recommended to the consideration of 
the people." With that hostile response, the resolution to 
amend the state constitution was laid on the table, never to 
be revived.55 
Efforts to amend the state constitution engendered as much 
heat as did the fight to call a convention to amend the federal 
Constitution. The friends of state constitutional revision were 
disconsolate and not a little displeased with the heavy-handed 
manner in which Randolph presented his critique of the state 
government. Most of Virginia's political leaders took offense at 
the bluntness of his attack on the state government. Such was 
their attachment to their traditional forms of local, decentral-
ized government that Randolph's proposal served only to 
strengthen their determination to preserve the state constitution 
from amendment and to set back the cause of constitutional 
revision a few more years. 56 
54 Ibid.; Swem and Williams, Register of the General Assembly, p. 31. 
55 Ibid. 
56 John Dawson to James Madison, Richmond, 17 Dec. 1789, Madison Papers. 
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It is all too easy to blame Virginia's leaders for being obstruc-
tive and self-interested in matters relating to state constitutional 
reform. Most of them, however, were genuinely outraged at 
Randolph's attack on the state government. That government 
had, after all, been a significant factor in the growth of a strong 
and independent-minded ruling class during the colonial period 
and had provided the state with a measure of stability during 
the hectic years of the Revolution. The members of the Virginia 
legislature, who constituted the social, political, and economic 
elite of their society, viewed themselves as just and responsible 
rulers and therefore saw no need for innovation in the structure 
of their state government. And their opposition to such innova-
tion sprung from the same source of political belief as did their 
efforts to amend, and weaken, the new federal Constitution. 
Both were products of the desire to preserve and protect the 
institutions which they believed had worked so well for Vir-
ginians for over a century. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Antifederalist Fears 
Confirmed 
IT wAs NOT UNTIL the First Congress of the United States had 
convened that Virginians faced the full consequences of their 
decision to join the union. All the charges and countercharges 
over the nature of the general government had been, up to 
that date, pure conjecture. But when the new government 
actually commenced operation, the Antifederalists faced the 
unhappy prospect of seeing all their dire predictions come true. 
The months following adjournment of the state legislature 
in November 1788 had not been particularly encouraging for 
the Antifederalists. The attempt to call a second convention 
had proved abortive. Virginia and New York alone advocated 
such a drastic measure; the other states either failed to respond 
or declined on the grounds that a convention at such an early 
date would be inexpedient and potentially disruptive for the 
union.1 Virginia's Antifederalists grudgingly came to realize 
that they would have to depend on Congress to frame the neces-
sary amendments. Worse, the congressional elections had not 
gone well for the Antifederalists; of the ten representatives 
elected from Virginia, only three had opposed ratification of 
the Constitution.2 Yet this was not as disastrous for the Anti-
federalists as it first appeared, since many of Virginia's Federalist 
congressmen were also committed to major alterations in the 
Constitution. In fact, the Federalist representatives from Vir-
ginia sided more often with the Antifederalist opponents than 
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with their Federalist colleagues from the North. As soon as 
Congress began its deliberations it became clear that the Fed-
eralists in Virginia, when faced with the choice of remaining 
loyal to Federalist orthodoxy or acting in accordance with their 
own, locally oriented interests, would usually choose the latter. 3 
The Antifederalists were most heartened by Madison's con-
tinuing transformation from a confirmed nationalist to a 
staunch defender of Virginia's interests. He not only had 
ceased to oppose amendments but also had actually initiated 
the call for them in the First Congress. Hoping to win over 
his Antifederalist opponents by leading the fight for amend-
ments, he was at the same time attempting to keep the proceed-
ings under his own control so as to prevent the Antifederalists 
from enacting measures drastically curtailing the power of the 
central government. This strategy had been suggested to him 
by his Virginia ally, Henry "Lighthorse Harry" Lee, who had 
warned against offering the opposition any improper conces-
sions, but who at the same time had urged that the House of 
Representatives "disarm them by complying with the rational 
views of the advocates for amendments spontaneously."4 In 
pursuing this course Madison walked a fine line. He risked 
alienating those staunch Federalists who were opposed to any 
alteration of the Constitution, while at the same time failing 
to satisfy those who wanted amendments of a more radical 
nature. Considering the feeling on both sides, Madison did not 
fare badly. 
Congress drafted twelve amendments, including the ten 
1 George Clinton to Governor Beverly Randolph, New York, 5 May 1789, 
Thomas Mifflin to Randolph, 6 March 1789, John Hancock to Randolph, 21 Feb. 
1789, Communications to the Executive, VSL; Randolph to the Speaker of the 
House of Delegates, Oct. 1789, Executive Letterbooks. 
2 The seven Federalists were Andrew Moore, Alexander White, Richard Bland 
Lee, John Page, Samuel Griffin, John Browne, and James Madison. The three 
Antifederalist congressmen were Josiah Parker, Isaac Coles, and Theodorick 
Bland. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, New York, 27 March 1789, in Hunt, 
ed., Madison's Writings, 5: 334. 
3 See the speeches by Virginia's congressmen in U.S., Annals of Congress, 1st 
Cong., 1st sess., 1789, 1: 424-49, 660-65, 704-76. 
4 Henry Lee to George Washington, Stratford, I July 1789, The Papers of 
George Washington, LC. 
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eventually adopted by the states; the two amendments excluded 
from the Bill of Rights-one to augment the number of repre-
sentatives in the House and the other to prevent senators and 
representatives from increasing their compensation while in 
office-were ultimately rejected by the states.5 The amendments 
were the result of many compromises; they did much to allay 
the fears of those who were concerned with the protection of 
individual liberties, but were less successful in appeasing those 
Antifederalists who desired a radical transfer of power away 
from the central government to the states. Few people in 
Congress were satisfied, but Madison had at least met some of 
his constituents' demands without substantially weakening the 
Constitution. 
Perhaps the most helpful factor in reconciling Virginians 
to the set of limited amendments, as well as to the Constitution 
itself, was that George Washington of Mount Vernon, Virginia, 
occupied the chair of the chief magistrate. The Constitution 
probably would never have been carried in Virginia had it not 
been a generally accepted fact that Washington would be the 
first president, and his influence continued to muffle criticism 
when the government commenced operation.6 
Yet despite ·washington's prestige and Madison's amend-
ments, many Virginians remained unreconciled to the Con-
stitution in its present form. Senators William Grayson and 
Richard Henry Lee had tried in vain to obtain amendments 
of a more substantial nature; their failure to do so served only 
to increase their disenchantment with the federal government. 
Lee wrote to Patrick Henry in despair: "We might as well have 
attempted to move Mount Atlas upon our shoulders. In fact, 
the idea of subsequent amendments was little better than 
putting oneself to death first, in expectation that the doctor, 
who wishes our destruction, would afterward restore us to life."7 
5 For a discussion of the framing of the Bill of Rights see Robert Allen 
Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1955), 
pp. 190-218. 
6 James Monroe to Jefferson, 17 July 1788, in Hamilton, ed., Monroe's Writings, 
1: 186. 
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Henry agreed. He was convinced that the congressional amend-
ments would "tend to injure rather than serve the cause of 
liberty." They would have the effect of lulling the suspicions 
of those initially hostile to the government without removing 
the cause for those suspicions. Henry was willing to trade the 
whole pack of amendments for just one limiting Congress's 
authority over direct taxation.8 
The Antifederalists pointed to other portents of danger in 
the new government. The debate in Congress over the proper 
form of address for public officials seemed symptomatic of the 
government's monarchical tendencies. Vice President John 
Adams, the leading advocate of a formal title for the chief 
executive, seemed to personify the faults of the new govern-
ment. His political theory, his New England bias, and his 
cantankerous nature were abhorrent to most Virginians. Even 
the Virginia Federalists were perturbed by the attempt to 
bestow titles on the president.9 This effort was in the end 
unsuccessful, but the episode did little to ease the minds of 
those initially hostile to the government. 
The apparent victory of the North in the contest for the 
permanent site of the nation's capital provided another cause 
for suspicion. Here was an issue upon which Virginia's Fed-
eralists and Antifederalists could unite; their common regional 
interests took precedence over any ideological differences. Con-
sequently, Virginia's representatives in Congress and, indeed, 
all southern representatives desired that the capital site be 
fixed on the Potomac River. Toward the close of the first 
session however, congressmen from Pennsylvania and New 
England devised a plan to locate the capital in Pennsylvania, 
on the Susquehanna River. The House adopted this plan, but 
the Senate amended it slightly by moving the site closer to 
7 Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, New York, 14 Sept. 1789, in Ballagh, ed., 
Richard Henry Lee, 2: 501-4. 
8 Patrick Henry to Richard Henry Lee, Prince Edward County, 28 Aug. 1789, 
Henry Papers; David Stuart to George Washington, Abingdon, 12 Sept. 1789, in 
Documentary History, 5: 205. 
9 John Page to St. George Tucker, New York, 7 Feb. 1790, Tucker-Coleman 
Papers. 
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Philadelphia. The spirit of the amended version was the same; 
the capital would be located in the North, far from the interests 
of Virginia. The hasty adjournment of Congress, however, and 
possibly the grumblings of Southern congressmen postponed 
final action on the bill until the next session.10 The repre-
sentatives from Virginia were nevertheless faced with the un-
pleasant fact that the Northern members of Congress, by in-
sisting on aN orthern site for the capital, had proved themselves 
willing to use their majority to further their interests at the 
expense of those of the South. And Virginians were not pleased 
with the prospect. Madison, increasingly mindful of Southern 
interests, warned the Northern representatives in Congress that 
Virginia never would have ratified the Constitution if the 
members of the Ratifying Convention had been aware that their 
wishes would be disregarded with such impunity.U 
Despite their fears of "Northern domination," Virginians 
could, by the time the General Assembly convened in October 
1789, take some comfort in the fact that Congress had not 
actually passed any legislation adversely affecting their interests. 
A set of moderate amendments had been adopted, the idea of 
titled officers had been rejected, and the North's bid for the 
permanent seat of government had been at least temporarily 
delayed. The other two major pieces of congressional legislation 
-an act initiating an impost and one establishing a judiciary 
system-had met with a generally friendly reception in Vir-
ginia.12 The fears of Virginians were further assuaged by the 
changing attitudes of their Federalist representatives. Madison 
10 For a good brief treatment of this issue, and indeed of all the early opera-
tions of the federal government, see Richard Hildreth, History of the United 
States, 6 vols. (New York, 1854-1855), 4: 127-29. 
11 The issue of the location of the permanent capital was merely one of the 
first of many where the interests of the North and South conflicted, and where 
Southerners came to realize that their sectional interests were substantially 
different from those of the North. It is a mistake, however, to read into these 
differences the more basic conflicts that would ultimately lead to civil war. 
There was, it seems, a qualitative difference between the issues of the 1790s, 
which were all capable of compromise, and the more deep-seated differences of 
the antebellum period. Annals of Congress, 1: 857. 
12 Mann Page to Richard Henry Lee, Mann's Field, 23 July 1789, Lee Family 
Papers: Henry Lee to Madison, Alexandria, 10 June 1789, Madison Papers. 
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was now considered the patron of amendments and Virginia's 
other Federalist congressmen had followed his lead. In their 
first year in Congress they had proved that, while they con-
tinued to support the idea of a national government and re-
mained unwilling to join the Antifederalists in their sweeping 
attacks on the new government, they also were not prepared 
to vote in opposition to Virginia's interests merely for the 
sake of maintaining harmony with Northern Federalists.13 This 
combination of moderation on the part of Congress as a whole 
and of Virginia's Federalists in particular made circumstances 
more favorable for the federal government in Virginia than 
at any time since the Ratifying Convention. As the Virginia 
Assembly began its fall session, it appeared that the federal 
government might finally receive the approbation of the Old 
Dominion's state officials. 
Some of the foes of the federal government were not pre-
pared to allow it to escape censure. Senators Lee and Grayson 
made one more attempt to alert the state legislature to the 
dangers of the government. On September 28, 1789, they wrote 
a formal letter to the Speaker of the House of Delegates 
apologizing for their inability to procure more radical amend-
ments. They refused to take their defeat lightly, declaring: 
"It is impossible for us not to see the necessary tendency to 
consolidated empire in the natural operation of the constitution, 
if no further amended than as now proposed; and it is equally 
impossible for us not to be apprehensive for Civil Liberty, 
when we know of no instance in the records of history, that 
shew a people ruled in freedom, when subject to one undivided 
government, and inhabiting a territory so extensive as that 
of the United States." They were persuaded that unless the 
states renewed their efforts to revise the Constitution, the 
present system would bring "the annihilation of the state gov-
ernments."14 
13 Edward Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 9 Sept. 1789, Madison Papers; 
see esp., Annals of Congress I: 836·900. 
14 Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson to the Honorable Speaker of the 
House of Representatives in Virginia, New York, 28 Sept. 1789, in Documentary 
History, 5: 217-18. 
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The call for renewed opposition went forth. It contained the 
familiar refrains; it cried out against consolidation and be-
moaned the destruction of state sovereignty by a Northern 
majority. This time, however, the Virginia legislature did not 
respond favorably to the challenge. The congressional amend-
ments, submitted to the General Assembly for ratification dur-
ing the first week of November, were discussed intermittently 
during the next month. Patrick Henry "was disposed to do 
more antifoederal business," but all his efforts were in vain.15 
He tried to round up support for an address thanking Lee and 
Grayson for their efforts to obtain more radical amendments in 
Congress, but the two Virginia senators seemed to have tem-
porarily lost the confidence of most of the members of the state 
legislature. Even some Antifederalists considered their letter 
to the Speaker of the House to be intemperate, and conse-
quently, Henry's proposed address failed to come to a vote.16 
Henry also attempted to postpone for a full year consideration 
of the congressional amendments on the grounds that the 
legislators had been elected prior to the drafting of them and 
thus were not competent to know the sense of their con-
stituents on the question. This was a tactical maneuver, since 
neither Henry nor anyone else in the House of Delegates 
previously had shown any concern for the constituent power. 
Only in a few cases had the citizens of a county ever instructed 
their delegates how to vote. Henry and his colleagues, when 
elected to the lower house, had always considered themselves 
free agents. It was their duty to protect the interests of their 
county, but the best way to do this, they believed, was to vote 
and act independently of the influence of their less-informed 
constituents. Faced with the proposal to postpone action on 
the amendments for a year, the delegates decided to act inde-
pendently of Henry's influence as well; the motion for post-
ponement was killed before it could be brought to the floor 
for a vote.17 
Once Henry's tactical ploys were exhausted, debate on the 
15 Edward Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 20 Dec. 1789, Madison Papers. 
16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 
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amendments began in earnest. The first ten amendments re-
ceived near-unanimous approval from Federalists and Anti-
federalists alike, but the eleventh and twelfth amendments, 
those reserving power to the people and the states, ran into 
difficulty. Randolph, who continued to support the new gov-
ernment while at the same time remaining steadfast in his 
advocacy of major amendments to the Constitution, led the 
opposition. The eleventh amendment was worded: "The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."18 
Randolph objected to the vagueness of the amendment; in his 
opinion the first ten amendments did not include all those 
rights necessary for the preservation of the liberties of the 
people, and the eleventh amendment set down no criterion by 
which it could be determined whether a right was retained or 
not. He believed that an amendment explicitly limiting Con-
gress's powers would be more effective than a vaguely worded 
one protecting unspecified rights of the people. His opposition 
to the twelfth amendment, which reserved power to the states, 
was based on the same grounds.l9 
Randolph's opposition to the eleventh and twelfth amend-
ments threatened the passage of the other ten. Not everyone 
was able to comprehend the logic behind his objections, but 
there were some Antifederalists in the legislature, unhappy 
because the congressional amendments were too weak, who 
were perfectly willing to use his opposition as an excuse to 
reject the whole package of amendments. In addition, there 
were many delegates, including some reluctant Federalists, 
who believed that the eleventh and twelfth amendments were 
vital to the proper limitation of the new government's authority. 
They approved of all the amendments, but thought it unwise 
to adopt the first ten if the last two were stricken. Randolph 
succeeded in persuading the Committee of the Whole to reject 
the eleventh and twelfth amendments, but, after a few days of 
behind-the-scenes wrangling a coalition of Federalists and 
18 Ibid.; Hardin Burnley to Madison, Richmond, 28 Nov. 1789, Madison Papers. 
19 Edward Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 20 Dec. 1789, Madison Papers. 
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moderate Antifederalists, weary of bickering over amendments 
and anxious to ensure the peaceful operation of the new govern-
ment, succeeded in obtaining the necessary majority to overrule 
the committee's recommendation. On November 30, 1789, the 
House of Delegates adopted all twelve amendments.20 
The amendments next went to the state senate for approval, 
and in a relatively infrequent display of independence, the 
senate confronted the lower house with unyielding opposition. 
Antifederalist Stevens Thomson Mason persuaded his col-
leagues to reject the third (freedom of speech, press, and re-
ligion), the eighth (trial by jury), and the eleventh and 
twelfth amendments on the grounds that they were too weak. 
According to Hardin Burnley, Madison's neighbor in Orange 
County, the senate was not really dissatisfied with the twelve 
amendments, but was "apprehensive that the adoption of them 
at this time will be an obstacle to the chief object of their 
pursuit, the amendment on the subject of direct taxation."21 
In short, the Antifederalist strategy was to reject the most 
popular amendments, such as that guaranteeing religious liberty, 
and throw the whole subject back at Congress, where the 
project for an amendment regarding direct taxation might be 
revived.22 
The House of Delegates refused to accede to the senate's 
rejection of the third, eighth, eleventh, and twelfth amendments 
and the senate in turn refused to be bullied into adopting all 
twelve. By the middle of December it was apparent that a 
stalemate could not be averted and supporters of amendments 
in the House decided to postpone any consideration of amend-
ments until the composition of both houses was more favorable. 
\Vith this tactical retreat, the controversy temporarily subsided. 
Although Virginia was the first state to consider the con-
gressional amendments, it was the last to adopt them. Two 
years later, in December 1791, after it had become clear that 
other states were willing to ratify the congressional amendments 
20 Hardin Burnley to Madison, Richmond, 5 Dec. 1789, Madison Papers. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Irving Brant, fames Madison, 3: 286·87. 
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in spite of the opposition to them in Virginia, the upper and 
lower houses of Assembly finally came to an agreement and 
added their assent.23 
The Antifederalists in the House of Delegates, despite their 
support of the congressional amendments, did not abandon 
their attempts to obtain additional amendments of a more 
substantial nature. On December 5, 1789, they proposed a 
harshly worded resolution demanding that Congress adopt the 
amendments proposed by the Virginia Convention, but the 
Federalists, by the tie-breaking vote of Speaker Thomas Mat-
hews, managed to defeat the measure.24 Patrick Henry, dis-
mayed by his inability to dominate the House as he had done 
in the past, had left the city for his home in Prince Edward 
County when the vote was taken. Even the Federalist members 
admitted that the result might have been different had he 
been present to exert his influence on the delegates who 
were undecided.25 As it was, a milder resolution urging Con-
gress to reconsider the Virginia amendments passed without 
division. 26 
The Virginia senate's refusal to ratify the congressional 
amendments and the resolution asking Congress to amend the 
Constitution more drastically were signs that the general 
government had not met with full acceptance by all Virginians. 
On the other hand, supporters of the government had cause for 
some optimism: most Virginians had at least recognized the 
new government as a fact of life. The obstinacy of the state 
senate, far from rallying support for those who wished to bring 
about the downfall of the government, only served to discredit 
them in the eyes of those who opposed the government in its 
present form, but who nevertheless hoped that the amendments 
would remedy its defects. The Baptists were especially angry. 
Although they had initially opposed the Constitution, the Fed-
eralists had begun to court their support. The senate's rejection 
23House .Journal, 13, 14 Dec. 1789; Senate .Journal, 14 Dec. 1789; Hening, 
Statutes at Large, 12: 327-29. 
24 House .Journal, 5 Dec 1789. 
25 Edward Carrington to Madison, Richmond, 20 Dec. 1789, Madison Papers. 
26House .Journal, 5 Dec. 1789. 
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of the amendment concerning religious freedom-a provision 
deemed vital by the dissenting sects-helped cement the alliance 
between the Baptists and increasingly moderate Federalists such 
as Madison.27 
The Federalists must have been particularly encouraged by 
the defeat of the Antifederalist resolution on amendments. To 
be sure, it was defeated by only one vote and a milder substitute 
was passed overwhelmingly, but for the first time since the 
Ratifying Convention, a sizable number of Virginia's elected 
representatives had expressed limited confidence in the general 
government and had not gone to great lengths to denounce it. 
Even Patrick Henry, though he had by no means given up his 
fight for amendments, began to change the tone of his argu-
ments. Where he had once refused even to recognize the new 
government, he now counseled his supporters to get into the 
government and make the best of a bad situation.28 This 
limited support on the part of some and reluctant acquiescence 
on the part of others was actually the zenith of Federalist 
sentiment in Virginia. 
Support for Federalist programs was at best temporary, how-
ever. Arthur Lee did not think the mood would last. He 
predicted that "the expectations raised of the benefits of the 
new Constitution are most unreasonable and therefore cannot 
be satisfied. Its additional weight upon the people, has not 
been considered, yet may be felt, and tho' its benefits should be 
more than proportionate, yet we know how much a small 
burthen outweighs a great benefit; and therefore how probable 
it is that dissatisfaction with the new government should 
exceed the present extravagant expectations from it."29 Al-
though it was an overstatement to say that the people's expec-
tations of the government were extravagant, Lee was on the 
mark with his prediction that "a small burthen outweighs a 
27 B. Ball to Madison, Fredericksburg, 8 Dec. 1789, Reverend John Leland 
to Madison, 1789, Madison Papers; Madison to the President of the United 
States, Orange, 20 Nov. 1789, in Documentary History, 5: 215. 
28 Fisher Ames to George Minot, New York, 13 Jan. 1790, in Seth Ames, ed., 
The Works of Fisher Ames, 2 vols. (Boston, 1854), 1: 72. 
29 Arthur Lee to Charles Lee, 8 May 1789, Ludwell-Lee Papers, VHS. 
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great benefit." Virginians would soon forget the advantages of 
union and remember only the hardships. 
From the day Congress assembled in 1790 until the end of 
the decade, the policies of the new government became increas-
ingly offensive. to the residents of the Old Dominion. From that 
time on an increasing number of Virginia Federalists were 
driven toward the Antifederalist camp by their aversion to the 
actions of the Northern majority in Congress. As it became 
apparent that Federalist policy conflicted with the interests and 
traditions of their home state, Virginia's Federalists abandoned 
their faction and joined with the Antifederalists in fighting that 
policy. The alliance between the two groups was not always 
comfortable. Most of the Federalists who defected from their 
faction retained their faith in the basic structure of the new 
government and in the necessity of union; they only objected to 
the particular policies the government was pursuing. The Anti-
federalists, on the other hand, were eager to make radical 
changes in the structure of the federal government. But it was 
a coalition formed out of the necessity of defending Virginia's 
interests. As the Northern majority in Congress embraced each 
of Alexander Hamilton's programs, other disenchanted Fed-
eralists recognized the importance of the alliance. In this 
fashion, the Republican party took shape in Virginia. 
When Alexander Hamilton, on January 14, 1790, delivered 
his First Report on the Public Credit, the dangers of union 
assumed a tangible form. It was on the question of finance 
that the Confederation had foundered and it was imperative 
that the new government straighten out the nation's tangled 
debt structure. Hamilton's task was to rescue the United 
States' declining credit at home and abroad without further 
dislocating the American economy. Nearly everyone agreed that 
it was necessary to pay the principal and interest on the foreign 
debt in full-Hamilton did not even bother to discuss this 
matter in his report-but the question of the domestic debt 
was not susceptible to such a simple solution.30 
30 The most sophisticated account of public finance during the Confederation 
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Hamilton proposed that continental certificates of indebted-
ness, of which there were many types differing widely in value, 
be redeemed from their owners at face value plus 4 percent 
accumulated interest, all payable in specie or western lands. 
The 4 percent interest rate was less than the full 6 percent that 
some of the security holders expected, but Hamilton was con-
fident he would not lose their support and hoped that the 2 
percent reduction might win over some of those hostile to 
redemption at the full interest rate. Hamilton also proposed 
that the federal government assume the debts of the individual 
states on the ground that the states' obligations had been con-
tracted in a common cause, the American Revolution, and that 
the payment of them by a single government unit would provide 
a more efficient and equitable means of liquidating them.31 
The government's obligation to fund the national debt was 
generally recognized; the major question on funding concerned 
the amount and method of payment. Assumption of state debts 
was another matter. The federal government had no legal 
obligation to pay the states' debts; the reasons for assumption 
were more political than financial. The purpose was not to 
strengthen the nation's credit structure, but to make the states 
more dependent upon the federal government, thereby tight-
ening the bonds of union. 32 Hamilton's report was criticized 
on two grounds therefore; his opponents disliked the method 
of funding the national debt and they denounced the whole 
concept behind assumption of state debts. 
The vast majority of Virginia's political leaders thoroughly 
detested both the funding and assumption proposals. Most 
agreed that funding was well within the limits of the Con-
stitution, but few thought that continental securities should 
be redeemed at nearly full value, and more important, almost 
no one believed that those who purchased securities at depre-
ciated prices should receive the same compensation as original 
and early national periods is Ferguson, Power of the Purse. Ferguson has done 
such a masterful job of untangling the complicated details of this period that 
I have relied heavily on his work. 
31 Ibid., pp. 293-97, 306-7. 
32 Ibid. 
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holders. They opposed assumption even more vehemently; 
they thought it both a violation of the Constitution and in-
equitable in operation, since they believed that their state 
had liquidated most of its debt.33 
Although most Virginians would have agreed that contracts 
ought not to be impaired and that the national debt should 
be funded, they objected to Hamilton's plan because they 
believed it was based on the British monocratic system and 
because it would reward those who were least deserving of 
payment-the Northern speculators. There was enough sub-
stance to these objections to make anti-administration rhetoric 
effective. There were widespread rumors, some with a grain of 
truth, that men like Robert Morris and William Duer were 
dispatching ships laden with money to buy up depreciated loan 
certificates. 34 This seemed in keeping with all that Virginians 
had heard about the economy of the commercial North. While 
the Southern states acquired wealth from productive labor-
tilling of the soil-the Northern states accumulated profits 
through artificial means, in this case by using depreciated paper 
currency to buy continental securities. 
The original security holders in Virginia, so the story went, 
had invested the just profits of their labor in federal securities 
to help the common cause, only to be duped into selling them 
during years of inflation by unscrupulous Northern speculators. 
Now these same Northern speculators were clamoring for pay-
ment at a value many times more than their initial investment, 
while industrious Virginians, who had invested honest profits 
or had fought in the continental army for the public welfare, 
were to receive nothing. This, at least, was the way in which 
the scheme was viewed by its opponents. The business of 
funding seemed to symbolize a fundamental difference between 
North and South: the agrarian system of the South was based 
on the notion that a man's profits should equal his total invest-
33 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, New York, 4 March 1790, in Hunt, 
ed., Madison's Writings, 6: 5-7; Edmund Randolph to Madison, Williamsburg, 
10 March 1790, John Dawson to Madison, 13 April 1790, Madison Papers. 
34 Whitney K. Bates, "Northern Speculators and Southern State Debts: 1790," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 19 (1962): 30-31. 
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ment of money and labor, while that of the North was based 
on artificial devices, some of them bordering on usury.35 
The kinship between the older English and the newer 
American funding systems made the evils of Hamilton's pro-
posals seem even more invidious. The Federalist administra-
tion, dominated by men subservient to the interests of Great 
Britain, was using the corrupt financial policy of that nation 
as a model for its own operations. The new government was 
creating a monopoly of the monied interests which differed 
little from that which Americans had fought to overthrow in 
the Revolution. John Taylor of Caroline, a bitter foe of the 
plan, claimed that Hamilton's financial plan "was invented in 
England to prop a revolution by corruption; extensively used 
to sacrifice the nation to German interests; and it has been 
continued to feed avarice and silently to revolutionize the 
revolution. It was introduced, into America, after that nation 
had been defended, to enrich a few individuals, and also to 
revolutionize that revolution .... It taxes them, enriches a 
credit or paper faction; changes property; forms a party; and 
transforms the principles as in England."36 
This denunciation of the monied interests represented more 
than a defense of Virginia's own economic interests; it was a 
defense of a whole way of life. In a state where agrarianism 
was lauded as the highest virtue, the creation of a new class 
of security speculators and "paper factions" was deemed a 
positive menace. 
Congressman James Madison was aware of the reaction to 
Hamilton's funding scheme in his home state. Accordingly, he 
announced a departure from the orthodox Federalist position 
by proposing that original creditors who still held securities 
35 Jefferson to Washington, 14 Aug. 1787, in Julian Boyd, ed., The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, 17 vols. (Princeton, N.J., 1950-1969), 12: 38 (hereafter re-
ferred to as Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers); Virginia Independent Chronicle, 18 Oct. 
1786; William Grayson to Patrick Henry, New York, 29 Sept. 1789; Richard 
Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, New York, 10 June 1790, in William Wirt Henry, 
Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches, 4 vo1s. (New York, 1891), 
3: 405-7, 420-22. 
36 John Taylor, An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government 
of the United States (Fredericksburg, 1814), pp. 253-54. 
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be paid the principal plus the full 6 percent interest, but that 
those who had purchased depreciated securities receive only 
the highest market value (about 50 percent of face value) of 
those securities. The balance of the payment, Madison pro-
posed, should go to those who originally owned the securities. 
This scheme had great appeal, for it appeared under the banner 
of equity, but it was probably illegal, since it would have 
impaired the government's contract with the owners of the 
depreciated securities and if adopted would have raised the 
public debt even higher.37 
It is likely, as E. James Ferguson has suggested, that Madison's 
proposal was yet another step in his transformation from a 
nationalist to a state-oriented politician. Madison had opposed 
making a distinction between original and recent security 
holders in 1783 and had remained silent on the issue during 
the Constitutional Convention, but as the anguished cries of 
Virginians began to reach him in New York, he began to change 
his position. His plan was designed to appeal to only a limited 
number of states, most notably Virginia, and would have cost 
more than Hamilton's original proposal. 
If Madison had been genuinely concerned with scaling down 
the public debt, and not merely with increasing Virginia's share 
of the booty, he would have cooperated with the other oppo-
nents of funding, who were urging that the interest rate be 
lowered to 3 percent and that redemption be paid only by the 
sale of western lands. His adherence to Virginia's interests, and 
his refusal to cooperate with opponents of the measure from 
other states caused Pennsylvania's Senator William Maclay to 
grumble that "the obstinacy of this man has ruined the opposi-
tion."38 Madison's proposal was defeated 13-36; nine of the 
thirteen votes in favor of the scheme came from the new 
coalition of Virginia Federalists and Antifederalists. Hamilton's 
system for funding the national debt was eventually adopted, 
37 Annals of Congress, 2: ll9l-95; again, for a lucid summary of Madison's 
proposal, see Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 297-301. 
38Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 297-301; William Maclay, The journal of 
William Maclay: United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791, ed. Edward 
S. Maclay (New York, 1927), p. 197. 
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but Madison had made his point; by denouncing the funding 
plan as the brainchild of a few greedy merchants and speculators, 
he had enhanced his reputation as a defender of the liberties 
and interests of the citizens of his home state.39 
Most Virginians considered funding of the national debt to 
be merely inequitable, but they viewed assumption of state 
debts as an open violation of the Constitution. Virginia's 
Federalists joined the Antifederalists in complaining that the as-
sumption proposal was unconstitutional. Nowhere, they claimed, 
did the Constitution give the federal government power to 
enter into the domestic finance of the states. Theodorick Bland, 
a leader of the Antifederal forces in the Ratifying Convention, 
predicted "that our state government will have little else to 
do than to eat, drink, and be merry" if the assumption bill were 
passed. He had warned the delegates to the Convention that 
consolidation would be the natural result of such a large 
grant of power, and he now felt the grim satisfaction of seeing 
his predictions come true.40 
Edmund Randolph, wavering between the two political 
camps, was beginning to see that there was some foundation 
to the Antifederalists' fears. He estimated that "the people 
of Virginia are ... almost unanimous against the assumption of 
the state debts," and he admitted that the danger of consolidation 
was no longer the slogan of a few hysterical Antifederalists.41 
Even such supporters of the Constitution as Henry Lee, Richard 
Bland Lee, and Archibald Stuart felt assumption to be an open 
defiance of the Constitution.42 Loudest in their complaints 
were those who believed that the assumption proposal would 
be prejudicial to Virginia's economic interests. They had reason 
to grumble: approximately 87 percent of the state's remaining 
debt was no longer in the hands of the original creditors and 
39 Annals of Congress, 2: 1298. 
40 Theodorick Bland to St. George Tucker, New York, 6 March 1790, Tucker-
Coleman Papers. 
41 Edmund Randolph to Madison, Williamsburg, 20 May 1790, Madison Papers. 
42 Henry Lee to Madison, Richmond, 18 March 1790, Madison Papers; Richard 
Bland Lee to Theodorick Lee, New York, 14 March 1790, Archibald Stuart to 
Richard Bland Lee, Abingdon, 23 May 1790, Richard Bland Lee Papers. 
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over 30 percent was owned by people living outside the state.43 
More important, Virginians believed, mistakenly, that they had 
discharged the greater part of their war debt and would there-
fore be taxed under the assumption plan to pay for the heavy 
indebtedness of states like Massachusetts and South Carolina.44 
At the time Hamilton proposed assumption there was a 
scheme in operation for adjusting inequalities in the contribu-
tions of the states to the war. By this plan, adopted by the 
Confederation Congress in 1785, a commission would examine 
claims by the states against the continental government. Pre-
sumably, the findings of this commission would serve as the 
basis for the settlement of accounts under Hamilton's assump-
tion proposal. The Southern states, however, had been slow 
in establishing their claims with the commission and, as a 
result, would be materially injured by an immediate settlement 
of accounts under the assumption act. Thus, it was not only 
assumption that Virginia opposed, but particularly assumption 
before her accounts could be brought up to date and accepted 
by the commission in charge of validating the debts owed to 
the states. 45 
In Richmond, Governor Beverly Randolph was doing all 
he could to improve Virginia's position in the final settlement. 
He instructed agents throughout the state to use all possible 
speed in locating old vouchers. Unfortunately, the business 
was moving much too slowly. Many holders of certificates were 
afraid to turn their vouchers over to state officials, fearing 
that they would not be paid after they relinquished them. 
Moreover, Virginia's accounts were in hopeless disarray. Gover-
nor Randolph, just before Hamilton issued his report, admitted 
to the secretary of the treasury that he was unable to give a 
reasonable estimate of Virginia's debt.46 The legislature resorted 
43 Bates, "Northern Speculators and Southern Debts," pp. 32-33. 
44 Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 308-9. 
45 Ibid., pp. 308-11. 
46 Beverly Randolph to William Davies, 13 Nov., 30 Dec. 1789, 20 March 1790, 
Randolph to Richard Banks, 12 Aug. 1789, Randolph to P. Williams, 20 March 
1790, Randolph to the Secretary of the Treasury, Oct. 1789, all in Executive 
Letter books. 
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to issuing duplicate certificates to people who claimed their 
originals had been lost, but this resulted in dual claims being 
presented at the Treasury Office, and the laws permitting the 
issuance of duplicates often had to be repealed.47 
Virginians in Congress, temporarily forgetting their constitu-
tional objections, tried to find ways to make the assumption 
bill work to the advantage of their state. Madison was able to 
add a provision to the bill extending the time allowed for 
submitting vouchers to the General Board for the Settlement 
of Accounts, but he was less successful in other areas.48 In 
particular, he was unable to fulfill Governor Randolph's request 
that additional Southern members be appointed to the General 
Board in order to insure a more friendly reception for Virginia's 
claims.49 
Madison's effort to improve Virginia's position in the settle-
ment of state debts took the form of an amendment to the 
assumption proposal, presented in March 1790, seeking to 
compensate the states for both their existing debts and those 
they had redeemed. The proposal was hardly in keeping with 
Madison's constitutional objections to assumption, since it 
would have resulted in a federal involvement in the states' 
affairs even wider than Hamilton had envisioned. The scheme 
was at length defeated, for it would have placed a prohibitive 
cost on the entire plan. When Hamilton's original plan came 
to a vote in 1 une 1790, it too was defeated, 29-31, thus setting 
the stage for one of the most famous compromises in American 
history. 50 Virginia's congressional representatives, realizing they 
did not have enough votes to secure the Potomac River as the 
site of the nation's capital, let it be known that they might be 
willing to change their minds on assumption in exchange for 
Northern support for a Southern location for the capital. 
1 efferson and Madison persuaded Congressman Richard Bland 
47 Beverly Randolph to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, 22 Dec. 1790, 
Executive Letterbooks; Hening, Statutes at Large, 13: 219. 
48 Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 314-15. 
49 Beverly Randolph to Madison, Richmond, 17 July 1790, 10 Aug. 1790, 
Madison Papers. 
50 Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 315-18. 
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Lee that "the poison of the [assumption] measure would be 
very much diminished" by the advantages of having the capital 
located on the Potomac. On June 28 Lee and his Virginia 
colleague Alexander vVhite, a representative of northwest 
Virginia, the only consistent source of Federalist support during 
the 1790s, reversed their former positions and voted in favor 
of assumption, providing the necessary margin for passage.51 
Lee and White, by voting for assumption, spared Madison the 
necessity of voting in favor of the compromise which he had 
co-authored. Madison, by casting his vote against assumption, 
was able to stay in the graces of the Antifederalists in his home 
state. 
In the end, assumption of state debts was not nearly so 
prejudicial to Virginia's interests as it was first feared. The 
Old Dominion's share of the $21,500,000 debt owed to the 
states was fixed at $3,500,000, a sum which even Virginia's two 
Antifederalist senators felt reasonable. In addition, the General 
Board began to take a much more liberal attitude toward some 
of Virginia's shakier claims. By 1794, when the states' claims 
were settled, Virginia, instead of being taxed to pay for the 
debts of the other states, emerged as the federal government's 
single largest creditor.52 
Although Madison and his Virginia colleagues in Congress 
seemed content with the bargain they had made, most of the 
local leaders within Virginia were irate over the passage of the 
assumption bill. Several years would pass before they discovered 
that their state had fared well in the settlement of accounts; 
for the present, they could see no way in which Virginia would 
benefit from the act and were not at all sure that the N orthem 
congressmen could be trusted to keep their promise regarding 
the site of the capital. James Monroe reported to Jefferson that 
assumption "would create great disgust if adopted under any 
51 Richard Bland Lee to Theodorick Lee, New York, 9 April, 26 June 1790, 
Richard Bland Lee Papers; Jefferson, "Memorandum on Assumption," [1792?]. 
in Boyd, ed., .JeffeTSon Papers, 17: 205-7. 
52 Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 324; Richard Henry Lee and William 
Grayson to the Governor of Virginia, New York, 25 July 1790, in Ballagh, ed., 
Richard Henry Lee, 2: 534. 
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shape whatever, and I doubt whether the immediate removal 
to the Potomak would reconcile [the people to it]."53 Federalist 
Henry Lee was even more dismayed. He thought the measure 
abhorrent to Republican government. Writing to Madison, he 
predicted: "This government, which we both admired so much, 
will I fear prove ruinous in its operation to our native state." 
Lee had become so disillusioned with the new government 
that he hoped Patrick Henry, whom he had opposed bitterly 
the year before, would take a seat in Congress to help fight for 
Virginia's interests.54 
Hamilton's financial program was not the only cause of anger. 
Congress had managed to antagonize Virginians on a number 
of other, unrelated matters. For the second consecutive year, 
the United States Senate rejected a petition from the Virginia 
General Assembly asking that the public be allowed to witness 
the Senate's proceedings.55 In rejecting the request, the Fed-
eralist-dominated Senate seemed oblivious to the concerns of 
Virginia. After Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson had 
spent two full days pleading with their Senate colleagues to 
open their doors to the public, only one other senator, William 
Maclay of Pennsylvania, was willing to join the Virginia 
senators.56 More serious, Congress also spent some time delib-
erating on petitions from the Quakers asking for the abolition 
of slavery. Someone had spread the rumor that Congress was 
prepared to pass an act for emancipation, hoping to panic 
Virginians into selling their slaves at a low price. Congress, in 
the spring of 1790, eased the fears of Virginia's slaveholders by 
passing a resolution denying its authority to interfere in matters 
relating to emancipation, but the incident provided Virginians 
with yet another glimpse of the dangers that lurked in union.57 
As news of the activities of Congress reached Virginia, discon-
53 James Monroe to Jefferson, Richmond, 13 July 1790, in Boyd, ed., jefferson 
Papers, 16: 597. 
54 Henry Lee to Madison, Richmond, 13 March 1790, Madison l'apers. 
55 Annals of Congress, I: 967-68. 
56 David Stuart to Washington, Abingdon, 2 June 1790, in Worthington C. Ford, 
ed., The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols. (New York, 1889-1893), 11: 
482-84 (hereafter referred to as Ford, ed., Washington's Writings). 
57 Ibid.; Annals of Congress, 2: 1472-74. 
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tent appeared in unexpected quarters. Federalist Henry Lee 
was led to declare: "Henry is already considered a prophet, his 
predictions are daily verified-His declarations with respect 
to the division of interests which would exist under the con-
stitution and predominate on all the doings of the government 
already have been undeniably proved. But we are committed 
and we cannot be relieved, I fear, only by disunion." Lee 
ventured that even disunion might be preferable to an existence 
dominated by "an insolent northern majority."58 Even David 
Stuart, President Washington's close friend, relative, and con-
fidant, could not contain his displeasure: 
I have now gone through the catalogue of public discontents, 
and it really pains me much, and I believe every friend to the 
government, to think that there should be so much cause for 
them; and that a spirit so subversive of the true principles of 
the constitution, productive of jealousies alone, and fraught 
with such high ideas of their power, should have manifested 
itself at so early a period of the government. If Mr. Henry has 
sufficient boldness to aim the blow at its existence, which he 
has threatened, I think he can never meet with a more favor-
able opportunity .... It will be the fault of those who are the 
promoters of such disgustful measures, if he ever does, or indeed 
anyone else. 59 
Lee and Stuart were two of Virginia's staunchest Federalists. 
Despite their dissatisfaction with government policy, they re-
mained Federalists. But like most other Virginians who stayed 
in the Federalist camp, they refused to endorse many of the 
specific policies of the new government. They retained their 
faith in the wisdom of union under the new Constitution, but 
were unwilling to sacrifice Virginia's interests simply to achieve 
harmony with Northern Federalists. The differences between 
the Virginia Federalists and their counterparts to the North 
were so great, in fact, that it is misleading to speak of a unified 
Federalist party in eighteenth-century America. 
58 Henry Lee to Madison, Berry-Hill, 3 April 1790, Madison Papers. 
59 David Stuart to Washington, Abingdon, 2 June 1790, in Ford, ed., Washing-
ton's Writings, II: 482-84. 
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The mood of the Virginia General Assembly toward the 
proposals of the 1790 Congress was decidedly hostile. Governor 
Beverly Randolph had warned Madison that the assumption 
act would "produce some warm animadversions from the legisla-
ture," but he underestimated the strength and depth of the 
opposition.60 He had not envisioned that a new political faction 
-a coalition of Antifederalists and disenchanted Federalists-
would arise from the debates in the legislature over federal 
policy. It was the members of the General Assembly, far more 
protective of local interests than their counterparts in the 
United States House of Representatives, who would exert 
pressure on Virginia's national leaders and bring about the 
movement known and mislabeled as Jeffersonian democracy. 
Patrick Henry, on November 3, 1790, introduced a resolution 
in the House of Delegates declaring the assumption act "repug-
nant to the Constitution, as it goes to the exercise of power not 
expressly granted to the General Government."61 The Fed-
eralists in the Assembly, knowing they lacked the numbers to 
obtain a resolution applauding assumption, or even postponing 
a condemnation of it, attempted to tone down Henry's proposal. 
They suggested that the House draw up a remonstrance to 
Congress stating that assumption "will, in its operation, be 
highly injurious to those states which have by persevering and 
strenuous exertions redeemed a considerable portion of the 
debts incurred by them ... and will particularly produce great 
injury to this state." They concluded by warning Congress 
that assumption was so unjust, that unless it was immediately 
repealed, it "will very much alienate the affections of the good 
citizens of this commonwealth from the government of the 
United States; will lessen their confidence in its wisdom and 
justice, and finally, tend to produce measures extremely unfavor-
able to the interest of the union."62 
The Federalist resolution was hardly an apologia for assump-
tion. It condemned the act on every ground except that of 
60 Beverly Randolph to Madison, Richmond, 26 May 1790, Madison Papers. 
61 House journal, 3 Nov. 1790. 
62 fbid. 
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constitutionality. Some supported it only to forestall Henry's 
resolution, but that it was necessary to resort to such a harshly 
worded substitute is indicative of Virginia's intense dislike of 
assumption. Denunciatory as it was, the Federalist version was 
defeated, 47-88, and the resolution proclaiming the assumption 
act unconstitutional passed, 75-52. On December 21, 1790, the 
Virginia senate added its approval and the resolution became 
official state policy. 63 
Embittered Virginians were not content with a brief resolu-
tion proclaiming the unconstitutionality of assumption. On 
November 22, 1790, a special committee of the lower house 
proposed an address to Congress; three weeks later a large 
majority in both houses of the state legislature voted to adopt 
it.64 The rhetoric of the Address of the General Assembly of 
the Commonwealth of Virginia to the United States in Congress 
Assembled would be echoed through the decade. Republican 
leaders in the nation's capital, when they began to organize 
their forces in Congress, leaned heavily upon this address and 
on others like it for their own attacks on the government. 65 
The Virginia Address was the opening round in a barrage of 
criticism that would culminate in the defeat of the Federalist 
administration. 
The memorialists from the Virginia legislature first con-
demned the close resemblance between the Hamiltonian and 
English systems of finance; they decried the effects of the latter, 
whose "unbound influence, pervading every branch of govern-
ment, threatens the destruction of everything that pertains to 
English liberty." 66 This was prerevolutionary rhetoric, dusted 
off and applied to the new national government. It was to be so 
frequently employed that it would become impossible for any 
Federalist to escape the charge of being under English influence. 
The second part of the Address accused the Federalist adminis-
63 Ibid.; Senate journal, 21 Dec. 1790. 
64 House .Journal, 22 Nov., 16 Dec. 1790. 
65 See the similarities between the Address and the later letter of Thomas 
Jefferson to George Washington, Mt. Vernon, 29 July 1792, in Ford, ed., Wash· 
ington's Writings, 12: 147-Sl. 
66 Hening, Statutes at Large, 13: 237. 
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tration of attempting to "perpetuate a large monied interest" 
which "must in the course of human events, produce one or 
other of two evils, the prostitution of agriculture at the feet 
of commerce or a change in the present form of the federal 
government fatal to the existence of human liberty."67 This 
was not only an outcry against the monied interest but also 
another reminder of the delegates' revolutionary heritage. By 
lifting a phrase from the Declaration of Independence, Vir-
ginia's agrarian republicans explicitly linked the evils of im-
perial rule with those under the new federal government. 
The third section of the Address recapitulated the specific 
grievances against the assumption act. The act would operate 
against the interests of those states which, like Virginia, had 
already paid the major share of their debts; it would also impose 
an intolerable burden of taxation on the Old Dominion. More-
over, the legislators could find no clause in the Constitution 
which could possibly enable Congress to take such action; they 
had ratified the Constitution under the express condition "that 
every power not granted was retained" by the states, and state 
debts were surely a case where the individual states, not the 
federal government, were vested with authority.68 
The Address, as adopted, would serve as a practical guidebook 
for anyone wishing to attack the federal government in the 
future. Anglophobia, fear of Northern monied interests, and 
a doctrine of strict construction-these were all present in the 
Virginia Address and would become staple commodities for the 
opponents of the Federalist administration during the next 
decade. 
One phrase was expunged in the final version of the Address, 
however. A majority in the House had agreed to it, but at the 
last minute the Senate deleted it. It declared assumption uncon-
stitutional and added: "it is manifest then, that the consent of 
the State legislatures ought to be obtained before the said act 
can assume a constitutional form." 69 The legislators were no 
67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 
69 "Senate Amendments to Address Concerning Assumption," 21 Dec. 1790, 
Rough Bills of the Legislature, VSL. There is no evidence to explain why the 
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longer giving a simple opinion on the constitutionality of a 
specific act. They were taking a step toward a general con-
stitutional principle upholding the right of the states to exercise 
authority in cases where the policies of the state and national 
governments conflicted. They had mounted a brief, but mean-
ingful assault on the notion of divided sovereignty and had 
temporarily resolved the issue in favor of the states. Although 
the Address of 1790 did not pronounce the assumption law null 
and void, it did hint at a way in which the constitutionality of 
an act could be determined and prepared the way for the doc-
trine of nullification expressed eight years later in the Kentucky 
Resolutions. 
Looking back from a vantage point where the implications 
of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Calhoun's nullifica-
tion doctrine, and secession can be viewed, it is easy to speak 
of the evils of the doctrine propounded by the Virginia legisla-
ture. To condemn the members of the lower house for a radical 
attempt to undermine the union is to ignore the fact that, in 
1790, there were few precedents to establish the final locus 
of sovereignty; most of the existing precedents were derived 
from the experience of the states under the Articles of Con-
federation and these were consonant with the position taken 
by the lower house. The Virginia Address, while antithetical 
to the doctrine of political sovereignty which emerged after 
1790, was in complete harmony with the principles upon which 
Virginia had fought the Revolution and with the spirit with 
which it had agreed to ratify the Constitution. 
Although Virginians may have had some cause to voice 
constitutional objections to the assumption proposal, much of 
the harsh language of the Virginia Address was not warranted. 
Senate deleted this important passage from the Address, and-even more surpris-
ing-why the House acceded to the Senate's action. Since technically the Address 
was not an official piece of legislation, but rather, merely a resolution giving the 
"sense" of the House on the subject, the members of the House of Delegates 
could have insisted on their version of the Address and then published it under 
their auspices alone. It is possible that the members of the House, when faced 
with Senate opposition, were made to realize that they had gone too far, but it is 
perhaps more likely that, failing to recognize the full ramifications of what they 
had said, the legislators dropped it out of convenience. 
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To be sure, the Northern monied interest was aided by estab-
lishment of the public credit, but the interests of agrarian 
Virginia had not been sacrificed. Instead of being burdened 
by assumption, Virginia proved to be the greatest beneficiary. 
But in 1790 many Virginians were still convinced that English 
influence and Northern greed were combining to destroy them. 
The Virginia Address was an expression of those fears and a 
warning to Congress that Virginians would never submit to 
the trend of the government. 
An analysis of voting behavior in the House of Delegates 
on the major national issues of 1788-1790 dramatically illustrates 
the antipathy of the members of Virginia's ruling elite to the 
general government. The two voting blocs that emerge are 
notable for their substantial number of members, for the 
impressive agreement among members within each bloc, and 
for their consistent and sharp opposition to each other on all 
national issues. Of the fifty-four men who served all three 
sessions in the House of Delegates during the years 1788-1790, 
thirty-two were Antifederalists and ten were Federalists. Thus, 
forty-two of the fifty-four sample delegates are readily identi-
fiable as supporters of one or the other of the two factions. 
Over three-fourths of the men in the Antifederalist bloc were 
in agreement all the time, the rest, at least 80 percent. Eight 
of the ten members of the Federalist bloc agreed on all issues, 
and the other two, on at least 80 percent of the national issues 
brought before the House of Delegates.70 Although the Anti-
70 See Appendix 2. The divisions listed in the appendix are based on a com-
puter analysis of the voting behavior, on national issues, of the fifty-four men 
who served in the House of Delegates every year between 1788 and 1790. A rate 
of 80 percent agreement was set as the minimum requirement for inclusion within 
either voting bloc. Since the General Assembly was elected annually and its 
turnover was high, it was impossible to make an accurate evaluation of the 
individual voting behavior of all the members of the Assembly. There is no 
indication, however, that the voting behavior of the three-term delegates was 
atypical. While the data listed in the appendix shows the similarities in occupa-
tion and property holdings among the members of the Federalist and Anti-
federalist voting blocs, I have not been able to find enough information on other 
variables (e.g., ethnic group, religion, age) to provide a complete explanation 
for the voting behavior of Virginia's political leaders. 
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federalists would have outnumbered the Federalists in any case, 
the small band of Federalists might have been larger had it 
not been for the controversy-filled session of 1790. In fact, 
many of the twelve delegates who are not included in either 
bloc were former Federalists who deserted their faction on the 
issues of funding and assumption. 
The alignments in the House of Delegates were not drastic-
ally dissimilar from the divisions between the supporters and 
opponents of the policies of the new government in the United 
States House of Representatives. Although Madison calculated 
that the Virginia delegation to the First Congress consisted of 
seven Federalists and three Antifederalists, it is clear that 
Virginia's Federalist representatives could no longer be con-
sidered friends of Federalist policy by the end of the second 
session of Congress. The final vote on assumption in the House, 
which was perhaps the most severe early test of a representative's 
commitment to Federalist policy, found eight Virginians op-
posed to Hamilton's proposal and only two in favor. 71 
It is imperative that one use considerable caution in drawing 
inferences from this data. There is no reason to doubt that 
the voting behavior of the fifty-four delegates in the sample is 
an accurate reflection of the political attitudes of the members 
of Virginia's political elite, but it does not follow that the 
partisan divisions among the delegates are representative of the 
divisions of opinion among the great mass of Virginia's citizens. 
The electoral process in Virginia was more often guided by 
personality and prestige than issues and ideology. The political 
attitudes of the delegates included in the sample group are 
therefore not necessarily a reflection of the views of their 
constituents. Rather, the delegates tended to align themselves 
with either the Federalist or Antifederalist factions only after 
they were elected and had taken their seats in the lower house.72 
71 Madison to Jefferson, New York, 27 March 1789, in Hunt, ed., Madison's 
Writings, 5: 334; Jefferson, "Memorandum on Assumption" [1792?], in Boyd, ed., 
jefferson Papers, 17: 205-7. 
72 The high rate of annual turnover in the lower house which necessitated the 
use of the sample of "three term" delegates should not be interpreted to mean 
that the members of the lower house were being closely watched by their con· 
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The delegates, because of their prestige and power within their 
own regions, were able to exert significant political pressure on 
Virginia's representatives in Congress-the changing political 
philosophy of Madison is testimony to that fact-but that same 
prestige and power allowed them to make their political de-
cisions relatively free from the demands of their constituents. 
If the composition of this sample group is at least a key to 
the division of opinion on national issues among Virginia's 
political leaders, then two distinct camps did exist among the 
ruling elite, each bound by common beliefs as to the direction 
their society should move. This division within the elite was 
apparent as early as 1788, when the Antifederalists attempted 
to call a second convention to amend the new Constitution, 
and as Jackson T. Main and Norman Risjord have shown, 
probably predated the Ratifying Convention, arising from dif-
ferences during the Confederation period.73 The solidarity of 
the two groups is particularly impressive when one realizes 
that there is no record of an attempt to organize them into 
political parties. The high rate of agreement within each 
faction during the period 1788-1790 was the product of a near-
unanimity of sentiment which made organization or party 
discipline superfluous. There was undoubtedly the same 
amount of backstage maneuvering in the Virginia legislature 
as there was in any body accustomed to operating within the 
framework of factional politics, but at this early stage, there 
were no overt attempts to organize either the legislators or the 
people into two permanent parties. 
It would be helpful if we could arrive at some neat pattern 
of economic or regional interests that determined an individual 
delegate's voting behavior. No such pattern emerges. The 
stituents and were therefore rapidly replaced. The high turnover, rather than 
being a sign of democratic stirrings among the electorate, was in fact only an 
indication that the leading members of the county oligarchies could enter and 
leave the legislature when they pleased. Although annual turnover in the 
legislature was high, the total years of service of most legislators was extra· 
ordinarily long. 
73 Jackson T. Main, "Sections and Politics in Virginia, 1781-1787," William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 12 (1955): 96·ll2; and Norman Risjord, "The 
Virginia Federalists," Journal of Southern History 33 (1967): 486-517. 
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economic interests of the members of the Federalist and Anti-
federalist voting blocs were strikingly similar. Three of the 
Antifederalists were lawyers, one a merchant, and twenty-six 
were planters. Of the Federalists, seven were planters, one a 
lawyer, and one a merchant and planter of substantial means.74 
Six Antifederalists were men of distinct affluence, twenty pos-
sessed at least enough property to be labeled "planters" rather 
than "farmers," and only three could in any sense be typified 
as farmers of moderate means. Of the Federalists, three could 
count themselves among the extremely wealthy, four were 
moderately wealthy planters, and two were merely farmers. 
That the economic holdings and interests of the members of 
both groups were so similar is hardly surprising; the members 
of each faction were drawn from the same group of predom-
inately wealthy and well-born citizens that had always ruled 
the affairs of Virginia. 75 
Norman Risjord, who has examined voting behavior in the 
Virginia lower house by studying the votes of each county 
74 It is of course difficult to be precise about occupation in an overwhelmingly 
agrarian society like Virginia. In particular, those men who are listed as "lawyers" 
or "merchants" in Appendix 2 were also often affluent planters as well. Con· 
versely, some of those listed as "planters" were often lawyers and merchants. 
In all cases I have attempted to discover the delegate's primary occupation and 
label him accordingly. No record of occupation could be found for two of the 
Antifederalists and one of the Federalists. 
75 See Appendix 2. There was no record of property holdings for three of the 
Antifederalists and one Federalist. I have divided landholders into four categories: 
0-50 acres-subsistence; 51-399 acres-farmers of moderate means; 400·1,500 acres-
planters of moderate wealth; 1,500 acres or more-affluent planters. 
Although categories of wealth vary from county to county in Virginia it is 
possible to calculate averages and medians for representative areas in Virginia. 
According to the tax lists for 1795, the average landholding in Surry County, 
in the southern Tidewater, was 290.8 acres, the median, 150 acres. In Lancaster, 
in the northern Tidewater, the average holding was 213.8 acres, the median, 131. 
The average holding in Pittsylvania County, in the southern Piedmont, was 
273.6, the median, 198. The tax lists for Washington County, in the extreme 
southwest, show an average holding of 321.6 acres, a median of 205.5. In 
Shenandoah County, in the northwest, the average was 277.5, the median, 200. 
The dramatic difference between the average and median landholding in each 
of the counties suggests that the gap between the affluent and the middle-class 
farmer was a significant one, with the vast majority of Virginia's landowners 
possessing estates of one or two hundred acres and a tiny minority of planters 
owning estates of over 1,500 acres. I will deal with patterns of landholding in 
Virginia, and the implications of those patterns, in a forthcoming article. 
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unit rather than the votes of the individual legislators them-
selves, has provided us with our most accurate picture of the 
geographic divisions in the legislature on national issues during 
this period.76 Two significant conclusions can be derived from 
a comparison of Risjord's findings and my own. First, there 
is a clear continuity in the geographic divisions arising from 
the Federalist-Antifederalist split in the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention and those occurring during the early years of the 
operation of the new government (see maps on pages 244-46). 
Second, Federalist strength declined drastically from its 1788 
level in nearly every area in the state and dropped particularly 
sharply in the Tidewater.77 It is also apparent, however, that 
although individual counties often voted the same way from 
year to year, relatively few blocs of counties in the same geo-
graphic region voted together consistently enough to warrant 
any broad-scale generalizations about patterns of regional voting 
in Virginia. The one exception was the extreme west, encom-
passing the Shenandoah Valley and the land west of the Blue 
Ridge Mountains, which continued to be solidly Federalist 
throughout the decade. The reasons for this were connected 
more to purely local issues relating to problems of defense 
and state constitutional revision than they were to any funda-
mental divisions between the extreme west and the rest of 
76 Risjord, "The Virginia Federalists," pp. 486-517, esp. p. 492, for an ex· 
planation of methodology. Risjord's method of analyzing votes by county unit. 
because it accounts for the voting behavior of all, rather than merely some of 
Virginia's counties, is preferable to my sample of individual legislators if one 
is interested primarily in charting the geographic divisions within the state. 
This approach does, however, tend to limit seriously the number of possible 
variables under consideration. By using a geographical unit, the county, one is 
prevented from making any meaningful generalizations about the personal at· 
titudes and interests of the delegates. Thus, while it is clear that Risjord's geo-
graphic analysis and my sample of individual voting behavior each have limita· 
tions, the two methods, when used in conjunction with one another, constitute a 
relatively accurate guide to the political divisions over national issues occurring 
in the lower house. 
77 Ibid.; Risjord used the period 1788-1793 for his analysis of roll call votes. 
Although longer than the 1788-1790 period that I have used, it does not render 
our data incomparable. The nature of the divisions in the lower house was 
firmly fixed by 1790, when former Federalists began to desert their faction over 
the issues of funding and assumption. Moreover, there were relatively few roll 
call votes on national issues in the lower house between 1791-1793. 
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the state on any of the important national issues of the period.78 
The other possible geographic division suggested by histor-
ians, that between the Northern Neck and Southside counties, 
does not add substantially to our understanding of the nature 
of the Federalist-Antifederalist split in the legislature. Accord-
ing to Jackson Main, the Northern Neck counties were char-
acterized by a wealthy aristocracy controlling a large share of 
the state's wealth and property, a high percentage of tenant 
farmers, and a favorable position along the coastlines of the 
navigable rivers and bays. Although predominately agrarian, 
the Northern Neck counties were oriented toward the com-
mercial economy of the North. The Southside counties had a 
larger middle class population, fewer tenant farmers, and were 
primarily interested in subsistence, as opposed to commercial 
farming. In a study of the 1780s Main found that the Northern 
Neck counties were overwhelmingly Federalist in sentiment, 
the Southside, Antifederalist.79 
The divisions suggested by Main begin to blur during the 
period 1788-1790, however. Again using Risjord's analysis of 
voting by county in the Virginia lower house, it is clear that 
the Southside Virginia counties were overwhelmingly Anti-
federalist. The importance of this should not be overestimated, 
however, since the vast majority of the representatives from the 
Northern Neck were Antifederalists as well. The only area 
of appreciable Federalist strength, the northwest, was not con-
sidered by Main to be identifiable as belonging definitely to 
either the Northern Neck or the Southside bloc.80 
78 Ibid.; Risjord, while he recognizes the importance of purely local issues as 
causes of the divisions between the northwest and the remainder of the state, 
also argues that the Federalist and Antifederalist counties tended to have 
different economic interests. In some ways the economic structure of some 
Federalist and Antifederalist counties was different, but these differences had 
no relation to questions of national policy. 
79 Main, "Sections and Politics in Virginia," pp. 96-ll2. 
80 The Northern Neck-Southside alignments are derived simply by comparing 
ibid. and Risjord, "The Virginia Federalists," p. 494. It is impossible, however, 
to make an exact correlation between the Federalist-Antifederalist and the North-
ern Neck-Southside divisions because Main was unable to identify many of 
Virginia's counties as belonging to either the Northern Neck or the Southside 
blocs. 
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The shortcomings of a geographic interpretation based upon 
a commercial-agrarian division are perhaps best illustrated by 
the political behavior of the town of Richmond. It has become 
almost axiomatic that Richmond, as the political and commer-
cial center of Virginia, was a Federalist stronghold, yet this 
holds true only during those years when illustrious Richmonders 
such as John Marshall ran for office. Marshall's colleague from 
Richmond in the House of Delegrates was Miles Selden, a man 
who sided with the Antifederalists on every issue during the 
1788-1790 period. Nathaniel Wilkinson, the other delegate 
who served from Richmond during these years, did not vote on 
enough national issues to be definitely classified as a member 
of either faction, but on the few occasions when he did vote he 
sided with the Antifederalists. This pattern of representation 
would remain, even in the politically sophisticated town of Rich-
mond, for the remainder of the decade. During those years 
when Marshall decided not to serve in the House of Delegates, 
his seat would most often be filled by a member of the opposing 
faction. It would seem that Richmond was a Federalist-
dominated town not because it had a commercial orientation 
but because prestigious Federalists such as Marshall, who could 
have been elected to office in any area of the state, happened 
to reside there.81 
The most striking feature about the geographic distribution 
of the two political factions is that Antifederalists were in the 
majority in nearly every section of the state. It seems likely 
that Federalists like Marshall won election in spite of their 
support for the federal government. That there were so few 
Federalist leaders in Virginia is not surprising. Most members 
of the ruling elite in Virginia, after seeing the new government 
in operation for less than two years, were convinced that it 
constituted a threat to the interests of their state in general and 
to their political power in particular. Marshall might have 
supported Federalist policies because he saw in them a way 
for America to achieve national greatness, Edward Carrington 
81 Selden is included in the Antifederalist bloc listed in Appendix 2. Wilkin· 
son's voting records may be checked in House Journal, 30 Oct., 18 Nov. 1788. 
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might have supported them because his political fortunes, 
meager as they might have been, were tied to those of prominent 
leaders in the nation's capital, but for most of Virginia's political 
leaders, the first two years of the operation of the new govern-
ment had confirmed the worst of Patrick Henry's fears. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Federal Policy and 
Domestic Affairs 
A COALITION OF Antifederalists and disenchanted Federalists, 
which, by 1791, would assume the name of the "republican 
interest," had dominated the Virginia legislature in 1790 and 
had passed overwhelmingly the Address to Congress, a memorial 
critical of the federal government. In so doing, the members 
of Virginia's ruling elite had expressed decisively their fears of 
consolidated government. Despite this heavy preponderance 
of leaders opposing the policies of the new government, there 
remained in the legislature a small band of Federalists, who 
though personally uncertain of the wisdom of government 
policy, nevertheless voted consistently against their republican 
opponents in the General Assembly. This polarization of po-
litical sentiment was not a completely new phenomenon in 
Virginia politics; two distinct political factions had developed 
in the legislature as early as the mid-l780s. But never before 
had the number of issues causing those divisions been so great 
nor the membership in those factions so broadly based. What 
had the new government done in the past three years to warrant 
this polarization of opinion and to cause such a large proportion 
of Virginia's leaders to turn against it? The issue is a partic-
ularly puzzling one, for in spite of widespread dissatisfaction 
with Alexander Hamilton's financial schemes, the first years of 
union worked few changes in the internal structure of the 
Old Dominion.1 
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The voting behavior of the state legislators on issues of 
purely local concern offers the best indication of the continuity 
within Virginia's internal political structure. The same planter-
gentry who had dominated the government of Virginia for 
over a century continued to hold power after ratification of 
the federal Constitution. The divisions over national policy 
did not change the way in which they viewed their local 
problems. Although most of Virginia's political leaders joined 
the vanguard of the movement labeled Jeffersonian democracy, 
they were not transformed into democrats. They continued 
to vote in the same fashion as before ratification, and indeed, 
as before the Revolution. Narrow, regional interests, not 
ideology or egalitarian principles, shaped their attitudes toward 
the important issues of the day. 
An analysis of the voting behavior on local issues of the 
fifty-four men serving all three terms in the House of Delegates 
during the years 1788-1790 does not yield the same clear-cut 
divisions as does the analysis of national issues. Two opposing 
voting blocs emerge, but they are substantially different from 
those arising over the divisions of opinion on national issues. 2 
The two blocs, Group A and Group B, were smaller than the 
Federalist-Antifederalist factions. They had fourteen and fifteen 
members respectively; almost half the delegates did not fall 
into either group. To the extent that these blocs represent a 
division in Virginia's internal political structure, and the small 
size of each group suggests that they did not represent a major 
one, the most important general source of disagreement lay in 
the different interests of the eastern and western delegates. 
Group A contained thirteen delegates from the Tidewater, 
1 Union under the federal Constitution did of course necessitate some pro-
cedural changes in the administrative relations between the state and the central 
governments, but these had little effect on the people of the state as a whole. 
For a discussion of some of the administrative adjustments made necessary by 
the Constitution see Richard R. Beeman, "The Old Dominion and the New 
Nation, 1788-1801" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1968), pp. 144-46. 
2 See Appendix 3. Because issues of purely local concern were both more 
numerous and encompassed a wider variety of questions than did those of 
national concern, it has been necessary to lower the minimum rate of agreement 
required for inclusion within a bloc from 80 to 70 percent. 
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one from the Piedmont, and none from the transmontane west. 
Of the fifteen delegates in Group B, nine lived in the Piedmont, 
three in the transmontane west, and only three in the Tide-
water.3 
There is no correlation between the members of the Fed-
eralist-Antifederalist voting blocs and those of blocs A and B. 
Group A contained twelve Antifederalists and two Federalists; 
Group B, eleven Antifederalists and four unaligned delegates; 
there were very few Federalists in either bloc and the Anti-
federalists were evenly split between the two.4 It is conceivable 
that the Federalist members of the legislature, as proponents 
of a system of government which thought in terms of national 
rather than local interests, were less likely to be tied to any 
one set of local or regional interests and thus were not supporters 
of either voting bloc. It seems more likely that there were few 
Federalists in either of the two groups because there were very 
few Federalists in the Virginia House of Delegates. 
The small size of the two local voting blocs is yet another 
indication of the lack of national partisan influence on local 
affairs, but it should not be interpreted to mean that political 
divisions on local issues in Virginia were slight. Indeed, as 
recent research on local politics in Virginia indicates, there 
were often, despite the deferential, nonissue oriented pattern 
of voting in the individual counties, bitter and divisive clashes 
of interests among the representatives from the various counties 
and regions in the state legislature.5 The members of Virginia's 
political elite, although elected on the basis of prestige and 
personality within their respective counties, proved more than 
willing to fight for the special interests of their own con-
3 Ibid. The relatively small size of the sample group makes any generalization 
about the exact nature of the divisions on local issues tentative. In "A Quanti· 
tative Approach to the Social, Economic and Political Structure of Virginia, 
1790-1810" (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern 
Historical Association, October 1969), Van Beck Hall suggests that there were 
discernible voting patterns on individual or related sets of local issues. It is also 
clear from Hall's findings that the complexity and diversity of the total number 
of local issues confronted by Virginians renders the formation of large voting 
blocs based on any single factor-e.g., class or geography-extremely unlikely. 
4 See Appendix 3. 
5 See Hall, "A Quantitative Approach to Virginia, 1790-1810." 
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stituencies. For the most part these divisions within the elite 
occurred outside the framework of the two national political 
parties that were beginning to emerge in Virginia and, in fact, 
were usually so localized as to prevent the emergence of sizable 
factions that voted cohesively on a whole slate of local issues. 
But the divisions, however localized, were frequently present 
nonetheless. Although a systematic discussion of purely local 
politics lies outside the scope of this study, a cursory survey of 
attitudes toward two of the persistent sources of conflict on the 
state level-the issues of separation of church and state and 
the status of Negro slaves-will at least suggest the particularistic 
nature of local politics in the Old Dominion. And it is, of 
course, precisely this particularistic view of politics that pro-
vides the general explanation for the hostility of so many of 
Virginia's citizens and political leaders to the consolidating 
tendencies of the federal government. 
In December 1785, after nearly ten years of piecemeal action, 
the Virginia legislature passed the bill for Religious Freedom, 
disestablishing the Episcopal Church. The quest for complete 
separation of church and state did not end with passage of the 
bill, however. Following that action the dissenting sects, par-
ticularly the Baptists, engaged in constant but unsuccessful 
agitation to divest the Episcopal parishes of the glebe lands 
originally given them by the Crown. The impetus behind their 
efforts came in part from the desire to carry the principle of 
separation of church and state to its conclusion, but a more 
practical consideration was also involved. The Episcopal 
Church was not using its lands for the purpose for which they 
were designed-the care of the poor; the job needed to be 
handled by a more efficient agency.6 When an individual parish 
proved incapable of discharging its duties to the poor, the 
Assembly was able to force the sale of its lands, but attempts 
to institute a statewide sale of the church's glebe lands had 
failed. 7 
6 Robert Usry, "The Overseers of the Poor in Accomac, Pittsy1vania, and 
Rockingham Counties, 1787-1802" (M.A. thesis, College of William and Mary, 
I 960), passim. 
7 Ibid., pp. 1-7: Shepherd, Statutes at Large, 1: 311. 
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The issue of the glebe lands was brought before the Assembly 
once again in 1789. On November 27 the House of Delegates 
agreed to hear a joint petition from the seven major Baptist 
associations of Virginia. The petition asked that the legislature 
order the sale of all the lands of the Episcopal Church, the 
proceeds to be used for a state-administered program of educa-
tion and care for the poor. The Baptists' opponents argued 
that the lands were a private donation from the king of England 
to the Episcopal Church of Virginia and that independence did 
not alter their status; the lands remained the private property 
of the individual parishes. As private property, they could not 
be disposed of by legislative act. If anyone had the right to 
tamper with private property, and opponents of the Baptist 
petitioners doubted that anyone did, it was the courts, not the 
legislature. 8 
As in the past, supporters of the Episcopal Church brushed 
aside the issue. vVhen the Baptists tried to bring the issue to a 
vote on December 9, the majority in the General Assembly 
succeeded in postponing further discussion until the next ses-
sion.9 On November 19, 1790, the Baptist petitioners finally 
succeeded in bringing the matter to a vote, but it was hardly 
worth the effort. A resolution calling for a statewide sale of the 
lands of the Episcopal Church was decisively defeated, 52-89.10 
The division on the question of the glebe lands reflected 
the special interests of the delegates. Of the fifty-two men in 
favor of the sale of the glebes, fifty were from the west, where 
the dissenting sects were strongest. Of those opposing, fifty-nine 
were from the Episcopalian-dominated east, thirty from the 
west. The western delegates favoring sale of the lands were 
almost exclusively from areas where the impact of Protestant 
revivals had been greatest. The far western counties, dominated 
by the dissenting sects, were unified in support of the measure. 
They were joined by Piedmont counties such as Orange and 
Loudon. In Loudon County the powerful Ketoctan Baptist 
8 House journal, 27 Nov. 1789. 
9 Ibid., 9 Dec. 1789. 
10 Ibid., 19 Nov. 1790. 
Domestic Affairs 95 
Association had gained many converts, and in Orange County 
one of the most influential Baptist ministers in the nation, John 
Leland, had attracted a large following. 11 James Madison of 
Orange County was alert enough to recognize the value of the 
Baptists as political allies and beginning in 1789 he carefully 
cultivated their support. When Madison assumed leadership 
of the emerging Republican party in Congress, he attempted 
to persuade his Republican colleagues in the eastern, Episco-
palian counties of Virginia to accede to the sale of the glebe 
lands in order to strengthen his alliance with the Baptists, but 
his efforts were unsuccessful. Republicans from the eastern 
counties were willing to join in his fight against the federal 
government, but they were not yet prepared to subordinate 
their own local interests for the sake of national partisan gain. 
As a result, the nature of the political divisions over the question 
of the glebe lands remained roughly constant for most of the 
decade. In votes on the same question in 1791, 1792, 1794, and 
1795 the sources of support and opposition for the measure 
to divest the Episcopal Church of its lands remained stable. 
It was not until the end of the decade that Madison actually 
succeeded in persuading the eastern members of his party of 
the importance of the Baptists to the Republican cause.12 
Policy toward the status and treatment of Negro slaves was 
similarly determined by the special interests of the members 
of the legislature. In 1792, the General Assembly undertook 
a thorough revision and consolidation of its many laws respect-
ing the slave population. The result, an "Act to reduce into 
one, the several acts concerning slaves, free Negroes and 
mulattoes," was prompted at least in part by the recent re-
bellion in Haiti and by a minor and abortive slave revolt in 
N orfolk.13 The act of 1792 reflected growing fears on the part 
11 Hall, "A Quantitative Approach to Virginia, 1790-1810," analyzed the vote 
on the glebe lands question a year later, in 1791, and found a roughly similar 
pattern. 
12 Ibid. There is disagreement between Hall and myself on the causes of the 
voting shift on the glebe land issue after 1795. 
13 Officials investigating the planned insurrection received testimony that the 
slaves involved had used the recent uprising in Haiti as a model for their own 
The Old Dominion 
of whites of unrest among the slave population. It placed 
further restrictions on assemblages of blacks and increased the 
punishments for such unlawful gatherings. The Assembly also 
took the final step in degrading the black man's status as a 
human being. In the past, slaves had been treated either as 
real or personal property as the situation dictated, but in 1792 
the Assembly made the Negro personal estate, chattel, once and 
for all, thus preventing him from legally owning or possessing 
private property. In addition, it enabled his owner to avoid 
many of the problems presented by Virginia's intricate inher-
itance laws relating to real property.14 
Defining the Negro as personal estate could have created 
problems for Virginians, since the slaveowner was held liable 
for any damages or injuries caused by his personal property. 
But ingenious Virginians found a way out of this potential 
difficulty. The courts differentiated between inanimate and 
animate chattel; although a planter might be held responsible 
for damages done by a falling tree or a runaway wagon, he 
was not held financially responsible for the acts of his slaves, 
for they were capable of acting on their own volition.15 Thus, 
Virginians succeeded in stripping their slaves of all human 
rights, yet absolved themselves of responsibility for the actions 
of those slaves. 
Virginians, slaveowners or not, agreed that it was necessary 
to supervise the slave population closely, and few would have 
quarreled with the provision making slaves personal property. 
But other features of the act of 1792 worked to benefit the 
slaveholders at the direct expense of the nonslaveholding pop-
plans. The immediate cause of the disturbance in Norfolk, which did not involve 
more than ten or twelve Negroes and never went beyond the planning stage, was 
the "practice of severing husband, wife and children in sales." Henry Lee to 
Col. Robert Goode, Richmond, 17 May 1792, Lee to Commanding Officers of 
the Norfolk Militia, Norfolk, 18 May 1792, Executive Letterbooks; William 
Nelson to Henry Lee, Northampton County, 3 May 1792, Littleton Savage to Lee, 
Northampton, 17 May 1792, Thomas Newton to Lee, Norfolk, 19 May 1792, 
Executive Communications, VSL. 
14 Shepherd, Statutes at Large, l: 122-30; James C. Ballagh, A History of 
Slavery in Virginia (Baltimore, Md., 1902), PP- 66-74. 
15 Ibid., p. 73. 
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ulation. One section provided that "the value of a slave con-
demned to die who shall suffer accordingly, or before execution 
of the sentence perish, to be estimated by the justices, shall be 
paid by the public to the owner." Not only was the slaveowner 
absolved from liability for illegal acts by his slave but also 
was recompensed by the public, including those who did not 
own slaves, for the value of such a slave. This provision met 
strong opposition, but an attempt to knock it out of the bill 
was defeated, 50-57.16 
The interests of the delegates were much in evidence during 
the vote on compensation for slaveowners. Again, there was 
an east-west split, but the division was more reflective of the 
pattern of slaveholding throughout the state than it was of 
geography. Only seven eastern counties opposed the section 
on compensation-precisely those counties that had small slave 
populations. Of the western counties that opposed the pro-
vision, only two had slave populations of over 50 percent, while 
over two-thirds had slave populations of less than 25 percent. 
Thirty-three eastern and twelve western counties supported the 
measure, and again, their support corresponded with the per-
centage of slaves in their population. Seven of the twelve west-
ern counties voting in favor of compensation had slave popula-
tions of 25-50 percent; the other five had slave populations of 
over 50 percent. Negro slaves comprised a majority of the 
population in twenty-three of the eastern counties favoring the 
provision, 25-50 percent in ten of the counties, and in no 
eastern county did they comprise less than 25 percentP 
That the slaveholding counties had a majority in the legis-
lature and were able to pass such preferential legislation did 
not bode well for those who sought a gradual end to slavery. 
St. George Tucker, the only Virginian of prominence to cam-
paign actively for emancipation, was rebuffed by the General 
Assembly when he presented a mildly worded proposal to that 
16House journal, 10 Dec. 1792; Shepherd, Statutes at Large, 1: 127. 
17 Shepherd, Statutes at Large, 1: 127; "A Return of the Amount of Each 
Description of Persons within the District of Virginia ... made this Twelfth Day 
of August, 1791 ," in Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 28 Sept. 1791. 
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effect in 1796.18 As both Winthrop Jordan and Robert McColley 
have noted, the gap between the egalitarian rhetoric of some 
Jeffersonians and the reality of their attitudes toward the black 
man was enormous. And Jordan is probably correct in stressing 
the psychological pressures that caused so many Virginians to 
be inconsistent in their application of Jeffersonian principles. 
It seems clear, however, that the decisions regulating the year-
to-year operation of the slave system itself-such as that on the 
question of compensation-were decided principally on eco-
nomic grounds, with those standing to profit from a system 
geared toward the interests of slaveowners voting on one side 
of the question and with the representatives from counties 
that were not dependent on the slave system voting on the 
other.19 
This same narrow, regionally oriented attitude predominated 
in most other issues affecting the internal polity of Virginia. 
Important questions on internal improvements and fiscal policy 
were not decided in terms of the needs and interests of the state 
as a whole, or even the needs of one section as opposed to an-
other. Rather, the delegates from each county voted in ac-
cordance with their particular needs at a given moment, often 
making large-scale reform impossible.20 Virginia was still an 
agrarian-based society and the average planter or farmer had 
few external needs. It was a society admirably suited to a theory 
18 St. George Tucker, A Dissertation on Slavery with a Proposal for the Gradual 
Abolition of it in the State of Virginia (Philadelphia, 1796); George K. Taylor 
to St. George Tucker, Richmond, 5 Dec. 1796, Tucker-Coleman Papers. 
19 Robert McColley, Slavery and jeffersonian Virginia (Urbana, Ill., 1964), 
pp. 34-57, II4-41, contends that most Virginians had no desire to eliminate, or 
even to ameliorate the slave system because of their almost-total dependence on 
slave labor as a source of economic profit. Winthrop Jordan, White over Black: 
The Development of American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel 
Hill, N.C., 1968), pp. 429-565, while recognizing the importance of the profit 
motive, achieves a more balanced view by his thorough and incisive treatment 
of the intellectual and psychological attitudes of the white man toward the Negro. 
20 The revenue shortage was acute. An inadequate defense system, an anti-
quated prison, and insufficient salaries for government officials made it imperative 
that taxes be raised; they were decreased instead. The delegates were equally 
oblivious to the need for internal improvements. On nearly every proposal for 
improvements, the few counties which would benefit directly from the improve-
ment would vote for it, the rest would vote against it. See, for example, House 
journal, 13 Nov. 1789, 14, 24, 25, 27,28 Dec. 1790, 12 Dec. 1791, 12 Oct. 1792. 
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of government which advocated as little interference as possible, 
and this was exactly the way the state government operated. 
Since Virginians were not willing to allow their own state 
government to assume broad powers, it is understandable that 
they were even more reluctant to grant those powers to the 
federal government. There was one area, however, where it 
was a practical necessity to yield power to the federal govern-
ment. Because of its shortsighted revenue and defense policies, 
the Commonwealth of Virginia was wholly incapable of de-
fending her frontier settlements against Indian attack.21 The 
supporters of the federal Constitution had won important votes 
in the Virginia Ratifying Convention by promising to rid the 
frontier of the Indian problem, and for once, Virginians looked 
forward to the intervention of federal power. 22 Few of the 
policies of the federal government promised to benefit the Old 
Dominion and the ability of the general government to halt 
Indian depredations on the frontier would therefore be a major 
test of its utility. 
While Virginia's frontier problem was not nearly as trouble-
some as that faced by Georgia, the Northwest Territory, or the 
counties in western Kentucky, this historical fact gave little 
solace to residents in western Virginia who were subjected to 
Indian attacks. The western counties were on the periphery 
of two Indian wars involving the Cherokee and Creek nations 
on the Southwestern frontier and the Shawnee and Miami 
Indians in the Northwest Territory.23 Although no major 
battles took place in western Virginia, the residents suffered 
heavy casualties from sporadic raids by all four of the Indian 
nations. 
The policy of the United States government was to maintain 
peace with the Indians at almost any price; the president and 
his secretary of war, Henry Knox, were well aware that peace 
21 Beverly Randolph to the Lieutenants of Militia, Richmond, 31 Dec. 1788, 
Executive Letterbooks. 
22 Elliot, Debates, 3: 238-41; Main, The Antifederalists, pp. 229-30. 
23 Ray Allen Billington, Westward Expansion: A History of the American 
Frontier, 2d ed. (New York, 1960), pp. 221-45. 
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treaties could not eliminate the grievances between the Indians 
and the frontier inhabitants, but they hoped that a pacific 
policy, backed by token forces of American militiamen, would 
allow them to buy time until a more permanent solution could 
be found. Small units of militia patrolled the frontier, but 
were widely scattered and severely handicapped by their orders 
to carry out only defensive warfare. 24 Virginia's frontier resi-
dents were enraged by this cautious policy. While their anger 
is understandable, they would have received even less protection 
if their own state government had been manning the defenses. 
The settlers were not impressed by this line of reasoning. The 
proponents of the federal government had promised to eliminate 
the Indian menace; when success did not come immediately, 
those already hostile to the government were much quicker to 
blame the federal forces than they were to remember the in-
adequacies of their own militia. 
Pursuant to orders from the United States secretary of war, 
Governor Beverly Randolph of Virginia, in June 1789, ordered 
the disbanding of nearly all the state troops patrolling the 
frontier. Within a month militia strength along the western 
border had been reduced to token forces in scattered counties.25 
Only a few months later the Indians began to increase the 
frequency and intensity of their attacks. In the southwest, 
·wythe, ·washington, Montgomery, and Russell counties were 
plagued by the Creeks and Cherokees. In the northwest, the 
Shawnee and Miami Indians terrorized the counties of Ohio, 
Harrison, Monongalia, Randolph, and Kanawha.26 The federal 
government's system of peace treaties was not bringing peace 
to the frontier settlements. 
There was an endless circle of complaints over the handling 
of the situation. The residents of the western counties peti-
tioned the governor, asking him to appropriate funds to bolster 
24 Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy 
(New York, 1923), pp. 11-12. 
25 Beverly Randolph to George Washington, Richmond, 1 June 1789, Executive 
Letterbooks. 
26 Samuel McDowell to Beverly Randolph, 26 July 1789, George Clendinen to 
Randolph, 10 Aug. 1789, Benjamin Wilson to Randolph, 27 Sept. 1789, Executive 
Correspondence, VSL. 
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the state militia. The governor answered that it was the respon-
sibility of the federal government to patrol the frontier; he 
was powerless to intervene. The governor then wrote the 
president, begging for more federal protection. He invariably 
received the answer that federal troops were overcommitted and 
that even if the troops were available, they could not be used, 
since the United States was theoretically at peace with the 
Indian nations and therefore could not take any offensive action. 
This discouraging news was relayed to the frontier inhabitants, 
completing the circle of evasion.27 
The western settlers were not entirely blameless for the 
troubles that beset them. Governor Randolph repeatedly 
warned against incursions into territory legally held by the 
Indians, but Virginia frontiersmen continued to stir up Indian 
animosity by their hunger for western lands.28 Nevertheless, 
most of the settlers were the unfortunate victims of the meddling 
of others. The machinations of James Wilkinson, intrigue by 
the Spanish and British, and agitation by the more unruly 
residents of Kentucky did much more to stir Indian hostility 
than did the expansionist desires of Virginia frontiersmen. Of 
particular concern to Governor Randolph was the shockingly 
unneutral conduct of Great Britain. Randolph was convinced, 
and there was considerable evidence to bear him out, that Great 
Britain was using the frontier posts, illegally retained after the 
Treaty of Peace, to foment Indian unrest.29 That the United 
States government would condone such action was proof to all 
Virginians that the commercial and financial interests of the 
Northeast were in league with the British. 
27 Robert Johnson to Beverly Randolph, Woodford County, 2 June 1789, in 
William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts 
Preserved in the Capitol at Richmond, 11 vols. (Richmond, 1875-1893), 4: 634-35 
(hereafter referred to as Calendar of State Papers); Beverly Randolph to Robert 
Johnson, Richmond, 26 Sept. 1789, Randolph to Henry Knox, Richmond, 5 May 
1790, Executive Letterbooks; Henry Knox to Randolph, New York, 10 June 
1790, Executive Communications, VSL. 
28 Beverly Randolph to Lieutenants of the Western Counties, 10 March 1790, 
Randolph to the Virginia House of Delegates, Richmond, 3 May 1791, Executive 
Letter books. 
29 Randolph to Timothy Pickering, Richmond, 4 Oct. 1793, Timothy Pickering 
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; Bemis, Jay's Treaty, pp. ll-20. 
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The situation became intolerable following the bungled 
efforts of General Arthur St. Clair. On November 4, 1791, 
St. Clair's federal forces met the Indians along the Maumee 
River. The result was a humiliating defeat for the American 
army; 630 men were lost, a devastating toll considering the 
paucity of American troops on the frontier. 30 The debacle gave 
the Indian tribes of the Northwest a great boost in morale. 
Their attacks increased until Governor Henry Lee was driven 
to circumvent the restrictions placed on him by the federal 
government. Lee appealed to the General Assembly to ap-
propriate more funds to raise a special militia force to perform 
the job the federal troops were supposed to be doing. The 
Federalist governor made no attempt to defend the administra-
tion in New York. He condemned United States Indian policy 
as a failure and demanded that the federal government reim-
burse the state for any funds it spent policing its frontiers.31 
The state militia proved no more successful than in previous 
years. Casualties continued to mount, prompting Governor 
Lee to embark on an inspection tour through the frontier 
counties. \Vhat he saw was not encouraging. The state militia 
was woefully understaffed, underequipped, and plagued with 
quarrels. There was bickering among the commanding officers 
as to the proper means of defense and politicking among the 
lower-ranking officers over promotions.32 The governor even-
tually had to resort to the policy used by the federal government. 
Realizing that he did not have enough men to mount an assault 
on Indian outposts, he established a system of defensive patrols 
of ten or twelve men in scattered areas. At the same time, he 
pleaded with his officers to give him some kind of minor victory 
in order to raise morale and attract additional recruits. As a 
stopgap measure, he placed the burden of defense on the resi-
dents of the frontier counties themselves. He recommended 
that families keep a loaded gun at all times, that they barricade 
30 Billington, Westward Expansion, p. 224. 
31 Henry Lee to William Blount, Richmond, 14 Dec. 1791, Lee to Lieutenants 
of the Western Counties, Richmond, 12 Dec. 1791, Executive Letterbooks. 
32 John Preston to Henry Lee, 13 June 1792, 15 Aug. 1792, Preston Papers; 
Lee to Lieutenants of Western Counties, 15 Aug. 1792, Executive Letterbooks. 
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their doors day and night, and that they remain alert to repel 
any Indian attack.33 
The governor's efforts were unproductive. The state simply 
could not afford to appropriate the necessary revenue to 
strengthen the militia, enlistments stayed low, and the frontier 
inhabitants became progressively more disillusioned with both 
the state and national governments. By 1793, Governor Lee 
was forced to admit that "at the present, the Commonwealth 
may be considered destitute of any legal system of defense."34 
At this juncture he tried once again to obtain more aid from 
the already depleted federal troops. The reply of Secretary of 
War Knox was not reassuring. He admitted that the pacific 
policies of the United States government were not working and 
that more vigorous action might be necessary in the future, 
but he added that it was impossible to increase the government's 
effort against the Indians because most of the members of 
Congress lived far from the frontier and could not be persuaded 
of the necessity for more stringent measures. At least for the 
present the United States would continue its policy of peaceful 
overtures.35 Knox's judgment was sound. The policy of biding 
time until a sufficient force could be raised proved to be wise, 
but it was not easy to convince the frontiersmen of the virtue 
of peace treaties and patience when their neighbors were being 
killed. 
In addition to discontent over tactical solutions to the 
frontier problem, all three agencies of government-county, 
state, and national-became embroiled in a controversy over 
the distribution of the expenses of the war. The state govern-
ment could not afford to supply local militia companies with 
adequate equipment; the local commanders either had to do 
without or impress the necessary supplies from local merchants. 
Not even the merchants could meet their demands, however, 
33 Ibid.; Lee to Captain Andrew Lewis, Richmond, 8 May 1792, Executive Let-
terbooks. 
34 Lee to the Justices of the Counties of Virginia, Richmond, 19 Jan. 1793, 
Executive Letterbooks. 
35 Henry Knox to Lee, Philadelphia, 10 May 1793, Executive Communications, 
VSL. 
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and the militia commanders continued to plead with the state 
government for more money and equipment. The governor 
sent these requests to the federal government, only to receive 
the answer that the president could not believe things were 
as bad as the governor had pictured them and that the existing 
federal forces could handle the problem. After receiving several 
such requests from Governor Lee, Secretary Knox finally told 
the Virginia chief executive to stop being so impatient; the 
United States had many other obligations and the frontier 
problem of Virginia was low on its list of priorities.36 This 
hardly strengthened the party loyalty of an embattled Federalist 
governor who was already dissatisfied with the financial policies 
of the new government. And it provides yet another example 
of the difficulties faced by Federalist officials in Virginia. Al-
though devoted to union, they were driven to oppose federal 
policies which threatened to work against the interests of their 
state. 
Relations between Governor Lee and the federal government 
were exacerbated by the unwillingness of the "\Var Department 
to reimburse Virginia for funds already spent in defense of the 
frontier. The "\Var Department had agreed to pay a large part 
of the expense, but was being obstinate about paying the 
balance. Lee was irate; if the federal government was going 
to assume control over Indian affairs, and a very poor control 
it was, then it must be prepared to assume the full expense of 
that control. To let it shirk that responsibility would set a 
dangerous precedent. 37 
Not until August 1794 did the federal government succeed 
in getting a full force of troops. General St. Clair's successor, 
Anthony Wayne, won a major victory at Fallen Timbers on 
August 20, thereby reducing the Indian threat to Virginia's 
frontier for the remainder of the decade and providing a severe 
36 John Preston to Lee, 13 June 1792, Preston Papers; Knox to Lee, Philadel-
phia, 14 Oct. 1792, 3 Nov. 1792, Executive Communications, VSL; Lee to Knox, 
29 April, 11 Sept. 1793, Executive Letterbooks. 
37 Lee to Virginia Representatives in Congress, Richmond, 9 Jan. 1792, Lee to 
Richard Henry Lee, Richmond, 1 April 1792, Lee Family Papers, VHS; Lee to 
the Auditor of Public Accounts, 18 April 1792, Executive Letterbooks. 
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blow to British hopes of using the Indians to thwart American 
expansion westward. 38 And the victory came at precisely the 
right time. The promise of federal protection from hostile 
Indians had been one of the few appealing proposals in the 
Federalist platform, but in the years prior to Wayne's victory 
it looked as if the federal government was not willing or able to 
fulfill its promise to the frontier residents. Fortunately for the 
supporters of the Federalist administration, the performance 
of the state government in the field of Indian defense during 
that time was even more dismal than that of the federal gov-
ernment and criticism of federal policy was therefore muted. 
Dissatisfied as they were with federal Indian policy, the frontier 
residents had no choice but to remain primarily dependent 
upon the federal government for protection. \\layne's victory 
at Fallen Timbers finally gave the Federalist administration a 
measure of positive appeal. The citizens of northwest Virginia, 
who tended to place most of the blame for their Indian troubles 
on the state government, would actually constitute a stronghold 
of Federalist support for the rest of the decade.39 
The weaknesses of the state militia system, although plainly 
apparent to those concerned with the problem of defense 
against hostile Indians, continued to escape reform. The 
inherent defects of the militia system, and of the attitudes that 
produced such a system, were a result of the negative theory 
of government held by most Virginians. At the heart of the 
matter was the lack of funds-a problem that hindered Virginia's 
development in almost every area. \\Then Governor James 
Wood informed his militia commander that it would be impos-
sible to raise military expenditures, he voiced a common com-
plaint: "Because of the ill-judged policy of our Legislature in 
reducing the taxes, we have an empty treasury." 40 The unwill-
38 Billington, Westward Expansion, pp. 225-26. 
39 Federalist strength in the northwest was bolstered by other factors as well. 
The failure of the Republican-dominated state government to grant the north-
western counties greater representation in the legislature served to drive the 
representatives from those counties into the arms of the Federalists. 
40 James Wood to Captain Southern, Richmond, 26 June 1794, Executive Let-
terbooks. 
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ingness of the legislature to levy taxes for anything but the 
most immediate needs of the state not only weakened the 
militia, it also hindered programs for internal improvements, 
education, and even delayed repair of a leaky roof on the 
governor's mansion for six years. 41 The existing tax rate was 
insufficient to meet the needs of the state, but worse, the peren-
nial problem of tax arrears made it impossible to collect taxes 
that had been assessed. It was not that the tax burden was too 
high-few people complained of this-but that men entrusted 
with collection of taxes, the county sheriffs, had many other 
duties and could not spend the time traveling through the 
county to make their collections. Since the collector was legally 
responsible for any revenue he failed to collect, many counties 
were unable to find anyone to fill the post. Consequently, 
some counties fell as much as ten years behind in their taxes. 
This problem became acute at the height of the frontier war-
fare; Governor Lee pleaded with his revenue agents to increase 
efforts to collect tax arrears, but there was no appreciable 
change in the situation.42 
The state militia probably could not have functioned effi-
ciently even if it had been properly financed. In the populous 
eastern counties, where monthly militia musters were a pleasant 
diversion and service did not subject participants to immediate 
danger, there was no problem finding recruits. It was a mark 
of social distinction to be a militia officer in Virginia, and the 
same families that controlled the county court and served in 
the Assembly also held the top ranks in their county's militia 
unit. 43 The main problems facing these militia commanders 
41 The governor, in his annual addresses to the legislature, continually pleaded 
for more funds for all these items. Beverly Randolph to the Speaker of the 
House of Delegates, 20 Oct. 1789, Henry Lee to the Speaker, 21 Oct. 1793, Robert 
Brooke to the Speaker, 8 Nov. 1796, James Wood to the Speaker, 4 Dec. 1797, 
Executive Letterbooks. 
42 The legislature was engulfed with petitions from sheriff-tax collectors, asking 
to be relieved of their responsibilities. The petitioners usually complained that 
the burden of their other duties, plus the large territory to be covered in col-
lecting the taxes, made it impossible for them to carry out their job. See, for 
example, Petitions of Ohio County, 23 Nov. 1796, Botetourt County, 16 Nov. 
1795, Loudon County, 8 Nov. 1790, Legislative Petitions, VSL; Henry Lee to 
Virginia Revenue Agents, Richmond, 17 Feb. 1794, Executive Letterbooks. 
Domestic Affairs I07 
were to keep the troops sober on muster day and to avoid 
making enemies when they appointed officers. Although the 
militia companies were badly disciplined (on one occasion a 
whole company deserted its commander for a night of revelry), 
it was of little consequence.44 There was no need to be in a 
state of readiness. 
Militia service along the frontier, however, was not a pleasant 
diversion. Leadership posts in the state militia were still con-
sidered an honor and remained under the control of members 
of prominent families, but it was much more difficult to fill the 
less prestigious positions. The western counties were far less 
populous than those of the east, and since each county consti-
tuted a separate militia unit responsible for raising its own 
troops, the west always had difficulty recruiting an adequate 
force. Moreover, militia service in the west was dangerous. 
It was one thing to gather every few months for a militia 
muster, but quite another to be fighting Indians. As a result, 
western residents viewed militia duty as something to avoid. 
Frederick County, safely situated in the eastern portion of 
Virginia's Northern Neck, had a force of 2,708, while Wythe 
County, the subject of almost nightly visitations by the Indians 
of the southwest, had a force of only 494 men. Likewise, 
Accomac County, on the eastern shore, had a force of 1,299 
men, the northwest county of Montgomery, a mere 436. This 
ratio held true throughout the state. This would have been of 
little consequence had the duties of the militia in the two 
regions been similar, but the vulnerability of the west to Indian 
attack made it all the more important that it have a strong 
militia.45 Virginia's outmoded militia laws made this impos-
43 A study of the "Rank Role of the Virginia Militia," 15 Aug. 1794, Wilson 
Cary Nicholas Papers, University of Virginia, indicates that command of the 
militia was even more tightly controlled by Virginia's leading families than were 
the political positions in the state. Almost no one of social prominence was 
excluded from the militia role and very few people of low social standing can 
be found on the list. 
44 Joseph Jones to William Mackin, Petersburg, 7 Sept. 1794, John Stith to 
Joseph Jones, Brunswick, Va., 19 Jan. 1795, Joseph Jones Papers, Duke Uni· 
versity. 
45 "Militia Role," 1798, Preston Papers. 
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sible. It was the responsibility of the militia in the particular 
county where a disturbance took place to handle the problem. 
Thus, the militia units of the west, which were the least 
equipped in supplies and men, bore most of the responsibility 
for policing the frontier against the Indians.46 
The burden placed on individual counties for raising and 
supervising militia forces was disastrous to military efficiency, 
but the historical reasons for assigning the counties such a role 
are understandable. Aversion to large standing armies, suspicion 
of centralized administration-state or national-and intense 
pride in local government as the legitimate source of justice 
and protection-these all served to discourage efficient adminis-
tration of military affairs. There was also a practical reason for 
maintaining the status quo. Those holding power in the 
counties had a vested interest in the old system. The county 
courts made all recommendations to the governor for the ap-
pointment of state militia officers, and the governor rarely 
refused to follow their recommendations. Since those nomi-
nated were either close friends or relatives of the county court 
officials, and in some cases were the officials themselves, the 
ruling aristocracy in the counties was understandably reluctant 
to relinquish power over the militia. Their control over the 
militia was an important ingredient in their own political 
power, and they would not willingly assent to any diminution 
in it.47 
The militia's part in the political process varied, but occa-
sionally it was important. The congressional elections of 1792 
in the district encompassing Montgomery, Washington, Wythe, 
Grayson, Greenbrier, Kanawha, Lee, and Russell counties-the 
region where the Indian threat was the greatest-provides a 
dramatic example of the curious way in which the militia, the 
social structure, and the political process became intertwined. 
The opposing candidates, Abram Trigg and Francis Preston, 
were the two most prominent men in the region. The Trigg 
46 Hening, Statutes at Large, 13: 340-56. 
47 Ibid., 13: 342: Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders, p. 92. 
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and Preston families had dominated the affairs of their respec-
tive counties for decades. During the Revolution, William 
Preston, Francis's father, had been chairman of the Montgomery 
County Committee of Safety; Abram Trigg's father had been 
second in command. The families' preeminence continued 
into the 1790s; both had enhanced their reputations by service 
in the Revolution and had increased their economic standing 
by well-timed land speculation. In addition to being rich and 
socially prominent, Preston and Trigg held the same political 
views, both identifying with the emerging Republican party. 
They shared a hatred of Great Britain and a desire to defend 
the agrarian interests of Virginia. Nor did they differ in the 
way in which they ran their campaigns. They avoided major 
issues and relied on prominent people living within the con-
gressional district to use their influence on the electorate.48 
On election day events took an unusual turn. Captain Wil-
liam Preston, commander of the federal troops in the area, 
became overzealous in support of his brother's candidacy. He 
marched his troops into the polling place and proceeded to 
turn the electoral process into chaos, demanding that all his 
men be given the opportunity to cast ballots. This was war-
ranted in some cases, as many men were residents of the county, 
but many others who voted that day lived in Kentucky. Captain 
Preston next marched his troops around the courthouse "to the 
disturbance, displeasure and terror of the voters assembled 
there." The soldiers began to intimidate those freeholders 
intending to vote for Abram Trigg. When the local justice 
of the peace protested, one of the soldiers knocked him down 
and took over his post.49 
48 Charles W. Crush, comp., The Montgomery County Story, 1776-1957 (Rich-
mond, 1957), pp. 12-18; William C. Pendleton, History of Tazewell County and 
Southwest Virginia, 1748-1920 (Richmond, 1928), pp. 257-58; Thomas Perkins 
Abernathy, Western Lands and the American Revolution (New York, 1937), pp. 
249-50; Francis Preston to John Preston, 10 Feb. 1795, Preston Papers; Ansel 
Wold, comp., Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1927 (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1928), pp. 143, 1627. 
49 Francis Preston to .John Preston, I .Jan. 1793, Petition of Abram Trigg of 
the State of Virginia to the Speaker of the House of Representatives ... [1793], 
Preston Papers. 
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The federal militiamen made a mockery of the election in 
Montgomery County. Surprisingly, Francis Preston did not 
deny the fact. When Trigg contested the election before a 
special committee of the United States House of Representa-
tives, Preston admitted that his brother had been guilty of a 
breach of conduct, but claimed he would have won the election 
anyway. The only charge he disputed was that concerning the 
assault on the justice of the peace. Preston claimed that the 
justice was intoxicated by the time the soldiers appeared and 
that the justice had struck the first blow.50 
Even more surprising than Preston's admission of his brother's 
guilt was the nonchalance with which Congress viewed the 
affair. When the matter was discussed on the floor of the 
House of Representatives, a few Northern members expressed 
surprise, but representatives from the Southern states saw 
nothing unusual. Samuel Smith of Maryland tried to explain 
to the Northern members that this sort of thing was customary 
in Southern elections; in the North, citizens met in small 
groups to cast their votes, but in the South the citizens of a 
county met together at once, creating great congestion, and 
not at all infrequently, tumult. Smith reassured his Northern 
colleagues that there was nothing exceptionable about one of 
Preston's supporters carrying a club under his coat or that 
drunkenness prevailed: "I suppose that five hundred of my 
constituents had clubs under their coats; so that if this be 
sufficient for putting an end to an election, the committee may 
begin by disallowing mine. If the committee are to break 
up every election whose persons are seen drunk, they will have 
great deal of work upon hand, sir." In regard to the charge 
that Captain Preston had intimidated people at the polls, 
Smith contended that in all Southern elections "a man of influ-
ence came to the place of election at the head of two or three 
hundred of his friends; and to be sure they would not, if they 
could help it, suffer anybody on the other side to give a vote 
as long as they were there." By Southern standards then, 
50 Francis Preston to William Preston, 11 April 1793, Preston Papers: Annals 
of Congress, 4: 612. 
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Preston's conduct was not out of the ordinary. And Smith's 
argument must have carried some weight, for Trigg's petition 
to void the election was rejected, without a division.51 
Preston kept his seat in the House, but the controversy 
continued at home. For the next six years the Preston-Trigg 
rivalry took on the appearance of family warfare. On each 
succeeding election, in 1794, 1796, and 1798, Trigg and Preston 
opposed each other, and their campaign rhetoric became more 
acrimonious each time.52 A new dimension was added to the 
affair when the fiery democrat Alexander Smythe, head of the 
Wythe County Democratic Society, joined forces with Trigg. 
Smythe dug up new charges, accusing Preston of land specula-
tion and of unlawful interference in the appointment of county 
court officials. He claimed that Preston's large landholdings 
in the West aligned him with the aristocratic elements in Con-
gress and made him unfit to serve the interests of the smaller 
landowners of his district. 53 Smythe became so abusive that 
Preston felt compelled to meet him on the field of honor. 
Characteristically, the duel ended with the shots going astray.54 
Smythe's democratic rhetoric notwithstanding, the Preston-
Trigg feud was not fought along ideological lines. The cam-
paigns of 1794, 1796, and 1798, which could have centered 
around the important political issues of the decade, were instead 
contested on an intensely personal level. Both candidates were 
supporters of the "republican interest." While in Congress 
Preston had sided with the Madisonian party and in 1800 
51 Annals of Congress, 4: 611-12. 
52 William Lewis to Abram Trigg, 22 Dec. 1794, Francis Preston to John 
Preston, Philadelphia, 11 Jan. 1795, Robert Gamble to John Preston, Richmond, 
23 May 1796, Circular Letter to the People of Wythe, Washington, Montgomery, 
Greenbrier, Kanawha, Grayson, Russell, and Lee Counties, 13 Feb. 1797, Preston 
Papers. 
53 The democratic societies of Virginia were responsible for the most extrava-
gant charges against the federal government. The societies had little influence 
however. Societies were formed in only three areas-Norfolk, Wytheville, and 
Dumfries, and in no cases did they survive longer than a year. Eugene Perry 
Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 (New York, 1942) p. 134; A Let-
ter from Alexander Smythe to Francis Preston (Richmond, 1795); The Third and 
Last Letter from Alexander Smythe to Francis Preston (Richmond, 1796). 
54 Benjamin Howard to John Preston, Williamsburg, 26 June 1796, Francis 
Preston to John Preston, Saltworks, 12 Aug. 1797, Preston Papers. 
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served as an elector on the Jeffersonian ticket. Trigg, though 
he had the support of the more radical Smythe, pursued the 
same policies as his predecessor when he succeeded in unseating 
Preston in 1798.55 Trigg was not even able to turn Preston's 
record of land speculation to his political advantage. If Preston's 
landholdings made him unqualified to serve the interests of 
his constituents, then Trigg, who had also enjoyed success 
speculating in western lands, would have been disqualified on 
the same grounds.56 Instead, Trigg continued to harp on 
Preston's misconduct in the appointment of county officials, 
while Preston asked the voters to uphold his honor in the face 
of the aspersions of Trigg and Smythe. Trigg's efforts finally 
paid off in 1798, but his victory was one of personality, not of 
political principles. Preston was mortified by his defeat, not 
because it signified a rejection of his conduct as a congressman, 
but because it meant the loss of his status as the most venerated 
man in his district.57 
In other sections of the nation a personal rivalry such as that 
existing between Preston and Trigg might have created a 
division along ideological lines, if only out of expediency. A 
candidate in Abram Trigg's position might have adopted a 
stance in support of the Federalist administration to add sub-
stance to his personal opposition to Preston.58 This did not, and 
could not, happen because of the unanimity of opinion existing 
between Preston and Trigg on the subject of the federal gov-
ernment. They both feared centralized government and de-
tested the policies of the Federalist administration in particular. 
Moreover, neither candidate was accustomed to debating issues 
of national policy during a political campaign. Each man 
55 Francis Preston to John Preston, Philadelphia, 9 Nov. 1794, Francis Preston 
to John Preston, 27 Feb. 1800, Preston Papers; Annals of Congress, 7: 1954, 9: 
2721. 
56 Lewis P. Summers, Annals of Southwest Virginia, 1769-1800, 2 vols. (Abing-
don, Va., 1929), 1: 923, 925-27. 
57 Francis Preston to John Preston, Philadelphia, 10 Feb. 1795, Robert Gamble 
to John Preston, Richmond, 23 May 1796, Francis Preston to John Preston, 
Philadelphia, I Feb. 1797, 21 March 1797, 12 Aug. 1797, Preston Papers. 
58 This is the hypothesis of Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Struc-
ture (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), 300-301. 
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viewed the campaigns as tests of his personal power and prestige 
and would have considered the manipulation of national issues 
for partisan gain as a breach of the etiquette of Virginia's 
electoral process. In many areas of the state this highly per-
sonalized view of politics was already breaking down, and the 
intensification of the struggles between Republicans and Fed-
eralists would cause a further decline in that kind of ethic. 
But for Preston and Trigg, and for their constituents, con-
siderations of personality and prestige remained more im-
portant than public policy. 
As people within Virginia began to feel the impact of 
federal policy, important changes were taking place in the 
nature of the opposition to the Federalist administration on 
the floor of the United States Congress. Before 1791, the loudest 
protests against Federalist policy had come from the members 
of Virginia's state government. Although these protests had 
not been directed by an organized political party, they were 
significant factors in the transformation of many of Virginia's 
congressmen from supporters to opponents of Federalist policy. 
By 1791 Virginia's congressmen had moved into the fore of the 
opposition and were now trying to control the sentiments that 
had hastened their transformation and turn them to partisan 
advantage. While they had formerly been captives of local 
interests, they were now seeking to coordinate those interests 
into effective opposition to Federalist policy.59 
The leaders of the new Republican interest in Congress knew 
they had a ready-made constituency in Virginia. A sizable 
majority in the House of Delegates had criticized federal policy 
from the beginning and there was no sign that the strength of 
that opposition was declining. Moreover, the oratory of Patrick 
Henry and the rhetoric of the Virginia Address to Congress 
59 Noble Cunningham, The jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill, 
N.C., 1957), pp. l-32, traces the early development of the Republican party in 
Congress. Cunningham maintains that the impetus behind party organization 
came almost exclusively from the Republican members of Congress. In a tech· 
nical sense Cunningham is correct, but he ignores the local pressures that made 
it mandatory for the congressional leaders to begin organizing in the first place. 
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Concerning Assumption provided them with an articulate 
philosophy of agrarian republicanism, well-suited to their 
current needs. Resistance to centralization, hatred of British 
influence, and a suspicion of Northern financial and commercial 
practices-these had already become the themes of Virginia's 
opposition to the national government and provided a useful 
weapon for Virginia's national leaders in their day-to-day 
opposition to Hamiltonian programs. 
The new party organization in Congress promised to be 
much more effective than the unorganized and sporadic opposi-
tion that had appeared in the state legislature. Republican 
congressmen could attempt to block Federalist proposals before 
they became law rather than indulge in spirited, but futile, 
protests after the fact. There were some serious obstacles to 
extending party organization to include political leaders within 
the state. While most Virginia Republicans in Congress shared 
the same views on the way the government should be admin-
istered, the Republican interest on the local level was composed 
of many disparate elements. Their attitudes on two of the 
fundamental questions of the age-the proper division of power 
between state and nation and the value of democratic forms of 
government-differed significant! y. 
The principal division within Virginia's Republican interest 
on the question of sovereignty was between the old Anti-
federalists and the growing body of disenchanted Federalists 
who were drifting over to the Republican cause. The Anti-
federalists had joined the Republicans en masse. Of Anti-
federalist members of the Ratifying Convention whose later 
careers can be traced, only one man, Patrick Henry, became a 
Federalist, while forty joined the new Republican party.60 This 
group formed the nucleus of Republican strength in Virginia 
and, indeed, provided the initial pressure which hastened the 
conversion of many of Virginia's Federalist congressmen to the 
Republican cause. In general, the Antifederalist wing remained 
unreconciled to a central government possessed with such vast 
power and was trying not only to block the particular policies 
60 Risjord, "The Virginia Federalists," p. 487. 
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of Alexander Hamilton but also to change the very structure of 
the government which allowed those policies to be enacted. 
Of the Federalists in the Virginia Ratifying Convention whose 
subsequent careers can be traced, thirty-eight remained sup-
porters of the government, while twenty-three defected to the 
Republicans.61 Those who joined the Republican party did so 
in reaction to Hamiltonian policies, but did not desire any 
radical changes in the structure of the government itself. Their 
attitudes more closely coincided with those of the Republican 
leaders in Congress, but they remained a minority within their 
party in Virginia. It was the task of Virginia's leaders in Con-
gress, and not an easy one at that, to maintain a semblance of 
unity between these two wings of the party without giving in 
to the more radical demands of those who wished to bring 
about drastic changes in the structure of government. They 
were not always successful; often they would resort to Anti-
federalist rhetoric, thus giving the Federalists the mistaken 
impression that they too sought the destruction of the new 
government. 
There was also a division of opinion within the Republican 
interest over the efficacy and desirability of democratic govern-
ment. At one extreme were the wealthy gentry who, though 
they opposed the federal government because it threatened 
their own political power, were seldom in sympathy with the 
mildly egalitarian goals of Jeffersonian liberalism. At the other 
extreme was a small and disparate collection of men-consisting 
of radical gentrymen and yeoman farmers alike-that made up 
the membership of the relatively few and uninfluential demo-
cratic societies that existed in Virginia. There were of course 
shades of opinion between these two extremes and many 
special interest groups that cannot be identified with either 
view. The Baptist associations, which constituted another 
source of support for Republican policies, are an example. 
They distrusted all government, especially centralized govern-
ment, because they had been penalized for their religious 
beliefs by such governments in the past. This attitude initially 
61 Ibid. 
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aligned them with the Antifederalists, but when the Anti-
federalist members of the state senate attempted to strike out 
the Federalist-proposed constitutional amendment guaranteeing 
religious freedom, they went over to the Federalist side. When 
the new Republican party emerged, led by such prominent sup-
porters of religious liberty as Madison and Jefferson, they 
changed allegiance once again. Although Baptists subscribed 
to a negative theory of government, they were neither liberals 
nor conservatives in the traditional sense; men both supporting 
and opposing the principles of Jeffersonian democracy could be 
found within their ranks. The unifying force among the 
Baptists was the desire to protect and promote the liberty and 
interests of their sect.62 
It was the task of Virginia Republicans in Congress to main-
tain harmony among these disparate elements and channel 
them into a united opposition to Federalist policy. The first 
test of their ability to do this came on the issue of the Bank 
of the United States. Unlike the assumption bill, when Vir-
ginia Republicans were willing to compromise to obtain the 
Potomac as the permanent site of the capital, the bank bill 
was opposed before and after its passage as a patent violation 
of the Constitution. Jefferson's failure to convince \Vashington 
of this fact, and Madison's inability to do the same with the 
Northern majority in Congress, prompted Republican congress-
men to carry the issue to the people.63 For the first time, how-
ever, the reaction in the counties to Federalist policy did not 
exceed or even equal the response in Congress. The bank bill, 
though far more dubious constitutionally than the assumption 
bill, did not even elicit a protest from the Virginia legislature. 
James Monroe reported a "general dissatisfaction to the 
measures of the Government prevailing" in Virginia, but he 
advised his Republican colleagues in Congress not to press the 
62 Gewehr, The Great Awakening in Virginia, pp. 189-94; Gewehr gives an 
accurate account of the historical reasons for the Baptists' aversion to centralized 
government, but mistakenly equates their opposition to centralism with a belief 
in democracy. There is no basis in either logic or fact for the assumption that a 
belief in democratic ideals and an opposition to central government were in any 
way inherently related to each other. 
63 Cunningham, The jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801, pp. 8-IO. 
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issue.64 It was difficult to arouse any opposition because of the 
very nature of the Bank of the United States. While as-
sumption threatened to do harm to Virginia's taxpayers by 
assessing them to pay off the debts of other states, the bank 
bill offered financial aid to the commercial segment of Virginia 
society, while threatening no adverse economic effect to those 
who did not stand to benefit from it. It proved impossible to 
stir opposition based on the bill's alleged unconstitutionality 
when a large segment of the population would directly benefit 
from it and the remainder would be unaffected.65 
The failure of Virginia's leaders in Congress to rally public 
opinion at home against the Bank of the United States is 
indicative of the difference between the Republican movements 
on the national and local levels. Jefferson and Madison, 
although tireless in defense of state and regional interests, were 
nevertheless able to perceive the long-range implications of the 
major issues of their day. They realized that, while the bank 
bill might do no immediate harm to Virginians, the precedents 
resulting from passage of the bill might lead to more serious 
encroachments on the federal Constitution in the future. Their 
followers in Virginia, conditioned to thinking in terms of what 
would be beneficial to their own or their counties' immediate 
interests, were unable to see the consequences of such an 
expansion in the powers granted by the Constitution. 
A few of Virginia's jurists and political theorists such as 
St. George Tucker and John Taylor of Caroline denounced 
the bank bill as a violation of the Constitution and as a device 
to promote consolidation, but they were men of unconventional 
wisdom and their views were further informed by their close 
association with Virginians in Congress.66 Significantly, John 
Taylor's pamphlets attacking the Bank of the United States 
were written over a year after the passage of the bank act; 
64 James Monroe to Madison, 27 June 1792, Madison Papers. 
65 Henry Lee to Madison, 8 Jan. 1792, 17 Jan. 1792 in Hunt, ed., Madison's 
Writings, 6: 81-83. 
66 St. George Tucker to James Monroe, Williamsburg, 10 Feb. 1791, Papers of 
James Monroe, LC (microfilm); John Taylor to James Madison, 11 May, 20 June, 
5 Aug. 1793 in John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph Macon College, 
2: 253-59. 
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although his pronouncements on the Bank gained wide circu-
lation and popularity, they were used not against the Bank itself, 
but against Federalist policy in general. By the time the 
pamphlets appeared, a new issue-America's relations with 
Great Britain-was before the people and Taylor's strictures 
upon the Bank served not so much to discredit the Bank as to 
arouse Virginians to the threat of the intrigues of "English 
monocrats" and Northern speculators in American foreign 
policy.67 
By 1792 the Republican party in Virginia found itself in an 
anomalous position. It had the support of most of the state's 
leaders and had spoken out forcefully on the issues of con-
stitutional amendments, assumption, and federal Indian policy. 
By its unrelenting agitation against the Federalist administra-
tion it had hastened the entrance of nearly all Virginia's con-
gressional representatives into the Republican camp. Despite 
this strong base of support, the Republican party in Virginia 
had not been able to mobilize itself in an effective manner. 
The bank bill had not generated enough animosity to channel 
the diverse elements within the party into a meaningful 
opposition. Republicans in Congress would have to wait for 
an issue that would unite opinion against the general govern-
ment on the local and national levels simultaneously before they 
could really gauge the effectiveness of their opposition. 
67 John Taylor, An Examination of the Late Proceedings in Congress Respect-
ing the Official Conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury (Richmond, 1793), pp. 
23-28; and Taylor, An Enquiry into the Principle and Tendency of Certain Public 
Measures (Philadelphia, 1794), passim, makes the connection between corrupt 
financial practices and "English influence" explicit. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Federal Policy and 
Foreign Affairs: I 
WHILE REPUBLICANS in Congress were trying unsuccessfully to 
mobilize opposition to the Bank of the United States, other 
issues began to occupy the public mind. The judgment of 
the Federalist administration in foreign affairs was to be chal-
lenged at every level of political life-in Congress, in the state 
legislatures, and in the counties. As the Anglo-French rivalry 
in Europe intensified, the Republican and Federalist factions 
took sides in the contest, with the Federalists becoming aligned 
with Great Britain, the Republicans with France. In only a 
few cases were these attachments determined by the interests 
of the members of either party. Rather, they represented a set 
of vaguely defined emotional attitudes that existed long before 
the Constitution had been drafted. These loyalties might have 
remained dormant, even after the two major European powers 
had declared war on each other, had it not been for the develop-
ment of party machinery in Congress which enabled them to 
be articulated and exploited fully. As this machinery was 
strengthened so were Federalist attachments to England and 
Republican attachments to France. This further facilitated the 
development of a two party political system; but unfortunately, 
it also wreaked havoc with American foreign policy.1 
There were two interconnected emotional attitudes that 
helped shape the debate in Virginia over foreign policy. The 
first was a hatred for Great Britain resulting from the last 
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decades of colonial rule, heightened by the Revolution, and 
further intensified by England's contemptuous attitude toward 
America's maritime rights after the Revolution. Virginians 
believed that corrupt English politicians had subverted the 
liberties guaranteed by English common law and had made the 
government of Great Britain a threat to the liberties of all 
nations. 2 In contrast to their rather pessimistic view of the 
intentions of England, Virginians viewed the French Revo-
lution with optimism and felt a spirit of community with the 
French people. They considered the turmoil in France a 
natural result of their own Revolution and envisioned similar 
movements by which other nations of Europe could throw off 
the vestiges of their corrupt past and acquire the virtues of 
America.3 While many Federalists outside Virginia became 
immediately disillusioned with the French Revolution because 
of the violence attending it, most Virginia Federalists continued 
to keep faith with the French commitment against corrupt, 
monarchical rule. 
It was much easier to support the people of France through 
messages of good will than it was to commit American resources 
to the French cause. When France declared war on England 
in February 1793, the Federalist administration in Philadelphia 
was thrown into the power struggles of Europe and Americans 
were forced to take sides between England and France. It 
was the intention of Washington, if not that of his secretary of 
the treasury, to remain as neutral as circumstances would per-
mit, but to most Virginians Washington's Proclamation of 
Neutrality of April 22, 1793, was proof that the Federalists 
sought to undermine the republican government of France. 
Virginians condemned the Proclamation for its failure to reit-
erate the attachment of the United States to the French revolu-
1 For the best, if also the most polemical, treatment of the relationship between 
party development and foreign affairs, see Joseph Charles, The Origins of the 
American Party System: Three Essays (Williamsburg, 1956). 
2 See, for example, Madison to Edmund Randolph, 17 Oct. 1788, in Hunt, ed., 
Madison's Writings, 5: 276; Jefferson to Richard Price, 8 Jan. 1789, in Boyd, ed., 
Jefferson Papers, 14: 420-24; Marshall, Washington, 2: 155. 
3 Jefferson to David Humphreys, Paris, 18 March 1789, in Boyd, ed., Jefferson 
Papers, 14: 676-79. 
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tionary cause and for what they believed to be its tendency to 
make the United States further dependent upon Great Britain. 
In particular, they charged that the members of the mercantile 
community had sacrificed the political independence of the 
United States for the sake of their own pocketbooks.4 
Affection for the French nation reached a high point soon 
after the Proclamation of Neutrality. Edmond Genet, Minister 
of France, arrived on American shores and received a hero's 
welcome everywhere he visited. Even in Richmond and Alex-
andria, supposedly Federalist strongholds, the residents turned 
out in large numbers to honor the French diplomat. 
Coincident with Genet's arrival the democratic societies 
began to organize in Virginia to rally support for the French 
cause. The Norfolk and Portsmouth Society, in its first set 
of public resolutions, was determined to disavow any support 
for the Proclamation of Neutrality. Its members explicitly 
linked America's struggle for liberty with the French Revolu-
tion: "When we behold the Tyrants of the world combined 
and every engine of despotism employed in making a grand 
effort to crush the infant spirit of freedom, recognized by our 
brethern [sic] of France, whose virtuous exertions (in a cause 
so lately our own) we cannot as men and as Republicans behold 
with indifference, or contemplate without a mixture of sym-
pathy and admiration." The Norfolk and Portsmouth Society 
then accused the Federalist administration of using the Proc-
lamation to obstruct the French cause. The Society considered 
it a fact much "to be lamented, that in the bosom of our own 
country we have men whose principles and sentiments are 
opposed to all free governments, that such are just objects of 
suspicion. "5 
4 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 4 Sept., 2 Oct. 1793; see also Harry 
Ammon, "The Formation of the Republican Party in Virginia, 1789-1796," 
journal of Southern History 19 (1953): 300-305. Ammon has done the most sig-
nificant work to date in tracing the development of Republican party organiza-
tion in Virginia. His articles, and his Ph.D. dissertation, "The Republican Party 
in Virginia, 1789 to 1824" (University of Virginia, 1948), are essential to an 
understanding of the intricacies of Republican party machinery. 
5 Virginia Chronicle, 8 June 1793, in Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 
pp. 9-10. 
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As pro-French sentiment increased, antipathy toward the 
British rose. Those who desired to arouse passions against 
Great Britain had a solid base on which to build. The residue 
of bitterness from the Revolution was still present. When a 
young Englishman, formerly of Virginia, attempted to move 
back to the Old Dominion in 1790, he immediately discovered 
the depth of Virginia's hostility to the mother country. Severn 
Major had lived in Virginia prior to the Revolution, but in 
1777 he joined the British army. His military service was con-
fined to five years behind a desk, and when he left the army in 
1782 he settled in New York, where he was allowed to become 
a citizen. Major yearned to return to his home state of Virginia, 
but Virginia law prohibited former loyalists from residing in 
the state. He petitioned the legislature, emphasizing his new 
loyalty to America and asking that they make an exception in 
his case.6 But the House of Delegates, by a vote of 74-59, 
expressed its unwillingness to forgive anyone whose back-
ground was tainted by British service.7 The war was long over, 
but such was the determination of Virginians to remain free 
from corrupt, "British influence," that the legislature persisted 
in strictly overseeing immigration into the state. 
The activities of the federal government in its first four years 
of operation served only to heighten Virginians' fears about 
British influence. The new government was pursuing policies 
whose obvious design was to aid the commercial North at the 
expense of the agrarian South. And what was worse, the system 
being used to destroy the freedom and security of the agrarian 
section constituted "the essence of the British monopoly, and 
... is sustained by a conspiracy between the government and 
those who are enriched by it."8 Thus the financial heresies of 
the Northern Federalists became intimately linked with the 
intrigues of Great Britain. Virginians were convinced that the 
"money-ocracy" of England was gaining control of the United 
States Bank in order to subvert the liberty of the South. 
6 "Petition of Severn Major," Accomac County, 6 Nov. 1790, Legislative Peti-
tions, VSL. 
7 House journal, 12 Nov. 1790. 
s John Taylor, Enquiry into Certain Public Measures, p. 21. 
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"America," John Taylor said, "has defeated a nation, but is 
subdued by a corporation .... The Bank, without a pretense 
of a claim upon the community, has found the means to occupy 
the station precisely, which Great Britain was striving to fill." 9 
This tendency to identify the financial policies of the federal 
government with the evils of British influence added con-
siderable emotional emphasis to the Republican opposition to 
Federalist foreign policy. The complicated and intricate ques-
tions involved in the formulation of American foreign policy 
ordinarily held little interest to a people preoccupied with 
their own local problems, but in this case Federalist policy 
toward Great Britain became a symbol of all the dangers of 
consolidated government. The Republicans interpreted any 
sign of Federalist weakness toward Great Britain as part of a 
design to impose the commercial and financial systems of that 
nation on the agrarian South, to extend federal power, and 
ultimately to bring all of America under the domination of 
England. 
A few Virginians disliked Great Britain for reasons that 
were not solely emotional or psychological. On the most selfish 
level, some people in Virginia had a vested interest in seeing 
that Great Britain and the United States never reached an 
agreement compelling Virginians to pay the ten to fifteen 
million dollars in debts owed to British merchants.10 The state 
government, ever since the Revolution, had done everything in 
its power to erect legal roadblocks to the payment of those debts. 
In 1774, when the courts were closed, British merchants lost all 
chance to bring suit against Virginia debtors. This extralegal 
action was regularized by an act of December 19, 1776, pro-
hibiting the recovery of all British debts. In 1787, four years 
after the Treaty of Peace, the legislature repealed the act 
prohibiting the recovery of British debts, but added a suspend-
ing clause stipulating that the act not go into effect until after 
Great Britain had given up her posts on America's Western 
frontier. This, of course, had not been done precisely because 
9 Ibid., p. 22. 
10 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 21 Sept. 1799. 
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of Virginia's refusal to enforce collection of the debts. As a 
result, Virginians continued to avoid their British creditors. 
The federal court in Virginia, dominated by Virginians, did 
little to encourage payment of the debts. Time and again the 
justices either refused to hear debt cases or instructed the jury 
in such a fashion as to preclude any judgment in favor of the 
British creditors.U Antifederalists, Republicans, and Federalists 
united in a common effort to make collection of the debts more 
difficult. Patrick Henry's most famous post-revolutionary cases 
were those in which he successfully defended Virginia debtors, 
and John Marshall, in a rather disingenuous argument before 
the Supreme Court in the case of \Vare versus Hylton, was 
instrumental in setting the precedent which made it almost 
impossible for British creditors to get a fair hearing in suits for 
the recovery of debts owed to them by Virginians. Marshall 
maintained that Virginia, when it passed the law prohibiting 
the collection of British debts, was a sovereign nation possessed 
with the legal right to confiscate and sequester debts in time 
of war. The provisions of the Treaty of Peace guaranteeing the 
payment of British debts did nothing to change this, as the 
previous Virginia act providing for the confiscation of British 
debts meant that by 1783 there were in fact no British debts 
to be paid.12 The cleverness, if not the fairness, of this argu-
ment, leads one to believe that it was not just Republicans 
who desired to avoid the payment of British debts.13 
11 "Notebook of William Hay: Considerations of Various Subjects of Enquiry 
Arising Out of the 6th Article of the Jay Treaty ... With an Appendix con-
taining ... a Variety of Acts of the Virginia Assembly which can be Considered 
as Lawful Impediments to the Collection of those Debts," Great Britain, Public 
Record Office MSS, Domestic, T79/27. 
12 Ibid.; Beveridge, Marshall, 2: 186-98; William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry, 
3: 601-48. 
13 Marshall, although his argument in Ware versus Hylton was instnunental in 
helping Virginians avoid the payment of debts, was one of the first to claim that 
the Republicans' hostility to Great Britain, while "cloaked in the name of 
patriotism," was in fact only an excuse to avoid paying their old British debts 
(Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 30 Oct. 1793). Although no one has 
yet determined whether Republicans or Federalists constituted the larger portion 
of debtors, it seems likely, given the similarity in the composition of the two 
factions, that enough members of each faction were in debt to the British to 
make all of them less than eager to find a solution for the payment of prewar 
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The number of political leaders in Virginia swayed by their 
own pecuniary interests was probably relatively small. More 
serious, because it affected both the honor and the livelihood 
of most Virginians, was the increasing belligerency of the 
British navy toward American commerce. The governor of 
Virginia received reports regularly from Norfolk complaining 
of the highhanded methods of the British navy in stopping 
and searching American vessels. The British were constantly 
impressing seamen and, of much more economic importance, 
slaves of Virginia merchants and shipowners.14 Nor did they 
confine their activities to the high seas. The British com-
manders frequently sent parties ashore to search for deserters. 
In one case, the "deserter" arrested turned out to be the 
captain of the Norfolk Town Guard. The result was a chorus 
of complaints from Norfolk residents and increased demands 
for retaliation, both commercial and military, against Great 
Britain.15 
No matter where Virginians turned, it seemed that the 
British were involved in activities detrimental to their interests. 
The piracy of the Algerians and the depredations of the Indians 
were both laid at the door of England.16 In the absence of 
government action, the citizens had to be content with their 
own methods of reprisal. Thus, the citizens of Norfolk, who 
came in closest contact with the British because of their prox-
imity to the sea, did everything possible to harass English 
citizens on American soil; it was reported that they performed 
"heroic exploits in the tar and feathers line."17 
debts. A final conclusion on this question, however, must await a detailed 
examination into the federal court records relating to British debts and a 
correlation of the findings of that investigation with the partisan divisions in 
Virginia. 
14 Henry Lee to George Washington, 2 May 1793, Lee to Thomas Newton, 22 
May 1793, Lee to Henry Knox, 3 .July 1793, .James Wood to .John Hamilton, 10 
Aug. 1793, Lee to Thomas Newton, 20 Feb. 1794, Executive Letterbooks. 
15 Robert Brooke to .John Hamilton, 22 April 1795, Brooke to the Secretary of 
State, 18 May 1795, Executive Letterbooks. 
16 Circular Letter of .John Page to the Citizens of the District of York in 
Virginia, 12 May 1794, Broadsides Collection, VHS. 
17 Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, Philadelphia, 6 May 1794, in Ames, Works, 
1: 143-44. 
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It is not surprising, given the hostility toward Great Britain, 
that French Minister Edmond Genet was so well received. 
By the late summer of 1793, however, Genet's popularity had 
begun to go to his head. He traveled throughout much of the 
United States attempting to enlist American privateers to carry 
out hostile action against British ships. Although Genet's 
activities in Philadelphia and Charleston were the most widely 
reported, he also had enlisted the aid of many of the residents of 
Norfolk. 18 The mayor of Norfolk, Thomas Newton, was also 
the president of the Norfolk and Portsmouth Democratic 
Society and was enthusiastic in his support for Genet. He stood 
by while anglophobic Virginians fitted out their vessels to 
capture British ships until finally both Secretary of State Jeffer-
son and Governor Lee had to rebuke him for condoning such 
partisan activities.19 
Republican leaders in Congress were beginning to suspect 
that Genet was more of a liability than an asset to their cause. 
The activities of some of his more radical supporters in America 
were exposing the Republican party to the charge of being the 
tool of a foreign power. While moderate Republicans sym-
pathized with the French cause, they had no intention, at least 
not at this early stage, of being dragged into a foreign war 
with the British. Even Jefferson, one of Genet's most ardent 
admirers, was beginning to have misgivings; it was apparent 
that the Republican interest could not control his actions and 
imperative that its members disassociate themselves from "this 
intermeddling by a foreigner." 20 
Genet's indiscretions created a major opportunity for the 
Federalists to bolster their flagging support. For the first time, 
a political faction in Virginia made an appeal to the populace, 
and the group to do so was that faction which was supposedly 
18 Minnigerode Meade, .Jefferson, Friend of France, 1793: The Career of Ed-
mond Charles Genet (New York, 1928), pp. 217-44. 
19 George Hammond to Foreign Office, 12 May 1795, Foreign Office, 5, IX, 
PRO Transcripts, LC; Jefferson to the Governor of Virginia, Philadelphia, 21 
May 1793, in Albert E. Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 20 vols. 
(Washington, D.C., 1903-1905), 9: 98-99. 
20 Jefferson to Madison, 25 Aug. 1793, in Ford, ed., Jefferson's Writings, 6: 7. 
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fearful of the passions of the people, the Federalists. The first 
public meeting of real significance was held in Richmond on 
August 17, 1793.21 The Federalists planned the meeting master-
fully. George Wythe, the law professor of both Jefferson and 
Marshall and the most eminent jurist in Virginia, was per-
suaded to preside over the meeting. He had remained aloof 
from the bickering over funding, assumption, and the Bank of 
the United States and his presence did much to obscure the 
partisan character of the meeting. Wythe's eminence, combined 
with the behind-the-scenes planning of Marshall, assured the 
passage of a set of resolutions friendly to the Federalist adminis-
tration. The assembled freeholders unanimously endorsed the 
Proclamation of Neutrality as the best means of avoiding 
conflict with the European powers and praised President Wash-
ington for his devotion to peace. Finally, they took direct aim 
at Genet, and at least an indirect shot at the Republicans who 
supported him. They proclaimed that "any interference of a 
foreign minister with our internal government or administra-
tion; any intriguing of a foreign minister with the political 
parties of this country would be at once a dangerous introduc-
tion of a foreign influence, and might too probably lead to the 
introduction of foreign gold and foreign armies, and their fatal 
consequences, dismemberment and partition."22 
Republicans in Congress, after hearing of the Federalist 
success in Richmond, began to organize in earnest. Madison, 
writing to his friend Archibald Stuart, diagnosed the political 
climate in Virginia and then prescribed a course of action: 
It seems little doubtful in my opinion what the sense of the 
people is. They are attached to the Constitution; they are 
attached to the French nation and Revolution. They are at-
tached to peace as long as it can be honorably preserved. They 
are averse to monarchy and to a political connection with that 
of Great Britain, and will readily protest against any known or 
supposed designs that may have this change in their situation 
for their object. Why then can not the sense of the people be 
21 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 21 Aug. 1793. 22 Ibid. 
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collected on these points, by the agency of temperate and 
respectable men who have the opportunity of meeting them.23 
Madison was trying to accomplish two objects: he was hoping 
to regain some of the support that the Federalists had captured 
at the Richmond meeting, and he was attempting to persuade 
"temperate and respectable men" to take the leadership of the 
republican interest away from the more radical members of 
the democratic societies. 
Madison enlisted his former political rival, James Monroe, 
in implementing his plan in the counties. He then drew up a 
list of resolutions to be sent to prominent Republicans through-
out the state. Madison hoped these resolutions would be 
offered in the counties as a rebuttal to the Federalist position.24 
The first was aimed directly at those who initiated the meeting 
in Richmond. It deplored the "prevailing practice of declaring 
resolutions, in places where the inhabitants can more easily 
assemble and consult than in the Country at large, and where 
interests, views and political opinions different from those of 
the great body of people may happen to predominate."25 
After a few perfunctory statements of affection for President 
·washington, the resolutions moved on to the subject of Franco-
American relations. They claimed that the Federalists' attempts 
to weaken America's ties with France in effect amounted to an 
assault on "the free principles of our own government." This 
was to be particularly lamented, since it came at precisely the 
time "when such vast efforts are making by a combination of 
Princes and Nobles to crush an example that may open the eyes 
of all mankind to their national and political rights." Madison 
ended the section with a passage that would soon become a 
standard theme for the Republicans. If the United States 
ignored its obligations to France, it "would obviously tend to 
forward a plan connecting them with Great Britain, as one 
23 Madison to Archibald Stuart, I Sept. 1793, Archibald Stuart Papers, VHS. 
24 For the backstage maneuverings of the Republicans at this time see 
Ammon, "Republican Party in Virginia, 1789-96," pp. 284-310. 
25 Madison to Jefferson, 2 Sept. 1793, in Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings, 6: 
192-93n. 
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great leading step towards assimilating our Government to the 
form and spirit of the British Monarchy." The Republican 
tactic was to characterize those who refused to aid the French, 
even those who desired strict neutrality, as tools of the "British 
monocrats." It was nearly impossible to find anyone in Virginia 
who would admit to an affection for the British, but one only 
had to voice the slightest dissatisfaction with the violent course 
of the French Revolution to be accused of it.26 
Finally, Madison was careful to separate the cause of Edmond 
Genet, who had just been recalled, with the more general cause 
of revolutionary France. The Norfolk and Portsmouth Demo-
cratic Society-the only society of its kind in Virginia at that 
time-had been discredited because of its unwavering commit-
ment to Genet, and Madison wanted the Republican party to 
avoid that pitfall.27 
Madison sent copies of his resolutions to Edmund Pendleton 
and John Taylor to be used in a meeting in Caroline County.28 
Adoption of the resolutions was a certainty, since the combined 
influence of Pendleton and Taylor, both opponents of adminis-
tration policy, was powerful enough to gain support for almost 
any measure which they advocated. Taylor wasted no time. 
On September 23, 1793, he wrote to Madison informing him 
that he had already succeeded in persuading a meeting of 
Caroline citizens to adopt a set of resolutions similar to Madi-
son's. He added, however, that he had made some changes 
from Madison's originals in order "to avoid suspicion of their 
being coined from the same mint."29 
That Taylor was able to get results so quickly was testimony 
to his enormous prestige within his county. This same prestige 
also allowed him to deviate from the resolutions proposed by 
Madison. The Caroline Resolutions contained, nearly word 
for word, the ideas suggested by Madison, but the few extra 
sentences that Taylor had added were not simply intended to 
mask Madison's role in the affair. Taylor's efforts rendered the 
26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 
29 John Taylor to Madison, Bowling Green, 25 Sept. 1793, in The john P. 
Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College, 2: 259-60. 
IJO The Old Dominion 
Caroline Resolutions substantially more radical than Madison's. 
The resolutions linked the men responsible for the Proclama-
tion of Neutrality with those who "desire a closer union with 
Britain and desire to alter the government of the United States 
to a monarchy." Moreover, Taylor, and the citizens whom he 
persuaded to pass the resolutions, refused to repudiate the con-
duct of Genet. 30 Taylor's determination to avoid being domi-
nated by the dictates of the Republican leaders in Congress 
was shared by many prominent Republicans within Virginia. 
This independence of attitude, although characteristic of Vir-
ginia politics, was often a source of anguish to those party 
leaders who hoped to develop a unified, national party organi-
zation. 
The Federalist meeting in Richmond and the Republican-
sponsored meeting in Caroline County prompted a series of 
gatherings throughout the state. The citizens of York and 
King William counties and the town of Williamsburg followed 
the pro-administration example of the Richmond meeting.31 
The residents of King William County, taking note of the 
Republicans' increased opposition to the policies of President 
\Vashington, avowed "that all attempts hitherto made to wound 
his character, so far from tarnishing the lustre of his political 
fame, have only stamped indelible disgrace on those who have 
made the attempt."32 This became a standard tactic for the 
Federalists. Not only would they defend the Proclamation on 
the grounds that it was in the nation's interest, but they would 
also attack any questioning of government policy as an expres-
sion of disloyalty to Virginia's only demigod, George Wash-
ington. 
At this stage, all the Republican-sponsored meetings carefully 
avoided any direct censure of Washington. Even those most 
hostile to the president's foreign policy prefaced their criticism 
with at least a perfunctory bow to the "wisdom and integrity" 
of the chief executive.33 In Staunton, Virginia, where the Re-
30 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 25 Sept. 1793. 
31 Ibid., 4 Sept., 9 Oct. 1793. 
32 Ibid., 4 Sept. 1793. 
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publican meeting was organized by Madison's confidant Archi-
bald Stuart, the resolutions adopted were nearly identical with 
those in Madison's rough draft. The assembled citizens vowed 
to maintain their friendly ties with France, to avoid falling 
under the influence of Great Britain, and they made it clear 
that they disapproved of Genet's conduct.34 
In Amelia County, where the Republican leaders were much 
more radical than Madison or Monroe, the anti-administration 
resolutions went further in their denunciation of Federalist 
policy. After the usual tribute to Washington, the Republican 
leaders of Amelia launched into a conspiratorial interpretation 
of the events leading up to the Proclamation of Neutrality. It 
was impossible for them to "avoid thinking, but that our own 
funded debt, from its imitative construction and operation with 
that of Britain, had its effect in impelling this dangerous 
conduct." Thus, the connection between Hamiltonian financial 
measures and English influence, which John Taylor had scored 
in his attack on the United States Bank, was now being applied 
to the conduct of American foreign policy. The Amelia 
Resolutions, like those of Caroline County, refused to censure 
Genet and instead blamed the Federalist press for distorting 
the facts concerning his conduct while in the United States.35 
In counties where Republican leadership was weak, or where 
the Federalist spokesmen had enough political power to offset 
the prestige of the Republican leaders, Madison found that he 
was unable to turn public opinion against the Federalist 
administration. In Fredericksburg, Republicans James Mercer 
and Mann Page tried to persuade a town meeting to adopt 
resolutions critical of the Proclamation, but an equally promi-
33 Meetings unfavorable to the Proclamation were held in Caroline, Augusta, 
Amelia, Albemarle, New Kent, Norfolk, and Frederick. Ibid., 4, 25 Sept. 2, 30 
Oct., 6, 23 Nov. 1793; Washington to the Mayor of Norfolk, 9 Sept. 1793, Wash-
ington to Alexander White, 23 Nov. 1793, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington's Writ· 
ings, 33: 19-92, 154-55. 
34 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 2 Oct. 1793; Monroe to Madison, 
Albemarle, 25 Sept. 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Monroe's Writings, 1: 277. 
35 The most prominent Republican in Amelia County was Joseph Eggleston, a 
former Antifederalist and a leader of the radical, anti-administration faction in 
the House of Delegates. Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 6 Nov. 1793. 
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nent Federalist, Edward Stevens, was present at the meeting 
and succeeded in blocking the adoption of the resolutions. The 
meeting finally disbanded, taking no action.36 Much the same 
thing happened in Rockingham County. Republican leaders, 
at the request of Monroe, attempted to organize a meeting to 
condemn the Proclamation, but because of lack of interest and 
poor communications, few people appeared at the appointed 
hour and the meeting was cancelled.37 
Madison had taken an important step in organizing the 
Republican interest within Virginia, but he had picked the 
wrong issue. Most Virginians in positions of political power, 
including some who were friendly to the Republican cause, 
supported the administration's Proclamation of Neutrality. 
When the General Assembly discussed the Proclamation in 
November 1793, Federalist Governor Lee urged them to adopt 
a resolution praising it as a "politic and constitutional meas-
ure, wisely adopted at a critical juncture." The Republicans, 
knowing that Genet's conduct had caused many of their mem-
bers to support the Proclamation, attempted to forestall the 
measure by introducing another resolution excluding any dis-
cussion of foreign policy by the legislature. For once, the 
opponents of the government failed to muster enough votes 
and the Federalist resolution was passed, 77-48.38 
The inability of Virginia's Republicans to bring censure 
upon the Proclamation indicated weaknesses both in their 
ideology and in their organization. Before Genet's arrival 
they could have expected near-unanimous support for any 
reasonable measure designed to aid the French, but Genet's 
indiscretions put a temporary end to the pro-French phase of 
Virginia politics. Virginians were not so devoted to the French 
revolutionary cause as to allow them to support France at the 
expense of their own self-interest. Although they were gradually 
diversifying their markets, Virginians were still dependent 
36lbid., 16 Oct. 1793; Momoe to Jefferson, 14 Oct. 1793, in Hamilton, ed., 
Monroe's Writings, l: 278. 
37 Monroe to Madison, Albemarle, 25 Sept. 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Monroe's 
Writings, l: 277. 
38 House Journal, l, 15 Nov. 1793. 
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upon Great Britain for the sale of tobacco and, to a lesser 
extent, flour and could not afford to lend their aid to France 
if it meant the disruption of that trade.39 Genet's privateering 
activities threatened to do just that. Madison and Jefferson 
realized the damage that Genet had done to their cause and 
were quick to disassociate themselves from him, but Republican 
leaders in the counties were much slower to abandon the French 
minister. By the time the full story of Genet's activities had 
been revealed, they were too committed to retreat, and much 
of the resulting reaction fell on their shoulders. 
The organizational failure of the Republicans is not sur-
prising. Up until the time of the Federalist meeting in Rich-
mond, it had never been necessary for the Republicans to 
organize themselves within the state; they could always be 
assured of a majority in the legislature without the necessity 
of building a party structure. The decision of the Federalists 
to appeal directly to the people through the county meetings 
changed this. When James Madison attempted to meet the 
Federalist challenge by organizing the Republican forces in the 
counties, he found that he was successful only in those areas 
where he had close friends who were themselves in full agree-
ment with him and who were in positions of undisputed local 
leadership. In Albemarle and Staunton counties, where Archi-
bald Stuart and Wilson Cary Nicholas held sway, events went 
exactly as planned. In Amelia and Norfolk counties, where 
popular sentiment was with the Republicans, but where the 
leaders were not disposed to follow the advice of leaders in 
39 Norman Risjord, in his article "The Virginia Federalists," pp. 486-517, argues 
that the Federalists monopolized the increasing trade in wheat and flour and thus 
had a vested interest in a powerful, commercially oriented government. The 
evidence supporting this hypothesis is inconclusive, however. Most of Virginia's 
flour was shipped to France and Southern Europe. If the Federalists relied on 
this trade as heavily as Risjord claims, they would undoubtedly have sided with 
France, not Great Britain during the foreign policy disputes of the 1790s. 
Evidence that both Republicans and Federalists were taking advantage of the 
new markets can be found in Robert Gamble to Wilson Cary Nicholas, 24 Feb. 
1794, John Nicholas to Wilson Cary Nicholas, 30 April 1794, Wilson Cary 
Nicholas Papers; George Hammond to Foreign Office, 29 Aug. 1794, Foreign Office, 
5, V, PRO Transcripts, LC; "Petition of Westmoreland Co.," 16 Nov. 1795, Leg· 
islative Petitions, VSL. 
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Congress, the resolutions passed were of such a radical nature 
that the Republican position was discredited. Finally, there 
were many areas, particularly in the far west, where poor 
communications and the apathy of the citizens made organi-
zation impossible. 
The activities of the democratic societies, both in the Genet 
affair and later in the Whisky Rebellion, also proved an 
embarrassment to Republicans. The members of the Norfolk 
and Portsmouth Society were enthusiastic in their support of 
Genet, and their enthusiasm led to conduct which served to 
bring censure upon the pro-French faction as a whole.4° Feder-
alist publicists wasted no time in exploiting the excesses of these 
radical Republicans. They raised the specter of anarchy, claim-
ing that the democratic societies intended to rule the country 
through the threat of "tar and feathers, a guillotine, or riots." 
According to these Federalist propagandists, the Republicans in 
Congress were responsible for this shocking behavior; while 
the Republicans had not openly advocated violence, their 
opposition to government policies greatly encouraged the 
growth of the democratic societies.H 
The Federalists' dire predictions about the intentions of the 
democratic societies gained some credence after the Whisky 
Rebellion. The backcountry residents of Virginia showed no 
desire to aid the insurgents in neighboring Pennsylvania, but 
the Virginia Federalists were nevertheless able to score propa-
ganda points against both French "meddling" and the demo-
cratic societies. The apparent machinations of Joseph Fauchet, 
Genet's successor, and the undeniable role played by members 
of Pennsylvania's democratic societies in the Rebellion pro-
vided the Federalists with good ammunition to use against 
their opponents. They took every opportunity to publicize 
Washington's letter to Governor Lee, which declared: "I con-
sider this insurrection as the first formidable fruit of the 
Democratic Societies. . . . That these societies were instituted 
40 George Hammond to Foreign Office, 8 May 1794, Foreign Office, 5, IV, PRO 
Transcripts, LC. 
41 "Distinctions between a Republican and a Democrat of the Present Day," 
in Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 20 Aug. 1794. 
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by the artful and designing members ... primarily to sow the 
seeds of jealousy and distrust among the people, of the govern-
ment, by destroying all confidence in the Administration of it; 
and that these doctrines have been budding and blowing ever 
since, is not new to anyone, who is acquainted with the char-
acters of their leaders, and has been attentive to their manoeu-
vres."42 
Republican leaders in Virginia did not make the same mistake 
with the Pennsylvania insurgents as they had with Genet. They 
denounced all attempts to oppose the policies of the government 
by force. Republican Congressman John Page, who just a 
month before had praised the democratic societies as patriotic 
organizations designed to preserve the true principles of the 
Constitution, immediately broke off all connection with them. 
He joined the Continental Army under the command of Vir-
ginia Governor Lee and vowed: "I obey the call of my General 
with Alacrity. I defend freedom of speech, of the press, and of 
clubs examining the measures of government, but I will oppose 
as the deadly enemy of the Republic the man who will oppose 
the execution of our laws by Force of Arms."43 
The Republicans were quick to condemn the Pennsylvania 
insurgents, but they were still disposed to find fault with the 
manner in which the Federalist administration handled the 
affair. Characteristically, the issue revolved around the question 
of national versus local control. Although the Virginia General 
Assembly unanimously passed a resolution praising the Virginia 
42 Washington to Henry Lee, Germantown, 6 Aug. 1794, in Fitzpatrick, ed., 
Washington's Writings, 33: 474-79. Jefferson was furious when he heard of 
Washington's denunciation of the democratic societies. He described the mem· 
bers of these societies as republicans and patriots and charged that the Federalists 
"are themselves the fathers, founders, and high officers" of the most dangerous 
organization in America, the Society of Cincinnati. Jefferson to Madison, 28 
Dec. 1794, in Ford, ed., .Jefferson's Writings, 6:517. Lisle A. Rose, Prologue to 
Democracy: The Federalists in the South, 1789-1800 (Lexington, Ky., 1968), pp. 
19-23, 39-40, has attempted to document Jefferson's charge and has himself con· 
eluded that the Society of Cincinnati was one of the major bases of organization 
for the Federalist party. This may have been true in some states, but an 
examination of the Society of Cincinnati Papers, VSL, indicates that Republicans 
played as active a role in the Virginia Society as did Federalists. 
43 John Page to St. George Tucker, Rosewell, 9 Aug., 22 Sept. 1794, Tucker· 
Coleman Papers. 
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state militia for its role in quashing the Rebellion, it remained 
critical of the intervention of federal troops into the local affairs 
of Pennsylvania.44 The matter came into the open during 
debate on a resolution concerning Lee's conduct. Proponents 
of the resolution claimed that Lee, by accepting the post of 
commander of the United States forces during the Rebellion, 
had violated the statute prohibiting men from holding offices 
in the state and federal governments simultaneously and had 
thus lost title to his position as governor. During the debate on 
Lee's status, it became apparent that he was not the only person 
being judged. Many members of the House of Delegates 
believed that the president "had exceeded his power in calling 
out the militia of the neighboring states before it was sufficiently 
proved that the militia of the state where the insurrection 
arose, was incompetent to the task of quelling it."45 
The outnumbered Federalists maintained that Lee was serv-
ing only in his capacity as head of the state militia and that his 
post as commander of the combined forces was an unofficial one 
awarded to him by the other state militia commanders with the 
consent of the president. Federalist delegate Thomas Evans 
charged that the Republican "endeavor seems to have been 
aimed to obstruct the General Government rather than har-
monize the interests of the two."46 The Republicans held the 
necessary votes, and the House declared the office of governor 
vacant. They next used their majority to elect their candidate, 
Robert Brooke, by a 90-60 margin over James Wood, a political 
neutral.47 
Brooke's election marked the beginning of a qualitative 
change in the structure of politics in Virginia. For the first 
time, a major state official had been selected on the basis of 
his stand on national issues. Prior to the foreign policy debates 
of the 1790s, state and local officeholders had been accustomed 
to operating independently of the controversies surrounding 
44 House Journal, 12 Nov. 1794. 
45 Thomas Evans to John Cropper, 30 Nov. 1794, John Cropper Papers. 
46 Ibid. 
47 House .Journal, 14 Nov. 1794; Madison to Monroe, 5 Dec. 1794, in Hunt, ed., 
Madison's Writings, 6: 225. 
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the actiVIties of the federal government. The unseating of 
Governor Lee, and the subsequent election of Robert Brooke, 
constituted a break in this tradition. Most state officials would 
continue to be appointed or elected on a nonpartisan basis, but 
the episode was indicative of an increasing interrelation be-
tween local and national affairs. 
In spite of the generally adverse effects of Genet's visit and 
of the Whisky Rebellion, the Republicans, by the fall of 1794, 
were in control of the state legislature. Although many Republi-
can members of the House of Delegates were disposed to 
acquiesce to Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality and to 
join with the Federalists in condemning Genet, their anglo-
phobic spirit continued unabated. And events since the Procla-
mation of Neutrality had shown that there was much basis for 
that spirit. British confiscations of American commodities on 
the high seas mounted steadily; hardly a day went by when the 
governor did not receive at least one complaint from a Norfolk 
citizen regarding the highhanded conduct of the British navy. 
Nor were the complaints confined to Norfolk. Crop failures in 
Europe had created an unusually large demand for American 
grain, and Virginia's commercial farmers, who were increasingly 
dependent on flour rather than tobacco as their principal 
export crop, were being hurt by England's seizure of American 
ships bound for France.48 No single faction had a monopoly 
on this trade, and, as a result, even the Virginia Federalists 
were turning against the British. No one in Virginia was more 
devoted to the nationalist goals of the Federalist program than 
John Marshall, yet even he was forced to declare: "The man 
does not live who wishes peace more than I do, but the outrages 
committed upon us are beyond human bearing."49 
In Virginia, the fundamental difference separating Federalists 
and Republicans lay in their solutions to the British threat. The 
48 Robert Brooke to John Hamilton, Richmond, 22 April 1795, Brooke to the 
Secretary of State, Richmond, 8 May 1795, Executive Letterbooks; Columbian 
Afirror, 19 June 1794. 
49 John Marshall to Archibald Stuart, Richmond, 27 March 1794, Archibald 
Stuart Papers. 
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Republicans believed that a firm alliance with France and strict 
discriminatory duties against English imports were the mini-
mum conditions which would convince Great Britain that the 
United States would not tolerate her interference. The radical, 
Antifederalist wing of the Republican faction wished to take 
more drastic steps: they wanted a declaration of war.50 But the 
Federalists realized that Americans, especially Virginians, were 
too dependent upon English markets to risk either war or a 
tariff battle. Although they had no affection for the British, 
they did not believe that the French were any more trust-
worthy and thought the Republicans naive in claiming that 
there was any natural basis for an alliance with France. The 
Virginia Federalists were convinced that the mere existence 
of a common revolutionary heritage could not change the fact 
that "interests and convenience are the principal directors of 
the conduct of European nations," and they were certain that 
France would treat American commerce with the same con-
tempt as Great Britain when it was in her interest to do so.51 
The immediate result of increasing anti-British sentiment 
was the revival of agitation for the passage of discriminatory 
legislation against Great Britain. It was the threat of such 
legislation, barely averted by the tie-breaking vote of Vice 
President Adams, that prompted England to receive an Amer-
ican envoy to discuss terms for a commercial treaty.52 The man 
chosen Envoy Extraordinary to Great Britain, Chief Justice 
John Jay, possessed as much diplomatic skill and experience 
as any man in America. To many Republicans the choice was 
less than ideal. They reminded their fellow citizens that "the 
general character of Mr. Jay is that of being at least very 
friendly to the British interest."53 Virginians in particular 
could not forget that he was the man who had attempted to 
barter away their right to navigate the Mississippi in 1784 and 
that he had defended the right of England to maintain her 
military posts on the nation's Northwest boundary.54 
50 Bemis, Jay's Treaty, pp. 192-96. 
51 William Lee to Henry Tazewell, I Dec. 1794, Tazewell Family Papers. 
52 Bemis, Jay's Treaty, pp. 199-202. 
53 Columbian Mirror, 19 June 1794. 
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While Jay carried on negotiations, Republicans predicted 
dire consequences. They accused him of being taken in by the 
flattery of the wily British diplomats. "It is feared," said a 
Republican publicist, "that if the business is to be settled at 
convivial entertainments, that some of our poor countrymen 
will be choused out of their rights."55 After Jay returned, in 
March 1795, the Treaty was discussed in secrecy by the United 
States Senate. This served only to heighten suspicion. Republi-
can opponents likened the procedure to the "darkness of a 
conclave or a seraglio" and declared the whole business to be 
incompatible with republican government. When Senator 
Steven Thomson Mason of Virginia defied the administration 
by giving a copy of the Treaty to the Philadelphia Aurora, the 
leading Republican newspaper in the nation, public debate on 
the merits of the Treaty began in earnest. One Virginia 
Republican exclaimed: "The negociator must have been intoxi-
cated; the charms of royalty must have bewitched him."56 
Another went even further, giving vent to his anglophobic ire: 
To be dragooned onto a treaty with barbarians, who the 
other day were laying this Country to smoke and ashes-and 
are at this day committing every Species of piratical depreda-
tion that robbers can suggest-For the citizens of America to 
be degraded by an instrument, obtained by British influence 
and calculated to make this Republic a party with the coalesced 
monsters against a nation which has so lately saved us from 
gibbets and confiscation .... To submit to this and to become 
the felons of our own constitution, would be synonymous terms. 
It would be on the one hand, a tyranny unread in the annals 
of the most despotic government, and on the other, a passive 
obedience unfound among our African slaves.57 
The Jay Treaty was not nearly as bad as its Republican 
opponents claimed. Although Great Britain did not make 
any unnecessary concessions to America, the young nation did 
54 Ibid. 
55 Virginia Gazette and Richmond Chronicle, 3 Oct. 1794. 
56 Columbian Mirror, 20 June, 1 Aug. 1795. 
57 W. Wilson to Joseph Jones, Portsmouth, 14 Sept. 1795, Joseph Jones Papers. 
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derive some benefit from the few commercial privileges that 
the English granted her. The Treaty temporarily provided the 
peaceful climate between the two nations that was vital to 
American commercial expansion. Indeed, considering Eng-
land's overwhelming commercial and military superiority over 
America, it is surprising that Jay accomplished as much as he 
did. Few people in America were blessed with the necessary 
foresight to appreciate the ultimate value of the Treaty, and as 
a consequence, it met a storm of criticism when it first appeared. 
The Treaty's failure to protect against the capture and impress-
ment of Negro slaves and its acceptance of the highly restrictive 
"Rule of 1756," which stipulated that trade prohibited in time 
of peace could not be opened in time of war, overshadowed 
English concessions for the abandonment of the western gar-
risons and for the opening of certain of the West Indian 
Islands to American trade. 58 
The fight over the Treaty in Virginia was carried out on two 
fronts. In the counties, Republican and Federalist leaders 
called meetings either to denounce the repugnant articles of 
the Treaty and to castigate the "monocrats" who had per-
petrated it or to defend the administration against the "gross 
calumnies" of the opposition. While these meetings had a 
marginal effect on the United States Senate's decision on 
whether or not to ratify the Treaty, they served to publicize 
the respective positions of each of the two parties. In the Vir-
ginia House of Delegates, the discussions were aimed at more 
constructive attempts to persuade Congress to reject the Treaty. 
By the time the text of the Treaty reached the House of Dele-
gates the legislators realized that it could be defeated only by 
contesting its constitutionality, and they directed their efforts 
at this point. 
During the late summer and early fall of 1795, both parties 
held meetings in counties throughout the state. In the early 
stages, nearly every meeting was dominated by those opposed 
to the Treaty.59 The effectiveness of these opposition meetings 
58 Bemis, jay's Treaty, p. 270. 
59 At this early stage, meetings were held to denounce the Treaty in Richmond, 
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varied according to the leadership available. When the organ-
izers of the meeting were tied closely to the Republican leaders 
in Congress, the resolutions adopted were usually moderate in 
tone and reasoned in their criticism. In other counties, where 
knowledge of the issues was not so widespread and where the 
leaders of the opposition were not controlled by the moderate 
wing of the party, the result was often a set of resolutions 
that were marked by hysterical anglophobia and charges of 
consp1racy. 
The citizens of Amelia County, unfettered by control from 
congressional Republicans, were not content with a mild state-
ment of disapproval. As in the Genet affair, they saw the 
whole negotiation as one more step in an anglo-monarchical 
conspiracy. They charged that the Treaty was "wholly cal-
culated for the aggrandizement of Great Britain and ... the 
extension of her commerce, to the destruction of American 
property, and eventually, her independence."60 The message 
was similar in many counties throughout the state: a coalition 
of self-interested merchants and Englishmen seemed to be bent 
on destroying the natural alliance existing between Republican 
France and America, thus bringing about the destruction of 
American liberty. 61 
The Amelia County Resolutions were mild compared to 
those of Clarke County in Kentucky. The citizens there 
warned the president that "should he concur with the Senate 
in the signature of the Treaty, our prognostication is that 
Petersburg, Norfolk, Mecklenburg, Lunenburg, Brunswick, Greensville, Amelia, 
Culpeper, and Caroline counties. Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 1, 8, 
12, 15 Aug., 15 Sept. 1795; Columbian Mirror, 13 Aug. 1795; "Petition of the 
Citizens of Mecklenburg, Lunenburg, Brunswick, and Greensville Counties to the 
President ... , 25 Aug. 1705, Petition of Culpeper County, 27 Aug. 1795, Wash-
ington Papers. \Vestmoreland County passed a resolution praising the surrender 
of the Western garrisons, but made no other mention of the Treaty. The few 
remaining pro-administration counties were content with an expression of con-
fidence in the personal integrity of the president. Joseph Pierce to George \Vash-
ington, 29 Sept. 1795, Washington Papers. 
60 For the text of the Amelia Resolutions, and a sampling of Virginia opinion 
on the Treaty, see The American Remembrancer; or an Important Collection 
of Essays, Resolves, and Speeches Relative, or Having Affinity to the Treaty with 
Great Britain, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1795), 2: 43-45. 
61 Ibid. 
The Old Dominion 
Western America is gone forever-lost to the union."62 One 
Northern newspaper had even heard the rumor that "in case 
the Treaty entered into by that d - d Arch Traitor J .. N J .y 
with the British tyrant should be ratified-a petition will be 
presented to the next General Assembly of Virginia at their 
next session, praying that the said state may secede from the 
union and be left under the government and protection of 
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND FREE AND INDEPENDENT VIRGINIANs."63 
Such talk was not confined to newspaper propagandists. 
Littleton Waller Tazewell, soon to become a member of the 
House of Delegates, remarked to his father Senator Henry 
Tazewell: "Do you seriously believe that ... disunion would 
be an event injurious to the Southern Interests? For my part, 
I have considered . . . it is more to be apprehended than its 
affects ought to occasion-A country like the U.S., so extensive, 
so difft. in wealth, manners, temper and the real situation of its 
inhabitants, can not hope for the long continuance of Republi-
can govt. . .. The friends of this form of govt. should rather 
desire than fear an event of this sort."64 Even so respectable a 
man as Judge John Tyler was led to speculate in the same vein. 
He maintained: "Tempers, customs, manners and a thousand 
things more [should have J been well-weighed before union 
had taken place. Every circumstance of our life (both civil and 
political) prove how unfit the states were for such an union as 
ours."65 President Washington was convinced that these were 
not isolated sentiments. As Tyler was speculating on the future 
of the union, Washington was warning United States Attorney 
General Edmund Randolph of the possibility of "a separation 
of the Union into Northern and Southern."66 
More helpful to the Republican cause than threats of dis-
62 Lexington Kentucky Gazette, 19 Sept. 1795, quoted in Thomas J. Farnham, 
"The Virginia Amendments of 1795: An Episode in the Opposition to .Jay's 
Treaty," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 75 (1967) : 81-82. 
63 Hartford Connecticut Courant, 31 Aug. 1795, in ibid. 
64 Littleton Waller Tazewell to Henry Tazewell, 3 Jan. 1797, Tazewell Family 
Papers. 
65 John Tyler to St. George Tucker, 10 July 1795, John Tyler Papers, LC. 
66 Farnham, "The Virginia Amendments of 1795," p. 82. 
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union were those county meetings planned and controlled by 
the moderate Republicans in Congress. The most important 
of these, both in the prestige of those who organized it and in 
the attention it attracted, was held in Richmond on July 29, 
1795. The meeting owed much of its success to George Wythe, 
who agreed to serve as chairman. Wythe had been a key figure 
in the 1793 Richmond meeting defending the Proclamation of 
Neutrality, and his switch to the Republican camp was hailed 
as a great victory.67 There was little that the Federalists could 
do in response. Except for one gathering in Westmoreland 
County, where the residents praised the surrender of the West-
ern garrisons, there were no Federalist attempts during the 
summer and fall of 1795 to rally support for the Treaty. The 
Republicans were well aware of their advantage. Jefferson 
gleefully reported to Madison that none of the Federalists 
dared raise his voice in support of the administration.68 
When Washington, on August 18, 1795, signed the Treaty 
into law, he put a temporary halt to the Republican opposition 
in the counties. The Virginia Republicans discovered that it 
was more difficult to rouse the citizenry once the Treaty had 
become an accomplished fact. John Guerrant, a leading Repub-
lican member of the House of Delegates, tried to organize a 
meeting in Goochland County, but was thwarted by the apathy 
of his constituents. He reported to Wilson Cary Nicholas, 
overseer for Madison and Jefferson of Republican interests at 
the local level, that the residents of Goochland would no 
longer protest the Treaty now that the president had assented 
to it.69 
The Republicans obviously needed a new strategy. Con-
sequently, they turned their efforts away from the counties to 
the floor of the state legislature. In late October 1795, one of 
67 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, I Aug. 1795. 
68 Joseph Pierce to Washington, 29 Sept. 1795, Washington Papers; Jefferson 
to Madison, 3 Aug. 1795, in Ford, ed., Jefferson's Writings, 7: 23. 
69 John Guerrant to Wilson Cary Nicholas, Goochland County, II Sept. 1795, 
Wilson Cary Nicholas Papers, LC; Jefferson to Madison, Philadelphia, 2 June 
1795, in Ford, ed., Jefferson's Writings, 6: 278; Madison to Jefferson, Orange, 17 
June 1795, in Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings, 6: 133. 
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Madison's informants in Virginia, Joseph Jones, outlined the 
plan of attack. He saw "no impropriety" in the General 
Assembly "declaring their opinion of the late Treaty, confining 
themselves to the truly exceptionable parts. With equal 
propriety may they propose an amendment in the Constitution 
to prevent a similar inconvenience in the future." 70 The plan 
was to reopen the debate on the Treaty, but this time on 
grounds of its constitutionality. If enough doubts were raised 
on that score, there was a chance that the Congress would be 
forced to reexamine it.H 
Edward Carrington kept President Washington informed 
of the climate of opinion in his home state. A few days before 
the legislature convened, Carrington assured \Vashington that 
the "spirit of dissatisfaction" over the Treaty had abated and 
predicted that "a question put on this day for making the Treaty 
a subject of conversation would be negative."72 Only a week 
later he was proved wrong. On a motion by Mann Page and 
Joseph Eggleston to approve the conduct of Senators Tazewell 
and Mason in voting against the Treaty, the subject came 
before the House of Delegates. The Federalists, led by Charles 
Lee, Robert Andrews, and John Marshall, immediately pro-
posed a counterresolution stating that the Virginia legislature 
had no authority or reason to pass upon the action of the two 
senators. Their argument rested on the assumption that the 
state and federal governments were separate and distinct and 
that the state government therefore had no right to censure 
those acts which were properly in the sphere of the federal 
government.73 With these proposals before the House, the 
70 Joseph Jones to James Madison, 29 Oct. 1795, in Massachusetts Historical 
Society Proceedings 25 (1901-1902): 150-51. 
71 Farnham, "The Virginia Amendments of 1795," pp. 83-88, argues that the 
Virginia legislature acted on the Treaty in order to persuade Congress to reopen 
discussion on it the following year. He attempts to refute the hypothesis of 
Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of john Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 
1795-1800 (New York, 1961), pp. 24-25, that the Republicans in the legislature 
were using the amendments to promote the candidacy of Thomas Jefferson for 
the presidency. It seems likely that both of these were factors. 
72 Edward Carrington to Washington, lO Nov. 1795, Washington Papers. 
73 Joseph Jones to Madison, 22 Nov. 1795, Madison Papers. 
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merits of the Treaty were "warmly agitated three whole days."74 
The debate began with another move by the Federalists to 
postpone discussion of the issue. The Federalists argued that 
any approval of the Virginia senators' conduct would amount 
to a censure of the president. Miles King, a Federalist from 
Elizabeth City, attempted to persuade the Republicans to drop 
their opposition to the Treaty by reminding them that the 
president "was incapable of acting against the true interests 
of his country." Washington's name was losing its magic, and 
the motion for postponement of the resolution was voted down, 
viva voce.15 
The Republicans took the offensive. As expected, their 
opposition to the Treaty centered around its alleged uncon-
stitutionality. The principal objection was that the Treaty 
dealt with many items that were connected with the commerce 
power, a power given to both Houses in Congress, not to the 
Senate alone. The Treaty also involved naturalization, the 
levying of imposts, and the expenditure of money-all the con-
cern of the entire Congress.76 Most galling was the Treaty's 
usurpation of the power of the United States judiciary. The 
assessment of debts was taken out of the hands of the United 
States courts and put under the control of a commission com-
posed of both British and Americans, with a provision insuring 
that the Americans would never constitute a majority on the 
commission. 77 
The Federalists, outnumbered, did not even try to defend 
the Treaty on its merits. Instead, they used evasive action. 
John Marshall argued that the House of Delegates could not 
pass judgment upon the Treaty while the House of Representa-
tives was debating its commercial provisions. He contended 
that it was more in the spirit of the Constitution for the House 
of Representatives to render the Treaty inoperative by refusing 
to appropriate the necessary funds for its implementation than 
74 Edmund Randolph to Jefferson, 22 Nov. 1795, in Ford, ed., Jefferson's Writ-
ings, 7: 197n. 
75 Jones to Madison, 22 Nov. 1795, Madison Papers. 
76 Beveridge, Marshall, 2: 133. 77 Bemis, .fay's Treaty, p. 259. 
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it would be for a state government to denounce the Treaty 
before it had officially been put into operation.78 In short, he 
was asking for a delay, hoping that the Federalists in the House 
of Representatives would have enough strength to silence the 
opposition. 
Carrington was so impressed with Marshall's defense that he 
advised Washington that "on the point of constitutionality, 
many conversions were acknowledged."79 But Carrington's 
judgment was once again overshadowed by his desire to please 
the president. The resolution denying the authority of the 
House of Delegates to pass judgment on the Treaty was defeated 
52-98 and the resolution praising the Virginia senators for 
voting against the Treaty was passed, 100-50.80 
The Federalists could take some small comfort from the fact 
that the legislatures of the other states did not follow Virginia's 
lead. Although the Virginia Delegates "supposed there was 
nothing unconstitutional in a state legislature speaking its 
opinion on any public measure," many states condemned the 
action as an attempt to "diminish the confidence of the people 
in the President."81 Virginians, of course, did not share this 
view. The legislature, acting in its official capacity, had de-
nounced the acts of the federal government since the Con-
stitution had been ratified and it would continue to do so 
whenever the situation warranted. 
The Republicans in the Virginia legislature were not content 
with a simple show of disapproval of the Treaty. The Com-
mittee of the Whole House on December 12, 1795, proposed 
four amendments to the United States Constitution. Although 
the amendments did not mention the Jay Treaty by name, 
their intent was obvious. The first would have made it neces-
sary for both houses of Congress and not the Senate alone to 
approve any treaty affecting the commerce power. The next 
78 Edmund Randolph to Jefferson, 22 Nov. 1795, in Ford, ed., Jefferson's 
Writings, 7: 197n. 
79 Carrington to Washington, 20 Nov. 1795, Washington Papers. 
80 House Journal, 20 Nov. 1795. 
81 Columbian Mirror, 15 Feb. 1796; Jones to Madison, 17 Feb. 1796, Madison 
Papers. 
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two amendments were aimed at weakening the power of the 
Federalist-controlled Senate. They proposed that a tribunal 
other than the Senate be responsible for impeachments and 
that senators' terms be limited to three years. The fourth 
amendment would have prevented United States judges from 
holding other offices at the same time. This last was directed 
at John Jay, the most recent judge to hold another office while 
serving on the bench. The Federalists attempted to delay 
discussion of the amendments for a year, or until after the 
House of Representatives had acted on the Treaty, but they 
failed in their effort, 57-79. The resolution proposing the 
amendments was then passed, 88-32.82 
At least one of the purposes of the amendments was to give 
Congress, and particularly the Republican-dominated House of 
Representatives, another chance to debate the merits of the 
Treaty. The stratagem was successful in that it helped persuade 
the members of the House of Representatives to demand that 
the president send the Treaty to the lower house for approval, 
but in doing so the Republican delegates suffered a setback 
with some of Virginia's most prominent citizens. Many Vir-
ginians remained dissatisfied with the Treaty, but they saw 
little merit in the Republican argument that it needed the 
approval of the House of Representatives before it could 
become law. They thought the House of Delegates had over-
stepped its bounds in challenging the legality of a federal law 
not in the sphere of the state government. 
The most illustrious convert to this point of view was Patrick 
Henry. The staunch Antifederalist of 1788 was far from pleased 
with the actions of the federal government since that time, 
but he was even more upset with those Federalists of 1788 who 
were now controlling the Republican opposition in Congress. 
Henry thought that the Treaty was "a very bad one indeed," 
but he had no doubt about the right of the Senate to approve 
it. He had pointed to the dangers of the treaty-making power 
in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, and he probably took 
82 House Journal, 12 Dec. 1795. 
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satisfaction in seeing some of his old opponents trying to deny 
the existence of that power which they had been instrumental 
in creating. He did not like the treaty-making provision, but 
it was the law of the land; he could only see disorder and 
possible disunion if the Republicans continued their opposition 
on those grounds. 83 
The Republicans had also gone too far in their attacks on 
Washington and had inadvertently given the Virginia Federalists 
a cause for which they could fight with real conviction. It 
had even been reported that one Virginia Republican, after a 
county meeting denouncing the Jay Treaty, had proposed a 
toast to "a speedy death to General Washington." 84 The 
Federalists, although not fond of the Jay Treaty, were deeply 
concerned with this increasingly strident rhetoric of the Treaty's 
opponents. Reacting to Republican criticism of the president, 
the Federalists made one last attempt to rally support for the 
Treaty which he had so recently endorsed. As usual, the most 
important appeal to the people came in Richmond. The meet-
ing, held in April 1796, succeeded in winning over many of the 
people who had opposed the Treaty in the 1795 meeting.85 
Again, the Federalist tactic was not to argue the merits of the 
Treaty itself, but to defend the constitutional right of the 
president and Senate to enact the Treaty. The address adopted 
by the gathering in Richmond was almost apologetic about 
past Federalist policy. It reviewed the events of the past year, 
admitting that the memorialists of 1795 were perfectly right in 
asking the president to withhold his signature from the Treaty 
on the grounds that it was injurious to American interests. 
Once the Treaty had been signed, however, it became a matter 
83 Patrick Henry to his daughter, Red-hill, 20 Aug. 1796, William Wirt Henry 
Papers. 
84 Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, lO Jan. 1795, in Ames, ed., Works, 1: 
161-62. 
85 Henry Banks, an organizer of the earlier meeting in Richmond, was one of 
those who changed his mind. "He observed on this occasion, that while the 
treaty was unratified, disliking some of its parts, he thought himself justifiable in 
opposing it, but after it had received all the constitutional sanctions of a law of 
the land, he conceived it to be a violation of the national faith to defeat its 
operation." Columbian Mirror, 30 April 1796. 
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of national honor to carry it into effect. Not to do so would 
"be productive of war; and what is worse-of dishonor."86 
The citizens of Richmond, like their counterparts in similar 
meetings in Frederick, Prince George, Fairfax, Loudon, King 
'William, and Westmoreland counties and in the cities of 
Fredericksburg and Alexandria, also decried the slandering of 
the president during the whole controversy.87 
The Richmond meeting of 1796 was the first such gathering 
where the organizers did not have complete control of the 
proceedings. Both Republicans and Federalists were given an 
opportunity to argue their case-a radical departure from the 
traditional one-sidedness of most county meetings. John Mar-
shall spoke for the Federalists, and Arthur Campbell presented 
the Republican argument. There was considerable debate, and 
even disorder, over who should be allowed to cast a vote at the 
meeting. The Federalists, with the Republicans protesting 
vehemently, managed to push through a resolution allowing 
nonfreeholders to participate. No sooner had the Federalists 
succeeded in passing the pro-administration resolutions than 
the Republicans issued a minority report claiming that the 
operation of the Jay Treaty would cause the retention of the 
Western posts by the British, the resumption of Indian warfare, 
and a renewal of British depredations on the high seas.88 
The historic significance of the Richmond meeting is to be 
found not in the pro-administration resolutions adopted, but 
rather in the structure of the meeting. For the first time, free-
holders and nonfreeholders listened to both sides of an argu-
ment instead of being presented with a set of resolutions to 
approve. This was the first important attempt to conduct a 
political campaign squarely on the issues, and it would spread 
to other counties as the competition for support increased. 
There were few areas so politically aware as Richmond, though, 
and in most counties those who initiated the meetings remained 
86 Ibid., 3 May 1796. 
87 Ibid., 19 Jan., 23, 28, 30 April, 3, IO, 14 May 1796; Virginia Gazette and Gen· 
eral Advertiser, 4 May 1796. 
88 Edmund Randolph to Madison, 25 April 1796, Madison Papers; Virginia 
Gazette and General Advertiser, 27 April 1796. 
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in full control from beginning to end. In the winter and 
spring of 1796 those in control were usually Federalists, since 
there were few attempts to oppose the Treaty once the president 
had signed it. The Republicans were unable to persuade the 
people to protest a measure that had already become the law 
of the land. 
Unable to revive opposition in the counties, the Republicans 
made one last attempt to defeat the Treaty in Congress. When 
Federalists in the House of Representatives sought to secure 
the appropriations necessary to put the Treaty into effect, the 
Republicans tried a new tactic. They directed their arguments 
at the danger of unchecked executive authority, claiming that 
in signing the Treaty, the president had usurped the power of 
the House of Representatives.89 Senator Henry Tazewell feared 
that ratification of the Treaty was a signal that "there may be 
yet something behind the curtain, that perhaps may authorize 
the President and Senate to convert our government into a 
monarchy and totally annihilate the state governments."9° Few 
members of Congress shared that conspiratorial view, and the 
House of Representatives, by the slim margin of 51-48, agreed 
to appropriate the funds to put the Treaty into operation. In 
spite of the strong Federalist showing in the county meetings, 
the Virginia delegation to Congress was not swayed in its 
determination to block the Treaty. All Virginia's congressmen, 
with the sole exception of George Hancock, a Federalist from 
Hanover County in Eastern Virginia, refused to vote for the 
necessary appropriations.91 
Nothing more could be done to block the Jay Treaty, so 
Republicans in the state legislature vented their anger on the 
man who had signed it into law. Prior to the close of the 1796 
session, after Washington had announced his decision to step 
down from the presidency, the Virginia General Assembly 
decided to draft an address to present to him upon his retire-
89 Samuel Shield to Henry Tazewell, York County, 20 March 1796, Tazewell 
Papers; Francis Preston to Thomas Madison, Philadelphia, 16 April 1796, Preston 
Papers. 
90 Henry Tazewell to John Ambler, 4 April 1796, Tazewell Papers. 
91 Annals of Congress, 5: 1291. 
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ment. Two separate addresses were drawn up and presented 
to the House for approval. The address proposed by the 
Federalists was a long and laudatory document praising the 
President for his wisdom and for his attempts to "check the 
destructive contest of party spirit." It was defeated, 70-76. The 
next day the Republicans proposed a new address, much shorter 
and less complimentary. The Federalists then attempted to 
amend the Republican version by adding a sentence praising 
his administration as one "marked by wisdom in the Cabinet, 
by valor in the field, and by the purest patriotism in both."92 
This move, according to John Marshall, provoked a debate in 
which "the whole course of the Administration was reviewed, 
and the whole talent of each party brought into action."93 The 
Washington administration evidently came out on the short 
end of the debate, as the Federalist amendment was defeated, 
67-75, and the Republican address passed, viva voce.94 
The tone of the second address differed so strikingly from 
that proposed by the Federalists that it could only reflect the 
decline of Washington's popularity in his home state. Fed-
eralists and Federalist-inspired measures were never popular in 
predominantly Republican Virginia, but the figure of George 
Washington had always served to blunt the force of the opposi-
tion. By 1796, in his final days in office, Washington's stature 
at home had so diminished that he was unable to obtain a full 
vote of confidence for himself, let alone for the measures of his 
administration. 
The voting behavior of the members of the House of Dele-
gates further indicates the extent of dissatisfaction with the 
policies of the general government. Of the sixty-one delegates 
serving all three terms during 1794-1796, thirty-seven voted 
with the Republican interest with a consistency of 75 percent 
or greater, seventeen voted with the Federalists, and only 
seven were unaligned. There was no pattern of economic or 
92 House journal, 9, lO Dec. 1796. 
93 John Marshall to Joseph Story, n.d., in John F. Dillon, john Marshall: Life, 
Character and judicial Services, 3 vo1s. (New York, 1903), 3: 355. 
94 House journal, 10 Dec. 1796. 
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regional interests which can wholly explain this division. Both 
factions were dominated by planters, most of them at least 
moderately wealthy, and nearly all of them slaveowners.95 
Some regional voting patterns on national issues are dis-
cernible, but these are not sufficiently pronounced to permit 
any broad generalizations about the determinants of voting 
behavior throughout the state as a whole. On the November 20, 
1795 vote affirming Virginia's opposition to the Jay Treaty the 
delegates from the northwest and the Eastern Shore voted 
predominately Federalist while those from the southern and 
central Piedmont areas voted overwhelmingly Republican. 
Voting patterns in other regions of the state, however, were 
considerably more mixed, with the Republicans nevertheless 
commanding majorities. Comparing the geographic divisions 
over the Jay Treaty to those occurring over the issues involving 
ratification of the federal Constitution and Hamilton's financial 
policies, one finds that the northwest remained consistently 
Federalist and that the southern and central Piedmont for 
the most part remained opposed to Federalist proposals. And 
perhaps most significant, the residents of the Tidewater seem 
to be moving out of the Federalist camp and into the Republi-
can96 (see maps on pages 244, 245, and 247). 
95 The divisions listed in the second part of Appendix 2 are based on an 
analysis of the voting behavior, on national issues, of the sixty-one men who 
served in the House of Delegates every year between 1794-1796. A rate of 75 
percent agreement was set as the minimum requirement for inclusion within 
either voting bloc. The larger sample of national issues during these years per-
mitted the rate to be lowered from the 80 percent requirement used to calculate 
the Federalist-Antifederalist blocs. 
The Republican preponderance in the United States House of Representatives 
was even greater than that in the Virginia lower house. By 1796 all Virginia's 
delegates to the House of Representatives voted more often with the Republicans 
than with the Federalists. In fact, all but three of the nineteen representatives 
from Virginia voted with the Republicans with a frequency of at least 80 
percent. The three men who did not-George Hancock, John Heath, and Robert 
Rutherford-seem simply to be more independent than Federalist in their in-
clinations. They represented three entirely different regions within Virginia 
and do not seem, at least at this time, to have been closely attached to either of 
the two parties. A detailed analysis of congressional voting behavior during this 
period can be found in Manning Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore, Md., 
1953), p. 292. 
96 House Journal, 20 Nov. 1795. I have selected the vote on the Jay Treaty as 
the basis for this analysis because it seems to be the one that was most crucial in 
Foreign Affairs: I I5J 
Factional alignments, however, were shaped not so much by 
strict economic or regional interests as by the emotional atti-
tudes of the members of Virginia's ruling elite. Although Fed-
eralist foreign policy, and particularly the Jay Treaty, provided 
the focus for the Republicans' attack against the general gov-
ernment, the sources of antagonism to federal policy ranged 
far beyond the immediate issue of Anglo-American relations. 
The Republican attitude was a direct continuum of Anti-
federalism, and all the Antifederalists' fears about "consolidated 
government" were aroused once again during the debate over 
the Jay Treaty. Their antipathy toward Great Britain and of 
what they believed to be the corrupt British system of govern-
ment, their distrust of any extension of central authority, 
particularly executive authority, and their determination to 
defend the agrarian way of life against the machinations of the 
mercantile community of the North-all these emotions became 
entangled with the more complicated problem of the proper 
conduct of American foreign policy. Moderate leaders in the 
Republican party tried to tone down some of these sentiments, 
but they were for the most part unsuccessful. In the end, they 
too relied on Antifederalist rhetoric to condemn the Federalist 
administration. 
The federal government was doing exactly what the Anti-
federalists had warned against. With its excessive power it was 
moving toward a consolidation of the states and pursuing 
policies whose design was to aid the commercial North at the 
expense of the agrarian South. Hamilton's financial programs 
were the first signs of this trend, but by 1793 the term con-
solidation began to take on a broader and more dangerous 
meaning. It was now not only the North which was profiting 
at Virginia's expense but also the British nation. When the 
Jay Treaty appeared, Virginia Republicans viewed it as another 
example of the treasonous collaboration between the commer-
determining a delegate's position on a whole range of foreign policy issues during 
the period under discussion. Similar analyses of the vote can be consulted in 
Risjord, "The Virginia Federalists," pp. 495, 502, and Hall, "A Quantitative 
Approach to ... Virginia, 1790-1810." 
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cial North and England. The Treaty's many concessions to 
Great Britain only served to strengthen their conviction that 
the "monocrats" of both nations were trying to "draw over us 
the substance as they have already done the forms of the British 
Government."97 The fact that the names of Alexander Hamil-
ton and John Jay were those most closely associated with the 
Treaty seemed to many to be conclusive evidence that this 
was the case. 
The Republicans were hypocritical in attacking the aristo-
cratic leanings of the Federalist administration. What they 
objected to was not the hostility of Alexander Hamilton or 
John Jay to democratic government, but rather, the Federalists' 
British sympathies. It could not have been otherwise, for 
Virginia's Republican leaders showed no greater love for demo-
cratic procedure than did the Federalists. When the results of 
the Richmond meeting of 1796 were revealed, the Republicans 
were the ones to complain that the Federalists had packed the 
meeting with propertyless supporters and to denounce those 
without a "shadow of a freehold." The party of Jefferson and 
Madison was not made up of democrats, but rather of wealthy 
lawyers, planters, and merchants who wanted to preserve local 
control over their own affairs. 
The philosophy of agrarian Republicanism constituted one 
of that party's greatest obstacles to effective organization, par-
ticularly at the state level. Virginia Republicans were more 
anti-Hamilton, anti-Treaty, and anti-British than they were 
pro-Republican. In Congress, Virginia Republicans at least 
attempted to block Federalist proposals and to formulate 
alternatives. Yet on the state level, they were strictly an ex 
post facto organization whose task was to alert the people after 
the danger was already present. Republican sentiment would 
lay dormant until the Federalists in Congress committed some 
new act to rouse them. The citizens in the counties were often 
uninformed of the day-to-day contests in the nation's capital. 
Jefferson, in temporary retirement at Monticello, wrote in 
97 Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei, 24 April 1796, in Ford, ed., jefferson's 
Writings, 7: 75. 
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exasperation at the apathy of his fellow citizens: "I could not 
have supposed, when at Philadelphia, that so little of what was 
passed there could be known even at Kentucky, as is the case 
here. Judging from the rest of the Union, it is evident to me 
that the people are not in a condition either to approve or 
disapprove of their government, nor consequently influence 
it. "98 
The behavior of Virginia's voters bears out Jefferson's assess-
ment. Despite the introduction of foreign affairs into the 
debate between Republicans and Federalists, few Virginia voters 
bothered to exercise their option, and of those that did, only a 
small number showed any awareness of the divisions developing 
in the nation's capital. They continued to elect the same 
candidates to office regardless of party loyalties. In those coun-
ties for which there are complete records of the elections for 
Congress and the state legislature, voter turnout remained 
abysmally low, averaging roughly 25 percent of the eligible 
voters and occasionally dipping below 15 percent. Most repre-
sentatives to Congress and the House of Delegates were elected 
by overwhelming majorities and in many cases, ran without 
opposition.99 Since the Virginia Republicans were able to 
maintain such strength in their congressional delegation and 
in the state legislature, and therefore could always be sure of a 
majority of votes on any critical issue, they saw no reason to 
change from their traditional, elitest style of campaigning to 
the newer, partisan methods that were being used in other 
states. While John Beckley was making frantic efforts to get 
the names of every pro-Republican voter in Pennsylvania and 
to organize them into a smoothly running party machine, the 
Virginia Republicans continued to rely on personal prestige 
and convivial entertainments.100 
98 Jefferson to Madison, 15 Feb. 1794, Madison Papers. 
99 For figures on voter participation compare Greene and Harrington, American 
Population, pp. 154-55, with the poll lists for 25 March 1795, 27 April 1795, and 
23 April 1796, in Brunswick Election Records, VSL; poll lists for 18 March 1793, 
30 April 1793, 29 April 1794, in Westmoreland County Records and Inventories, 
Vol. 7, VSL; and poll lists for 18 April 1796, 23 April 1796, in Essex County 
Deed Book, no. 34, VSL. 
100 Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801, pp. 102-6. 
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The Federalists, although always m a decided minority in 
the legislature and rarely elected to Congress, nevertheless 
profited from the continuation of the old style of Virginia 
politics. The Republicans, true to a tradition which judged 
people on their prestige and their record of public service, 
allowed prominent Federalists to continue to occupy important 
positions within the state government. The speakership of the 
Virginia lower house was occupied by a Federalist every year 
from the ratification of the federal Constitution until 1799, 
when the Republicans in Congress, led by James Madison, 
imposed rigid party discipline and purged most Federalists from 
positions of power. Federalist Henry Lee was governor of 
Virginia from 1792 until November 1794, when the Repub-
licans in the legislature expressed their dissatisfaction with 
Lee's role in quashing the Whisky Rebellion by removing him 
from office. Partisan feelings cooled, and James Wood, a 
political neutral, served as chief executive from 1797 to 1799.101 
The Republicans probably would not have been willing to 
allow the Federalists to maintain their power in state affairs 
had their opponents been Federalists in the Hamiltonian sense. 
For the most part, the supporters of government in Virginia 
were Federalists in name only. The vast majority of them 
opposed funding and assumption and only undertook to defend 
those policies on the grounds of their constitutionality. Sim-
ilarly, they did not like the Jay Treaty, but defended the 
constitutional right of the administration to enter into it. They 
were not opposed to the policies of Jefferson and Madison 
nearly so much as they were to the excesses of their partisans 
in the counties.102 This attitude was both the Federalists' 
greatest strength and their greatest weakness. On the one hand, 
their moderation obscured the differences between themselves 
and the Republicans on the state level and enabled them to 
be elected to important statewide offices. On the other hand, 
when important national issues did come up, they rarely could 
101 Swem and Williams, Register of the General Assembly, pp. 41-50; House 
journal, 2 Dec. 1799. 
102 Thomas Evans to John Cropper, 6 Dec. 1796, John Cropper Pape1·s. 
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defend them with conviction. The only success the Federalists 
enjoyed was their defense of the Proclamation of Neutrality. 
Not coincidentally, this was the only administration policy 
which they in good conscience could endorse without reserva-
tion. 
\\Thy, if Virginia's Federalists were so lukewarm in their 
attachment to the policies of the administration, did they 
remain Federalists? They had no love for the British, they 
distrusted the North, and had precisely the same interests as 
their Republican neighbors. Nor does it seem that a faith in 
national rather than local control was a central part of Federalist 
ideology. John Marshall was virtually the only Virginia Fed-
eralist who could see beyond the immediate issues and view 
the struggle as one of national versus local, parochial interests; 
most of his Federalist colleagues in Virginia were as anxious 
as the Republicans to maintain the locally based power that 
they had so long held. The only beliefs that Virginia's Fed-
eralists seemed to share was their abiding faith in the ability 
and integrity of President Washington and their fear of dis-
order should the effects of party spirit go unchecked. As over-
zealous Republican orators continued to criticize Washington 
in county meetings, the Federalists were pushed into a defense 
of administration policies.103 While their concern for Wash-
ington's reputation may have often been only a tactic to disarm 
their opponents, the tone of outrage running through nearly 
all the Federalists' responses to the Republican attacks indicated 
their concern for more than the reputation of one man. They 
were beginning to believe that the whole direction of Repub-
lican criticism would ultimately lead to civil war and disunion. 
They envisioned America's experiment in liberty degenerating 
in the same fashion as that of revolutionary France. When 
Federalists described their opponents as "jacobinical," they 
were not merely using a popular epithet; they were drawing an 
explicit parallel between the dangerous factionalism and violent 
mobism attending the French Revolution and the current 
103 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 24 Jan. 1796. See also Columbian 
Mirror, 23, 28, 30 April, 3, 10, 14 May 1796. 
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opposition of the Republican party to the federal government.104 
Patrick Henry admitted that this fear of disorder was the 
decisive factor in his decision not to aid the Republican party. 
In October 1795 he informed Washington: "I have bid adieu 
to the distinction of federal and anti-federal ever since the 
commencement of the present government, and in the circle 
of my friends have often expressed my fears of disunion amongst 
the states from collision of interests, but especially from the 
baneful effects of faction." 105 Henry's fear of disunion was 
based on his knowledge of the sectional differences within the 
nation. He too was suspicious of the power of Northern com-
mercial interests and saw that entrance into the union, far from 
lessening those tensions, had only exacerbated them. His fear 
of the "baneful effects of faction," more pronounced every day, 
caused him to view the Federalist administration with some 
sympathy. 
Neither order nor a quieting of party spirit was in the offing. 
Divisive issues would appear more frequently, party lines would 
harden, and the leaders of both the Federalist and Republican 
factions, unwillingly, would begin steps to include the mass of 
Virginia's citizenry in their expanded party organizations. The 
Federalists, soon to be deprived of the services of George Wash-
ington, would find it even more difficult to remain a force m 
Virginia politics. 
104 See, for example, the writings of "Bradford" and of "A Friend to the Present 
Administration of Government," in the Columbian Mirror, 1 Oct., 1 Nov. 1796. 
105 Patrick Henry to George Washington, 16 Oct. 1795, in William Wirt Henry, 
Patrick Henry, 2: 558. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Federal Policy and 
Foreign Affairs: II 
THE INTENSE DEBATE over the Jay Treaty and the impending 
retirement of President Washington combined to make the 
1796 presidential election the most bitterly contested in the 
nation's brief history. For the Republicans, it was a matter of 
reversing the dangerous trends toward consolidation and alli-
ance with Great Britain; for the Federalists, it was a means of 
vindicating Washington and putting a halt to the attempts by 
the opposition to bring about anarchy and disunion. 
In Virginia, preparations for the election began much earlier 
than usual. As early as May 1796, four months before Wash-
ington had officially announced his intention to retire, William 
Munford, author of The Candidates) announced his own candi-
dacy for presidential elector. Munford noted: "A suggestion 
has generally gone forth that the President who now fills the 
chair intends to decline the office. If this should be the case, 
every true Republican must wish that the virtuous and philo-
sophic Jefferson may succeed him. I candidly avow my resolu-
tion, if I am honored by the suffrages of my Countrymen, to give 
my voice in his favour, provided Washington declares in a sol-
emn manner that he will not accept the place."1 Munford took 
great pains to assure the voters that his loyalty would always be 
to Washington, and when Republican leaders in Congress 
picked their candidate they followed the same tack. They had 
lost considerable support during the controversy over the Jay 
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Treaty because of the attacks made on Washington by some of 
their more intemperate followers. Consequently, nearly all 
Republican candidates for elector stated that they would sup-
port Jefferson only if Washington decided not to seek a third 
term; privately they were confident Washington would retire.2 
Only a few weeks after Munford's announcement, Repub-
lican congressmen informally agreed to back Jefferson for the 
presidency. A caucus, probably the first of its kind in American 
politics, was held in Philadelphia to choose a vice presidential 
nominee, but it broke up before any choice was made. Never-
theless, when Congress adjourned in June 1796, Jefferson had 
become the official candidate of the Republican party and it 
was recognized that the Republican members of Congress would 
be entrusted with primary responsibility for promoting his 
candidacy in their respective states.3 
The Republican congressmen met varying success in orga-
nizing campaigns within their home states. In Pennsylvania, 
where presidential electors ran on a single statewide ticket, it 
was relatively easy to build a unified party organization.4 In 
Virginia, where each elector was chosen in a separate district, 
it was more difficult to control the campaign. In all states, the 
Republicans were handicapped because they could not start 
their campaigns in earnest until ·washington had announced 
his retirement. And the Federalist candidates used this delay 
to every possible advantage. They continued to act as if Wash-
ington would be their candidate, refused to disclose their 
second choice should the chief executive decline to seek reelec-
tion, and pretended to view Republican speculation about 
Washington's retirement as disloyal. 
When Washington's Farewell Address was published on 
September 19, 1796, it was, as Fisher Ames described it, "a 
signal, like dropping a hat, for the party racers to start."5 
Virginia Republicans unanimously supported Jefferson: their 
1 William Munford to Joseph Jones, 18 May 1796, Joseph Jones Papers. 
~Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801, pp. 89-91, 
3 Ibid., p. 91. 4 Ibid., pp. 98-115. 
5 Fisher Ames to Oliver Wolcott, 26 Sept. 1796, quoted in Cunningham, The 
jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801, p. 93. 
Foreign Affairs: II 
principal problem was coordinating the campaigns in the Old 
Dominion's twenty-one separate electoral districts. The Fed-
eralists faced more difficult obstacles. They knew that John 
Adams was not likely to win any popularity contests in Virginia 
and were themselves not overly sympathetic with his political 
views. They could not dispel the notion, contained in Adams's 
writings, that the testy New Englander was a partisan of the 
monarchical government of Great Britain. 
The Virginia Federalists, to avoid the burden of campaigning 
for a man they did not like, attempted to lure Patrick Henry 
out of retirement. Whether they thought he had a chance of 
winning the presidency or were merely using him to draw 
enough votes away from Jefferson in Virginia to assure Adams's 
victory is not clear, but their alliance with the old Antifederalist 
was not built on cynicism alone. When members of the Fed-
eralist administration in Philadelphia heard of Henry's disen-
chantment with the tactics of the Republican opposition, they 
offered him his choice of a position as minister to Spain, chief 
justice of the United States, or secretary of state. Although he 
had declined all three offers, Henry assured Washington that 
he was no longer a foe of the federal government.6 Whatever 
the drawbacks to Henry's candidacy, not least of which was 
the uncertainty of his acceptance, the Federalists desperately 
needed a candidate who could rally support. And Henry could 
certainly do that. His personal popularity in Virginia was far 
greater than that of Jefferson, Madison, or any other candidate 
the Republicans had to offer. Henry, not Jefferson, was regarded 
as the patron saint of the Revolution in Virginia. His fellow 
citizens continued to honor him during the two decades after 
the Revolution by offering him every statewide office imag-
inable, including the governorship and a seat in the United 
States Senate, even though they were virtually certain that he 
would decline them. 7 
6 Edmund Randolph to P. Henry, Philadelphia, 28 Aug. 1794, William Wirt 
Henry Papers, VHS; George Washington to Patrick Henry, Mt. Vernon, 9 Oct. 
1795, Henry Lee to Washington, 26 Dec. 1795, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Washington's 
Writings, 34: 334-35, 421. 
7 William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry, 2: 553. 
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The Federalists contended that Henry would "unite all 
parties and do away with that spirit of contention which at 
present rages with so much violence amongst us and threatens 
the destruction of the Union." While recalling Henry's heroism 
during the Revolution, they leveled their most serious charge 
against Jefferson, one from which he could never completely 
escape: cowardice during the American Revolution. They dis-
closed details of his midnight retreat from the capital at Rich-
mond in 1781 in the face of a British invasion and hinted that 
Jefferson's resignation as secretary of state after the Genet 
Affair stemmed from the same lack of fortitude. The Federalists 
argued that both actions "shew him to want a firmness; and a 
man who shall once have abandoned his helm in the hour of 
danger, or at the appearance of a tempest, seems not to be 
trusted in better times, for no one can know how soon or from 
whence a storm may come."8 Nor did the Federalists fail to 
exploit Jefferson's other political liabilities. They noted his 
deism, warning the voters against casting a ballot in favor of a 
man "whose Christian principles are much in question."9 
Jefferson's attachment to France and his role as the philo-
sophical leader of the opposition party also left him open to 
criticism. The Federalists predicted that if Jefferson were 
elected, "government itself may be destroyed and give place to 
sweet chaos and confusion." They claimed that soon after 
Jefferson took office taxes would be abolished, the arbitrary 
rules of the democratic societies would become the law of the 
land, and debts would be forfeited.10 
The Republicans were not particularly bothered by the 
charges that Jefferson was an atheist and an anarchist-Feder-
alists had been trying unsuccessfully to capitalize on those for 
years-but the personal attacks on Jefferson's courage during 
the Revolution necessitated a careful reply. Jefferson remained 
aloof from the controversy, but Daniel Brent, a Republican 
s Columbian Mirror, 8, 29 Sept. 1796; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 
8 Sept., 12 Oct. 1796. 
9 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 12 Oct. 1796. 
10 Columbian Mirror, 1 Oct. 1796. 
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elector in the midst of a close race with his Federalist opponent 
in Alexandria, undertook to disprove the accusation by making 
public a resolution of the 1782 session of the General Assembly 
exonerating Jefferson from the charge of cowardice. In a speech 
to his constituents, Brent admitted that Jefferson had dropped 
in popularity after the incident and had been forced to resign 
his office as governor, but he noted that the public later realized 
its error in judgment and within a year had fully endorsed the 
Assembly's resolution. In answer to the charge that Jefferson 
had also resigned as secretary of state under fire, Brent pointed 
out that Jefferson had decided to retire a full year before 
the Genet Affair and that the effective date of his retirement 
just happened to fall at a time when he was in disfavor.11 
Jefferson, for all his liabilities, was at least reasonably popular 
in his home state. And as it became obvious that Henry would 
not agree to become a candidate, the Federalists were unable 
to find anyone with even that advantage working for them. 
They were forced to back John Adams, but did so as unob-
trusively as possible. Charles Simms, the Federalist candidate 
who initiated the charges against Jefferson for his conduct 
during the Revolution, stoutly maintained that Henry was his 
first choice; when pressed about Henry's unwillingness to run, 
he grudgingly admitted that he would vote for Adams if neces-
sary, but continually tried to evade the subject by renewing 
his attacks on Jefferson.12 Levin Powell, candidate for elector 
in Loudon and Fauquier counties, would not even go that far 
in defense of Adams. He continued to list Henry as his first 
choice, adding that if Henry refused to run he would vote for 
either Adams or J efferson.l3 
As the election drew near, the Federalists found it impossible 
to maintain the fiction of Henry's candidacy. Both Charles 
Simms and Levin Powell, the only two Federalist electors in 
the state who had any chance, were forced to defend Adams 
11 "Address to the Freeholders of Prince William, Stafford and Fairfax Coun-
ties," ibid., 18 Oct. 1796. 
12 Ibid., 29 Sept. 1796. 
13 Ibid., I Oct. 1796; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 12 Oct. 1796. 
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against the accusations that he was a partisan of monarchy and 
an enemy of Southern interests. Republicans maintained that 
Adams's Defense of the Constitutions of ... the United States 
was irrefutable proof that the New Englander had aristocratic 
leanings. The Federalists tried to explain that Adams, in his 
Defense) was making a subtle distinction between the kind of 
government that would be best for the people of corrupt, 
European nations and that which was best for virtuous America, 
but Adams's political philosophy was consistently misinter-
preted by his Republican opponents, who insisted that he 
preferred the monarchical forms of Europe to the republican 
features of the American government.14 
More damning was the publicity given to a conversation 
between Adams and John Taylor of Caroline on the floor of 
the Senate in 1794. According to Taylor, there was some dis-
agreement between the senators on whether a democratic gov-
ernment could survive in France: 
Mr. Adams urged the ignorance, vices and corruptions of Eu-
rope, to prove that such a government could not exist there. 
Upon its being observed, that same argument he used would 
extend to America, after admitting, that the greater degree of 
virtue existing here, from the circumstance of our being a young 
country, would have a temporary effect, and enable us to go 
on some time longer as a popular government, he subjoined 
"that he expected or wished to live to hear Mr. Giles & Myself 
acknowledge, that no government could long exist, or that no 
people could be happy, without an hereditary first magistrate, 
and an hereditary senate, or a senate for life."15 
Adams was not advocating a monarchy for the United States, 
but was merely ruminating on the possible results of the declin-
ing virtue of the American people. The people of Virginia 
could not be expected to make that fine distinction and J effer-
14 Criticisms of Adams's "monarchical" prejudices appeared almost daily. See, 
for example, Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 12, 26 Oct., 2 Nov. 1796; 
and Columbian Mirror, 18, 25 Oct. 1796. 
15 John Taylor to Daniel C. Brent, Caroline, 9 Oct. 1796, in john P. Branch 
Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College, 2 (1908): 267. 
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son's supporters did everything in their power to see that they 
did not. As a result, Adams was forever accused of being a 
"monocrat." 
This was not John Adams's only handicap. As one of Jeffer-
son's partisans noted, "Mr. Jefferson is a Virginian. The eastern 
people will vote for Mr. Adams .... The Southern people ... 
ought to do the same for Mr. Jefferson. The local interests of 
the two parts of the union are known to be different, and as it 
is natural for every man to respect his own in preference to 
those of others, so I think that the electors of Virginia ought to 
vote for Mr. J efferson."16 Virginia Republicans predicted that 
the South would lose the Potomac as the site of the capital if 
Adams were elected. There had already been too many signs 
that the Northern states were planning to renege on the agree-
ment of the location of the capital, but Jefferson's election, 
they claimed, would put an end to any plans to change the 
siteP 
It was difficult for Virginia Federalists to find any quality 
in their candidate that would offset those disadvantages. The 
recurring theme in their defense of Adams was that he had 
been in agreement with President Washington while vice 
president and it was incumbent upon Virginians to uphold 
·washington's policies.18 
This last argument was not persuasive, for the election in 
Virginia was a disaster for the Federalists. In only one district, 
which included Loudon and Fauquier counties, was an Adams 
elector victorious. And much of Adams's success there was 
due not to his own popularity, but to the campaign that the 
Federalist elector Levin Powell conducted against Jefferson's 
record as a war governor. The only other area where a Feder-
alist candidate came even close was in neighboring Alexandria, 
where Charles Simms was narrowly defeated by his Republican 
opponent, Daniel Brent. Even the counties in northwest Vir-
ginia, whose representatives to the state legislature seemed to 
16 Virginia Gazette and Central Advertiser, 26 Oct. 1796. 
17 Columbian Mirror, 20 Sept. 1796. 
18 Ibid., 20, 27 Oct., 1 Nov. 1796. 
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be leaning toward Federalism, chose Republican electors.19 
Thomas Griffin of York County and Ralph Wormley of 
Middlesex, two Federalist candidates for elector, simply refused 
to declare a preference for either Jefferson or Adams in hopes 
that a nonpartisan appearance would obscure their Federalist 
attachments. The voters were unimpressed by this approach, 
however, and the two men were defeated along with the other 
Federalist candidates for elector in the state.20 It would appear 
that the failure of the nonpartisan approach used by Griffin 
and Wormley signified that Virginia's voters were becoming 
more aware of the new party alignments in the nation's capital 
and less inclined to follow traditional, deferential voting pat-
terns. This is to some extent true, but the importance of the 
Republican and Federalist party labels in the presidential 
campaign of 1796 should not be overestimated. For example, 
Wormley, the thinly disguised Federalist candidate from Mid-
dlesex County, would have had a difficult time gaining election 
had Jefferson himself campaigned for him. Except for his 
immense wealth, Wormley had little working in his favor. 
In addition to being a partisan of Adams, he was suspected of 
toryism during the Revolution and had suffered a long string 
of defeats in elections for local office during the past decade. 
His opponent, Benjamin Temple, had beaten him in previous 
contests where the Republican and Federalist labels were not a 
factor and there is little doubt that his victory over Wormely 
in 1796 was a continuation of this preeminence.21 
Similarly, Thomas Griffin could hardly blame his defeat in 
the electoral districts encompassing Henrico, Charles City, New 
Kent, and York counties on a smoothly running Republican 
party machine. The Republicans in those counties were either 
so confident, or so ill organized, that they allowed two J effer-
19 Ibid., 12 Nov. 1796. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make further gen· 
eralizations about voting patterns in the 1796 election in Virginia. Since electors 
were chosen by the voters of individual electoral districts, no one felt it necessary 
to collect the vote totals for the state as a whole. As a result, only scattered 
returns for a few counties have survived. 
20 Ibid.; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 12, 19 Oct., 7 Dec. 1796. 
21 Main, "The One Hundred," pp. 363-83. 
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sonian candidates to enter the race, thus running the risk of 
splitting the pro-Jefferson vote and permitting Griffin to gain 
a plurality. One Jeffersonian candidate, Nathaniel Wilkinson, 
was a former Antifederalist who was now loyal to the Madi-
sonian wing of the Republican party; the other, John Mayo, 
was a Federalist who nevertheless preferred Jefferson to Adams. 22 
Wilkinson narrowly triumphed, with Mayo finishing a close 
second and Griffin a poor third. Voter turnout was no higher 
than in most elections for local offices. In Charles City County 
it was 25 percent of the free adult white males, in New Kent 
County 20 percent, and in Henrico only 18 percent.23 
The inability of the Republicans to persuade many pro-
Jefferson voters in the district to cast their ballots for Wilkinson 
rather than the Federalist Mayo offers further evidence of the 
weak state of their party organization. Nor does it appear that 
Mayo's support of Jefferson was merely a Federalist ploy to 
draw votes away from Wilkinson. Everyone, including Wilkin-
son's supporters, was convinced of Mayo's sincerity in support-
ing Jefferson. That Mayo chose to stand for election as a 
Jeffersonian elector is itself indicative of the principal reason 
why the presidential campaign of 1796 in Virginia was not 
conducted solely in terms of Republicans versus Federalists. 
It was, above all, a contest between Thomas Jefferson, a popular 
Virginian, and John Adams, a crotchety New Englander. It 
cannot be ascertained just how many Federalists deserted their 
party to vote for the Republican candidate, but Thomas 
Evans, a loyal Federalist from Accomac County, made it clear 
that a Virginia-born Republican president would not be viewed 
as a catastrophe. He predicted that if Jefferson were elected 
in 1796 "he will support the measures which have been pursued, 
and will soon be obnoxious to those violent partisans who 
are willing to go any lengths in his favor, whilst his administra-
22 For Wilkinson's and Mayo's party affiliation see the Virginia Gazette and 
General Advertiser, 9, 12, 19 Oct. 1796. 
23 The election returns for Charles City, New Kent, and Henrico counties are 
printed in the Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 9 Nov. 1796. The results 
in Richmond and York counties, which also fell within the bounds of the 
electoral district, are not extant. 
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tion may probably be supported by those who seem now 
unfriendly."24 Those were hardly sentiments that could be 
expected from the Hamiltonian wing of the Federalist party, 
but Virginia's Federalists were never enthusiastic for the na-
tionalistic programs of the New York lawyer and financier. In 
spite of Jefferson's sympathy for France and his opposition to 
Washington's policies, he was after all a Virginian; he would 
surely look after the interests of the Old Dominion. 
Not until December 1796 did Virginians hear the results 
of the presidential election in their home state; it was another 
month yet until they heard of Adams's victory throughout the 
nation as a whole. 25 The Virginia Republicans accepted the 
news of Jefferson's defeat with surprising equanimity, at least 
in part because the months between the election and the 
inauguration in March 1797 were ones of conscious and well-
publicized conciliation between the leaders of the opposing 
parties. Adams, increasingly alienated from Hamilton's wing 
of the party, proved willing to cooperate with Jefferson and 
other moderates in the Republican party. Jefferson was content 
to play along, since he earnestly desired an untroubled term 
as vice president. Even the Federalist and Republican news-
papers did their part. They stressed the differences between 
Hamilton and Adams and publicized the cordial relations 
between the new president and vice president.26 
Unfortunately, the foreign powers of Europe were at the 
same time taking steps to destroy this sudden harmony. The 
French Directory, on March 2, 1797, announced that it would 
treat all American seamen serving on British ships as pirates 
and would henceforward confiscate goods on neutral ships 
laden in whole or in part with enemy goods. This was in 
contradiction to the "free ships free goods" provision of the 
24 Thomas Evans to John Cropper, 6 Dec. 1796, John Cropper Papers. 
25 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 7 Dec. 1796; Jefferson to Edward 
Rutledge, 27 Dec. 1796, in Ford, ed., jefferson's Writings, 7: 93·94. 
26 For the best account of Hamilton's attempts to dump Adams in favor of the 
more pliant Thomas Pinckney and of the brief reconciliation between the 
moderate Republicans and Federalists, see Kurtz, The Presidency of .John 
Adams, pp. 209·38. 
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Franco-American Treaty of 1778 and was even more strict in 
its application than the much-hated British "Rule of 1756." 
At the same time, the Directory refused to receive American 
Minister Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, presumably in retalia-
tion for the recall of the previous American minister, James 
Monroe, who was considered by the Federalist administration 
to be too attached to the French cause to carry out his job 
effectively.27 President Adams informed Congress of the new 
French directives and recommended a series of steps to be taken 
should France attempt to interfere with American commerce. 
He proposed that a navy be created, that coastal defenses be 
strengthened, and that a provisional army be raised in case 
France attempted a land invasion.28 The ensuing reaction both 
in Congress and in Virginia brought an end to any hope of 
reconciliation between Republicans and Federalists. 
Most Virginia Republicans blamed the sudden hostility of 
the French on the errors of the previous Federalist administra-
tion. In a Republican-sponsored meeting in Richmond in 
April 1797, they admitted that the French had become an 
"annoyance to our commerce," but claimed that the Federalists' 
pro-British policies, and particularly the Jay Treaty, had forced 
France to protect herself. Republicans present at the meeting 
reaffirmed their confidence in France as America's only republi-
can ally and vowed to maintain their friendship toward the 
French people.29 The Virginia Federalists were not so impressed 
with France's republican principles. The incursions of the 
French, following similar action by the British, convinced 
them that it was imperative to remain free from any connection 
with the European powers. They saw the need for a stand 
against future French aggression and thus supported Adams in 
his attempt to strengthen American defenses, but were not in 
favor of a precipitous war with any of the European nations.30 
~7 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 4th ed. 
(New York, 1955), p. 114. 
28 Annals of Congress, 7: 54-59. 
29 An account of the meeting is in the Columbian Min·or, 22 April 1797. 
30 See, for example, the argument of "A Friend to Peace," in the Virginia 
Gazette and General Advertiser, 12 April 1797. 
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The radical, pro-French wing of the Republican party was 
in the ascendant. John Marshall noted "the insidious attempt 
which is made to ascribe the aggressions made on us by France 
to the British Treaty" and lamented that the Republican 
"party has laid such fast hold on the public mind in this part 
of Virginia that an attempt to oppose [French influence] 
sinks at once the person who makes it. The elections for the 
state legislature go entirely against the federalists, who are 
madly and foolishly as well as wickedly styl'd a british party."31 
Marshall's diagnosis of the political climate in Virginia was 
correct. The Republicans had become so committed to France, 
or more important, so hostile to Great Britain, that they under-
took to defend the French Directory even when it was threat-
ening their interests. 
Republicans in the state legislature, with a two-to-one ma-
jority, waited for the proper moment to record their opposition 
to the Adams administration. Federalist Judge James Iredell, 
presiding over a grand jury presentment in Richmond, gave 
them their opportunity. In the course of a judicial hearing 
Iredell lashed out at a number of unnamed public officials, 
who by their allegedly seditious writings had earned the judge's 
scorn. Although no indictment was, or legally could have been, 
brought against the offenders, the jury presented "as a real 
evil the circular letters of several members of the late Con-
gress, and particularly letters with the signature of Samuel J. 
Cabell, endeavouring at a time of real public danger to dis-
seminate unfounded calumnies against the happy government 
of the United States."32 
This attack by the federal judiciary on a Virginia congress-
man provoked an immediate outcry from the Republicans. At 
issue were both Cabell's constitutional right to speak out 
against the Federalist administration and the wisdom of the 
pro-French policy he had been advocating. Cabell, along with 
several other Virginia representatives, immediately wrote a 
31 John Marshall to Charles Lee, Richmond, 20 April 1797, Adams Family 
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
32 Iredell's charge to the jury and the jury's presentment were published in the 
Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 24 May 1797. 
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circular letter defending his conduct and condemning the 
judiciary for meddling in the affairs of Congress.33 
For the first time since the new government went into 
operation, Thomas Jefferson took the lead in formulating 
strategy for the opposition party. Previously reluctant to oppose 
Federalist policy publicly, he now struck out on a course inde-
pendent from that of the administration. He drafted a petition 
for the counties encompassing Cabell's congressional district 
condemning the grand jury presentments as "a great crime, 
wicked in its purpose and mortal in its consequences." He 
denounced the action as both a violation of the principles of 
free speech and as an unlawful interference with the affairs of 
Congress by the judiciary.34 There was some uncertainty as to 
where the petition should be sent-to county meetings, to the 
Virginia House of Delegates, or to Congress. The county 
meetings often failed to exert enough influence and there was 
no certainty that the Federalist-dominated Congress would look 
favorably on the petition, so Jefferson, with the advice of 
Madison and Monroe, decided to lay the petition before the 
state legislature. 
This marked the first time that either Jefferson or Madison 
had placed their faith in the state government for a redress of 
their grievances; in the past they had been content to fight 
their battles in the halls of Congress, but with the tide rising 
against the Republicans in the nation's capital they had no 
alternative but to turn to the states.35 The decision to rely on 
the state legislature rather than Congress as a base of political 
operations had far-reaching implications. From this point on 
the importance of the state's rights argument became paramount 
for both Jefferson and Madison. Reliance on the state legisla-
ture rather than Congress would mean that they would occa-
sionally have to deviate from their moderate constitutional 
H3 Circular Letter of Samuel J. Cabell to his Constituents, Philadelphia, 31 
May 1797, in ibid., 14 June 1797; Henry Tazewell to John Ambler, 3 June 1797, 
Tazewell Papers, LC; .John Clopton to Francis Ferguson, .John Clopton Papers, 
Duke University. 
34 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty (Boston, 1962), pp. 334-
37; .Jefferson's petition is printed in Ford, ed., Jefferson's Writings, 7: 158-64. 
35 Ford, ed., Jefferson's Writings, 7: 158-64. 
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positions to win support from the many factions within the 
Republican party in Virginia. 
The House of Delegates took immediate action on Jefferson's 
petition. The Republicans proposed that the House demon-
strate its approval of the petition by ordering a thousand copies 
printed and distributed at public expense. In effect, they were 
asking the legislature to subsidize their campaign against the 
Federalist-dominated judiciary. The Federalists used every 
parliamentary maneuver to block the proposal, but failed. They 
first contended that it was the duty of Congress, not the House 
of Delegates, to pass judgment on a petition concerning a 
federal representative. A motion to this effect was defeated, 
56-94. They then brought forward a resolution denying the 
authority of the House to define the powers of the grand juries. 
This too met defeat, 54-93. Finally, they asked that the matter 
be left to the courts. This also met the disapproval of the 
House; the Republican-sponsored resolution passed, 92-53.36 
Nothing ever came of the Cabell case; no formal charge was 
brought against Cabell, but Virginia Republicans managed to 
gain considerable propaganda benefit from it. The two com-
batants seemed to represent in microcosm the struggle that 
was taking place throughout the nation. Cabell, a popular 
Virginia congressman, was speaking out courageously against 
policies aimed at increasing United States dependence on Great 
Britain at the expense of republican France and agrarian 
Virginia. The federal court, composed at least in part of judges 
living outside Virginia, was attempting to curb the inalienable 
right of free speech, hoping that an unwary electorate would 
not perceive the dangers inherent in the policy of the Adams 
administration. 
The highhanded action of the grand jury insulted nearly 
everyone in Virginia, and the Republicans took advantage of 
the reaction. Yet they were not able to turn their attachment 
to France to similar advantage. By January 1798, French 
depredations on American shipping were exceeding even those 
of Great Britain; moreover, England, contrary to the Republi-
36 House journal, 27 Dec. 1797. 
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cans expectations, was beginning to live up to its obligations 
under the Jay Treaty.37 Worse, it was apparent that France 
was not even willing to enter into serious negotiations with the 
United States. Throughout the first months of 1798 rumors 
reached American shores that the American diplomatic team 
composed of John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry, and Charles Cotes-
worth Pinckney were being treated with a good measure of 
contempt by the French. When President Adams presented 
the details of the XYZ Affair before Congress in April 1798, 
the Republicans were thrown off balance. The Federalist 
majority in Philadelphia, its numbers increased by the sudden 
popular revulsion against France, adopted a decidedly militant 
posture.38 
The Republicans in Congress were powerless; they could 
only sit back and watch while the Adams and Hamiltonian 
wings of the Federalist party struggled with one another for 
supremacy. Unable to influence the course of events in Con-
gress, Virginia's political leaders looked homeward for support. 
But even there the Republicans found that their strength had 
eroded. The Federalists in Virginia took advantage of the anti-
French sentiment generated by the XYZ Affair and for once 
they had both the numbers and the strength of conviction to 
give the Republicans a good fight. 
At about the same time that Adams announced the details 
of the XYZ Affair, Monroe distributed a defense of his conduct 
while minister to France in 1795 and 1796. By this time, public 
37 Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the 
Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801 (New York, 1966), pp. 8-12; Bemis, 
Diplomatic History, p. 114. The editors of the Virginia Gazette, on hearing news 
of the evacuation of the Western posts by the British, exclaimed: "What think 
you of the Treaty now? The posts are taken and not one drop of blood shed. 
Eternal praises to the God of Peace and Negociation. Thanks to his servants, the 
President, Vice-President, Messrs. Jay, Hamilton, Knox, Wolcott and Pickering-
Thanks to the majority in both Houses of Congress-and let all people say 
AMEN." Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 17 Aug. 1796. 
38 Although all the Federalists in Congress advocated a firm stand against 
France, there were differences of opinion as to the means to be used. Alexander 
Hamilton and his wing of the party desired a strong army, presumably to put 
down domestic as well as foreign opposition, while Adams placed a higher 
priority in building the navy. For an excellent account of the intrigues within 
the Federalist party in the nation's capital see Manning J. Dauer, The Adams 
Federalists (Baltimore, Md., 1953), pp. 225-45. 
1 74 The Old Dominion 
opinion was so polarized that Monroe's View of the Conduct of 
the Executive served only to reinforce the existing loyalties of 
the members of each of the two parties. To diehard Republi-
cans, it offered conclusive proof that the United States had 
always been slavishly dependent upon Great Britain and that 
the Federalist administration had never been sincere in its 
desire for peace and friendship with France.39 The Federalists 
saw in the View irrefutable proof of Monroe's shockingly 
unneutral conduct while in France and were convinced that 
he had willfully disobeyed his instructions in order to sabotage 
the Jay Treaty. They were certain that much of France's 
current hostility toward the United States could be blamed on 
the false picture of American affairs given to the French 
Directory by Monroe.40 
Party rivalry in Virginia had reached such heights that passion 
and partisanship, not reason, became the principles behind the 
discussion of American foreign policy. It mattered little what 
was in America's interest: Republican leaders were too com-
mitted to the French cause to back down at such a late date 
and the Federalists, forgetting that they had urged restraint 
when Great Britain had been the aggressor, were now urging 
stern measures against the new enemy. The only people in 
Virginia who seemed to have a clear view of the situation were 
the residents of Norfolk. They voted and acted according 
to their interests. When the British were harassing their ship-
ping, they denounced Great Britain; when the French began 
their depredations in 1797, they quickly switched allegiance 
and supported the Federalist administration in its attempt to 
bring pressure on France.41 If everyone in Virginia had pos-
39 One of the best-publicized defenses of Monroe by a Virginian was that by 
"Thrasybulus," Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 21, 28 Feb. 1798. 
40 The most violent attack on Monroe was that by "Scipio," who was evidently 
Federalist Charles Lee. Monroe to Jefferson, Richmond, 27 Jan. 1798, in Hamil-
ton, ed., Monroe's Writings, 3: 98. 
41 Norfolk was the most violent center of anti-British activity in 1795. Not 
only did the residents hold county meetings protesting Great Britain's conduct, 
but they also took matters into their own hands by harassing British seamen at 
every opportunity. When the French became belligerent, the Norfolk residents 
gave them the same treatment. See the Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 
15 May, 10 July 1798. 
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sessed such a clear understanding of his own interests, the 
debate over foreign policy might have been more rational and 
productive. Unfortunately, the propagandists of both political 
parties made this impossible. 
Denunciations of Federalist policies became more strident 
than ever. Senator Henry Tazewell was convinced that "the 
great political object of our govt. has from the beginning been 
to assimilate it to that of G. Britain ... if war is declared I 
shall instantly return home-for I can no longer be a fit 
representative to conduct and measures which I believe to be 
so big with calamities to my country."42 Tazewell, according 
to one Federalist congressman, had even threatened to fight on 
the side of France should that nation become involved in a 
land war against the United States.43 Major General Richard 
Meade of the state militia was court martialed for voicing 
similar sentiments. If the French army invaded America he was 
prepared "to repair to their standard with the black people 
who he could enlist."44 Bishop James Madison, not always as 
moderate as his cousin in Congress, thought it would be an 
act of "self defense on the part of the Southern states to break 
the Union," should the Federalists continue their warlike 
aims.45 Daniel Brent, Republican congressman from Virginia's 
Northern Neck, vented his anger on Adams. When asked if 
he would support the idea of a national holiday in honor of 
Adams's birthday, he replied that "he would not fast a day 
'to save John Adams from an apoplectic fit'-and repeated the 
assertion that he would on that day rather introduce a dance." 46 
The Federalists, after years of being on the defensive, were 
able to defend Adams's policies with conviction. They blamed 
the Republicans for encouraging the French to believe they 
could expect preferential treatment from the United States and 
42 Henry Tazewell to John Ambler, Philadelphia, 9, 20 May 1798, Tazewell 
Papers. 
43Testimony of Thomas Evans, reported in House journal, 11 Dec. 1798. 
44 James Wood to Captain Archibald McRae, Richmond, 16 July 1798, 
Executive Letterbooks. 
45 Bishop James Madison to Henry Tazewell, 31 May 1798, Bishop Madison 
Papers, Duke University. 
46 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 24 April 1798. 
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claimed that the recent acts of war by France provided final 
proof that none of the nations of Europe could be trusted. 
They asked: "\Vill we even now learn that to make ourselves, 
our country respected, & to obtain that justice we are entitled 
to from other nations and powers-is to respect ourselves, our 
Country-to cling to our Government and descry the more 
childish folly, the belief that foreign nations ever will act toward 
us with any views but as it accords their own interest."47 This 
had been the position of the Virginia Federalists throughout 
the decade. They liked neither the British nor the French 
and thought the Republicans naive to believe that their friend-
ship toward the people of France could affect the actions of the 
self-interested French diplomats with whom they had to deal. 
More important than the Federalists' approval of Adams's 
policy toward France was their abhorrence of the Republican 
opposition to those policies. Federalists viewed the statements 
of people like Henry Tazewell and Daniel Brent as disloyal 
and urged their fellow Virginians to "Banish my friends from 
your confidence those designing hypocrites who delight in 
painting the power and wisdom of France-who declaim against 
the President and government as subservient to British influ-
ence .... Be assured they have their ends to answer."48 
The commitment of the Virginia Federalists to the policies 
of the federal government, or at least their distaste for the 
Republican opposition, had never been stronger. The civic-
minded citizens of Norfolk were so eager to aid the Adams 
administration that they raised a private fund of over $16,000 
to help build and equip ships to be loaned to the United 
States government to carry out an attack on the French navy.49 
Soon after the details of the XYZ Affair were announced, 
Republican and Federalist leaders, in what was becoming stan-
dard practice, organized county meetings to rally support to 
their banners. Although the Republicans enjoyed some success 
47 Robert Gamble to Timothy Pickering, Richmond, 20 March 1798, Timothy 
Pickering Papers. 
48 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 24 April 1798. 
49 Robert Gamble to John Cropper, Richmond, 11 July 1798, John Cropper 
Papers. 
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in the counties, their efforts were seriously handicapped by the 
continuing belligerency of France. The arguments used by 
the Republicans paralleled those of the Federalists of 1795 
and 1796. They lamented the actions of the French, but main-
tained that the United States was in no position to go to war 
with such a powerful European nation. 
At a meeting in Richmond, Republican William Foushee 
proposed a set of resolutions condemning Adams for his unwar-
ranted exercise of executive power and asking that peace with 
France be preserved at all costs. He was immediately opposed 
by Federalist Bushrod Washington who called for a statement 
affirming America's determination to defend the national honor 
against all aggression. Both sides claimed that a majority of 
the people present supported their resolutions and as a result, 
the meeting ended with two sets of resolves. 50 In Caroline 
County, where Edmund Pendleton and John Taylor controlled 
the electorate, the citizens agreed on a petition to Congress 
containing a violent denunciation of Federalist policy. The 
petition was in keeping with Taylor's agrarian philosophy, 
claiming that "war makes individuals richer, by making the 
people poorer," and blaming the current desire for war on 
those who wanted to protect British commerce. The petitioners 
from Caroline saw no way in which agrarian Virginia could 
benefit from the protection of British trade and therefore 
vowed to maintain their friendly ties with republican France.51 
The freeholders of Albemarle County gathered not only to 
listen to opposing arguments regarding Federalist foreign policy 
but also to witness the beginnings of a bitter family quarrel. 
Wilson Cary Nicholas, the leading Republican in the General 
Assembly, sponsored a series of resolutions condemning the 
foreign policy of the Adams administration, while his cousin, 
John Nicholas, attempted to defend the Federalists.52 Although 
50 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 3 April 1798. 
51 Ibid., lO April 1798. 
52 Ibid., 12 June 1798. There were two John Nicholases, both living in Albe-
marle County, and, as a result, there has been confusion as to which deserted 
the Republican cause. Manning J. Dauer, "The Two John Nicholases," American 
Historical Review 45 (1940); 338-53, has cleared up much of the misunderstand-
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the views of Wilson Cary Nicholas prevailed, the young Republi-
can leader was dismayed by the political heresy in his family. 
He confided to his father, George Nicholas, the former governor 
of Kentucky: 
J. Nicholas has taken the side of the administration. He has 
been constantly disgraced when he has made a public effort, 
but such is his zeal or pique, that he has been unwearied in his 
personal applications to the people-But the great body of 
people are right; it is a mortification to me that a man of our 
name should take part against the liberty of his Countrymen. 
I have frequently pressed John to let me get an Act of Assembly 
to change his name. Next to this reputation of being honest 
men, I am most anxious that our family should be distinguished 
for their love of country and the rights of man.53 
Not all Federalists were as unsuccessful as John Nicholas. 
On the whole, they gained more support in the county meetings 
than at any previous time. Resolutions praising Adams's con-
duct were passed in Norfolk, Alexandria, Fairfax, Boutetourt, 
Frederick, Portsmouth, Lancaster, and Rockbridge. 54 Most 
followed the form of those passed in Norfolk, where the citizens 
reaffirmed their attachment to the initial stages of the French 
experiment with republicanism, but rejected "with honest indig-
nation her inadmissable demands." As in all cases, the meeting 
closed with a statement deprecating war, but refusing to "pur-
chase peace at any price."55 
The annual celebration of Independence Day, always an 
occasion for patriotic speeches, gave the Federalists another 
opportunity to drum up popular support. With the threat of 
war on the horizon, they were able to use the holiday to 
ing. The John Nicholas who became a Federalist was the cousin of Wilson Cary 
Nicholas and a county clerk in Albemarle County. The other John Nicholas was 
Wilson Cary Nicholas's brother and a Republican congressman. It is important 
to keep the two men straight, as each played important parts, on opposing sides, 
during the controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
53 Wilson Cary Nicholas to George Nicholas, Warren, 21 Sept. 1798, Wilson 
Cary Nicholas Papers. 
54 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 15 May, 12 June, 10 July 1798; 
Columbian Mirror, 17, 19,29 May 1798. 
55 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 15 May 1798. 
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advantage. In towns and counties throughout the state, the 
citizens drank toasts to President Adams and the burgeoning 
United States military establishment. The order in which the 
toasts were given provided a clue as to the current popularity 
of the men and policies of the period. In Richmond, honors 
went to the "People and Government of the United States ... 
Not to be separated by the diplomatic skill of France."56 In 
Albemarle County, Jefferson's home, the vice president was 
at the bottom of the list, with the warning: "may those who 
dispose to slight the voice of the majority of their fellow citizens, 
in the choice of the rest of our officers of government, learn to 
respect that voice as we do."57 
The high point of Federalist sentiment in Virginia was 
reached during the weeks that John Marshall traveled through 
Virginia on the way home from his mission to France. On June 
18, 1798, Marshall entered the capital city of Philadelphia and 
received a hero's welcome unsurpassed by any except that given 
to Washington. As he set out for Virginia, he was honored at 
every stop on the way.58 The Federalists were overjoyed. They 
had an issue capable of attracting public support and, at the 
same time, a popular leader who was capable of capitalizing on 
that support. In his hometown of Richmond, Marshall made 
an impressive speech to an enthusiastic audience where he casti-
gated the French diplomats for their duplicity and warned his 
fellow citizens not to become attached to any foreign powers. 
His speech was followed by a series of toasts to Northern Fed-
eralists.59 This burst of enthusiasm for Northern Federalists 
was unprecedented in Virginia, but such was the popular reac-
tion against France, and to the Republican attachment to 
France, that even the men surrounding Alexander Hamilton 
were temporarily in public favor. 
One side effect of this resurgence of the Federalist party in 
Virginia was the beginnings of a political system where decisions 
56 Ibid., 10 July 1798. 
57 Ibid., 28 Aug. 1798. 
58 Beveridge, Marshall, 2: 344. 
59 The text of Marshall's address is printed in ibid., 2: 571-73; Virginia Gazette 
and General Advertiser, 14 Aug. 1798. 
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were made on the basis of issues and not on the personalities 
of the respective candidates. In many of the county meetings 
during the winter and spring of 1798 there were debates 
between the members of the two opposing parties, and as a 
result, the electorate was beginning to play at least a small role 
in influencing public policy. Even the state legislature, which 
for almost two centuries had been the private reserve of the 
wealthy and well-born, was beginning to feel the democratizing 
pressures of party politics. For the first time on record, candi-
dates for the legislature were running as Republicans or Fed-
eralists.60 Not coincidentally, the only areas where this occurred 
were those where Federalist policy was popular with a large 
portion of the electorate; in most parts of the state, where 
influential Republicans and Federalists commanded the respect 
of the voters for reasons other than their political ideology, 
the political structure remained unchanged. If the Federalists 
could continue to formulate policies capable of winning wide 
popular support, the system of deferential politics would be 
subject to its most severe test. 
On the negative side, there is no doubt that the tightening 
of party lines around complex questions of American foreign 
relations was disastrous to the conduct of foreign policy. At 
one extreme, Alexander Hamilton and his coterie were using 
the crisis with France to advance their plans to raise a pro-
visional army to quell domestic as well as foreign opposition. 
At the other, some Virginia Republicans were threatening 
disunion and even offering to fight on the side of the French. 
Virginia, for the first time, was beginning to experience the 
divisive quarrels between Republicans and Federalists that were 
troubling so many other states in the union. 
Partisanship was not the sole cause of the profound division 
of opinion within Virginia, however. To be sure, the increas-
ingly heated contests for political power between Republicans 
60 The candidates did not call themselves "Republicans'' or "Federalists," but 
rather, "opponents" or "supporters" of the "present Administration." Although 
it cannot be ascertained how many counties felt the impact of this sudden burst 
of partisanship, it is certain that the campaigns in Alexandria, Hanover, Chester· 
field, Gloucester, York, and Fauquier were at least partially affected by the divi-
sions over foreign policy. Columbian Mirror, 14 April, 12 May 1798. 
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and Federalists caused each faction to take a more extreme and 
inflexible stand toward the nations of Europe than they would 
have under ordinary circumstances. The Republicans surely 
would not have gone to such lengths to defend the belligerent 
French if they had not already committed themselves to a 
pro-French position during the debates on the Proclamation of 
Neutrality and the Jay Treaty. Nor would the Federalists have 
advocated such stern measures against the French if they had 
not seen in such a policy a means of discrediting the Republi-
cans' attachment to that nation. But this does not explain 
either the nature or the depth of the loyalties of the members 
of both parties. The Republicans sincerely believed that their 
predictions about the threat of consolidation had been con-
firmed. The Virginia state legislature had proved itself power-
less to halt the dangerous trend of government policy. Even 
more alarming was the ascendancy of the executive branch over 
Congress within the federal government. Everything the Repub-
licans detested-funding, assumption, the Bank of the United 
States-had been initiated by the executive branch. At least 
Congress had added its sanction to these measures. In foreign 
affairs the House of Representatives was unable to check the 
actions of the president and his advisers. In all parts of the 
world Federalist diplomats of known British sympathies were 
now trying to barter away America's political and economic 
independence, for the sake of a small, self-interested minority 
of Northern merchants. The Republicans believed that France 
and the United States were partners in an attempt to eliminate 
this kind of corruption from the world-the only reason that 
France was temporarily hostile to America was because of the 
Federalists' collaboration with the British. The Adams adminis-
tration's warlike posture toward France was only one more 
step, they claimed, in the attempt to bring America permanently 
under the influence of the British. 
The Republicans were uncharitable in assessing the motives 
of the Federalists and excessively optimistic in their faith in 
France. The French, for their part, had no illusions about any 
natural alliance with America. The new French minister to 
America, Pierre Adet, summed up the attitude of France toward 
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America while discussing the character of the leader of the 
Republican interest: "] efferson, I say, is American and, as such 
he cannot be sincerely our friend. An American is the born 
enemy of all the European peoples."61 If only the Republicans 
could have been aware of that attitude. America, despite the 
turmoil of her internal affairs, was fast becoming one of the 
major powers of the world, a potential rival to both Great 
Britain and France. The French minister could see that self-
interest, not republican loyalties, would be the force that would 
guide the country's conduct with the rest of the world. 
The Federalists were every bit as unrealistic as the Republi-
cans. Everywhere they saw conspiracy. They charged the French, 
who had meddled in American politics to gain advantage over 
Great Britain in the power struggles of Europe, with attempting 
to undermine and eventually overthrow the American govern-
ment and they accused the Republicans of materially aiding 
the French in their treasonous activities. Most of this hysteria 
was connected with the Federalists' growing concern for order 
and with their alarm over the direction and tone of the Repub-
licans' criticism of federal policy. The Virginia Federalists, far 
more than their Republican opponents, were unable to realize 
that disagreement with government policy was not equivalent 
to disloyalty. Both Republicans and Federalists felt distinctly 
uneasy about the growth of party in America, but the Fed-
eralists complained more about the partisan rhetoric that party 
warfare engendered. It does not seem likely that the Federalists 
were by nature any more intolerant or illiberal than their 
Republican opponents; they simply happened to be the ones 
who were most often on the receiving end of those partisan 
attacks. 
At least two of Virginia's political leaders were able to rise 
above the animosities generated by his party warfare. In the 
summer of 1798, John Marshall and Wilson Cary Nicholas 
exchanged letters in which they discussed the political situation 
in America. Marshall, writing while he was in Europe, gently 
urged his Republican opponent to give up his attachment to 
61 Quoted in Malone, jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, pp. 289-90. 
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France. Nicholas, who just a few months later would take the 
responsibility for guiding the Virginia Resolutions through the 
General Assembly, replied in a tone which indicated that the 
gentlemanly style of Virginia politics was not a thing of the past: 
Your letter gave me infinite satisfaction, for there is not a 
man whose esteem I value more, whose friendship I reciprocate 
with more sincerity. I sincerely lament the difference of opinion 
that has existed between us as to some of the great political 
events, but I flatter myself that you will give me full credit 
when I assure you, that my confidence in you, my affection and 
regard for you, has not been for one moment in the smallest 
degree impaired. I have myself consciously pursued that course 
which seemed to me best calculated to promote the happiness 
and secure the liberty of my countrymen. I am confident that 
your motives are equally pure, and your only object the public 
good. 
Nicholas then explained his reasons for opposing war with 
France and asked only that Marshall accept the sincerity, if not 
the wisdom .. of his position. He was confident that "however 
we may differ about the means, our objects are the same." 
Nicholas could foresee the difficulties and crises that were to 
come in the years ahead and saw the necessity of joining with 
Federalists of good faith, like Marshall, to discourage the radical 
members of both parties. He was well aware that he and 
Marshall would never be able to agree on all matters of public 
policy, but he hoped that they could both use their wisdom 
and moderation to see that future disagreements would be 
kept within responsible limits.62 
Events were moving too fast to allow the two Virginia states-
men to continue their efforts toward conciliation. As Nicholas 
was replying to Marshall, Federalists in Congress were putting 
the finishing touches to the Alien and Sedition Acts. The 
resulting uproar would not recede until the election of Jefferson 
two and a half years later. 
62 Wilson Cary Nicholas to J. Marshall [Summer] 1798, Wilson Cary Nicholas 
Papers. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Party Politics and 
Political Theory 
IN THE SUMMER OF 1798 the Federalist majority in Congress 
enacted measures to organize a provisional army, to suspend 
trade with France, to capture and punish French privateers, to 
regulate the activities of aliens, and to punish anyone guilty of 
seditious writings against the federal government.1 The citizens 
of Virginia were enraged-not since the Revolution had the 
actions of the central government so threatened their liberties. 
The establishment of a sizable peace-time army-which many 
Virginians feared would be used to crush domestic opposition to 
administration policy-and passage of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts raised new questions regarding the civil liberties of 
American citizens and the proper balance of federal-state au-
thority. The division caused by these measures was widened 
by rifts within the Federalist party and by a marked increase 
in party spirit in general. As both Federalists and Republicans 
stepped up their efforts to win support from the electorate, it 
became increasingly difficult for the two parties to place the 
public interest above partisan gain.2 
The most controversial of the Federalist measures, and the 
one at which Republicans decided to direct their attack, was 
the second section of the Sedition Act, which provided a fine 
of up to two thousand dollars and a prison sentence not exceed-
ing two years for anyone who wrote, printed, published, or even 
spoke "false, scandalous, and malicious" statements against any 
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member or branch of the federal government.3 The Federalists 
maintained that the federal courts had assumed common law 
jurisdiction over seditious libel, and that the Act only codified 
what had been accepted procedure. Indeed, they claimed that 
the Sedition Act was a liberalization of the English Libel Law 
of 1792, since it permitted anyone charged with libel to give 
evidence of the truth of his statements as a defense. The Repub-
licans believed it a patent violation of the first amendment and 
a blatant attempt to silence opponents of the Federalist adminis-
tration.4 
If the members of either party had been capable of a dispas-
sionate examination of the Act, they would have discovered 
no clear precedents defining the limits of the federal govern-
ment's power to punish seditious libel. John Marshall, the only 
prominent Federalist to oppose the Alien and Sedition Acts 
publicly, gave his tentative opinion on the question in 1794, 
long before it had become such an explosive issue: "Whether 
the truth of the libel may be justified or not is a perfectly 
unsettled question. . . . The principle which seems now to 
prevail, tho' it is scarcely to be found in print, is that where 
words are said to be maliciously spoken & to be injurious to the 
plaintiff & the verdict has established them to be so, they are 
to be considered as actionable unless it is plain that they could 
not be slanderous."5 
While the right of the federal government to punish seditious 
libel was unclear, there was no uncertainty as to the right of 
the state to take such action. The state was explicitly given 
l Annals of Congress, 9: 3729, 3733, 3738-39, 3744, 3754, 3776. 
2 For a discussion of Federalist policy, and of the division within the Federalist 
party during this crucial year, see Dauer, The Adams Federalists, pp. 225-45. 
n Annals of Congress, 9: 3776. 
4 The modern equivalents of the Republican and Federalist positions on this 
question can be found in the recent historiography of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts. Tbe Republican position is taken by James Morton Smith, Freedom'.s 
Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1956); Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in 
Early American History (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), argues persuasively that the 
Alien and Sedition Laws were actually a step forward toward a more liberal 
interpretation of the first amendment. 
5 Johu Marshall to Archibald Stuart, Richmond, 28 May 1794, Archibald Stuart 
Papers. 
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the power to punish seditious libel, and moreover, the accused 
was not allowed to offer proof of the truth of his statements 
as a defense. The framers of the Virginia libel law reasoned 
that "the party grieved ought to complain for an injury done 
to him in the ordinary course of law and not by any means to 
revenge himself, whether by the odious course of libelling or 
otherwise.' '6 
The Virginia Republicans carried out their fight against the 
Alien and Sedition Acts on three different fronts. They con-
tinued, as they had done in the past, to call county meetings 
where memorials and petitions were drafted denouncing the 
laws. Of much greater importance than these meetings were the 
highly secret plans of Jefferson and Madison to persuade the 
legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky to lodge formal protests 
against the Alien and Sedition Acts. And finally, in a number 
of campaigns for seats in the state legislature and in Congress, 
the Republican candidates subjected the merits of Federalist 
policy to the closest scrutiny. The Republicans used these 
channels of protest not to condemn the Alien and Sedition Acts 
alone, but to link them to a more systematic design, manifested 
in both the Federalists' foreign and domestic policy, to rob 
Virginians of their liberties. 
At a meeting in Powhatan County, the citizens mixed parti-
sanship with political theory. First, they resumed a theme that 
had been debated since ratification of the Constitution-the 
degree to which British influence guided Federalist policy. 
They denounced the Federalists' attachment to the British, 
claiming that "such connections have an evident tendency to 
corrupt our own, and subject us to a participation of those evils, 
which the pride, ambition, and avarice of Monarchical and 
Aristocratical Governments naturally produce."7 The Pow-
hatan residents then labeled the Alien and Sedition Acts "tyran-
nical and unconstitutional" and in their final resolution, turned 
to the more complicated problems of the relationship between 
6 William Walter Hening, The New Virginia justice, Comprising the Office 
and Authority of a justice of the Peace .. . (Richmond, 1796), pp. 313·17. 
7 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 25 Sept. 1798. 
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a representative and his constituents and of the proper mode of 
seeking repeal of unjust laws. They claimed that ultimate 
sovereignty rested with the people and, when the people dis-
covered that their will had been subverted, it was their right 
"to resist the usurpations, extirpate the tyranny, to restore their 
sullied majesty and prostituted authority; to suspend or abro-
gate those laws, to punish their unfaithful and corrupt ser-
vants."8 
This last resolution suggests some fundamental changes in 
the concept of representation. As the activities of the two 
political parties increased, so too did the awareness of the elec-
torate. Some voters were no longer content to give their 
representative a free hand to decide what policy was best for 
them and now demanded that he act as their direct agent in 
all dealings with the government. Nearly a quarter of a century 
after the Revolution, some Virginians were beginning to ask 
for the kind of constituent power that most New Englanders 
had been exercising for over a century. The Powhatan residents 
were less successful in defining the way in which an unconsti-
tutional law could be abrogated. They were certain the people 
had the right to disallow any law which violated the Constitu-
tion, but they were not able to define the procedure for doing 
so.9 
Not all the memorials from the counties were as restrained 
or as well reasoned as that of Powhatan. Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering, when he received a copy of the Address 
of the Citizens of Prince Edward County to the President of the 
United States, refused even to deliver it to Adams on the 
grounds that it was personally insulting to the chief magistrate. 
Pickering maintained that the publication of the Address in 
the newspapers was proof that it was meant as a device "to 
8 Ibid. 
9 In one respect, the resolutions adopted in Powhatan were more sophisticated 
in their theory of sovereignty than were the Virginia Resolutions passed by the 
General Assembly two months later. The Virginia Resolves never clearly 
identified where ultimate sovereignty rested; they implied that the state legis-
lature might have the right to claim it. The Powhatan resolutions, on the other 
hand, explicitly vested the people with the ultimate sovereign power. 
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inflame the minds of the people," rather than a sincere remon-
strance. The Republicans, of course, made much of the fact 
that the Secretary of State was suppressing the document, and 
cited it as one more example of the government's determination 
to destroy all civil liberties, even the right "to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances," a freedom specifically 
guaranteed by the first amendment.10 
Republican leaders were beginning to realize that county 
meetings alone could not exert enough influence to change 
Federalist policy. 'Wilson Cary Nicholas, the man entrusted by 
Jefferson and Madison with the advance preparations for the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, was convinced that "the 
disease has gained too much strength to be destroyed by anything 
they [the county meetings] can do" and predicted that "if no 
other effort is made, we are undone."11 At that very moment, 
Jefferson, Madison, John Taylor, John Breckinridge of Ken-
tucky, and Nicholas were taking steps to guarantee that some 
other effort was made. 
The Kentucky Resolutions were drafted by Jefferson some-
time before October 4, 1798.12 He gave them to Wilson Cary 
Nicholas and instructed him to send them to the North Carolina 
legislature for approval. Nicholas instead turned them over to 
John Breckinridge of Kentucky and asked Breckinridge to 
steer them through the Kentucky legislature. Jefferson was 
happy with this scheme, since the Kentucky legislature was 
friendly to the Republican cause and Breckinridge's participa-
tion would help obscure his own role in the affair. When 
Madison drafted the Virginia Resolutions, he had with him a 
lOTimothy Pickering to P. Johnston, Trenton, 29 Sept. 1798, Johnston to 
Pickering, Prince Edward County, 20 Oct. 1798, Timothy Pickering Papers. 
ll Wilson Cary Nicholas to George Nicholas, Warren, 12 Sept. 1798, Wilson 
Cary Nicholas Papers. 
12 Madison's role in the drafting of the Virginia Resolutions did not become 
public knowledge until 1809; it was not until 1814 that Jefferson's participation 
was revealed. The exact details of Madison's and Jefferson's effort remained 
obscure throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and only 
recently has the sequence of events been discovered. See Adrienne Koch and 
Harry Ammon, "The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jeffer· 
son's and Madison's Defense of Civil Liberties," William and Mary Quarterly, 
3d ser., 5 (1948): 145·76. 
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copy of Jefferson's resolves. Jefferson, again using Wilson Cary 
Nicholas as an intermediary, suggested some last minute changes 
in Madison's draft and then sent the Resolutions to John Taylor 
of Caroline, who was to introduce them in the Virginia House 
of Delegates.13 
Although they were not aware of the backstage maneuverings 
of Jefferson, Madison, Nicholas, and Taylor, the members of 
both parties knew that the 1798 session of the Virginia General 
Assembly would be crucial. As early as July 1798, almost five 
months before the legislature convened, the Federalists were 
speculating that the Republicans would use the assembly session 
to pass resolutions critical of the general government. The 
Republican members of the Governor's Council, to insure an 
even greater majority for the opponents of the federal govern-
ment in the legislature, attempted to push through a measure 
calling the General Assembly into session early in order to 
prevent the Federalists from faraway western Virginia from 
attending. They nearly succeeded, but at the last minute one 
Council member changed his vote, giving a majority to those 
who wanted the legislature to convene at the usual time.14 
vVhen the General Assembly convened on December 3, 1798, 
the Republicans tried to displace John Wise as Speaker of the 
House. The Speaker ordinarily voted only in the case of a tie, 
and while Wise had never officially cast his vote with either 
party, it was common knowledge in the state capital that he had 
been a supporter of the Federalist faction ever since ratification. 
Yet he had been elected Speaker by the predominantly Republi-
can House of Delegates every year since 1794, when his prede-
cessor, Thomas Mathews, also a Federalist, retired.15 The 
speakership had never before been an object of partisanship, 
but some Republicans were intent on gaining every advantage 
possible and accordingly nominated Wilson Cary Nicholas to 
13 Ibid., pp. 155-60. 
14 Robert Gamble to Timothy Pickering, Richmond, 12 July 1798, Timothy 
Pickering Papers; William Radford to John Preston, Richmond, 21 July 1798, 
Preston Papers. 
15 Thomas Jefferson to John Wise, 12 Feb. 1799, in Virginia Maga.zine of 
History and Biography 12: 257. 
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oppose Wise. Although they possessed a substantial majority in 
the legislature, the Republicans were unable to persuade their 
members to abandon their traditional mode of selecting a 
presiding officer. While Wise was a Federalist, he was also an 
experienced and respected legislator; some Republicans were 
not willing to carry partisanship to such an extreme and they 
joined with the Federalists in reelecting Wise.16 Thomas Jef-
ferson was incensed at this lack of discipline in the Republican 
ranks. He denounced Wise as a tory and "roundly abused those 
of his followers who had forgotten their party allegiance at 
such a time."17 
Jefferson had little to complain about, for Wise's victory 
was the only setback suffered by the Republicans during the 
entire session. On December 10, John Taylor introduced the 
Virginia Resolutions into the House of Delegates.18 In the first 
two resolutions the Republicans paid their obligatory homage 
to the Constitution and the union. The third resolution 
analyzed the nature of the compact between the states and the 
federal government, declaring "that in the case of a deliberate, 
palpable and dangerous exercise of power not granted by the 
said compact, the states ... are in duty bound to interpose for 
arresting the progress of evil." If the states did not take these 
steps to limit the exercise of federal power, "the inevitable 
result ... would be to transform the present republican system 
of the United States into an absolute, or at best, a mixed mon-
archy." The fourth resolution dealt explicitly with the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, claiming that they were a "palpable and 
alarming" violation of the Constitution.19 
Up to this point, the wording of the Resolves was nearly 
identical to Madison's rough draft. The final resolution was 
introduced at the suggestion of Thomas Jefferson. It declared 
the Acts unconstitutional and pronounced them ((not law) but 
16 House journal, 3 Dec. 1798. 
17 Jefferson to .John Wise, 12 Feb. 1799, Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography 12: 257. 
18 House journal, lO Dec. 1798. 
19 Italics mine. Resolutions of Virginia and Kentucky ... and Debates in the 
House of Delegates of Virginia ... (Richmond, 1832), pp. 174-76. 
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utterly void) and of no force or efject."20 In this form, the 
Virginia Resolutions were not a mere statement of opinion, 
but an explicit defiance of federal law. 
During the next two weeks of debate, both Federalists and 
Republicans demonstrated that they were as much concerned 
with advancing the cause of their respective parties as they 
were with the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
John Taylor opened the debate. He maintained that the Alien 
and Sedition Laws violated every principle of civil liberties con-
tained in the bill of rights and "deemed it a sacrilege for Gov-
ernment to regulate the mind of man." Taylor and his Repub-
lican colleagues may have believed that the Alien and Sedition 
Laws were a threat to civil liberties, but the Federalists had a 
devastating rejoinder. If the Republicans were so concerned 
with preserving human rights, why had they enacted laws 
similar to the Sedition Act within their own state? "An act 
against divulgers of false news," passed by the Virginia General 
Assembly in 1792, specifically excluded from protection under 
the Bill of Rights anyone accused of spreading defamatory 
propaganda. Under the Virginia statute the accused was not 
even allowed to offer proof of the truth of the statement in his 
defense. The Federalists were able to point to an old letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee to reinforce their argu-
ment. In this letter the indefatigable champion of freedom had 
ventured that "in preventing the abridgment of the freedom 
of the press, punishment for uttering falsehoods, ought not to 
be inhibited."21 
The Federalists' arguments, however disingenuous, were tech-
nically correct. The Republicans realized this and did not 
rely on the civil liberties issue after the Federalists had made 
their counterattack. They turned instead to the problem of 
the proper division of authority between the state and federal 
governments, arguing that the federal government derived its 
20 Italics mine. Ibid., p. 166; Jefferson added this statement just before the 
Resolutions were sent to John Taylor. Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, 
Monticello, 29 Nov. 1798, in Ford, ed., jefferson's Writings, 7: 312-13. 
21 Resolutions of Virginia, pp. 7, 70, 110. 
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power from the states alone, and that nowhere in the Constitu-
tion was there mention that the states had relinquished power 
to regulate the conduct of aliens or of the press.22 The Feder-
alists challenged the Republicans' reliance on the states. The 
phrase "We the states" was purposely deleted in favor of "We 
the people" in the preamble of the Constitution. Hence, a state 
legislature surely would not disobey a law passed by men 
representing a majority of the people of the United States. 
The attempt by the Republicans to coerce Virginia into unlaw-
ful behavior was the more odious, the Federalists charged, 
because the Republicans who controlled the state legislature 
had systematically denied to some sections of the state adequate 
representation in the affairs of government and thus did not 
even have a legitimate claim to representing the will of the 
people of Virginia.2H This wrangling over the locus of sover-
eignty continued throughout the two weeks of debate. Most 
of the arguments were similar to those used during the first 
half of the nineteenth century. Tragically, the difficult question 
of ultimate sovereignty was not settled by words; it would have 
to be settled by force. 
The Federalists, after defending the constitutionality of the 
Alien and Sedition Laws, turned to the area where their 
Republican opponents were most vulnerable: they enthusi-
astically supported the Enemy Alien Act and used that Act as 
a platform from which to launch their attacks on French influ-
ence. Federalist George K. Taylor claimed: 
attempts ... had already been made, by French emigrants, to 
excite our slaves to insurrection. Suppose then, they were to 
attempt the thing again, and an insurrection should accordingly 
take place, what would be the consequence? ... The inexorable 
and blood-thirsty negro would be careless of the father's groans, 
the tears of the mother, and the lamentation of the children. 
The loudest in their wailings would be their wives and daugh-
ters, torn from their arms, with naked bosoms, outstretched 
hands and dishevelled hair, to gratify the brutal passion of a 
22 Ibid., pp. 26-34, 43-50, ll8-19. 
23 Ibid., pp. 71, 133-36. 
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ruthless negro, who would the next moment murder the object 
of his lust. [How was] ... all that to be prevented? By vesting 
the General Government with the power to remove such aliens, 
which it already so generously exercised for the purpose, in the 
law under consideration; a law particularly calculated for the 
protection of the Southern States.24 
Somehow the issue had clouded; while John Taylor talked of 
human rights, George Taylor warned of "naked bosoms." But 
Taylor's rhetoric, however partisan, played upon some real 
fears. Concern over slave violence, particularly sexual violence, 
was constant in Virginia; it was only natural, and unfortunate, 
that at least one of the two political parties would discover a 
way to exploit that concern. 
The Republicans did not match George K. Taylor's dem-
agoguery, but they rarely missed an opportunity to attack the 
Federalist administration. They conceded that Adams had 
somehow received a majority of the votes in the presidential 
election of 1796, but claimed that "it was well known that the 
majority was produced by artifice and coalition of Federal 
officers, persons deeply concerned in funding and banking 
systems, refugees, foreigners (whose life has been but a life of 
warfare against the principles of free government), bankrupt 
speculators, and to complete the groupe all those who could 
profit by change and convulsion."25 
This exchange of abuse continued throughout the debates, 
but the legislators ultimately had to face the central issue 
presented by the Virginia Resolutions. Jefferson's contribution 
to the Resolves had been the one phrase in the last resolution 
declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts "utterly null, void, and 
of no force or effect." The implications of this single phrase 
were frightening to both Federalists and moderate Republicans. 
They feared that "the old Republican maxim that the majority 
must govern" would be destroyed if a single state legislature 
was vested with the power to declare a law null and void. 
While Virginians might be morally justified in defying a law 
24 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
25 Ibid., p. 56. 
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they thought to be a clear violation of the Constitution, other 
legislatures at other times might use the precedent set by Vir-
ginia to sow the seeds of anarchy and disunion.26 
This coalition of Federalists and moderate Republicans, fear-
ful of the consequences of Jefferson's doctrine, succeeded in 
deleting the nullification provision from the Virginia Resolu-
tions.27 The radical Republicans were disappointed. John Tay-
lor thought its inclusion in the Resolves "would have placed 
the State and general governments at issue" and would therefore 
have necessitated the calling of a new constitutional convention 
to resolve the problem. It was Taylor's hope that such a con-
vention would completely change the structure of the federal 
government and give back to the states much of the power they 
had lost in the Convention of 1787.28 Taylor could not convince 
enough of his colleagues to embrace his radical doctrines, and 
the Virginia Resolutions, without the nullification provision, as 
passed by the House on December 21, 1798, by a vote of l 00-63, 
merely declared the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional 
and asked that "necessary and proper measures" be taken to 
repeal them.29 
The Virginia Resolutions, because of their kinship with 
John C. Calhoun's nullification doctrine, have received the 
close attention of historians, but the Resolves were but one 
item in the Republican program during the legislative session 
of 1798. The Republicans also proposed a series of resolutions 
commenting once again on the conduct of American foreign 
policy. The growing body of evidence attesting to French 
hostility toward the United States made it necessary for the 
Republicans to retreat from their position of unqualified sup-
port for France, but they remained adamant that "our security 
from invasion, and the force of our militia, render a standing 
army unnecessary." The Federalists countered with a set of 
resolutions vigorously condemning the French for their con-
26 Ibid., pp. 154-57. 
27 House journal, 21 Dec. 1798. 
28 John Taylor to Jefferson, Richmond, 1798, in john P. Branch Historical 
Papers of Randolph-Macon College 2 (1908): 277. 
29 House journal, 21 Dec. 1798. 
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duct in the XYZ Affair and for their attacks on American 
shipping, and finally, praising the administration's proposal for 
a provisional army. In votes nearly identical to the one on the 
Virginia Resolves, the Federalist resolutions were defeated, 
68-97, the Republican ones passed, 103-58.30 
The Republicans next drafted and passed, 80-58, a lengthy 
Address to Congress from the General Assembly.31 The Address, 
which was to be distributed to the public at government 
expense, was in many ways more inflammatory than the Vir-
ginia Resolutions. Madison, the author of the Address, unques-
tionably meant it as a campaign document for future elections. 
In it he warned that the "acquiescence of the states under 
infractions of the federal compact, would either beget a speedy 
consolidation, by precipitating the state governments into 
impotency and contempt; or prepare the way for a revolution, 
by a repetition of these infractions."32 The only alternative to 
consolidation or revolution was, in his opinion, the speedy 
installation of a Republican administration in the nation's 
capital. 
The Address sought to demonstrate how the Federalist 
administration had subverted the liberties of Americans. The 
first steps on the road to consolidation were "the fiscal systems 
and arrangements, which keep an host of commercial and 
wealthy individuals, embodied and obedient to the mandates 
of the Treasury." Next came the dangerous alliance with 
Great Britain, which could only corrupt America's republican 
institutions. The Republicans deplored the creation of an 
army and navy, which was obviously intended to "employ the 
principle of fear, by punishing imaginary insurrections under 
the pretext of preventative justice." Warming to his partisan 
task, Madison claimed that the Federalist administration was 
composed solely of "swarms of officers, civil and military, who 
can inculcate political tenets tending to sovereignty and mon-
archy." The Address closed with a denunciation of the Alien 
30 Ibid., 4 Jan. 1799. 
31 Ibid., 22 Jan. 1799. 
32 Ibid. 
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and Sedition Acts similar to that contained in the Virginia 
Resolves.33 
The Federalists, aided by the pen of John Marshall, drafted 
an Address from the Minority. 34 Like the Republican Address) 
it was a partisan document. The Virginia Federalists not only 
defended the Alien and Sedition Acts but also embarked on a 
belated, yet vigorous defense of the entire Federalist program 
over the past decade. They lauded President Washington for 
his wise decision to avoid the power struggles of Europe, but 
noted that "unfortunately, for America, and for Republican 
government, a few openly, and more secretly, lifted their voice 
against the country's will." They lamented the fact that 
Citizen Genet, with the help of the more radical opponents 
of the government, was able to stir up "acrimony against the 
constituted authorities of the nation."35 Turning their attention 
to Anglo-American relations, the Federalists admitted that the 
Treaty of Peace had not eliminated America's grievances against 
England: "The unjustifiable conduct of our late foe, especially 
on the ocean, rekindled our ardor for hostility and revenge." 
Fortunately, the brilliant diplomacy of John Jay had averted 
war and resolved most of America's differences with Great 
Britain. In spite of these efforts, a coalition of dissatisfied 
Americans and self-interested Frenchmen persisted in their 
attempts to undermine America's relations with England.36 
There was of necessity some hesitation in the Federalists' 
justification of administration policy toward Great Britain, for 
they had misgivings about the wisdom of that policy themselves. 
But when they turned to President Adams's policy toward 
France they were able to speak with more conviction. They 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. According to Albert J. Beveridge, Marshall, 2: 402, 575-77, the style and 
language of the Minority Report indicate that it was the handiwork of Marshall. 
If Beveridge is correct, then Marshall, who had initially opposed the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, was either playing both sides of the political fence or was facing 
extreme pressure from his fellow Federalist legislators to support the administra-
tion measures. For further proof of Marshall's authorship of the Minority Report, 
see Theodore Sedgwick to Rufus King, Stockbridge, 29 March 1799, in King, Life 
and Correspondence, 2: 581. 
35 House journal, 22 Jan. 1799. 
36 Ibid. 
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condemned the French demand for tribute from America and 
vowed to put an end to French military encroachments. The 
only way America could maintain her independence, claimed 
the Federalists, was by supporting the policies of the present 
administration.37 The most recent of those policies was, of 
course, the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Enemy Alien Act 
was relatively easy to justify; it was a fundamental weapon in 
America's fight against "French influence." The Sedition Act 
was necessary because "government cannot be secured, if, by 
falsehood and malicious slander, it is to be deprived of the 
confidence of the people. It is vain to urge that truth will 
prevail and that slander, when detected, recoils on the calum-
niator. The experience of the world, and our own experience, 
prove that a continued course of defamation will at length sully 
the fairest reputation and throw suspicion on the purest 
conduct."38 
To make certain that virtue was recognized, the Federalists 
felt it necessary to punish anyone who attempted to question 
the virtues of their leaders. Thus, the Virginia Federalists, 
who in the past had given only grudging support to Alexander 
Hamilton's financial measures and the Jay Treaty-policies 
which later proved to be in the nation's best interest-were 
now actively defending the most unpopular and illiberal of all 
administration measures, the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
The harsh rhetoric of both the Republican and Federalist 
Addresses was due at least in part to the fact that each was 
meant to constitute an unofficial party platform. The Repub-
licans concentrated on Hamilton's detested financial policies, 
the threat of English influence, and the menace to civil liberties 
and states' rights posed by the Alien and Sedition Acts. These 
were the issues which promised to win them the most votes. 
Similarly, the Federalists tried to avoid discussion of the secre-
tary of the treasury's financial schemes and the administration's 
close ties with Great Britain because they knew that they could 
not make a case for them with the electorate; instead, they 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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resumed their persistent theme-the need to combat French 
influence and Republican disloyalty. 
The legislative session had dragged into January 1799, but 
the Republicans still had one more item on their agenda. 
Although in no way connected with the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, or with any matter of national concern, it was nevertheless 
a valuable weapon in their campaign against the Federalists. 
In January 1798, Madison had lamented that Republicans had 
not rallied behind the recent attempts to divest the Episcopal 
Church of its glebe lands and hinted that he hoped that they 
would do so in the future. 39 The Baptists and other dissenting 
sects had come close to victory in the legislative session of 1797, 
but at the last minute the state senate had vetoed the House 
proposal to sell the church lands.40 In 1798, the Republicans 
lined up solidly with the Baptists and pushed their plans to 
completion. On January 19, 1799, at the close of the session, 
the General Assembly finally agreed to a measure divesting the 
Episcopal Church of its lands.41 
Party spirit had worked a revolution in the attitude of the 
assembly toward what had earlier been a purely local issue. On 
all previous occasions, the dominant division on the church 
land issue had been that between the east and the west; Feder-
alists and Republicans could be found in equal proportions on 
both sides of the question. The predominantly Episcopalian 
east, because it had more representatives than the Baptist-
dominated west, had always been able to rebuff any attempts 
to sell the church lands. By 1798, party loyalty had become 
more important than religious persuasion. Of those who voted 
for the proposal, sixty-seven were Republicans, only seventeen 
were Federalists. Predictably, all seventeen Federalists were 
from western counties. Thirty-three Federalists and only twenty-
39 Hamilton, ed., Monroe's Writing, 2: 97n. The glebe lands issue did not 
suddenly reappear in 1799. The House of Delegates had voted on, and rejected, 
petitions calling for the sale of the glebes nearly every session between 1790 and 
1799. The most detailed treatment of the voting patterns in the House during 
the decade of the 1790s on the glebe lands issue is Hall, "A Quantitative Ap-
proach to ... Virginia, 1790-1810." 
40House journal, 5 Jan. 1798; Senate journal, 20 Jan. 1798. 
41 House journal, 19 Jan. 1799. 
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one Republicans opposed the bill; nearly all the opponents 
from both parties represented the eastern part of the state. 
The three areas most affected by the increasingly partisan 
character of the glebe lands issue were the Southeastern Pied-
mont and the Central Neck, previously heavily Republican 
and opposed to the sale of the lands, and those counties lying in 
the Shenandoah Valley, which had formerly been leaning toward 
Federalism and had favored sale of the glebes. In each of these 
areas the respective positions on the glebe lands question 
shifted as partisan divisions tightened.42 
The legislative history of the glebe lands proposal provides 
an excellent example of the way in which national politics and 
local interests were beginning to play upon one another. Madi-
son, working to strengthen the position the Republican party 
in national affairs, recognized the importance of this strictly 
local issue in bolstering Republican support in Virginia. The 
Baptists, less concerned with national politics than with their 
own special interests, were more kindly disposed to the Republi-
cans after receiving their aid in the church land struggle. The 
culmination of this alliance would come in the presidential 
election of 1800, when the Republican ticket would reap the 
rewards of Madison's efforts. 
The assembly session of 1798 was momentous. Never before 
had opposition to federal policy been so persistent and never 
before had partisanship affected such a variety of legislative 
business. But it would be unfair to judge the actions of the 
legislature solely on the quality of the political theory it 
espoused. The Virginia Resolves and the Republican and 
Federalist Addresses were not abstract, political treatises, but 
were campaign documents aimed at attracting popular support 
for the respective parties. The Republicans, because they were 
fighting to maintain their advantage over the Federalists within 
Virginia and to set an example for Republicans elsewhere, 
42 Again, the best discussion of voting patterns on the issue is Hall, "A 
Quantitative Approach to ... Virginia, 1790-1810." For the specific votes on the 
question see House journal, 9 Dec. 1789, 13 Nov. 1790, 6 Dec. 1791, 25 Nov. 1794, 
27 Nov. 1795,.5 Jan. 1798, 19 Jan. 1799. 
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resorted to much stronger rhetoric than they would have under 
ordinary circumstances. This was certainly the case in J effer-
son's attempt to nullify the Alien and Sedition Laws. But the 
doctrine advanced by Jefferson cannot be ignored because it was 
proposed at the height of partisan rivalry. As a leader of the 
Republican party and as one of the most gifted political thinkers 
of his day, Jefferson had a special obligation to keep the methods 
of opposition to the Federalist administration within reasonable 
bounds. 
Was Jefferson justified, then, in using the nullification 
doctrine to promote civil liberty and victory for the Republican 
party? Did the evils of the nullification doctrine, which were 
apparent even to Jefferson's contemporaries, outweigh any good 
that might be obtained by its use?43 In assessing Jefferson's 
conduct, it is not fair to compare his attempt to nullify the 
Alien and Sedition Laws with those of John C. Calhoun three 
decades later. The circumstances were different. When the 
Virginia Resolves were proposed, the bonds of union were new 
and uncertain; the Supreme Court had not yet asserted its 
authority as the final arbiter of the constitutionality of federal 
statutes. Furthermore, in the absence of any clear precedents 
as to where sovereignty ultimately rested, it was not unreason-
able to assume that it resided with the states. Indeed, the 
Articles of Confederation, upon which the Constitution was 
based, clearly made the states the final source of sovereign 
power. If the states possessed ultimate sovereignty, then it was 
only logical, from the viewpoint of a political theorist in 1798, 
that the states should also possess the power to declare a federal 
law unconstitutional. 
Even in its proper historical context, however, the nullifica-
43 Most of the leading Jeffersonian scholars have maintained that Jefferson 
was justified in this particular case in resorting to the nullification doctrine. 
Their reasoning has been best summed up by Douglass Adair: "Jefferson and 
Madison in advancing their theory of States' Rights were not defending the 
abstract authority of the states as an end in itself, but as a practical means to 
protect the civil liberties of living persons." William and Mary Quarterly, 3d 
ser., 5 (1948): 146. One of the few dissenters from this viewpoint is Leonard W. 
Levy, jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 
pp. 42-70. 
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tion doctrine advanced by Jefferson was dangerous. Both 
Federalists and moderate Republicans in the Assembly warned 
that if a single state legislature attempted to disallow a federal 
law either anarchy or forceful repression would shortly follow.44 
Jefferson, John Taylor, and those who supported nullification 
had no way of knowing that the means they advocated would 
be the same as those used by South Carolina nullifiers and 
Southern segregationists, but they should have recognized that 
the act of defying established laws and institutions, no matter 
how noble the ends, was fraught with danger. A great many 
Republicans were aware of the implications of nullification 
even if their leaders were not, for without their support the 
Federalists would never have succeeded in deleting the passage 
from the Virginia Resolutions.45 
One aspect of the proceedings in the Virginia legislature of 
1798, seemingly unrelated to the controversy over the Virginia 
Resolutions, has remained under a cloud of suspicion. During 
the session in which the members of the Assembly debated the 
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts, they also 
passed legislation to reorganize the militia, to purchase addi-
tional arms, and to erect an armory in Richmond. The legis-
lature also raised taxes by 25 percent, presumably to pay the 
cost of these increased defense expenditures.46 Historians 
writing in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries main-
tained that the increase in the defense establishment was 
intended to provide for armed resistance against enforcement 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts.47 The basis for this conclusion 
44 Resolutions of Virginia, pp. 76-78, 111-13, 154-57. 
45 House journal, 21 Dec. 1798. As a political weapon, the Virginia Resolutions 
at least partly failed in their objective. The Republicans had hoped that other 
states would join in their protest over the Alien and Sedition Acts, but the exact 
opposite was the case. None of the other states concurred with Virginia and 
Kentucky, and the legislatures of Delaware, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New 
York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont condemned the Resolutions 
as an unwarranted exercise of power. Even in Staunton, Virginia, when the 
Resolutions were presented for distribution, "the court, without any deliberation, 
tore them to pieces and trampled them under foot." Resolutions of Virginia, 
pp. 5-16; Columbian Mirror, 23 April 1799. 
46 Shepherd, Statutes at Large, 2: 141-47, 151. 
47 Among those who have repeated the story are Beveridge, Marshall, 2: 406; 
and Henry Adams, fohn Randolph (Boston, 1887), p. 27. 
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has previously rested on a few, isolated pieces of evidence. John 
Nicholas, the heretical member of the predominately Repub-
lican Nicholas family, published an open letter in the Virginia 
Argus on March 29, 1799, accusing the Republicans of gathering 
a store of arms in Richmond as part of their plans for rebellion.48 
In 1817, John Randolph of Roanoke openly boasted of these 
plans for resistance in a speech on the floor of the United States 
House of Representatives.49 And William Branch Giles, rem-
iniscing before the Virginia legislature in 1825, again kindled 
the suspicion that the Republicans' opposition to the Alien 
and Sedition Acts was not meant to be confined to peaceful 
remonstrances. 50 All these sources are highly suspect. Nicholas 
had already been involved in an abortive attempt to incriminate 
Jefferson by stealing his mail from the Albemarle County Post 
Office, and his Republican opponents believed him to be so 
embittered against them that he would easily stoop to lying.51 
Randolph's testimony is also open to question, since it is impos-
sible to know whether the mentally unstable Virginia congress-
man was enjoying one of his lucid moments at the time he made 
his statement. Twenty-seven years had passed when Giles 
recalled the event in the Virginia legislature; he might have 
mistakenly passed off as absolute fact the rumors he had heard 
from people like Randolph. 
It is possible to reject a conspiratorial interpretation and to 
view the strengthening of the militia as just one step in a cam-
paign begun as early as 1792 to improve Virginia's defenses 
against Indian attacks and foreign intrigue. The need for 
additional armaments was apparent as early as 1796, and in 
September of that year Governor James Wood began negotiating 
for the purchase of additional arms. These activities, initiated 
long before the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, may 
48 Virginia Argus, 29 March 1799. 
49 Annals of Congress, 30: 794-95. 
50 William B. Giles, Political Miscellanies (Richmond, 1830), p. l46. 
51 The letter that Nicholas stole contained statements highly critical of Pres· 
ident Washington. It actually belonged to Jefferson's nephew, Peter Carr, but 
Nicholas tried to make Washington believe that Jefferson wrote it in order to 
damage Jefferson's political career. Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, 
pp. 309-11. 
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have been part of a long-range plan to guard against outside 
aggression and may have had no connection with the Repub-
lican opposition to federal policy.52 
There are some pieces missing from the puzzle. Accusations 
regarding plans among Republicans to resist the federal gov-
ernment were not confined to John Nicholas, John Randolph. 
and William Branch Giles. After the legislature adjourned in 
January 1799, similar charges were circulated by Federalists 
throughout the state. One Republican, Augustine Jennings, 
was reported to have declared openly that "the object of the 
last Virginia legislature in increasing the taxes upon the people 
to twenty five per cent is to purchase arms to put in the hands 
of the people of this state for the purpose of enabling them to 
oppose the government of the United States." Other Federalists 
maintained that it was common knowledge that "the people 
were encouraged most openly to make resistance" during the 
controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts.53 
More important than the partisan and self-serving testimony 
of the Federalists was the way in which the members of the 
House of Delegates reacted to the proposals for a larger defense 
establishment at the various times during the decade at which 
they were discussed. The Virginia legislature had been notorious 
in its failure to provide funds for defense. At the height of the 
Indian warfare, when physical danger to Virginians was greatest, 
the legislature had refused to increase taxes to provide more 
troops and material.54 The General Assembly continued to 
procrastinate on matters of defense during every session until 
1798. Furthermore, on all occasions prior to 1798, the vote on 
whether or not to increase defense expenditures had been non-
partisan; Federalists and Republicans were evenly divided on 
the question. In the 1798 session, however, the Federalists 
specifically asked that the "act to authorize the Executive to 
52 This is the argument of Philip Davidson. "Virginia and the Alien and 
Sedition Laws," American Historical Review 36 (1931): 336·42. 
53 Columbian Mirror, 23 April 1799; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 
29 .Jan. 1799,26 Feb. 1799; Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton, 1799, in The 
Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge, 9 vols. (New York, 1885-
1886), 8: .518; Resolutions of Virginia, p. II. 
54 See House journal, 13 Nov. 1789, 2 Dec. 1793, 24 Dec. 1794. 
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procure arms for the defense of the Commonwealth" be sus-
pended for twelve months. This request was denied, 73-81. 
Fifty-four Federalists supported the motion to delay the pur-
chase of the arms, only one opposed it. 55 Thus, although it 
may have been only coincidental that the efforts to improve 
Virginia's military establishment occurred at the same time 
that Republican opposition to federal policy was greatest, it 
is evident that the Federalists were well aware of the possible 
consequences of such an unfortunate accident of timing. Repub-
licans in positions of authority probably had no intention of 
using the newly strengthened militia to resist federal enforce-
ment of the Alien and Sedition Laws, but the Federalists almost 
certainly believed they did. 
Many Virginians thought that the Republicans had gone 
too far in their opposition to the federal government. There 
had been altogether too much talk about disunion and secession 
during the legislative session of 1798, and the Federalists took 
advantage of the reaction that followed. Although the Virginia 
Federalists had on the whole approved of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts they had played, by necessity, an essentially defensive role 
when faced with the Republican attacks on government policy. 
Once the Virginia Resolves were adopted, however, the Fed-
eralists were able to take the offensive. ·with considerable gusto, 
they turned from their defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts 
to attack the Virginia Resolutions as an unwarranted exercise 
of power by the state legislature. 
The major testing ground for the Federalists' strategy was 
the congressional district encompassing Richmond. John Mar-
shall, the Federalists' strongest possible candidate, was running 
against the Republican incumbent, John Clopton. Although 
the election was not held until April 1799, the campaign began 
as early as September 1798 when one of Marshall's supporters 
(possibly Marshall himself), signing himself as "Freeholder," 
publicly inquired about Marshall's qualifications for office.56 A 
<>5 Ibid., 15 Jan. 1799. 
56 Beveridge, Marshall, 2: 386-87. 
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week later, on September 20, Marshall replied to "Freeholder" 
in the newspapers. His remarks with respect to signs of party 
division and French influence within America paralleled the 
sentiments of Federalists everywhere. In replying to the query 
regarding the Alien and Sedition Acts, however, Marshall 
differed sharply with many of his Federalist colleagues. He 
declared: "I am not an advocate for the alien and sedition bills; 
had I been in Congress when they passed, I should, unless my 
judgment could have been changed certainly have opposed 
them. Yet, I do not think them fraught with all those mischiefs 
which many gentlemen ascribe to them. I should have opposed 
them because I think them useless; and because they are cal-
culated to create unnecessary discontents and jealousies at a 
time when our very existence as a nation, may depend on our 
union." 57 
Some Northern Federalists were particularly upset at Mar-
shall's statement and denounced him for his cowardice.58 But 
it was moderation that kept Federalism alive in Virginia. Un-
fortunately, most Virginia Federalists, by deciding to support 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, were in the process of abandoning 
their moderation. 
Soon after Marshall had published his "Answers to a Free-
holder," John Clopton's supporters published some questions 
for their own candidate. Clopton unequivocally opposed the 
Alien and Sedition Laws, would continue to fight all attempts 
to draw America under the influence of Great Britain, and, 
although continuing to champion the cause of revolutionary 
France, would never work for her interests at the expense of 
those of the United States.59 
"Buckskin," a supporter of Marshall, was the next to speak 
out. He accused Clopton of calling President John Adams "a 
traitor to the United States."60 This was a serious charge; 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering began plans to prosecute 
57 Marshall's "Answers to a Freeholder" are printed in full in ibid., 2: 575-77. 
58Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, 18 Dec. 1798, in Ames, ed., Fisher Ames, 
1: 246-47. 
59 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 5 Oct. 1798. 
60 Ibid., 9, 16 Oct. 1798. 
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Clopton for sedition, even though Clopton immediately printed 
a denial of "Buckskin's" charge. To his credit, Marshall wrote 
Pickering, informed him that there was no evidence to prove 
that Clopton had made such a statement, and advised him not 
to proceed any further against his Republican opponent.61 
After the passage of the Virginia Resolutions, supporters of 
the two candidates intensified their efforts. The Federalists 
turned from their defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts and 
began a counterattack against the "disloyal" activities of their 
Republican opponents. The Virginia Republicans, while they 
did not alter the substance of their criticism of federal policy, 
became even more sharply critical. In December 1798 Meri-
wether Jones, a radical Republican, began publishing the Rich-
mond Examiner> one of the most irresponsible newspapers in 
the history of American journalism.62 
The Federalists' offensive against Clopton and the Republi-
can party was based largely on the debates in the legislature over 
the Virginia Resolves. They criticized the Republicans for 
usurping rights of the people and for fostering a spirit of 
disunion. If anyone had the right to declare a law uncon-
stitutional, and the Federalists doubted whether anyone did, 
it was the people, not a state legislature. Clopton, because he 
approved of the actions of the Republicans in the legislature, 
was no less guilty than those who had voted for the Resolutions.63 
John Thompson, a young polemicist from Fredericksburg, 
renewed the attack on Marshall's political principles through 
61 Timothy Pickering to Edward Carrington, Trenton, 23 Oct. 1798, Marshall 
to Pickering. Richmond, 30 Oct. 1798, Timothy Pickering Papers. 
62 Six months later, in May 1798, the Federalists established their own news-
paper, the Virginia Federalist. Both newspapers reached new depths of scur-
rility and irresponsible journalism. The exchange between the two became so 
bitter that eventually, the two rival publishers, Meriwether Jones and James 
Rind, fought a duel. William C. Stanard, "Party Violence, 1790-1800," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography 29 (1921): 177. Lisle Rose, Prologue to 
Democracy, pp. 222-23, maintains that the establishment of the Virginia Federalist 
was "one of the most significant advances" in the Virginia Federalist party's 
history. This appears to be an overstatement. The Federalist newspaper, plagued 
by low subscriptions and erratic writing, survived little more than a year. 
63 Particularly effective were the arguments of "Plain Truth," Virginia Gazette 
and General Advertiser, 5, 12, 15, 26 Feb., l March 1799. 
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the pages of the Examiner. \\lriting under the pseudonym 
"Curtius," Thompson admitted that Marshall was respected by 
many good and patriotic men, but added, "if you are indeed 'an 
American in heart and sentiment,' you must be deeply mortified 
when you observe that the persons most vehement in your 
praise are the partizans of Great Britain and the inveterate 
enemies of independence."64 This theme ran through Thomp-
son's and, indeed, all the Republicans' attacks on Marshall. He 
was accused of being among those "who have long endeavoured 
to restore us to the abject condition of the British colonies" 
and of attempting to sell American independence to British 
merchants in order to enrich a privileged minority. 65 Great 
Britain had long been the symbol of corrupt, oppressive rule, 
and now the federal government was beginning to be viewed in 
the same light. As a result, it became impossible for anyone to 
support the Federalist administration without being labeled a 
partisan of the British, monarchical form of government. 
Marshall refused to become embroiled in a pamphlet war 
with "Curtius." A few of his supporters attempted to answer 
in his behalf, but their efforts were short-lived, since they 
possessed neither the style nor the polemical skill of "Curtius."66 
As election day approached and it became obvious that the 
contest would be close, the Federalists enlisted the aid of Patrick 
Henry. In a letter to Archibald Blair, circulated throughout 
the congressional district, Henry denounced the tactics of the 
Republicans in the legislature and threw his support to Mar-
shall.67 The effect of the endorsement was terrific. Henry had 
refused to identify himself with either party during the con-
troversies of the past few years, and his support of Marshall 
had a considerable effect among the sizable group of Virginia 
voters who were, like Henry, as yet unaligned with either the 
64 [John Thompson], The Letters of Curtius Addressed to john Marshall 
(Richmond, 1798), p. 4. 
65 Ibid., p. 8. 
66 Ibid., p. 37; "Hodge" and "Procopius" in the Virginia Gazette and General 
Advertiser, ll, 25 Dec. 1798. 
67 Patrick Henry to Archibald Blair, Red-hill, 8 Jan. 1799, Timothy Pickering 
Papers; Beveridge, Marshall, 2: 413. 
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Republicans or the Federalists. In the minds of many, Patrick 
Henry was the man most closely associated with the struggle 
to preserve the liberties of Virginians from the threat of outside 
authority; if Marshall possessed Henry's confidence, the Repub-
licans' accusations as to his pro-British sympathies must assuredly 
be false. 
On election day the two candidates were seated alongside 
the judges at a table on the courthouse green to listen to the 
progress of the voting. This election was considered so impor-
tant that, reportedly, not a single eligible voter was allowed to 
be absent. "Sick men were taken in their beds to the polls; 
the halt, the lame, and the blind were hunted up and every 
mode of conveyance was mustered into service." All the while 
the assembled voters were imbibing the hospitality of the two 
candidates, and "the majority took it straight." As each free-
holder cast his vote, viva voce, the favored candidate would 
rise from his seat, bow, and publicly thank him for his suffrage. 
The sheriff would ask, "Mr. Blair, who do you vote for?" 
When he said, "John Marshall," the Federalist candidate re-
plied, "Your vote is appreciated Mr. Blair." When the next 
voter voiced his preference for John Clopton, the Republican 
candidate avowed: "Mr. Buchanan, I shall treasure that vote in 
my memory. It will be regarded as a feather in my cap forever." 
As the afternoon wore on and the contest remained close, the 
partisans of each candidate became more vocal and more violent. 
\\Then one citizen, Thomas Rutherford, cast his vote for Mar-
shall, an enraged Republican snarled: "You sir, ought to have 
your mouth smashed." When the tumult and shouting had 
ended, Marshall emerged victorious by I 08 votes. 68 
The conduct of Marshall and Clopton during the campaign 
and on election day was a curious mixture of the traditional, 
aristocratic style of politics and the new, highly partisan brand. 
The two candidates based their appeal squarely on the impor-
68 Beveridge, Marshall, 2: 413-16; Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders, pp. 21-22. 
Both Beveridge and Sydnor take their description from George W. Munford, 
The Two Parsons; Cupid's Sports; the Dream; and the jewels of Virginia (Rich-
mond, 1884), pp. 208-10. 
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tant issues of the time. To a significant degree, the freeholders 
were made to feel that they had a part in shaping public policy; 
no longer were they simply voting for the most prestigious 
candidate. But certain elements of the old style remained. The 
treating, the personal attention, and often subtle coercion given 
to each voter were practices of an earlier era.69 Virginia, in the 
Marshall-Clopton election, found itself at a crossroads. In one 
direction lay a political process where elections were decided 
by the people after a full and free discussion of the issues. 
Although there were many obstacles in this path, it was the 
road to democracy. In the other direction lay a method of 
campaigning which relied on wealth, influence, and personal 
prestige. Although this road had considerable appeal for tra-
ditionalists, it was a road leading back to the past, toward 
aristocracy. If the Federalists could continue to offer the voters 
popular alternatives to Republican policies and personnel, the 
election campaigns that followed would constitute a meaningful 
step toward the democratization of the political process in 
Virginia. 
The Federalists' success was not confined to Richmond. They 
captured eight of Virginia's nineteen seats in Congress-a gain 
of four seats over the previous session. The Federalists retained 
strength in the Eastern Shore, in the Norfolk area, and in the 
northwestern district encompassing Frederick and Berkeley 
counties; they increased their strength in the Southern Pied-
mont, in the Southern Tidewater, in the two congressional 
districts in the Northern Neck, as well as in the city of Rich-
mond. The shift in the Northern Neck was the most significant; 
there the Federalists would succeed in consolidating their gains 
beyond the election of 1800. The Federalist victory in the 
Southern Tidewater is perhaps best explained by the intensity 
of anti-French, and therefore by implication, anti-Republican 
sentiment in those areas served by the port of Norfolk. And 
Federalist fortunes in Richmond were enhanced both by the 
69 The new standards of campaigning were even beginning to become institu-
tionalized. In 1798 the General Assembly prohibited the practice of treating at 
elections. Shepherd, Statutes at Large, 2: 150. 
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increasing disenchantment with France and by Marshall's 
extraordinary popularity. 70 
The Federalist gain in Virginia was but one element in a 
general upsurge of Federalist fortunes throughout the nation. 
The opposition party, now a minority in both houses of Con-
gress, realized that it was essential to maintain control of the 
state government. There was little chance that they would 
ever lose their numerical majority in the Virginia legislature, 
but the Republican leaders in the Assembly needed to use 
that majority more effectively than they had in the past. The 
Republicans spared no effort to persuade their most influential 
spokesmen to run for the legislature. After considerable plead-
ing by party stalwarts, both Madison and William Branch Giles 
agreed to serve in the legislature.71 The triumvirate of Madison, 
Giles, and John Taylor promised to lend the Republican cause 
a wealth of prestige and organizational ability. 
The Federalists had similar plans. They urged Patrick Henry 
to run for the legislature on the grounds that he was the only 
man who could halt the movement towards disunion. Henry 
agreed in hopes that he could "arrest the progress of the State 
legislature in opposition to the General Government" and like 
Madison and Giles was elected with no difficulty.72 Jefferson 
was furious when he heard the news: "Mr. Henry will have the 
mortification of encountering such a mass of talents as he has 
never met before; for from everything I can learn, we never 
had an abler nor a sounder legislature. His apostacy must be 
unaccountable to those who do not know all the recesses of his 
heart." 73 Jefferson's pique overruled his judgment. Although 
70 Dauer, The Adams Federalists, pp. 316-21. The election of a Federalist con-
gressman in the Southern Piedmont is more difficult to explain. The over-
whelming proportion of representatives from that area to Congress and to the 
legislature had been, and would remain, vigorously opposed to the policies of 
the Federalists. 
71 Republican Members of Congress to James Madison, 7 Feb. 1799, in Hunt, 
ed., Madison's Writings, 6: 341; John Taylor to Creed Taylor, 10 April 1799, 
Creed Taylor Papers, University of Virginia. 
72 George Washington to Patrick Henry, Mt. Vernon, 15 Jan. 1799, in Fitz-
patrick, ed., Washington's Writings, 37: 87-90; Spencer Roane to James Monroe, 
24 March 1799, Monroe Papers, LC, quoted in Cunningham, Jeffersonian Repub-
licans, 1789-1801, p. 156. 
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it was undeniable that the strength and quality of the Repub-
lican delegation to the legislature was superior to any other 
during the past decade, Henry's presence would have been an 
enormous aid to the Federalists. 
Unfortunately for the supporters of the administration, 
Henry died in June 1799, before the General Assembly met. 
The Federalists were faced with the unpleasant fact that they 
would be without the services of the one man who might have 
been able to dampen some of the partisan spirit in the legisla-
ture. With Marshall in Congress and Henry gone from the 
scene, the Federalists were ill equipped to combat the combined 
talents of Madison, Giles, and Taylor. 
The Republicans expected to accomplish three general tasks 
during the legislative session of 1799. First, they were intent 
on purging the state government of all its Federalist officials. 
They had failed to do so in 1798 when the Federalist Speaker 
of the House John Wise was reelected to his post, but they had 
no intention of allowing a repetition. Nor did they mean to 
confine themselves to the legislative branch. Governor James 
Wood had tried to remain neutral in the contest between the 
two parties, but at this crucial time the Republicans considered 
neutrality a danger to their cause. 
Second, the Republicans wanted to pass additional resolutions 
clarifying the meaning of the Virginia Resolves. Jefferson, 
perhaps realizing that his suggestions had been too extreme the 
year before, mapped a more moderate course for the Republi-
cans in the 1799 session. He believed that the Republicans in 
the House of Delegates should first answer the objections of 
those states that had condemned the Virginia legislature for 
passing the Resolves. He wanted the legislature to make clear, 
"in affectionate and conciliatory language, our warm attach-
ment to the union with our sister states, and to the instrument 
by which we are united." 74 Some Republicans protested that 
73 Jefferson to Archibald Stuart, Monticello, l4 May 1799, in Ford, ed., ]effer· 
son's Writings, 7: 378. 
74 Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, Monticello, 5 Sept. 1799, in Ford, ed., 
jefferson's Writings, 7: 390. 
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this strategy was too mild and that it would not effect the desired 
changes in federal policy. John Taylor considered "the Repub-
lican cause as daily declining on account of its fashionable 
maxim of moderation in its efforts, and waiting, as it is called, 
for the public mind .... Bold truth and steady detection ought 
to have been all along resorted to, as the only means of counter-
acting their acts." He predicted that Americans would find 
themselves ruled by an "anglo-monarchic-aristocratic-military 
government" unless they immediately combined to stop Feder-
alist policy.75 Fortunately, moderate voices prevailed. 
Third, the Republicans were determined to change Virginia's 
presidential electoral law. The present law permitted the res-
idents of each of Virginia's twenty-one electoral districts to 
vote for only one presidential elector, thus giving the Federalist 
presidential candidate a chance of picking up at least a few 
electoral votes in those districts where the Federalist party 
had concentrations of strength. The Republicans, in order to 
assure their candidate's receiving all Virginia's electoral votes, 
wanted to change from a system of individual districts to the 
method of a single, statewide ticket. If that could be accom-
plished, the task of party organization for the election of 1800 
would be considerably simplified. 
When the Assembly convened on December 2, 1799, the 
Republicans systematically began to remove Federalists from 
every state office. The first to go was John Stuart, Federalist 
Clerk of the House. His association with the Virginia Federalist 
made him anathema to the Republicans, and accordingly, he 
was replaced by William Wirt.76 The Republicans next nomi-
nated Larkin Smith to oppose John Wise for the speakership. 
The Federalists pleaded with the Republican members to 
consider Wise's long and distinguished service before they cast 
their votes. The Republicans, on the other hand, argued that 
75 John Taylor to Creed Taylor, Caroline, 10 April 1799, Creed Taylor Papers. 
The whole tone of Taylor's letter suggests that he was prepared for more violent 
means of opposing the general government should the more moderate methods 
of Madison fail to exert any influence in government policy. 
76 House journal, 2 Dec. 1799; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 6 Dec. 
1799. 
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the Federalist administration in Philadelphia had consistently 
excluded Republicans from office. It was therefore imperative 
that they attempt to combat the effects of Federalist patronage. 
This time their arguments were effective; Larkin Smith defeated 
Wise, 83-55.77 
The Republicans next elected Wilson Cary Nicholas to fill 
the United States Senate seat formerly occupied by the recently 
deceased Henry Tazewell. This was hardly unusual, as in the ten 
years that Virginia had been a member of the union, it had 
never had a Federalist senator. Immediately thereafter, the 
Republicans nominated James Monroe for governor. This 
move occasioned more opposition from the Federalists than 
any of the others. They demanded that the election be post-
poned until they could more fully investigate Monroe's conduct 
while ambassador to France. They suspected Monroe, more 
than any other Virginian, of being under French influence. 
The Federalists, however, simply did not have the votes to 
block Monroe's election. Monroe received Ill votes; the 
Federalist, James Breckinridge, 44.78 The next day, the 
strongly pro-administration newspaper, the Virginia Federalist) 
mourned: "Virginia's misfortunes may be comprised in one 
short sentence-Monroe is elected."79 The Republicans had 
succeeded in occupying every important office over which the 
legislature exercised control. They were not prepared to con-
centrate on vindicating the conduct of the last Assembly. 
The Virginia Report) written and guided through the leg-
islature by Madison, was the most careful and knowledge-
able analysis of federal-state relations to appear up to that 
time.so Perhaps its most important feature was its exposition 
on the nature of the compact between the state and national 
77 House journal, 2 Dec. 1799. 
78 Ibid., 5 Dec. 1799; Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, 10 Dec. 1799. 
79 Virginia Federalist, 6 Dec. 1799. 
so Historians have of course discussed the Report, but they have spent much 
more time analyzing the more brief and dramatic Resolutions of Virginia and 
Kentucky. Most Federalists and Republicans at the time viewed the Report as 
little more than a reiteration of the Virginia Resolutions. F. M. Anderson, 
"Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions," American 
Historical Review 5 (1900): 243. 
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governments. While the Virginia Resolutions had used the 
word compact rather loosely and indeed had implied that it 
could be broken by the action of a single state legislature, the 
Report treated it as a solemn agreement which could be 
challenged only under the most serious circumstances. Although 
Madison maintained that the states possessed ultimate sov-
ereignty, and therefore were vested with the power to maintain 
or dissolve the compact, he was careful to add: "It does not 
follow however, that because the states, as sovereign parties 
to their constitutional compact, must ultimately decide whether 
it has been violated, that such a decision ought to be interposed 
either in a hasty manner or on doubtful and inferior cases .... 
[I]n the case of an intimate and constitutional union, like that 
of the United States, it is evident that the interposition of the 
parties, in their sovereign capacity, can be called for by measures 
only deeply and essentially affecting the vital principles of 
their political system."81 Madison stressed this again and again. 
Any violation of the Constitution, to warrant the interposition 
of the states, must be "of a nature dangerous to the great 
purposes for which the Constitution was established" and must 
be clearly seen as such by a majority of the people.82 
Despite the facts that union among the states was a novelty, 
that precedents for judging the constitutionality of federal laws 
were ill defined, and that Madison used extreme caution in 
defining the circumstances under which a state could rule a 
law unconstitutional, the doctrine of nullification was never-
theless pernicious. And Madison realized this. When the 
General Assembly declared the Alien and Sedition Acts uncon-
stitutional in 1798, many Republicans believed that it was 
81 J. W. Randolph, Virginia Report (Richmond, 1850), p. 192. The Virginia 
Resolutions had also used the term "states" carelessly; no one knew whether 
the authors of the resolutions intended the word to mean state legislatures 
or the people of the state as a whole. In the Report, Madison was careful 
to define the state as "the people comprising those political societies in their 
highest sovereign capacity." This definition was consistent with Madison's own 
belief that sovereignty rested with the people, not with the states. It also 
reflected his misgivings over the fact that the Virginia Resolutions had been 
passed by the state legislature, rather than a constituent assembly. Madison to 
Jefferson, 29 Dec. 1798, in Hunt, ed., Madison's Writings, 6: 328-29n. 
82 Randolph, The Virginia Report, pp. 192-95. 
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a statement of fact, not opinion, and that the practical effect 
of the declaration was to render the laws null and void. In 
the second half of the Report, when he was specifically discussing 
the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison 
clearly stated: "The declarations ... are expressions of opinion, 
unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may pro-
duce on opinion, by exciting reflection. The expositions of 
the judiciary, on the other hand, are carried into immediate 
effect by force. The former may lead to a change of the general 
will; possibly to a change in the opinion of the judiciary; the 
latter enforces the general will, whilst that will and that opinion 
continue unchanged."83 
This statement presents a striking contradiction with the 
first half of the Report. Madison had carefully laid down the 
conditions under which a state could resort to interposition 
and had stated that the circumstances surrounding the Alien 
and Sedition Acts had met those conditions, but in the second 
half of the Report, he was unwilling to admit that Virginia had 
taken the steps that would lead to interposition. Although he 
probably met disagreement from some of his Republican 
colleagues on this matter, Madison maintained that the Virginia 
legislature had not passed a judgment on the constitutionality 
of the Alien and Sedition Laws but, rather, had merely stated 
its opinion on the subject. This distinction, while it probably 
lessened the political effectiveness of the Report, was testimony 
to Madison's longstanding commitment to the union. 
The Federalists were not impressed by Madison's moderation. 
For all its subtleties and equivocations, the Report still con-
stituted a defense of the Virginia Resolutions. Accordingly, 
on January 7, 1800, when the Report came to a vote, the 
Federalists proposed a resolution stating "the present General 
Assembly, convinced of the impropriety of the Resolutions of 
the last assembly, deem it inexpedient to act upon the said 
resolutions." Their efforts failed, 57-98, and Madison's Report 
was approved, 100-60.84 
Ten days later the Assembly acted on the Republican pro-
83 Ibid., pp. 230-31. 84 House journal, 7 Jan. 1800. 
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posal to change the method of choosing presidential electors. 
The Republicans made no secret of the purpose of the general 
ticket law: it was intended solely to assure Jefferson all of 
Virginia's twenty-one electoral votes in the next election. This 
reform, which the Federalists claimed would "exclude one-third 
at least of the citizens of Virginia from a vote for the President 
of the United States," represented a betrayal of the political 
principles which Virginia's Republican leaders had espoused 
over the past decade and offered a striking contrast with the 
high-toned phrases of the Virginia Report.85 For ten years, 
the Antifederalists had been complaining of the dangers of 
consolidation and domination by the Northern majority in 
Congress; they now sought to stamp out any influence which the 
minority party in their own state might possess. Indeed, the 
radical and unsavory Republican journalist, James Thomson 
Callender, in his The Prospect before Us) had only recently 
condemned the general ticket laws of the New England states 
as a device to facilitate consolidation.86 The Republicans' only 
justification for the general ticket law was thoroughly pragmatic: 
the Eastern states had such laws, and "it is necessary to fight 
an adversary at his own weapons."87 Many Republicans were 
disturbed by such an obvious departure from their own political 
principles, and the measure only narrowly passed, 78-73.88 
The Federalists had lost every major battle in the legislative 
session of 1799. They were unable even to win approval for a 
resolution honoring Patrick Henry, in which it was stated, his 
"unrivalled eloquence and superior talents, were in times of 
peculiar peril and distress, so uniformly devoted to the cause of 
freedom and of his country." The Republicans evidently 
thought Henry's most recent efforts had not been devoted to 
the cause of freedom and defeated the resolution, 58-88. Henry 
could not escape the "baneful effects of faction," even in his 
grave.89 
85 Ibid., 17 Jan. 1800, Virginia Federalist, 19 March 1800. 
86 House journal, 17 Jan. 1800. 
87 Virginia Argus, 21 Jan. 1800, quoted in Cunningham, jeffersonian Republi-
cans, 1789-1801, p. 175. 
BBHouse .Journal, 17 Jan. 1800. 
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The tightening of party lines in Virginia can best be seen 
in an analysis of the election and voting behavior of the mem-
bers of the House of Delegates. The assembly elections of 
1798 and 1799 are notable in one important respect: for the 
first time in the decade, the citizens of Virginia seemed to be 
interested enough in the campaigns for the Assembly to vote. 
Although there are only a few counties where election records 
are sufficiently complete to allow a comparison of the rate of 
voter participation throughout the decade, the evidence that 
exists suggests that the citizens of Virginia were experiencing 
a change of attitude toward the electoral process. In Essex 
County it was customary for 250 voters, or 25 percent of the 
free adult white male population, to cast ballots for members 
of the General Assembly; in both 1798 and 1799 nearly 350 
citizens, or 35 percent voted in the Assembly election. In Bruns-
wick County the increase was even more striking. In 1798 and 
1799 nearly 800 citizens, or 45 percent of those eligible voted 
in the Assembly election. The usual turnout had been about 
half that figure. Thus, the voters of these two Virginia counties, 
long apathetic, were finally beginning to respond to the in-
creased competition between Republicans and Federalists for 
public support.9o 
As could be expected, partisan divisions were even more 
pronounced among the politically conscious gentry who served 
in the General Assembly than among the electorate as a whole. 
An analysis of the voting behavior of the fifty-four delegates 
serving all three terms in the legislature during the years 
1797-1800 indicates that each of the delegates, without excep-
89 Ibid., 13 Dec. 1799. George Washington, who died on December 14, escaped 
this display of partisanship. The Virginia General Assembly unanimously agreed 
to wear black armbands throughout the session in honor of Washington. The 
only hint of ill feeling in the Republican ranks was the rumor that James Monroe 
had initially refused to attend the funeral of the former chief executive. 
Columbian Mirror, 11 March 1800. 
90 Essex County, House of Delegates' Election Poll Lists, 21 April 1788, 14 April 
1790, 18 Aprill791, 16 Aprill792, 15 Aprill793, 18 Aprill796, Aprill797, April 
1798, 24 April 1799, Essex County Deed Books, nos. 33 and 34, VSL; Brunswick 
County, House of Delegates' Election Poll Lists, April 1789, April 1790, 25 April 
1791, 27 April 1795, 24 April 1797, 23 April 1798, 24 April 1799, Election Returns, 
Brunswick County Records, VSL. 
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tion, was aligned with one of the two parties. Despite the 
Federalists' increased efforts to win popular support, they con-
tinued to be hopelessly outnumbered in the lower house. Forty 
of the fifty-four delegates were Republicans, fourteen were 
Federalists.91 As in previous years, there were no marked 
differences in the occupational or economic interests of the 
members of the two voting blocs.92 
It is possible, however, to detect some patterns of regional 
voting within the state. Using the 1788 vote on ratification 
of the federal Constitution, the December 21, 1790, vote con-
demning assumption as unconstitutional, the November 20, 
1795, vote on the Jay Treaty and the December 21, 1798, roll 
call on the Virginia Resolutions as guides to party voting over 
time, at least one area of strong and consistent Federalist 
support in the extreme west becomes apparent.93 The Federalist 
success there probably resulted from a number of factors. First, 
the promise of federal protection against hostile Indians had 
always proved particularly attractive to the citizens of the west. 
It was generally conceded that the western delegates to the 
ratifying Convention were ultimately persuaded to support the 
Constitution because of the inability of the Confederation 
government to provide defense for them. And federal Indian 
policy, after a shaky beginning, actually began to yield tangible 
benefits to the western residents by the mid 1790s. Second, 
the Jay Treaty had proved advantageous to the citizens of the 
extreme west. The British, to the surprise of nearly everyone, 
had lived up to their promise in the Jay Treaty and had 
promptly relinquished their posts on the western frontier. 
91 The Federalist-Republican ratio among the sample group is probably more 
lopsided than it was in the Assembly as a whole. If the votes on the Virginia 
Resolutions and the Virginia Report are any indication, the Republicans out-
numbered their opponents by slightly less than two to one. 
92 The divisions listed in the third part of Appendix 2 are based on a computer 
analysis of the voting behavior, on national issues, of the fifty-four men who 
served in the House of Delegates every year between 1797 and 1800. A rate of 
75 percent agreement was set as the minimum requirement for inclusion within 
either voting bloc. 
93 Accomac and Northampton counties on Virginia's Eastern Shore also tended 
to be solidly Federalist during the I 790s, but they were not numerically strong 
enough in the legislature to constitute a meaningful voting bloc. 
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Finally, the western counties had a number of compelling 
reasons for disliking the Republican-dominated state govern-
ment in Richmond. They were particularly dissatisfied with the 
state constitution, believing that its provisions concerning 
apportionment of the legislature had consistently denied them 
adequate representation. Moreover, the national government 
in Philadelphia, no matter how distant it was in actual fact, 
seemed no more inaccessible than the capital in Richmond. 
In the absence of strong ties with either government, the 
western residents probably felt that the federal government 
could help them more than the state. The one rationale for 
their support of the Federalists that was conspicuously lacking 
was a belief in the nationalist precepts of Hamiltonian ideology. 
As was so often the case in Virginia, their allegiance to Fed-
eralism was based on particular, local interests and not on 
broad principles of public policy. 
Federalist strength was less impressive elsewhere. Although 
the Federalists had picked up two congressional seats in the 
Northern Neck in the election of 1798, they actually lost 
ground in that area in the state legislature at the same time. 
In fact, Federalist strength in the Northern Neck throughout 
the entire decade seemed to fluctuate markedly; the Northern 
Neck representatives strongly supported ratification, mildly op-
posed assumption, narrowly favored the Jay Treaty, and disap-
proved of the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
Republican domination in all other areas of the state by 
1798 was even more pronounced than it was in the Northern 
Neck. In the Piedmont, which had been a strong source of 
Antifederalist support in 1788 and a nearly united source of 
opposition to both assumption and the Jay Treaty, the delegates 
overwhelmingly supported the Virginia Resolutions. And in 
the Tidewater, which provided the key to Republican fortunes, 
Republican-dominated counties outnumbered Federalist coun-
ties by more than four to one by 1798. This was an important 
development, since the Tidewater had been moderately Fed-
eralist in 1788 and rather evenly divided in 1790 and 1795 
(see maps on pages 244, 245, 247, and 248). 
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Thus the Republicans, looking forward to the presidential 
election of 1800, had considerable cause for optimism in most 
parts of the state. And the small pockets of Federalist strength 
that did exist would be of no consequence in the election unless 
the supporters of the Federalist administration could somehow 
work a miracle throughout the rest of the state. With the gen-
eral ticket law in effect, the party with a bare majority would 
gain all Virginia's twenty-one electoral votes. After the Assembly 
adjourned in January 1800, both Republicans and Federalists 
immediately began preparations for the campaign. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
Triumph of Agrarian 
Republicanism 
THE REPUBLICANS were the first to take advantage of the new 
presidential elector law. On January 21, 1800, the very day 
after the general ticket proposal had become law, ninety-three 
members of the legislature and a number of other persons met 
to lay plans for an efficient party organization for the election. 
It had long since been decided that Jefferson and Aaron Burr 
would be Republican candidates for president and vice pres-
ident, so the first task was to nominate a slate of electors pledged 
to these two candidates. They succeeded in enlisting the aid 
of nearly every prominent Republican in the state. Among 
those chosen to run on the Republican ticket were George 
Wythe, Edmund Pendleton, James Madison, William Branch 
Giles, Archibald Stuart, and William CabelJ.l With the general 
ticket law in operation, the prestige of these men would 
undoubtedly enhance Republican prospects in those districts 
where the party's strength might otherwise not have been so 
great. 
On January 23, after the General Assembly had adjourned, 
the Republicans met a second time. They first appointed a 
General Standing Committee, headed by Philip Norborne 
Nicholas, which constituted the central body of the Republican 
organization and which was to oversee the campaign throughout 
the state. All the members of the committee lived in or near 
Richmond and could easily communicate with each other. 
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Moreover, Richmond, as the hub of political act1v1ty in the 
state, was the distribution point for most of the important news 
on the progress of the campaign throughout the nation and 
was thus the logical choice for the home base for Republican 
organization. The Republicans next appointed five-man com-
mittees in every county except three, Princess Anne in the 
east and Kanawha and Randolph in the west. In these counties, 
the Republicans were enough in doubt about the political 
loyalties of the leading residents that they did not appoint 
county committees. The task of the committees was to distribute 
any communications received from the General Committee 
throughout their respective counties and to send back to the 
central organization in Richmond any information that would 
promote the Republican ticket.2 Republican leaders, particu-
larly Jefferson, had been so plagued by the snooping of Fed-
eralist postal employees that the General Committee instructed 
the county committeemen to write Philip Norborne Nicholas, 
"without annexing the word chairman; this is enjoined to avoid 
interruption in their correspondence."3 
Before the Republican strategy meeting adjourned, each 
member agreed to contribute a dollar to defray the expense of 
printing and distributing the list of Republican electoral col-
lege candidates. This was particularly important, since the 
new electoral law had eliminated viva voce voting and it was 
now the responsibility of each voter to write the names of all 
twenty-one candidates for elector, together with his own name, 
on a piece of paper which was to be used in place of a printed 
ballot. Since it would be difficult for the voters to remember 
the names of all twenty-one candidates, the Republicans printed 
sample ballots, sent them to each county committee, and sug-
gested that the committeemen distribute them to the freeholders 
to be used as ballots on election day.4 
1 Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 9: 74-75. :! Ibid. 9: 75-87. 
3 Letter from Philip Norborne Nicholas, Chairman of the General Committee 
of Correspondence, Richmond, I Feb. 1800, in Virginia Argus, 25 March 1800, 
quoted in Cunningham, .Jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801, p. 153. 
4 Ibid., pp. 194, 196: Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 9: 76; Shepherd, Statutes 
at Large, 2: 197-200. 
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The Federalists met in February to plan their campaign.5 
In May they printed a list of their own candidates for pres-
idential elector along with an address to the voters. The Fed-
eralist ticket was woefully inferior to that of the Republicans. 
Not one of Virginia's revolutionary heroes was on the list; 
even John Marshall, who was in the nation's capital serving a 
brief term as secretary of state, was unavailable as a candidate. 
Only John Wise, James Breckinridge, and George K. Taylor 
had any kind of statewide reputation and even they possessed 
none of the prestige of Wythe, Pendleton, or Madison. The 
Virginia Federalists were aware of their disadvantage. To avoid 
the stigma of being associated with such Northern Federalists 
as Hamilton, Wolcott, and Pickering, they styled themselves 
"The American Republican Ticket." Nowhere in their address 
to the voters did they attempt to praise President Adams. In-
stead, they carped at the unfairness of the general ticket law 
and pleaded with the voters to uphold the honor of the late 
President Washington.6 
The embattled Federalists, because of the lackluster quality 
of their own ticket, were even driven to berating the Republi-
cans for the "imposing names" used in behalf of Jefferson. The 
Federalists claimed that their candidates, because they had not 
enjoyed positions with the state government, would not "regard 
the rival authorities of the union with a jealousy, too apt to 
degenerate into hatred."7 This last observation, although tinged 
with malice, contained some truth. So accustomed to directing 
the affairs of the largest and most populous state in the union, 
the Republicans had been unhappy about yielding any of their 
power to the new federal government; conversely, the Feder-
alists, shut out of important statewide offices by 1800, looked 
to the federal government for a source of patronage and political 
power. 
5 Broadside, from William Austin, Secretary of "The Committee Entrusted with 
the Ticket of the Minority," ll Feb. 1800, John Cropper Papers. 
6 William Austin, "An Address to the Voters for Electors of President and Vice 
President of the United States, in the State of Virginia," 26 May 1800, John 
Cropper Papers. 
7 Ibid. 
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After their long denunciation of Republican electioneering 
tactics, the Federalists gave a brief defense of the policies of 
the federal government, giving particular emphasis to the accom-
plishments of Washington.8 The Republicans, whose efforts 
had been hindered by the legend of Washington when he was 
still alive, were determined not to allow the Federalists to 
resurrect him for their own partisan gain. They asked the 
voters "to consummate your reverence for the memory of \Vash-
ington, not by employing it as an engine of election, but by 
declaring that even his name shall not prevent the free use of 
your own understandings." 9 
All this activity-the nomination of candidates for elector, 
the printing of sample ballots, and the publication of campaign 
platforms-had been completed by May, less than five months 
after the two parties had begun organizing in earnest. Although 
the party machinery of both the Republicans and Federalists 
was not complex, the changes that did occur represented a 
revolution in the political practices of Virginia. Prior to the 
changes, the candidates in most counties had relied solely on 
their own influence and prestige and that of close friends to be 
elected to office. After the change, the campaign was managed 
from headquarters in Richmond and the candidates and issues 
were selected by a small committee. For the first time, the 
politics of the Old Dominion were taken out of the hands of 
amateurs. 
It proved impossible for the two central committees to 
maintain a tight hold on the course of the campaign. The 
trial of James Thomson Callender for seditious libel, held in 
Richmond in May and June of 1800, injected new life and 
considerable confusion into the presidential race. The case 
was important both because it was the most celebrated test 
of the Sedition Act and because Callender had close association 
with many of the most prominent Virginia Republicans. The 
brief, and in the end unhappy, romance between Callender 
and the Republican party of Virginia had begun in the autumn 
of 1798, when Callender, fearing arrest under the Sedition Act, 
8 Ibid. 9 Virginia Argus, 11 July 1800. 
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fled from Philadelphia to Virginia. Senator Stevens Thomson 
Mason agreed to feed and lodge him at his home in Loudon 
County and Thomas Jefferson sent the pamphleteer and rumor-
monger fifty dollars to help him renew his journalistic efforts. 
It was at Mason's home that Callender began his The Prospect 
before Us) the work which was eventually to land him in jail. 
Callender asked Jefferson for more financial aid to carry the 
project forward, and Jefferson, believing that it "cannot fail to 
produce the best effect," sent Callender another fifty dollars.10 
Callender was hoping that his tracts would make enough money 
to allow him to "come up the James River ... and try to find 
50 acres of clear land, and a hearty Virginia female, that knows 
how to fatten pigs and boil hominy, and hold her tongue."11 
Although he did not know it at the time, Callender was headed 
not for the James River but for the Richmond jail. 
When the trial opened on May 23, the courtroom "was 
thronged with spectators from every quarter."12 The two prin-
cipal combatants, Federalist Judge Samuel Chase and Callender, 
personified the extreme wings of each party. Before he reached 
Richmond, Judge Chase had been given a copy of The Prospect 
before Us with the inflammatory passages underlined. He had 
determined to secure a conviction against Callender before the 
trial had even started. Chase's only fear was that "we shall 
not be able to get the damned rascal in this Court." He man-
aged to get an indictment against Callender, which described 
the Republican propagandist as "a person of wicked, depraved, 
evil disposed, disquiet and turbulent mind and disposition," 
10 All the relevant correspondence between Jefferson and Callender is printed 
in Thomas jefferson and james Thomson Callender, ed. Worthington C. Ford 
(Brooklyn, N.Y., 1897), pp. 10-20 (hereafter referred to as Ford, ed., jefferson 
and Callender). Actually, Jefferson's financial dealings with Callender began 
before the journalist fled Philadelphia for Virginia. In 1797 and 1798 Jefferson 
made several small contributions to Callender, totaling slightly more than fifty 
dollars. A sympathetic, but on the whole balanced account of Jefferson's relation-
ship with Callender is given by Malone, jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, pp. 
332·33, 466-72. 
11 Callender to Jefferson, Richmond, 26 Sept. 1799, in Ford, ed., .Jefferson and 
Callender, p. 17. 
12 Ford, ed., jefferson and Callender, p. 23. My account of Callender's trial is 
largely derived from the excellent description in James Morton Smith, Freedom's 
Fetters, pp. 334-58. 
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and then set the rules for the trial. The federal government 
would not have to prove Callender's allegations against the 
Adams administration as false; rather it was the defendant's 
task to prove that they were true.13 In short, Callender was 
presumed guilty until proved innocent. 
Virginia's state officials, because they had publicly opposed 
the Sedition Act as a violation of the Constitution, decided 
that they had a responsibility to defend Callender. Jefferson 
advised Governor Monroe that "Callender should be sub-
stantially defended, whether in the first stage by public inter-
ference, or private contributions."14 Callender's supporters used 
both methods. John Taylor raised a defense fund exceeding 
one hundred dollars and Monroe enlisted Attorney General 
Philip Norborne Nicholas and the clerk of the House of 
Delegates, William Wirt, to provide legal counsel for the pen-
niless defendant.15 The participation of Nicholas, who was also 
chairman of the Republican General Committee, was a clear 
indication that the Republicans had decided to make an issue 
of the trial. 
It is doubtful whether any defense attorney in the nation 
could have saved Callender. Chase had laid plans so well 
against the defendant that it was well-nigh impossible to prove 
Callender's innocence. The defense attorneys were barely 
allowed to rise from their seats without being overruled, the 
testimony of Callender's key witnesses was disallowed, and the 
jury was heavily packed with Federalists.l6 Perhaps even more 
unfavorable to Callender's case were his own writings. The 
Sedition Act was certainly unjust, and it may have been uncon-
stitutional, but it was nevertheless the law of the land and 
Callender's guilt or innocence was determined by the standards 
it laid down. The Prospect before Us was not a timid piece 
of prose. It charged: "The reign of Mr. Adams has been one 
continued tempest of malignant passions. As President, he has 
never opened his lips, or lifted his pen without threatening 
13 Smith, Freedom's Fetters, pp. 343-45, 348-54. 
14 Jefferson to Monroe, 26 May 1800, in Ford, ed., jefferson's Writings, 7: 448. 
15 Beveridge, Marshall, 3: 38-39: Smith, Freedom's Fetters, p. 346. 
16 Smith, Freedom's Fetters, pp. 346-56. 
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and scolding; The grand object of his administration has been 
to exasperate the rage of contending parties to calumniate and 
destroy every man who differs from his opinions .... The object 
of Mr. Adams was to recommend a French war, professedly 
for the sake of supporting American commerce, but in reality 
for the sake of yoking us into an alliance with the British 
monarch." Callender proceeded to call Adams a "hoary-headed 
incendiary" and a "professed aristocrat." He gave his readers 
a choice "between Adams, war and beggary, and Jefferson, peace 
and competency."17 
Judge Chase, in his instructions to the jury, gave an election 
speech of his own. He noted that Adams had been "one of 
the principal characters of the revolution" and praised him 
for his work during the peace negotiations that followed. Chase 
reviewed Adams's illustrious service during his two terms as 
vice president and his one term as president and asked the jury 
"if it was possible for any rational man to believe such a man 
guilty of the atrocious crimes laid to his charge by the tra-
verser?"18 The jury evidently thought not, for they rendered 
a verdict of guilty and sentenced Callender to nine months in 
prison and assessed him a two hundred dollar fine. 19 
The Federalists may have derived some initial propaganda 
benefits from the trial, but the Republicans got what they 
needed most-a martyr who would rally opposition against the 
Sedition Act and President Adams. Callender's imprisonment 
only made his writings more vituperative. He issued the second 
volume of The Prospect in installments, each bearing the post-
mark of "The Richmond Jail." He termed Adams a "repulsive 
pedant, a gross hypocrite, and an unprincipled oppressor" who 
was entitled "not only to the laughter, but likewise the curses 
of mankind."20 
While Callender was cranking out more abuse against the 
17 Francis Wharton, State Trials of the United States during the Adminis-
trations of Washington and Adams . ... (Philadelphia, 1849), pp. 688-90 (here-
after referred to as Wharton, State Trials). 
18 Judge Chase's charge to the jury is printed in Ford, ed., Jefferson and Cal-
lender, pp. 23-24. 
19 Wharton, State Trials, p. 718. 
20 Smith, Freedom's Fetters, p. 358. 
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president, another group of Richmond residents was organizing 
a protest of a more serious nature. On August 30, 1800, rumors 
of a massive slave insurrection panicked the city of Richmond. 
Gabriel's Rebellion-one of the largest slave conspiracies in 
American history-temporarily quieted the contest between the 
two political parties; Republicans and Federalists united in the 
face of a crisis that threatened to undermine one of the corner-
stones of their society.21 
Surprisingly, once the threat posed by the rebellion had 
ended, neither party attempted to make political capital of it. 
Although some of the testimony taken during the aftermath 
of the conspiracy suggested, wrongly, that two white Frenchmen 
were the first instigators of the insurrection, the Virginia 
Federalists were not inclined to resort to their usual tactic of 
linking the Republicans to French intrigue.22 That the Repub-
licans escaped such charges was no doubt due in part to Republi-
can Governor James Monroe's vigorous action in initiating an 
inquiry into the causes of the rebellion and his relentless 
prosecution of all the conspirators. Monroe was himself so 
horrified by the abortive rebellion that no one could properly 
accuse him of being soft on the question of maintaining the 
security of the slave system. Moreover, the Federalists feared 
the possible consequences of the rebellion too much even to 
consider making a partisan issue of it.23 They differed with the 
Republicans on many important questions, but the two parties 
were united on the necessity of preserving the social and eco-
nomic fabric of society. 
21 The first concrete proof that an insurrection was to take place was given by 
Mosby Shepherd in a communication to the Governor, Richmond, 30 Aug. 1800, 
in Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 9: 134. For a detailed discussion of the 
events and aftermath of the rebellion see Richard R. Beeman, "The Old 
Dominion and the New Nation, 1788-1801" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 
1968), pp. 369-77. 
22 The pro-Federalist Gazette of the United States of Philadelphia claimed that 
"the insurrection of the negroes in the Southern states, which appears to be 
organized on the true French plan, must be decisive with every reflecting man in 
those states of the election of Mr. Adams and Gen. Pinckney," quoted in Herbert 
Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (New York, 1943), p. 150. I have not 
found any similar statements in the newspapers of Virginia. 
23 Beeman, "The Old Dominion and the New Nation, 1788-1801," pp. 369-77. 
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The only way in which Gabriel's Rebellion affected the 
campaign was through the residue of bitterness left against the 
black man. Recognizing that the white citizens of Virginia 
were determined to adopt a much more harsh policy toward 
the slave population, the Federalists dragged out evidence 
from Jefferson's Notes on Virginia to prove that the Republican 
presidential candidate desired a program of general emanci-
pation. This was a plan that was, needless to say, particularly 
unpopular at the present, unsettled time.24 
For the most part, however, the Federalists concentrated on 
the same themes used during the election of 1796. Jefferson's 
religious beliefs were again an easy target. Blurring the dis-
tinction between deism and atheism, the Federalists asked the 
voters: "Is that man fit to preside over a Christian nation who 
does not believe in the Christian Religion? Can that man be 
a believer in Christianity who thinks it does him no injury 
whether his neighbor believes in twenty Gods or in no God, 
and who attempts to prove from the principles of natural 
philosophy that the Mosaic account of the deluge cannot be 
true?"25 The Federalists thought not. They predicted that if 
Jefferson were elected, "religion itself & a belief in the immor-
tality of the soul ... may possibly be discarded as anile fictions. 
Churches are little more than heaps of bricks & stones, but 
sufficient for him who was born in a manger, & virtue itself 
may soon perhaps be declared to be nothing more than a 
name."26 
Nor could Jefferson escape the charges of cowardice. The 
Federalists no longer directly accused him of cowardice during 
the Revolution, but made oblique references to "want of firm-
ness" and the necessity of electing a president who was "not 
24 Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, p. 480. 
25 Columbian Mirror, 21 Oct. 1800. 
26 Thomas Evans to Levin Powell, Accomack, 30 Oct. 1800, in .John P. Branch 
Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College, I (1901): 54-56. One of the stories 
circulating about Jefferson's religious beliefs was that, on seeing a church in a 
state of disrepair, Jefferson had remarked to his friend Philip Mazzei: "It is 
good enough for him who was born in a manger." Serious Considerations on 
the Election of a President; Addressed to the Citizens of the United States (New 
York, 1800), pp. 16-17. 
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one who shrinks from danger." This time the Republicans 
were armed with answers. Philip Norborne Nicholas, acting 
for the Republican General Committee, issued a seven-page 
circular letter defending Jefferson's wartime conduct. The cir-
cular reprinted all the correspondence relevant to the British 
invasion of the capital in 1781, including a copy of the resolu-
tion passed by the General Assembly in 1782 absolving Jefferson 
of cowardice. 27 
Finally, the Federalists sounded the alarm over the disastrous 
results of such a radical change in administration. They 
warned the voters: "The political sentiments of him and his 
party are diametrically opposed to those of the present officers 
of our government. ... and remember that ... to make the 
desperate change, that you will do it at the risk of everything 
dear to mankind; that you may find war, poverty and misery 
substituted for the peace, plenty and happiness which we at 
present enjoy; and that the ploughshare may be again wrested 
from the rustic swain and reconverted into the exterminating 
sword! I " 28 
The Federalists, genuinely fearful of the results of a Republi-
can victory, would have accused any Republican opponent of 
attempting to sow the seeds of anarchy and disunion, but Jeffer-
son was particularly vulnerable to charges of political radicalism. 
In a letter to his Italian friend, Philip Mazzei, written in 1796 
and published without permission in 1797, Jefferson made 
some highly intemperate remarks. Referring to the Washington 
administration, he had complained of those "who were Samsons 
in the field, Solomons in the Council, but who have had their 
heads shorn by the harlot of England." He described the sup-
porters of the administration as "timid men who prefer the calm 
of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty, British merchants 
& Americans trading on British capitals, speculators & holders 
in banks & public funds, a contrivance invented for the purposes 
of corruption & for assimilating us in to the rotten as well as 
the sound parts of the British model."29 Jefferson's nearly 
27 Cunningham, The jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801, p. 154. 
28 Columbian Mirror, 21 Oct. 1800. 
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direct censure of Washington gave the Federalists another 
opportunity to invoke the memory of the former chief executive. 
To the Federalists, the Mazzei letter was concrete proof of the 
radical and irresponsible nature of Jefferson's political prin-
ciples. 
The themes of anarchy and disunion raised by the Federalists 
were expressions of some deep concerns. Political styles, at 
least on the level of national politics, were in a state of flux 
and the members of the Federalist administration were having 
great difficulty adjusting to the new mode of political discourse. 
Jefferson, as the head of the Republican ticket, symbolized 
the evils the Federalists so feared. 
If the Federalists appeared eager to defame .Jefferson, the 
Republicans were hardly models of objectivity when discussing 
the merits of Adams.30 They accused the members of his 
administration of every crime from financial corruption to 
adultery.31 Adams bore the brunt of the abuse. He was never 
able to escape the charge that he was a partisan of monarchy. 
As was the case in the election of 1796, Republican publicists 
combed his writings, extracting passages, many out of context, 
to prove Adams was sympathetic to the "monocratic" govern-
ment of Great Britain.32 
29 Jefferson to Philip Mazzei, Monticello, 24 April 1796, in Ford, ed., jefferson's 
Writings, 7: 72-78. 
30 Charles 0. Lerche, "Jefferson and the Election of 1800: A Case Study in the 
Political Smear," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 5 (1948): 471, has con-
cluded that the Federalist attacks on Jefferson were so malicious that they "were 
executed with something of the same imagination and finesse as were those of 
the late Herr Goebbels." This judgment appears to be a bit harsh on the 
Federalists. Although the attacks on Jefferson in New England exceeded those of 
Virginia in their intensity, they did not differ significantly from the mud-
slinging that has taken place in many hotly contested elections in America. 
31 These charges were directed in particular at Alexander Hamilton, and 
dated back to 1793, when William Branch Giles introduced a resolution in the 
House of Representatives claiming that the secretary of the treasury was "guilty 
of maladministration in the duties of his office." After a thorough investigation, 
Hamilton was completely exonerated. He was, however, caught in his indiscre-
tions with Mrs. James Reynolds, and James Thomson Callender, in his History 
of the United States for 1796 (Philadelphia, 1797), exploited fully Hamilton's 
amorous adventures. The blame for Hamilton's indiscretions should not have 
been laid at the door of the Adams administration, however, for Hamilton was 
never an official member of that administration. 
32 The Examiner, 14, 17, 21, 24, 28, 31 Oct. 1800. 
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On at least one occasion the Virginia Federalists tried to 
turn the popular aversion to "monocratic" rule to their own 
advantage. "An American Republican," writing in Alexandria's 
Columbian Mirror, included a letter from the Republican 
candidate for elector, Edmund Pendleton, to Carter Braxton 
written in 1776. Pendleton, hazarding some observations on 
the nature of government, had ventured: "Of all the others, I 
own I prefer the true English constitution, which consists of a 
proper combination of the principles of honor, virtue and fear." 
It followed, the Federalist writer claimed, that Pendleton 
favored "an hereditary king, and a hereditary House of Lords." 
If this was the type of man who supported Jefferson, the citizens 
of Virginia would do well to think twice before casting their 
votes for such a partisan of monarchy.33 
This was precisely the tactic which the Republicans had 
been using against Adams. By borrowing from Pendleton's 
speculative writings on the nature of the English constitution, 
a form of government which was revered by most American 
Whigs in 1776, the Federalists were able to make it seem as if 
Pendleton, twenty-five years later, preferred the present English 
system of government to that of the United States. Unfortu-
nately for the Federalists, the writings of Adams contained 
more passages praising the British system of government than 
the writings of all the nation's Republicans combined. As a 
consequence, this device was never fully exploited. 
It is unlikely that any tactic the Federalists could have devised 
would have saved them from defeat in Virginia. The election, 
held on November 3, 1800, was a triumph for the Republican 
ticket. The final tally in the state stood: Jefferson-Burr, 21,002; 
Adams-Pinckney, 6,175.34 The Federalist ticket received a ma-
jority in only seven of Virginia's ninety-four counties and 
townships. In only four of these areas-Accomac, Northampton, 
Bath, and Greenbrier-did it gain substantial majorities.35 Fur-
thermore, Adams and Pinckney owed their success in those 
33 Columbian Mirror, 23 Oct. 1800. 
34 Election Records, no. 259, "Presidential Election of 1800," VSL. 
35 Ibid. 
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counties not to their own popularity but to the personal 
prestige of the electors campaigning for them in the particular 
districts. In Accomac and Northampton, the Federalist candi-
date for elector was John Wise, the former Speaker of the House 
of Delegates; the Republican candidate was William Nevison, 
a man of no fame in the district. In spite of the combined 
prestige of the candidates for elector on the Republican ticket, 
the individual influence of John Wise was enough to carry the 
lackluster Federalist ticket to victory. Similarly, Greenbrier 
and Bath counties probably supported Adams and Pinckney 
because of the popularity of James Breckinridge, the Federalist 
candidate for elector in that district. 
In most of the state, Adams's unpopularity, in combination 
with more traditional patterns of deferential voting, worked 
directly to the advantage of the Republicans. In Amelia 
County, where William Branch Giles was the Republican 
candidate, the Jeffersonian ticket won, 243-0. In Buckingham. 
Archibald Stuart carried the Republicans to a 501-0 victory. 
Madison's presence on the Republican ticket was undoubtedly 
the main reason for Jefferson's and Burr's 337-7 victory over 
the Federalists in Orange County. In Caroline County, Edmund 
Pendleton was largely responsible for the Republicans' 369-6 
victory.36 
Although the margin of the Republican victory was not 
everywhere so dramatic, this pattern of deferential voting held 
generally true throughout the state. The citizens of Virginia, 
despite attempts by the organizations of the respective parties 
to gear their campaigns toward questions of national policy 
and despite some recent indications that party affiliation was 
becoming as important as personality in local elections, persisted 
in following the recommendations of the well-born and socially 
prominent when casting their ballots. Virginians, with their 
agrarian values and localist traditions, were not yet prepared 
to abandon their narrow view of the national interest. 
Only in towns such as Richmond, Norfolk, and Alexandria, 
where party machinery was well established and where the 
36 Ibid. 
234 The Old Dominion 
partisan newspapers gained wide circulation, did the voters 
show any inclination to act independently. The Jeffersonian 
ticket only narrowly triumphed in Richmond despite the fact 
that George Wythe was the Republican candidate for elector 
representing that district. The presence of two pro-Federalist 
newspapers, the Virginia Gazette and the Virginia Federalist, 
helped Adams. In Norfolk, although the Federalist candidate 
for elector, John Nevison, was nowhere near as popular as the 
Republican candidate, Mayor Thomas Newton, the Adams 
ticket nevertheless narrowly defeated the Jeffersonian organi-
zation. The continuing hostility of the Norfolk residents toward 
the French, together with Jefferson's well-publicized attachment 
to France, more than offset any advantage the Republicans 
gained by having Newton on the ticket.37 
The Federalists derived little solace from these isolated 
victories and near-victories in the politically sophisticated towns 
of Virginia, for the inescapable fact presented by the election 
returns was that the supporters of government had proved 
unable to gain a majority in any region in the state. The mag-
nitude of Jefferson's and Burr's success would virtually extin-
guish Federalism as a political force in the Old Dominion. 
The presidential electors were to meet in the state capitals 
on December 3, 1800, to cast their ballots; due to poor com-
munications, however, it was several weeks later when Virginia's 
residents heard the final results: Jefferson and Burr-seventy-
three electoral votes each; Adams-sixty-five; Pinckney-sixty-
four; and John Jay-one. With Jefferson and Burr tied, the 
election was thrown into the House of Representatives.3s Most 
Virginians had not expected party discipline to be so strict that 
Jefferson and Burr would get the same number of votes from 
37 Ibid. Historians have generally assumed that the more commercialized towns 
of Virginia were naturally more sympathetic to Federalism than was the country-
side. This does not seem to be the case, since the citizens of both Richmond and 
Norfolk had supported Republican candidates more often than Federalists during 
the 1790s. 
3S There are a number of sources that give a detailed treatment of the election 
throughout the nation: Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801, pp. 
175-248; Malone, jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, pp. 484-506; and John C. 
Miller, The Federalist Era, 1789-1801 (New York, 1960), pp. 251-77. 
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each state. They had expected that Jefferson, as the Republican 
presidential candidate, would get more votes than Burr, the 
candidate for vice president. The Republican General Com-
mittee had made certain that Burr, as well as Jefferson, received 
all Virginia's electoral votes, but they had done so only because 
they had been promised that the Republicans in either South 
Carolina or Georgia would withhold at least one vote from 
Burr.39 They never imagined that any Republican other than 
Jefferson would be considered for the presidency. Now that 
the election was to be determined by the House of Representa-
tives, Virginians realized for the first time the incompatibility 
between the present electoral laws and the new party system. 
The congressional delegation of each state had only one vote 
in balloting for president. Since the Republicans constituted 
a majority of Virginia's delegation, there was never any danger 
that the Federalists would wrest Virginia's vote from Jefferson. 
But no one knew what the Federalists from the Northern states 
might do to thwart the will of the people. 
The most important maneuverings in the nation's capital 
centered around attempts of the dissident elements in the 
Federalist party to throw their support to Burr. The citizens of 
Virginia, located far from the scene of action, heard many wild 
rumors, from one report that Adams would remain in office 
until another election could be held to the rumor that the 
Federalists in the House of Representatives were planning, by 
legislative fiat, to elevate John Marshall to the presidency.40 
39 Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 1789-1801, p. 240. Some Vir-
ginians had been alert to the danger of being too staunch in support of Burr. 
James Madison recalled: "It was with much difficulty that a unanimous vote 
could be obtained in the Virginia College of Electors for both lest an equality 
might throw the choice into the House of Reps, or otherwise endanger the known 
object of the people. J. Madison had received assurances from a confidential 
friend of Burr that in a certain quarter votes would be thrown from B. with a 
view to secure a majority for Jefferson. This authority alone with the persuasive 
language of the other electors overcame the anxiety of Mr. Wythe, whose 
devoted regard for Mr. Jefferson made him nearly inflexible." Douglass Adair, 
ed., "James Madison's Autobiography," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 
2 (1945): 206. 
40 St. George Tucker to John Page, Williamsburg, 7 Feb. 1801, Tucker-
Coleman Papers; Monroe to Jefferson, Richmond, 6 Jan. 1801, in Hamilton, ed .. 
Monroe's Writings, 2: 253-55. 
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The Virginia Republicans were certain of one thing: if the 
Congress of the United States attempted to thwart the will of 
the people, either by electing Burr instead of Jefferson or by 
arranging for a Federalist to retain the presidency, they were 
prepared to secede from the union. These sentiments were 
not confined to a few radical Republicans. Party leaders in 
positions of political power-men like Monroe, St. George 
Tucker, and Philip Norborne Nicholas-had stated their de-
termination to see the union dissolved if Jefferson were not 
elected.H 
Fortunately for Virginians, and the union, the House of 
Representatives, on February 17, 1801, elected Jefferson on the 
thirty-sixth ballot. Federalist James Bayard, the lone representa-
tive from the state of Delaware, made the election possible by 
changing his vote from Burr to Jefferson at the last minute. 
Whether Jefferson, or the Republican floor leader in the House 
of Representatives, Samuel Smith, made concessions to Bayard 
on subjects concerning future appointments and policy in order 
to persuade him to change his vote has long been a source of 
contention among historians. Circumstantial evidence indicates 
that one of the two Republican leaders did make promises to 
the Delaware representative, but there is no written evidence 
to corroborate any story of a bargain between Jefferson and 
Bayard.42 In any case, the citizens of Virginia were jubilant at 
Jefferson's election. The Republican victory represented for 
them the salvation of the union. 
41 Ibid.; St. George Tucker to John Page, Williamsburg, 7 Feb. 1801, Tucker-
Coleman Papers; Philip Norborne Nicholas to A. Stuart, Richmond, 17 Feb. 
180 I, Archibald Stuart Papers. 
42 Malone, .Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, p. 505, offers what is 
probably the best explanation. While Jefferson himself did not make any specific 
promises to Bayard, Samuel Smith of Maryland undoubtedly made some vague 
promises that Jefferson would not take any drastic steps to undo the work of 
previous administrations. 
CHAPTER NINE 
Virginia and the Revolution 
of 1800 
JEFFERSON AND REPUBLICANISM had triumphed. Joseph C. 
Cabell commented: "It is the triumph of principles & not the 
triumph of men which now causes the heart to vibrate with 
joy & the eye to swim in tears of delight .... The men who 
would make this country a scene of tyranny and ruin are now 
giving place to those who wish to keep us in peace to share our 
treasure & to administer our government upon the purest 
principles of republican liberty."1 But what did this triumph 
mean for Virginians and how was it to affect their state's 
internal polity and its relations with the federal government? 
Jefferson's election signified a return to the nonpartisan, 
gentlemanly style of Virginia politics. Yet the importance of 
this should not be overemphasized, for Virginia, even during 
the years when opposition to the Federalist administration 
was greatest, never fully abandoned her traditional patterns of 
political behavior. Even in the election of 1800, most counties 
continued to pay deference to the gentlemen-politicians who 
had so long ruled their affairs. Virginia, during the 1790s, had 
experienced some changes. The use of county meetings to make 
direct appeals to the people, the growing political awareness 
of the citizens living in urban areas such as Richmond, Norfolk, 
and Alexandria, and the beginnings of centralized party orga-
nizations in the election of 1800-these seemed to signal the 
arrival of a new era in Virginia politics.2 But Jefferson's victory 
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sounded the knell for the two-party system in Virginia. The 
Federalist General Committee, organized in 1800 to promote 
John Adams's candidacy, was disbanded immediately after the 
election, never to be revived. Never again would the Federalist 
party in Virginia attempt to stake out an official position on 
the important issues of the time. While Federalists in other 
states continued to denounce the Republicans as anarchists and 
atheists, the Federalists in Virginia quietly returned to their 
nonpolitical duties. These Federalists continued to be elected 
to statewide offices, and in some cases to Congress, but this 
occurred only when the prestige of such a candidate was 
powerful enough to surmount the handicap imposed by his 
party affiliation or when the particular regional interests of the 
district he represented happened to be at odds with the policies 
of the Republican administration.3 
When Federalism declined as a political force in Virginia, 
so too did the slow trend toward democratization of the political 
system. Twenty-five percent of Virginia's free adult white males 
voted in the election of 1800. Although this figure may seem 
low in light of the fact that 85 to 90 percent could have voted 
had they desired to do so, it was nevertheless a considerably 
higher percentage than in any previous congressional or pres-
idential election in the state.4 If the Federalist organization had 
not folded, that percentage might have continued to rise. In-
1 Joseph C. Cabell to his father, Williamsburg, 5 March 1801, Cabell Family 
Papers. 
2 Ironically, the Republican gentry in the counties, whose primary aim had 
been to resist innovation in the political structure of their state, unintentionally 
initiated changes that they had not foreseen. In their opposition to the general 
government, they were forced to formulate strategies and policies which would 
have drastically changed the nature of local politics. Their support of the 
General Ticket Law, for example, was in direct contradiction to their long 
fight against consolidation. 
3 David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The 
Federalist Party in the Era of jeffersonian Democracy (New York, 1965), argues 
that the Federalist party throughout the nation as a whole was much more 
active in the decades following Jefferson's election than most historians have 
previously believed. Jt seems safe to assume, judging from the dearth of evidence 
in Fischer's book attesting to the vitality of Virginia Federalism, that the "sup-
porters of government" in Virginia were a major exception. 
4 Brown and Brown, Virginia: Democracy or Aristocracy? pp. 125-46; .J. R. Pole, 
"Representation and Authority in Virginia," p. 49. 
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stead, Virginia's citizens entrusted their political power to the 
Republican gentrymen who had traditionally guided their 
affairs, and voter participation in subsequent elections dropped 
sharply. In 1804 only 11 percent of those eligible voted in 
the presidential election. This figure rose to 17 and 18 percent 
in the elections of 1808 and 1812, primarily because of the 
competition from within the Republican party by the tertium 
quids. It was only a momentary increase, and by 1820 voter 
participation among free adult white males had dropped to a 
mere 3 percent.5 
A New Englander, traveling through Virginia in 1804, noted 
the striking contradiction between the rhetoric and reality of 
Jeffersonian democracy: 
Though we hear so much about democracy from this quarter, 
the State approaches nearer a pure aristocracy than any other 
state in the union. The great landholders are Lords; and their 
tenants, as decidedly as their negroes, are slaves. They are 
amused, indeed, with incantations of republicanism liberty and 
equality, whereas in truth, their public affairs are in an absolute 
monopoly by the rich. The poor have, unquestionably, the 
liberty to quarrel about the support of a patron at an election, 
but as to equality, it no more exists here than it does in the 
French, English, or Turkish Dominions.6 
Nor did political practice seem to change much in the half-
century that followed. John S. Wise, reminiscing about the 
manners and customs of Virginia during antebellum days, 
described a congressional election held in 1855 that could well 
have taken place in the eighteenth century: 
voting was done openly, or viva voce, as it was called, and not 
by ballot. The election judges, who were magistrates, sat upon 
a bench with their clerks before them. When practicable it was 
customary for the candidate to be present in person, and to 
occupy a seat at the side of the judges. As the voter appeared, 
a Pole, "Representation and Authority in Virginia," p. 49. 
6 William Eaton to Col. Alexander Sessions, Hampton, 24 June 1804, in Louis 
B. Wright, ed., "William Eaton Takes a Dismal View of Virginia," William and 
Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 5 (1948): 106. 
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his name was called out in a loud voice. The judges inquired, 
"John Jones (or Bill Smith), for whom, do you vote?" ... He 
replied by proclaiming the name of his favorite. The clerks 
enrolled the vote, and the judges announced it as enrolled. The 
representative of the candidate for whom he voted arose, 
bowed, and thanked him aloud; and his partisans often 
applauded.7 
This scene took place fifty-five years after the triumph of 
Jeffersonian democracy. It is no wonder that V. 0. Key, in his 
study of Southern Politics) described Virginia as "a political 
museum piece."8 
The return to the old style of politics did not of course 
signify an end to political disagreement in the Old Dominion. 
Issues that had always caused divisions within the ruling elite-
constitutional reform, establishment of new counties, and legis-
lation affecting the slave population-continued to divide indi-
viduals and regions in Virginia in much the same way as they 
had before 1801. And some regions, such as the extreme west, 
could still be counted on to give their support to Federalist 
proposals in Congress.9 But the lessening of competition be-
tween the two parties would make it easier for members of the 
ruling elite to settle their differences among themselves, without 
the necessity of appealing to the people for support. And the 
decisions in those disputes would most often go to those who 
thought it "safer to remain as we are rather than risk a reform 
which may be more defective." 
Not until 1829 did a majority of the ruling oligarchy agree 
to call a convention to consider amending the state constitution, 
and even then their commitment to constitutional revision 
was minimal at best. Many of the members of the Virginia 
Constitutional Convention of 1829 had been in the fore of the 
Republican movement in 1800, and not surprisingly they 
7 John S. Wise, The End of an Era (Boston, 1900), pp. 55·56. 
8 V. 0. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, 1949), p. 19. 
9 For the persistence of local political divisions in Virginia see Hall, "A 
Quantitative Approach to ... Virginia." Risjord, "The Virginia Federalists," pp. 
486·517, is the best account of the continuation of Federalist·Republican divisions 
after 1801. 
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showed the same disinclination to alter Virginia's internal 
political structure as they had in the 1790s. The 1829 Conven-
tion liberalized, but did not eliminate, the freehold qualification 
for voters. It refused to consider changing the basis for 
apportioning representation in the lower house, despite protests 
from the western delegates that the present system was inequi-
table.10 In general, the proceedings of the Convention illus-
trated the unwillingness of Virginia's ruling oligarchy to do 
anything which might diminish their political power. 
The county government, the backbone of Virginia's political 
system, remained alert to thwart any attempt at innovation. 
Nowhere is the essential conservatism of Virginia political life 
more clearly displayed than in the attitude of the county 
governments toward free, public education. In 1796, the Gen-
eral Assembly passed a long overdue act to establish a public 
school system. It placed responsibility for laying out the 
school districts and for expenses of the schools with the indi-
vidual counties. Thirteen years later, in 1809, Governor John 
Tyler complained to the legislature that not one single county 
had put the public school law into operation. He lamented 
that "an enlightened stranger, if he were making a tour thro' 
the states, [would] readily conclude that in the general passion 
for war which pervades the civilized world, we had, for want 
of an enemy at our gates, declared an exterminating war against 
the arts and sciences."11 It was not until 1845 that the state 
government established a system of public education; in the 
meantime the rich and the well-born were educated at private 
academies, while the remainder of the population taught them-
selves or remained illiterate.12 It is not surprising that Vir-
ginians protested against federal taxes for the maintenance 
of defense or payment of the public debt when they would 
not even tax themselves for the education of their children. 
10 See David L. Pulliam, The Constitutional Conventions of Virginia from the 
foundation of the Commonwealth to the Present Time (Richmond, 1901), pp. 
63-70_ 
1l Shepherd, Statutes at Large, 2: 3-5; Governor Tyler to the Speaker of the 
House of Delegates, 4 Dec. 1809, Cabell Family Papers. 
12 Porter, County Government in Virginia, p. 222. 
The Old Dominion 
Many Virginia Republicans hoped that Jefferson's election, 
in addition to restoring calm to their internal political affairs, 
would work revolutionary changes in the conduct and structure 
of the federal government. They would be disappointed. To 
be sure, Jefferson would rely less on Great Britain and would 
continue the policy, begun by Adams during his last year in 
office, of seeking a rapprochement with France. He would also 
use his power of patronage to replace Federalist cabinet mem-
bers with Republicans who would take a more sympathetic 
view of the interests of the agrarian South. This would not 
satisfy the Antifederalists, who composed a majority of the 
Republican party in Virginia. They desired not only a change 
in personnel but also a radical alteration of the structure of 
the federal government. John Taylor was the most vocal and 
articulate champion of the Antifederalist position. He was con-
vinced that the United States Constitution, as it stood, did not 
allow for a true division of sovereignty. As a consequence, the 
American form of government was drifting toward that "pro-
duced by the English original-namely-concert and union 
among the three branches of government-influences-corrup-
tion-and force, so as to leave the people a nominal, but not a 
real influence over the measures of government."13 A mere 
change of men could not effect the desired reforms. "It ... 
might operate temporary public benefits, but they would cer-
tainly be transient, and constitutional error will still ultimately 
prevail. It would be only like the lucid intervals of a mad-
man."14 
Most Republicans in positions of political power did not give 
in to the Antifederalist demands for drastic changes in the 
structure of the general government. Wilson Cary Nicholas, 
who, with James Madison, was responsible for guiding the new 
president along a course of moderation, cautioned: "It depends 
very much upon the temper of the administration and the 
people of America for the next four years whether the present 
13 John Taylor to Harry Innes, Caroline County, 25 April 1799, Innes Papers, 
LC. 
14 John Taylor to James Monroe, Caroline County, 25 March 1798, in john P. 
Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College, 2 (1907): 269. 
Revolution of 1800 
parties in this country shall be entirely extinguished, or whether 
they shall be perpetuated until they produce all the mischiefs 
that have flown from the like excess in other countries, and 
either make us prey to some other country, engender a despotism 
in our own, or cause a separation of the states. 15 Nicholas 
suggested that through cautious use of executive patronage 
and by constant assurances that federal policy would not be 
radically changed, Jefferson could mitigate many of the ani-
mosities that had been engendered over the past decade. This 
was precisely the course that the new president followed, even 
though it meant risking harmony within the Republican party. 
The position of the moderate Republicans was precarious. 
They had joined the Republican party not because they quar-
reled with the principles upon which the federal government 
was founded, but because they opposed the particular policies 
of Alexander Hamilton. They had worked with the Anti-
federalists, and had even used the rhetoric of Antifederalism, 
in order to wage an effective fight against a common enemy. 
But this was an alliance of expediency. When the moderate 
Republicans gained control of the federal government in 1800, 
they found themselves flanked by extremists. Because the 
moderates had borrowed the language of Antifederalism in 
their assault on Hamiltonian policy, the Federalists viewed 
them as wild-eyed radicals bent on destroying the central 
government. The Antifederalist wing of the party, believing 
they had converted the moderates to their point of view, 
expected them to take precisely d-iose drastic steps the Fed-
eralists so feared. 
Jefferson's term in office would help allay, but not eliminate, 
the fears of the Federalists. It would partially satisfy, but not 
fulfill, the hopes of the old Antifederalists. Jefferson would 
change the. style of the federal government, but not its sub-
stance. Virginians would feel more comfortable with Jefferson 
in the executive mansion, but their battle against consolidation 
and domination by the general government had not ended. 
15 W. C. Nicholas to James Madison, 1801, Carter-Smith Papers, University of. 
Virginia. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Leadership of the House of 
Delegates, 1788-1800 
Name and County 
Robert Andrews 
(Williamsburg) 
Carter Braxton* 
(King William) 
Samuel Jordan Cabell 
(Amherst) 
William Cabell* 
(Amherst) 
William 0. Callis 
(Louisa) 
Occupation 
Minister 
Planter 
Planter 
Planter 
Planter 
Property 
1 house in town 
2 lots in town 
8 Negroes 
2 horses 
8,508 acres 
91 Negroes 
75 horses 
1,444 acres 
38 Negroes 
24 horses 
15,237 acres 
· 93 Negroes 
20 horses 
5,330 acres 
16 Negroes 
12 horses 
• The individuals listed here were selected on the basis of an analysis of their 
service on the important standing and special committees of the House of Dele-
gates. The real and personal property holdings of those men with the asterisk 
following their names were taken from Jackson T. Main, "The One Hundred," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 10 (1954): 368-83. The real and personal 
property holdings of all others were found in the Real and Personal Property 
Tax Lists, 1795, VSL. 
250 The Old Dominion 
Name and County Occupation Property 
Wilson Miles Cary* Planter 11,426 acres 
(Elizabeth City) 286 Negroes 
72 horses 
Francis Corbin Planter 4,194 acres 
(Middlesex) 119 Negroes 
9 horses 
Joseph Eggleston Planter 1,895 acres 
(Amelia) 56 Negroes 
26 horses 
Thomas Evans Lawyer 556 acres 
(Accomac) 7 Negroes 
6 horses 
William Foushee Physician 1,344 acres 
(Henrico) 2 lots in town 
6 Negroes 
3 horses 
William Branch Giles Lawyer 400 acres 
(Amelia) · 23 Negroes 
10 horses 
John Guerrant Planter 491 acres 
(Goochland) 12 Negroes 
7 horses 
Benjamin Harrison* Planter 21,266 acres 
(Charles City) 2Y:! lots, 1 house 
304 Negroes 
109 horses 
Collier Harrison Planter 3,512 acres 
(Charles City) 67 Negroes 
21 horses 
Patrick Henry* Planter 22,190Y:! acres 
(Prince Edward) 66 Negroes 
38 horses 
Leadership 25I 
Name and County Occupation Property 
Zachariah Johnston Planter 607 acres 
(Augusta) 11 Negroes 
24 horses 
Miles King Physician 1,303 acres 
(Elizabeth City) 40 Negroes 
19 horses 
Henry Lee• Planter 4,626 acres 
(Westmoreland) 97 Negroes 
13 horses 
Richard Lee Planter 6,103 acres 
(Westmoreland) 138 Negroes 
17 horses 
Richard Bland Lee Planter 4,098 acres 
(Westmoreland) 16 Negroes 
2 horses 
Thomas Madison Planter 3,326 acres 
(Botetourt) 50 Negroes 
20 horses 
John Marshall Lawyer (land books destroyed-
(Henrico) owned at least 4,000 
acres) 
9 Negroes 
4 horses 
Thomas Mathews Merchant 1lot in town 
(Norfolk) 3 Negroes 
I horse 
Wilson Cary Nicholas• Planter 7,100 acres 
(Albemarle) 62 Negroes 
22 horses 
John Page* Planter 6,015 acres 
(Gloucester) 234 Negroes 
47 horses 
252 The Old Dominion 
Name and County Occupation Property 
Edmund Randolph* Lawyer 7,463 acres 
(Williamsburg) 101 Negroes 
19 horses 
Larkin Smith Planter 1,087 acres 
(King and Queen) 7 Negroes 
4 horses 
French Strother Planter 1,310 acres 
(Culpeper) 22 Negroes 
12 horses 
'William Tate Planter 346 acres 
(Washington) 2 Negroes 
7 horses 
George K. Taylor Lawyer 130 acres 
(Prince George) 2 horses 
John Taylor* Planter 12,907 acres 
(Caroline) 47 Negroes 
9 horses 
Nathaniel Wilkinson Planter 1,685 acres 
(Henrico) 8 Negroes 
3 horses 
John Wise Lawyer 1 lot in town 
(Accomac) I Negro 
I horse 
APPENDIX TWO 
Party Divisions zn the 
House of Delegates~ 
1788-1790 
Antifederalist Bloc 
N arne and County Occupation Property 
John Trigg Planter 363 acres 
(Bedford) 15 Negroes 
2 horses 
Notley Conn No record 
(Bourbon) 
Binns Jones Planter 732 acres 
(Brunswick) 13 Negroes 
6 horses 
Anthony New Lawyer 566 acres 
(Caroline) 11 Negroes 
5 horses 
* The real and personal property holdings of those men with the asterisk 
following their names were taken from Jackson T. Main, "The One Hundred," 
pp. 368-83. The holdings of those with the double asterisk were taken from 
Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution 
(Chicago, 1958), pp. 269-81. The holdings of all others were found in the Real 
and Personal Property Tax Lists, 1795, VSL. It is likely that the holdings of 
many of the men listed here were actually much larger; the figures given here 
account only for their holdings within the county in which they resided. 
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Name and County Occupation Property 
Benjamin Harrison Planter 7,225 acres 
(Charles City) 64 Negroes 
25 horses 
Matthew Cheatham Planter 400 acres 
(Chesterfield) 12 Negroes 
5 horses 
George Markham No record 
(Chesterfield) 
French Strother Planter l,IOO acres 
(Culpeper) 22 Negroes 
I2 horses 
John Woodson Planter 388 acres 
(Cumberland) I4 Negroes 
IO horses 
Robert Bolling Merchant 2,860 acres 
(Dinwiddie) I3 Negroes 
lO horses 
George Booker Planter 400 acres 
(Elizabeth City) 30 Negroes 
II horses 
James Upshaw, Jr. Planter 599~ acres 
(Essex) I6 Negroes 
7 horses 
Joshua Rentfro Planter 400 acres 
(Franklin) I2 Negroes 
8 horses 
John Guerrant Planter 491 acres 
(Goochland) 12 Negroes 
7 horses 
Batte Peterson Planter 2,457 acres 
(Greensville) 
Party Divisions 255 
Name and County Occupation Property 
Miles Selden Planter 721 acres 
(Henrico) 31 Negroes 
16 horses 
Thomas Cooper** Planter 1,163 acres 
(Henry) 7 Negroes 
II horses 
Benjamin Eley Planter 330 acres 
(Isle of Wight) 12 Negroes 
3 horses 
Francis Boy kin Planter 440 acres 
(Isle of Wight) 13 Negroes 
3 horses 
John Roane Planter 1,000 acres 
(King William) 19 Negroes 
8 horses 
Richard Kennon Planter 1,094 acres 
(Mecklenburg) 46 Negroes 
29 horses 
Willis Riddick Planter 4,500 acres 
(Nansemond) 
Henry Guy Planter 493 acres 
(Northampton) 10 Negroes 
5 horses 
Benjamin Lankford Planter 400 acres 
(Pittsylvania) 8 Negroes 
3 horses 
Tarlton Woodson Planter 1,248 acres 
(Prince Edward) II Negroes 
IO horses 
Patrick Henry* Lawyer 22,I90V2 acres 
(Prince Edward) 66 Negroes 
38 horses 
256 The Old Dominion 
Name and County Occupation Property 
Andrew Buchanan Planter 423 acres 
(Stafford) 9 Negroes 
4 horses 
Thomas Edmunds Planter 3,979 acres 
(Sussex) 32 Negroes 
10 horses 
Samuel Edmiston Planter 400 acres 
(Washington) 5 Negroes 
5 horses 
Robert Sheild Planter 570 acres 
(York) 17 Negroes 
6 horses 
William Nelson Lawyer 8 Negroes 
(York) 
Federalist Bloc 
Zachariah Johnston Planter 607 acres 
(Augusta) II Negroes 
24 horses 
Francis Walker Planter & 6,300 acres 
(Albemarle) Merchant 45 Negroes 
10 horses 
Joseph Swearingen No record 
(Berkeley) 
James Ball Planter 1,077 acres 
(Lancaster) 26 Negroes 
6 horses 
Ralph Wormley* Planter 15,707 acres 
(Middlesex) 325 Negroes 
74 horses 
John Stringer Planter 408 acres 
(Northampton) l horse 
Party Divisions 257 
N arne and County Occupation Property 
Walker Tomlin** Planter 274 acres 
(Richmond) 60 Negroes 
7 horses 
George Baxter Lawyer 1,196 acres 
(Rockingham) 3 Negroes 
8 horses 
Francis Kirtley Planter 394 acres 
(Rockingham) 21 Negroes 
12 horses 
John Allen Planter 2,200 acres 
(Surry) 49 Negroes 
19 horses 
1794-1796 
Repubican Bloc 
\Vilson Cary Nicholas* Planter 7,100 acres 
(Albemarle) 62 Negroes 
22 horses 
Joseph Eggleston Planter 1,000 acres 
(Amelia) 56 Negroes 
26 horses 
.Joshua Chaffin Planter 353 acres 
(Amelia) 16 Negroes 
8 horses 
John White Planter 106 acres 
(Bath) 2 horses 
Thomas Madison Planter 3,326 acres 
(Botetourt) 50 Negroes 
20 horses 
Thomas Washington Planter 704 acres 
(Brunswick) 18 Negroes 
9 horses 
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Name and County Occupation Property 
Collier Harrison Planter 3,512 acres 
(Charles City) 67 Negroes 
21 horses 
Matthew Cheatham Planter 400 acres 
(Chesterfield) 12 Negroes 
5 horses 
Philip Thompson Planter 1,149 acres 
(Culpeper) 15 Negroes 
11 horses 
John Hatcher Planter 126 acres 
(Cumberland) 6 Negroes 
3 horses 
Anderson Cocke Planter 400 acres 
(Cumberland) 9 Negroes 
7 horses 
Alexander McRae Lawyer 
(Dinwiddie) 
Augustine Jennings Planter 200 acres 
(Fauquier) 6 Negroes 
4 horses 
Joseph Hadden Planter I,099 acres 
(Fluvanna) 8 Negroes 
3 horses 
Thomas Miller Planter 828 acres 
(Goochland) 28 Negroes 
18 horses 
John Guerrant Planter 491 acres 
(Goochland) I2 Negroes 
7 horses 
Joseph Wilkins Planter I,IOO acres 
(Greensville) II Negroes 
II horses 
Party Divisions 259 
N arne and County Occupation Property 
1 ohn Goodwyn Planter 890 acres 
(Greensville) 12 Negroes 
5 horses 
1 oseph Martin Merchant & 810 acres 
(Henry) Planter 14 Negroes 
15 horses 
Martin Shearman Planter 332 acres 
(Lancaster) 8 Negroes 
4 horses 
Peter Garland Planter 446 acres 
(Lunenburg) 6 Negroes 
2 horses 
Holder Hudgins Planter 1,075 acres 
(Mathews) 27 Negroes 
7 horses 
Thomas Smith Planter 252 acres 
(Mathews) 40 Negroes 
11 horses 
Will is Riddick Planter '1,500 acres 
(Nansemond) 
William Chamberlayne Merchant 414 acres 
(New Kent) 20 Negroes 
8 horses 
1 ohn Quarles Merchant Y2lot 
(Norfolk) 3 Negroes 
Charles Wells Planter 1,690 acres 
(Ohio) 
Isaac Davis Planter 527 acres 
(Orange) 12 Negroes 
14 horses 
William Mosely Lawyer 925 acres 
(Powhatan) 14 Negroes 
9 horses 
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Name and County Occupation Property 
George K. Taylor Lawyer 130 acres 
(Prince George) 2 horses 
William Dulaney Planter 266 acres 
(Shenandoah) I Negro 
I horse 
James Wilkinson Planter 366 acres 
(Southampton) 18 Negroes 
12 horses 
John Willis Merchant 50 acres 
(Spotsylvania) 18 Negroes 
7 horses 
Nathaniel Fox Planter 200 acres 
(Stafford) 9 Negroes 
6 horses 
William Boyce Planter 305Y2 acres 
(Surry) 5 Negroes 
5 horses 
N icho1as Faulcon Planter 604 acres 
(Surry) 1lot 
14 Negroes 
8 horses 
William Massenburg Planter 535 acres 
(Sussex) 17 Negroes 
7 horses 
Federalist Bloc 
Thomas Evans Lawyer 556 acres 
(Accomac) 7 Negroes 
6 horses 
Joseph Burrus Planter 818 acres 
(Amherst) 15 Negroes 
8 horses 
Party Divisions 261 
N arne and County Occupation Property 
Samuel Hancock Planter 677 acres 
(Bedford) 8 Negroes 
5 horses 
Miles King Physician 1,303 acres 
(Elizabeth City) 40 Negroes 
19 horses 
William Cavendish Planter 
(Greenbrier) 
John Hutcheson No record 6 horses 
(Greenbrier) 
Isaac Parsons No record 
(Hampshire) 
Thomas Tinsley Planter & 57 acres 
(Hanover) Merchant llot 
15 Negroes 
6 horses 
.James Machir Lawyer 
(Hardy) 3 Negroes 
l horse 
.John Pierce Planter 731 acres 
(James City) 13 Negroes 
3 horses 
Charles Stuart Planter 732 acres 
(King George) 25 Negroes 
8 horses 
William Claiborne Planter 939Y2 acres 
(King William) 28 Negroes 
18 horses 
Peter Hull No record 
(Pendleton) 
William Bentley Planter 600 acres 
(Powhatan) 12 Negroes 
9 horses 
262 The Old Dominion 
Name and County Occupation Property 
William Nimmo Merchant 476 acres 
(Princess Anne) 3 lots 
5 Negroes 
3 horses 
.John Bowyer Planter 1,733 acres 
(Rockbridge) 19 Negroes 
23 horses 
Robert Andrews Minister 1 house 
(Williamsburg) 2lots 
8 Negroes 
2 horses 
1797-1800 
Republican Bloc 
Francis Walker Planter & 6,300 acres 
(Albemarle) Merchant 45 Negroes 
10 horses 
Wilson Cary Nicholas* Planter 7,100 acres 
(Albemarle) 62 Negroes 
22 horses 
.Joshua Chaffin Planter 353 acres 
(Amelia) 16 Negroes 
8 horses 
James Fletcher Planter 344 acres 
(Brunswick) 7 Negroes 
5 horses 
William Ruffin Planter 1,887 acres 
(Brunswick) 17 Negroes 
George Buckner Planter 718 acres 
(Caroline) 10 Negroes 
Party Divisions 26J 
Name and County Occupation Property 
John Taylor* Planter 12,907 acres 
(Caroline) 47 Negroes 
9 horses 
Samuel Tyler Lawyer 75 acres 
(Charles City) 17 Negroes 
15 horses 
Thomas A. Taylor Planter 557 acres 
(Chesterfield) 6 Negroes 
4 horses 
Matthew Cheatham Planter 400 acres 
(Chesterfield) 12 Negroes 
5 horses 
John Roberts Planter 523 acres 
(Culpeper) 5 Negroes 
10 horses 
Peterson Goodwyn Lawyer 1,837 acres 
(Dinwiddie) 45 Negroes 
25 horses 
John Pegram Planter 600 acres 
(Dinwiddie) 15 Negroes 
4 horses 
George Booker Planter 400 acres 
(Elizabeth City) 30 Negroes 
11 horses 
Joseph Hadden Planter 1,099 acres 
(Fluvanna) 8 Negroes 
3 horses 
James Payne No record 
(Fluvanna) 3 Negroes 
2 horses 
William Hall Planter 460 acres 
(Gloucester) I4 Negroes 
4 horses 
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Name and County Occupation Property 
James Pleasants Lawyer 100 acres 
(Goochland) 4 Negroes 
3 horses 
Greenberry McKenzie Planter 405 acres 
(Grayson) 2 horses 
Thomas Starke No record 235 acres 
(Hanover) 7 Negroes 
4 horses 
William Price Planter 3,172 acres 
(Henrico) 16 Negroes 
6 horses 
Miles Selden Planter 721 acres 
(Henrico) 31 Negroes 
16 horses 
Joseph Martin Planter 810 acres 
(Henry) 14 Negroes 
15 horses 
.John Redd Planter 1,103 acres 
(Henry) 10 Negroes 
14 horses 
William 0. Callis Planter 5,330 acres 
(Louisa) 16 Negroes 
12 horses 
Francis Eppes Planter & 100 acres 
(Lunenburg) Lawyer 14 Negroes 
11 horses 
Henry Hill Planter 1,064 acres 
(Madison) 22 Negroes 
11 horses 
.Josiah Riddick Planter 575 acres 
(Nansemond) 
Party Divisions 265 
Name and County Occupation Property 
William Claughton Planter 422:y2 acres 
(Northumberland) II Negroes 
6 horses 
William Mosely Lawyer 925 acres 
(Powhatan) 14 Negroes 
9 horses 
Richard Barnes Planter 1,016 acres 
(Richmond) 20 Negroes 
6 horses 
William Dulaney Merchant 267 acres 
(Shenandoah) 1 Negro 
l horse 
John Gatewood No record 
(Shenandoah) 
John Mercer No record 
(Spotsylvania) 
Nathaniel Fox Merchant 200 acres 
(Stafford) 9 Negroes 
6 horses 
Samuel Meek Planter 460 acres 
(Washington) 3 Negroes 
6 horses 
Samuel Shields Minister 1,106 acres 
(York) 33 Negroes 
6 horses 
William Foushee Physician 1,344 acres 
(Richmond) llot in town 
6 Negroes 
3 horses 
James Johnson Lawyer 300 acres 
(Isle of Wight) 3 Negroes 
3 horses 
266 The Old Dominion 
Federalist Bloc 
Name and County Occupation Property 
Andrew Anderson Planter 540 acres 
(Augusta) 6 Negroes 
9 horses 
James Breckinridge Lawyer 520 acres 
(Botetourt) 8 Negroes 
2 horses 
John Miller Planter 1,343 acres 
(Botetourt) 6 Negroes 
3 horses 
Archibald Magill Lawyer 239 acres 
(Frederick) 4 Negroes 
5 horses 
William Cavendish No record 
(Greenbrier) 12 horses 
Jacob Fisher No record 2 Negroes 
(Hardy) 8 horses 
Christian Simons No record 
(Hardy) 5 horses 
William Morris Planter 400 acres 
(Kanawha) 1 horse 
Robert Pollard Merchant 772 acres 
(King William) 20 Negroes 
5 horses 
John Evans Planter 
(Monongalia) 4 Negroes 
4 horses 
John Upshur Planter 1,213 acres 
(Northampton) 16 Negroes 
5 horses 
Party Divisions 267 
N arne and County Occupation Property 
James Cureton Planter 1,279 acres 
(Prince George) 18 Negroes 
8 horses 
George K. Taylor Lawyer 130 acres 
(Prince George) 2 horses 
Thomas Griffin Physician 100 acres 
(York) 11 Negroes 
APPENDIX THREE 
Local Interest Groups zn the 
House of Delegates, 
1788-1790* 
Group A 
Name and County Region Political Affiliation 
Binns Jones (Brunswick) East Antifederalist 
Anthony New (Caroline) West Antifederalist 
Henry Southall (Charles City) East Antifederalist 
Robert Bolling (Dinwiddie) East Antifederalist 
George Booker (Elizabeth City) East An tifederalis t 
James Upshaw (Essex) East Antifederalist 
Batte Peterson (Greensville) East Anti federalist 
Miles Selden (Henrico) East Antifederalist 
Francis Boykin (Isle of Wight) East Antifederalist 
Ralph Wormley (Middlesex) East Federalist 
Tarlton Woodson (Prince Edward) West An tifederalis t 
• This appendix is based on an analysis of the voting behavior, on local issues, 
of the fifty-four delegates serving all three terms in the lower house during the 
years 1788-1790. All roll call votes, except those pertaining to national issues and 
those of a strictly procedural nature, were examined. Although the two groups 
listed below suggest a pronounced east-west division within the state, the small 
number of men aligned with each group indicates that this factor should not be 
overemphasized. 
Local Interest Groups 
Name and County 
John Allen (Surry) 
Thomas Edmunds (Sussex) 
William Nelson (York) 
Region 
East 
East 
East 
Group B 
John Trigg (Bedford) West 
Notley Conn (Bourbon) West 
John Clarke (Campbell) 'West 
Matthew Cheatham (Chesterfield) East 
George Markham (Chesterfield) East 
French Strother (Culpeper) West 
John Guerrant (Goochland) West 
Thomas Cooper (Henry) West 
Richard Kennon (Mecklenburg) \Vest 
Willis Riddick (Nansemond) East 
Hardin Burnley (Orange) West 
Benjamin Lankford (Pittsylvania) \Vest 
William McKee (Rockbridge) ~West 
Thomas Carter (Russell) West 
Samuel Edmiston (Washington) West 
Political Affiliation 
Federalist 
An tifederalis t 
Antifederalist 
Antifederalist 
Antifederalist 
Unaligned 
Antifederalist 
Antifederalist 
Antifederalist 
Antifederalist 
Antifederalist 
Antifederalist 
Antifederalist 
Unaligned 
Antifederalist 
Unaligned 
Unaligned 
Antifederalist 
Bibliographical Note 
IT IS SURPRISING, when one considers the important role that Vir-
ginia, and Virginians, played in the political struggles of the late 
eighteenth century, that there is so little secondary literature 
devoted exclusively to Virginia politics during the revolutionary 
and post-revolutionary years. H. J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in 
Virginia (Boston, 1916), and Freeman H. Hart, The Valley of 
Virginia in the American Revolution, 1763-1789 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 
1942) are the only two detailed accounts of the Revolution in 
Virginia and neither is entirely satisfactory. For the Confederation 
period one must rely on two doctoral dissertations, Augustus Low, 
"Virginia in the Critical Period, 1783-1789" (University of Iowa, 
1949), and Myra L. Rich, "The Experimental Years: Virginia, 1781-
1789 (Yale University, 1966), and one important article, Jackson T. 
Main, "Sections and Politics in Virginia, 1781-1787," William and 
Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 12 (1955): 96-112. Although all three 
make important contributions to our understanding of certain facets 
of Virginia politics during the Confederation, none provides an 
adequate synthesis of the period. Harry Ammon, "The Republican 
Party in Virginia, 1789-1824" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 
1948), "The Formation of the Republican Party in Virginia, 1789-
1796," journal of Southern History 19 (1953): 283-310, "The Jeffer-
sonian Republicans in Virginia," Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography 71 (1963): 153-67, and "Agricola vs. Aristedes: James 
Monroe, John Marshall and the Genet Affair in Virginia," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography 74 (1966): 312-20 are all impor-
tant contributions to our knowledge of Virginia during the years 
1788-1801. Ammon has directed his attention at Virginians in Con-
gress and has uncovered important material relating to the mechan-
ics of party organization at the national level. He does, however, 
tend to overlook the essentially chaotic state of party organization 
on the local level. Norman Risjord, "The Virginia Federalists," 
journal of Southern History 33 (1967): 486-517, has made a useful 
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contribution to our understanding of party development by showing 
the intimate connection between the factional divisions of the 
I 780s and the party divisions of the I 790s. 
More general studies of party development, particularly Noble 
Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of 
Party Organization) 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1957), and Lisle 
A. Rose, Prologue to Democracy: The Federalists in the South) 1789-
1801 (Lexington, Ky., 1968), seem to suffer from their tendency to 
assume that the mechanisms of national party organization actually 
worked the way they were supposed to when transferred to the state 
and county level. This focus on the formal mechanisms rather than 
the actual operation of the political system often obscures rather 
than illuminates our understanding of late eighteenth-century Vir-
ginia. Eugene P. Link, Democratic-Republican Societies) 1790-1800 
(New York, 1942), avoids the pitfalls of an approach based solely 
on national politics, but he too tends to overestimate the cohesive-
ness of party organization on the local level. 
Van Beck Hall, "A Quantitative Approach to the Social, Economic 
and Political Structure of Virginia, 1790-1810" (unpublished paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Historical Associa-
tion, 1969), is the only systematic approach to local politics in 
Virginia. Charles H. Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 
1861 (Chicago, 1915), is less helpful. 
Biographies of prominent Virginians, particularly Albert J. Bev-
eridge, The Life of John Marshall) 4 vols. (New York, 1916-1919), 
Irving Brant, ]ames Madison) 5 vo1s. (New York, 1941-1961), Dumas 
Malone, .Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty (Boston, 1962), and 
David John Mays, Edmund Pendleton) 1721-1803: A Biography) 2 
vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), provide some of the best commentary 
on Virginia during the first decade of government under the 
federal Constitution. Of lesser value are Dice Robins Anderson, 
William Branch Giles: A Study in the Politics of Virginia and the 
Nation from 1790 to 1830 (Menasha, Wis., 1914), Thomas Boyd, 
Light Horse Harry Lee (New York, 1931), Robert Douthat Meade, 
Patrick Henry) 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1957-1969), Eugene Mudge, 
The Social Philosophy of .John Taylor of Caroline: A Study of .Jeffer-
sonian Democracy (New York, 1939), and Kate Mason Rowland, 
The Life of George Mason (New York, 1892). 
Charles Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders: Political Practices in 
Washington)s Virginia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1952), stands in a class 
by itself. Sydnor has perhaps overlooked too many of the negative 
The Old Dominion 
features of the "county oligarchies," but his book remains the most 
intelligent analysis of Virginia political life written to date. 
The primary source material on eighteenth century Virginia, 
although voluminous, has some unfortunate gaps. The .Journal of 
the House of Delegates (Richmond, 1776- ) and the .Journal of 
the Senate (Richmond, 1776- ) together comprise the single most 
important source for reconstructing the basic framework of political 
activity in Virginia, but, unhappily, we have no records of debate 
in either the House of Delegates or the state senate. The Virginia 
Ratifying Convention and the important 1798 session of the House 
of Delegates are recorded in more detail. Debate on ratification 
of the Constitution can be found in Jonathon Elliot, The Debates 
in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1836), and a full record of 
the discussion in the House of Delegates on the Virginia Resolutions 
is printed in Resolutions of Virginia and Kentucky ... and Debates 
in the House of Delegates of Virginia (Richmond, 1832). Other 
published official records are W. W. Hening, The Statutes at Large: 
Being a Collection of the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of 
the Legislature in the Year 1619, 12 vols. (Richmond, 1823), Samuel 
Shepherd, Statutes at Large of Virginia, 1792-1806: Being a Con-
tinuation of Hening Statutes at Large, 3 vo1s. (Richmond, 1835-
1836), and William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers 
and Other Manuscripts Preserved in the Capitol at Richmond, 11 
vols. (Richmond, 1875). The Executive Communications to the 
General Assembly, Executive Correspondence, Executive Letter-
books, Legislative Petitions, and Rough Bills of the House of Dele-
gates, all in manuscript in the Virginia State Library, further fill in 
our picture of the operation of the state government. 
The published papers of the people involved in Virginia political 
life are of course an invaluable source for a study of this kind. 
Those that I found most helpful are Julian Boyd, ed., The Papers 
of Thomas jefferson, 17 vo1s. (Princeton, N.J., 1950- ), Paul 
Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings of Thomas jefferson, 12 vols. 
(New York, 1904-1905), John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of 
George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 174 5· 
1799, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1931-1944), Worthington C. Ford, 
ed., The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols. (New York, 
1889-1893), William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry: Life, Correspon-
dence, and Speeches, 3 vols. (New York, 1891), Gaillard Hunt, ed., 
The Writings of ]ames Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1900-1910). Stan-
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islaus M. Hamilton, ed., The Writings of ]ames Monroe, 7 vols. (New 
York, 1898-1903), Henry Cabot Lodge, The Works of Alexander 
Hamilton, 12 vols. (New York, 1912), James C. Ballagh, ed., The 
Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 2 vols. (New York, 1911-1914), and 
U.S., Department of State, Documentary History of the Constitution 
of the United States of America, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1894-
1905). 
The following manuscript collections were of particular impor-
tance: Breckinridge Family Papers, Harry Innes Papers, the Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson, Richard Bland Lee Papers, the Papers of 
James Madison, James McHenry Papers, Garret Minor Papers, 
Wilson Cary Nicholas Papers, and Henry Tazewell Papers (all in 
the Library of Congress); David Campbell Papers, John Clopton 
Papers, Joseph Jones Papers, and William and John Preston Papers 
(all at Duke University); Cabell Family Papers, Edgehill-Randolph 
Papers, Lee Family Papers, Wilson Cary Nicholas Papers, and 
Creed Taylor Papers (all at the University of Virginia); Real and 
Personal Property Tax Lists, Zachariah Johnston Papers, and Taze-
well Family Papers (all in the Virginia State Library); John Cropper 
Papers, Ludwell-Lee Papers, Preston Family Papers, Archibald 
Stuart Papers, and Stuart Family Papers (all at the Virginia His-
torical Society); Tucker-Coleman Papers (College of William and 
Mary). 
Newspapers are probably the most valuable source available to 
the historian of eighteenth-century Virginia. Although they still 
reflect the biases of the literate portion of the population, they at 
least are free of the legalistic tone set by the official records and 
their content is more representative than the writings of such highly 
atypical members of the Virginia elite as Jefferson, Madison, and 
Washington. I have relied most heavily on the [Alexandria] 
Columbian Mirror and Alexandria Advertiser, the [Richmond] 
Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser, the [Richmond] Exam-
iner, and the [Richmond] Virginia Federalist. Other newspapers of 
importance are [Alexandria] Virginia journal and Alexandria Ad-
vertiser, the [Dumfries, Va.] Republican journal, Fredericksburg 
Herald and General Advertiser, Norfolk and Portsmouth Chronicle, 
[Richmond] Virginia Gazette and Manchester Advertise, and [Rich-
mond] Virginia Gazette and Richmond Chronicle. 
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concerning assumption, 81; and 
Virginia Resolves, 200-201 
Page, John, 46, 57n, 135 
Page, Mann, 131, 144 
Parker, Josiah, 57n 
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change of opinion regarding Jay 
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meeting in 1797, 169; town meeting 
in 1798, 177; independence day 
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suffrage requirements, 33 
Sydnor, Charles, ix 
Tate, William, 46 
taxation: Virginians guard power over, 
12 
Taylor, George K.: on dangers of 
French influence, 192-93; candidate 
for elector, 223 
Taylor, John: House leader, 46: 
opposes funding and assumption, 70; 
links the Bank of the United States 
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denounces the Bank of the United 
States, 117; threatens disunion, 236 
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View of the Conduct of the Executive, 
174 
Virginia Convention of 1776, x 
Virginia Convention of 1788: debates 
federal Constitution, l-10; proposes 
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